THE SWORD WAS THEIR PASSPORT

By

HARRIS G. WARREN

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The SWORD *Was Their Passport*

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FILIBUSTERING IN THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

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

Excelentisimo Sor Dn Bernardo Gutierres, Gov.or del Estado
Texas, Presidente amparador del Soviano Provicional de dha. Nacion
General en Gefe del Exercito Republicano del Norte &c.a

Por quanto en la persona de D.n Miguel Menchaca
concurren las circunstancias de fidelidad, instruccion, firmeza, Valor,
Adhicion a la Justa Causa de la Independencia Mexicana, y demas
circs. q. ha hecho en su favor, he venido en nombrarlo, como de
hecho por el presente lo nombro por Coronel de Infantería quien
Dandole y haciendole guardar todos los fueros y privilegios, q. le son
concedidos, y que el Ministerio de la Jurisdiccion del Exto. como razon
de este despacho en la comandancia, y en ella en lo sucesivo actue
con el Sueldo que le es correspondiente segun el Reglamento de
primero de Mayo de mil ochocientos catorce del cual hace gozar
desde el dia de la fecha del Cumplase en este Despacho.

Doy el presente Vale
pues, y el sello gral. de el
Exercito en mi quartel gral
de S. Fernando de Bexar y mes
de Junio de mil ochocientos
catorce y tercero de mi Inde
pendencia.

José Bernardo Gutierrez

A FILIBUSTER'S COMMISSION ISSUED BY GUTIÉRREZ

This colonel's commission was issued to Miguel Menchaca at San Antonio on June 29, 1813, by José Bernardo Gutiérrez. The original is in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

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MADE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Preface

THE Old Southwest teemed with a choice array of adventurers during the period of the Mexican Revolution. They were men of all nations. Soldiers of fortune, vagabonds, revolutionary agents, spies, merchants, lawyers, pirates, and patriots rubbed shoulders on the frontiers. Privateers sailed from the principal ports of the United States to prey on commerce in the Gulf and in the Caribbean, and of these ports New Orleans was the favorite. From Kentucky and Tennessee, Louisiana and Mississippi, appeared scores of adventurous and unscrupulous men who were willing to embark on a cruise against Spanish vessels or to march into Texas against Spanish troops. "Liberty was their aim, and the sword their passport."

A filibustering expedition is an irregular, unauthorized attack which proceeds from the territory of one state against that of a friendly state. Once such an expedition merges with the armed forces opposed to the legal government of a friendly state, it ceases to be a filibustering movement. If, however, its organization remains intact and merely attracts recruits from among the rebels, it retains its filibustering character. Because of their clandestine nature, secrecy and deception characterize the formation of filibustering expeditions. Plots and intrigues are formed, disrupted, and formed again with bewildering profusion. The main actors, as John Quincy Adams remarked, cross and double-cross one another so frequently that suspicion and doubt hang like a black cloud over all of their actions. During the decade from 1812 to 1821 a series of these intrigues occurred in connection with the Mexican Revolution. They were formed chiefly in England and the United States; however, those in the latter country were more numerous and

more important because of the proximity of the United States to New Spain. Three serious invasions of New Spain took place and each was defeated, largely through the energy of General Joaquín de Arredondo, commanding general of the Eastern Interior Provinces of New Spain. A number of intrigues threatened Spanish sovereignty in New Spain and Florida, but only one actual invasion of the latter occurred.

These plots and expeditions are an important phase both of the history of Mexico and of the American Southwest. They have never been treated adequately in their entirety. Many scholars have paved the way with important research and some aspects of the filibustering period from 1812 to 1821 have been studied exhaustively. The present writer has endeavored to prepare a comprehensive treatment of the movement.

The materials for this study have come to a great extent from the remarkable collection of transcripts, or typescripts, in the Edward E. Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library in Chicago. Special acknowledgment is gratefully made to Mrs. Pierce Butler and Miss Barbara Boston of the Ayer Collection for their unfailing courtesy, interest, and assistance. The staffs of the Library of Congress and the National Archives were, as always, more than co-operative. Juan Villasana Haggard, translator of the Béxar Archives at the University of Texas, provided a calendar of materials relating to James Long. Mr. Stanley Faye, of Aurora, Illinois, generously allowed access to his voluminous notes and transcripts. Professor I. J. Cox, under whose guidance the first draft of this monograph was prepared as a doctoral dissertation at Northwestern University in 1937, placed his notes at my disposal and gave invaluable advice throughout the period of research. My wife, Katherine Fleischmann Warren, has assisted me in the collection of materials and was a constant source of inspiration.

Baton Rouge
December 4, 1942

HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN

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Chapter 1

Formation of the Gutiérrez-Magee Expedition

International Background

The fifty years between 1775 and 1825 were crowded with many extraordinary events and movements. It was a period of revolution, a time in which economic, social, and political changes threw the European world into turmoil. The long struggle between England and France for world supremacy was entering a final stage. The dispute between England and her American colonies precipitated a war fraught with momentous consequences. If French participation in that war assured success for the colonies, it also hastened the storm which engulfed all Europe in the French Revolution. And when the great Corsican adventurer picked up the crown of France after it had fallen from the nerveless grasp of the Bourbons, he changed the course of history.

Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian peninsula eventually resulted in his own destruction and in the creation of those independent states collectively known as the Latin-American republics. Freedom from Spanish domination was not a new dream in South America and New Spain when Napoleon's armies invaded the mother country in 1807, but the invasion resulted in translating dreams into action. The Spanish people formed governing committees, or juntas, to rule in the name of Ferdinand VII. This example was followed in the Americas, and for a time there was reason to hope that a new Spanish empire would be the outcome. But, when the self-constituted juntas of Spain attempted to enforce their will upon similar bodies in America, it was discovered

that the long-submerged Creoles had entirely different ideas. Spanish America was moving rapidly toward complete independence in 1810.

English statesmen toyed for many years with the idea of aiding insurrection in Spain's colonies. Their desire for unrestricted commercial relations with the colonies was a powerful—if not the principal—motive. Charles IV furnished another motive when he agreed to a humiliating alliance with France in 1795. Commercial advantages eventually gave way as an inducement when Napoleon's invasion resulted in placing Joseph on the throne and threatened to bring the resources of the Spanish colonies into the balance against England. The hopes of Spanish-American revolutionists, like the Venezuelan precursor Francisco de Miranda, for English aid were dispelled by the treaty between England and Spain in 1809.[1] Spain agreed not "to cede to France any part of the Territories or Possessions of the Spanish Monarchy, in any part of the World." England was bound to aid Spain against France and "not to acknowledge any other King of Spain and of the Indies . . . than His Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII, his Heirs, or such lawful Successor as the Spanish Nation shall acknowledge. . . ." [2] This alliance caused British statesmen to view the revolution in America with disfavor,[3] and when emissaries from Caracas arrived in England on July 10, 1810, they received nothing more tangible than an offer of mediation.[4] England's policy was to avoid action which would encourage the independence of Spanish America, and to aid the revolution only in case of French success in the Peninsula.[5]

[1] William Spence Robertson, *The Life of Miranda* (Chapel Hill, 1929), II, 34. See also M. Romero, "The United States and the Liberation of the Spanish-American Colonies," in *North American Review*, CLXV (1897), 72–73.

[2] *British and Foreign State Papers* (London, 1841——), Vol. I, Pt. 1, p. 670. The treaty was signed on January 14, 1809.

[3] J. Fred Rippy, *Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America (1808–1830)* (Baltimore, 1929), 2–3.

[4] Robertson, *The Life of Miranda*, II, 82–84.

[5] Liverpool to Layard, Downing Street, June 29, 1810, in *Bell's Weekly Messenger* (London), September 16, 1810, p. 291; *Annual Register* (London), LII (1810), 230.

Political leaders in the United States had little reason to favor the designs of either of the chief European combatants. Difficulties connected with neutral commerce, impressment, and the raw enthusiasm of people in the western states and territories were sufficiently serious to the United States without the additional threat of English championship of the Spanish cause. Occupation of West Florida by virtue of Madison's proclamation of October 27, 1810, caused Don Luis de Onís, the unrecognized Spanish envoy to the United States, to declare:

> All this is a Machiavellian plan proposed by Bonaparte to menace that important Kingdom [New Spain] and to work in agreement with this Government in order to disturb the peace of our Americas, and to compromise this country with Spain.[6]

But the Americans were not involved in a French intrigue against Spain. It was the danger from Spain's alliance with England,[7] combined with the possibility that Napoleon might occupy the Floridas as a result of his Spanish invasion, that prompted Madison's Florida policy. Jefferson pointed the way in 1809 when he instructed the archtraitor and conspirator General James Wilkinson and Governor William C. C. Claiborne to inform Spanish officials that the United States "would never acquiesce in British or French occupation of the Floridas."[8] Using the British machinations on the border as an excuse, John McKee and General George Mathews, both prominent figures on the southeastern frontier, were sent on a mission to encourage revolution in East Florida. Their activities resulted in the occupation of Amelia Island on March 18, 1812.[9]

The European situation exercised a constant influence on the

[6] Onís to the Viceroy of New Spain, Philadelphia, January 5, 1811, Historia, Operaciones de Guerra, Notas Diplomáticas (Archivo General y Público de la Nación, Mexico), III, f. 33. Hereafter cited as AGN ND.

[7] Julius William Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812* (New York, 1925), 68.

[8] Isaac Joslin Cox, "The Border Missions of General George Mathews," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XII (1925–1926), 311. Wilkinson solicited the mission to bolster his waning prestige.

[9] *Ibid.*, 328.

numerous intrigues between Spanish-American agents and their sympathizers in the United States, which was threatened with an English war. Florida and New Spain bordered on the south and the west, and the sovereign of those territories was an ally of England.[10] Add to this situation the zeal of a boisterous republic and the ubiquitous activities of American merchants, and one has little difficulty in understanding the attitude of the administration in Washington toward the filibustering movement.

Gutiérrez de Lara's Mission to Washington

The Mexican Revolution began on September 16, 1810, when Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla issued his dramatic call at Dolores[11] and initiated a decade of fratricidal conflict, intrigue, and filibustering expeditions. Hidalgo sought aid abroad after the revolution was well under way. The first Mexican envoy whom he commissioned was instructed to effect an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States and to enter into a treaty of commerce, but the royalists captured him before he reached Vera Cruz.[12] The second envoy, bearing with him considerable silver, was arrested by royalists at San Antonio.[13] Don José Bernardo Maximiliano Gutiérrez de Lara, familiarly known as Bernardo,

[10] Spain had no intention of declaring war on the United States. See Ignacio de la Pezuela to Wellesley, Cádiz, August 10, 1812, Papeles de Estado (Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid), legajo 5556, expediente 1. Hereafter cited as AHN Estado.

[11] Niceto de Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico desde sus Tiempos más Remotos hasta Nuestros Días* . . . (Barcelona, 1878–1903), VI, 142.

[12] Isidro Fabela, *Los Precursores de la Diplomacia Mexicana* (Mexico, 1926), 29–31.

[13] Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico desde los Primeros Movimientos que Prepararon su Independencia en el Año 1808, Hasta la Época Presente* (Mexico, 1849–1852), II, 167. This envoy was Don Ignacio Aldama, sent with Father Juan Salazar to secure aid in men and arms from the United States. A revolution had been started in San Antonio by Juan Bautista Casas on January 22, 1811. Padre Juan Manuel Zambrano executed a counterrevolution, and imprisoned Casas and Aldama at the beginning of March. Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of the North Mexican States and Texas* (San Francisco, 1886–1889), II, 18–19; "J. B. Gutierrez de Lara to the Mexican Congress. Account of Progress of Revolution from Beginning," in Charles Adams Gulick and Harriet Smither (eds.), *The Papers of Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar* (Austin, 1921–1927), I, 5–6. Hereafter cited as Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*.

finally succeeded in reaching the United States in an effort to obtain aid for the insurgents.

Gutiérrez was a blacksmith and merchant of Revilla, a village founded by his family in 1750 near the junction of the Río Salado and the Río Grande.[14] An early adherent of Hidalgo's revolution, he became a lieutenant colonel under General Ignacio Allende and offered to undertake the difficult journey to the United States in the interest of the insurgent cause.[15] Gutiérrez spent some time in a vain attempt to rescue Hidalgo, who had been captured on March 21, 1811, through the treachery of General Ignacio Elizondo, and then concealed himself in Revilla "like the miserable mole under the leaves. . . ."[16] Gutiérrez was so prominent in Revilla that he would have had to conceal himself under something if his presence was to be kept unknown to royalist sympathizers! Captain José Menchaca, a Texas rebel in hiding, joined him in July, 1811. Together they assembled a party of twelve men with arms, ammunition, and as much treasure in silver as they could carry, and began the long and dangerous trip through Texas on August 1.[17] Royalist officials knew of their presence in Texas but failed to apprehend them. At the village of Bayou Pierre on the northern edge of the Neutral Ground, which the republican envoys reached in September, they lost practically everything in an attack made by a party of pursuing royalists. Gutiérrez and Menchaca escaped capture and arrived safely at the important border town of Natchitoches, Louisiana.[18]

The citizens of Natchitoches, many of whom were engaged in a profitable trade with Nacogdoches beyond the Neutral Ground,

[14] Julia Kathryn Garrett, *Green Flag Over Texas* (New York and Dallas, 1939), 34.

[15] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 6–7; Isaac Joslin Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in American Historical Association, *Annual Report*, 1911 (Washington, 1913), I, 200; Carlos María de Bustamante, *Campañas del General D. Félix María Calleja*, . . . (Mexico, 1828), 178–79.

[16] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 6–7.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in *loc. cit.*, 200; St. Louis *Louisiana Gazette*, March 28, 1812.

gave the envoys a warm welcome. The Mexicans were primarily interested in recruits and supplies for the insurgent armies of New Spain, and Natchitoches was an ideal place to make arrangements for such aid. There were about fifty bandits in the Neutral Ground who were ready to embark upon any adventure which promised excitement and profit. Captain José Menchaca was invited to command this choice contingent of human driftwood.[19] Gutiérrez and his friends agreed that Menchaca, commanding a force of volunteers, should march against San Antonio, establish a government, and then supply funds for the purchase of arms and other supplies.[20] Gutiérrez planned to remain at Natchitoches to negotiate with merchants "for the delivery of certain articles at a place agreed on, at or near the mouth of the River Grand," where there was "a deposit of money to pay for the articles so delivered." [21] His principal object was to reach Washington and to confer with American officials, and so he sent an appeal for aid to Secretary of State James Monroe. Mexico, he wrote, was throwing off the yoke of Spain's tyranny and offered mutually advantageous treaties of friendship and commerce in exchange for arms, men, and money —especially arms. There was, perhaps, a hint that the Mexican agents would seek aid elsewhere if it was not forthcoming from the United States: "We know very well, Sir, that we lack all those formalities necessary for representing a nation; but the good of humanity and our anxiety for our own [people] authorizes us to claim protection wherever we can find it. . . ." [22] Dr. John Sibley, the American Indian agent at Natchitoches, gave the Mexican several letters of introduction and $200 for the trip to Washington.[23] A Spanish agent at Natchez hired men to do away with Gutiérrez;

[19] New York *Herald*, January 11, 1812; St. Louis *Louisiana Gazette*, March 28, 1812.

[20] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 8.

[21] New York *Herald*, January 11, 1812.

[22] Gutiérrez and Mariano Sosa to Tomas Monrroi [James Monroe], Natchitoches, September 27, 1811, Consular Despatches, Mexico, 1811–1825 (National Archives, Washington), I.

[23] Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in *loc. cit.*, 201; Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 8.

but, if we can believe his story, the envoy "put a quietus on them" and continued to Washington. His trip was made easier by the cordial reception accorded to him by prominent persons to whom he had letters of introduction and with whom he discussed matters regarding money and arms desired by the insurgents. In Kentucky and Tennessee he found men who wanted him to stay and lead an army of volunteers into Mexico.[24]

Gutiérrez was well received in the departments of War and State when he arrived at the capital early in December, 1811. His principal mentor was John Graham, chief clerk of the Department of State.[25] During his few interviews with American officials, the Mexican asked for aid in money, men, and munitions, and called attention to possible commercial gains for the United States and to the danger of foreign intervention in Mexico.[26] According to Gutiérrez, Monroe "agreed to supply the Mexican forces with 10,000 muskets and to accept in payment bills of exchange on their revolutionary government."[27] The Secretary of State is also supposed to have suggested sending an army of fifty thousand men "already enlisted in Kentucky and Tennessee" to Texas to assist the patriots, and perhaps to take possession of the province as far as the Río Grande. The proposal was dropped when Gutiérrez agreed on condition that he be in command.[28]

[24] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 8–9.

[25] Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in *loc. cit.*, 201.

[26] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 9–10.

[27] Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in *loc. cit.*, 201; Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 10. Here the statement appears that there were to be 100,000 guns at $20 each, "delivered at the expense and risk of the sellers." Professor Cox doubts the whole story. Gutiérrez later told José Nicolás Benites that he had been promised ten to twelve thousand men and anything he needed. Benites to Antonio Cordero, Monclova, May 30, 1813, Historia, Operaciones de Guerra, Arredondo (Archivo General y Público de la Nación, Mexico), IV, f. 24. Hereafter cited as AGN Arredondo.

[28] Elizabeth H. West (ed.), "Diary of José Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara, 1811–1812," in *American Historical Review*, XXXIV (1928–1929), 71–73. Hereafter cited as West (ed.), "Gutiérrez Diary." Onís, relying on information received by a confidant from Telésforo de Orea, the agent from Caracas, reported that Monroe had offered 25,000 troops, arms, and munitions, and had suggested that Mexico join the Union. Gutiérrez

The former smith of Revilla had a busy time in the East and learned something at least of how intrigues are formed. English agents approached him with "the most liberal offers of supplies . . . ," which Gutiérrez refused to accept. If such offers were actually made, they certainly did not harmonize with English policy at the time. In Philadelphia the Russian minister tendered expressions of good-will,[29] and French agents made overtures of friendship.[30] Before he left Washington, Gutiérrez learned of Don José Álvarez de Toledo's presence in Philadelphia, and on December 27 he rejoiced because Toledo had come to Washington. Toledo was a revolutionist from Cuba and Santo Domingo who was likewise trying to enlist support for ambitious schemes.[31] Within a short time the two rebels were to become bitter enemies, but their brief acquaintance at the capital convinced Gutiérrez that Toledo was "a man of great talents, and passionately devoted to the cause of the liberty of Mexico. . . ." [32] This opinion was later modified in a most radical manner, and justly so.

The American officials urged Gutiérrez to "return home with all possible diligence." [33] They were well aware of conditions on the Louisiana frontier where many adventurers were congregating in the hope of a profitable and exciting venture into Texas. On

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was furious at the suggestion. Onís to the Viceroy, February 14, 1812, in Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, III, appendix, 45–46.

[29] Notes for a dispatch from Gutiérrez to the Commander in Chief, encl. in William Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1812, Special Agents, William Shaler (National Archives). Hereafter cited as Shaler Papers.

[30] "[Jan.] 11. [1812]. Some Frenchmen have made themselves very friendly to me, and I have returned the compliment, so that they believed me, though they are the very devil. I think by this bit of deception to get some papers from them, and thereby I shall be able to discover a formidable plot which is being laid against Mexico. They have believed me so implicitly that they have already offered me one of the four aides-de-camp of Napoleon that are here, to accompany me. I have accepted, but as soon as I return from Mexico." West (ed.), "Gutiérrez Diary," in *loc. cit.*, 285–86.

[31] See *infra*, pp. 10 ff. for further information about Toledo.

[32] West (ed.), "Gutiérrez Diary," in *loc. cit.*, 75–76.

[33] Notes for a dispatch from Gutiérrez to the Commander in Chief, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1812, Shaler Papers.

December 31, 1811, John Graham loaned $200 to the envoy from the Río Grande and gave him a letter to Governor Claiborne asking that Gutiérrez be furnished with transportation from New Orleans to the frontier.[34] He was quite willing to leave, for he had heard that Menchaca, whom he had left in the Neutral Ground, had gone over to the royalists.[35] Gutiérrez left Washington on January 4, 1812, and arrived at Philadelphia four days later.[36] Instead of going at once to New Orleans, he remained in the East almost a month. It is likely that he came to an understanding with Toledo whereby the latter would recruit men and assemble supplies for the projected invasion of Texas. After another trip to Washington late in January,[37] Gutiérrez sailed from the East and arrived at New Orleans on March 23,[38] ready to proceed to Natchitoches to join his fortunes with the adventurers of that frontier village.

If the accounts given by Gutiérrez are true—and there is no reason to doubt them entirely—the President and the Secretary of State had been parties to what Onís would call a Machiavellian negotiation. Their action in supplying the envoy with funds was entirely in harmony with the practice of governments generally, especially at that time. But Gutiérrez had been led to believe that the United States would extend more than sympathy to the Mexican patriots, and, although Don Luis de Onís had not yet been recognized as the Spanish minister, Spain was still a friendly power within the definition of international law. Madison and Monroe desired "the formation of a provisional government which

[34] West (ed.), "Gutiérrez Diary," in *loc. cit.*, 77.

[35] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 11. There is a possibility that Manuel de Salcedo, governor of Texas, and his associate Simón Herrera, had bribed Menchaca to abandon the recruits he had gathered at Natchitoches. See *Lamar Papers*, I, 281.

[36] West (ed.), "Gutiérrez Diary," in *loc. cit.*, 281–89.

[37] Gutiérrez to the Cavallero Grahan [John Graham], Washington, January 28, 1812, Mexico, Filibustering Expedition against the Government of Spain, 1811–1816 (National Archives). Hereafter cited as Mexico, Filibustering.

[38] West (ed.), "Gutiérrez Diary," in *loc. cit.*, 281–89.

they would recognize at the earliest possible moment . . ." and therefore gave aid and encouragement to Gutiérrez.[39] Another interpretation is that Monroe and Gutiérrez came to an agreement regarding an expedition to Texas under the Mexican flag, and that Monroe led Toledo, without the knowledge of Gutiérrez, to understand that he was to have command of the expedition.[40] The activities of one of Monroe's agents in behalf of Toledo, after Gutiérrez had been in Texas for some time at the head of the expedition, lend credence to this view. At any event, there is no doubt that Madison and Monroe were ready to extend some aid to the Mexican patriots. If the Spanish alliance with England and the danger of war with either or both of the allies prompted Madison's Florida policy in 1811 and 1812, a similar policy toward Texas is not hard to understand. An independent nation beyond the Sabine, friendly to the United States, would protect a long border and pave the way for an amicable arrangement of the western boundary. President Madison and Secretary Monroe certainly conducted themselves as though aware of these considerations.[41]

Toledo's Plan for the Antillean Confederation[42]

Just as the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the revolutions in the colonies combined to send Gutiérrez to Washington, so also did they cause Don José Álvarez de Toledo y Dubois to embark upon a dizzy career of intrigue and deception. This stormy petrel of the Mexican Revolution was born in Havana on May 14, 1779. His father, Don Luis de Toledo y Liche, was a native of Seville who had taken up his residence in the Cuban capital. Don Luis entered the navy and rose to positions of responsibility. Commandant of

[39] Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in *loc. cit.*, 202.

[40] Joseph B. Lockey, "The Florida Intrigues of José Álvarez de Toledo," in *Quarterly of the Florida Historical Society*, XII (1934), 151.

[41] Monroe was by no means as naïve as one writer asserts. See James Morton Callahan, *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations* (New York, 1932), 8–9.

[42] This discussion of Toledo was published in essentially the same form in Harris Gaylord Warren, "José Álvarez de Toledo's Initiation as a Filibuster, 1811–1813," in *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XX (1940), 56–82, and is reproduced here by permission.

the Arsenal in 1781, Capitán de Navío in 1789, and Captain of the Port of Havana in 1811, Toledo's father was a trusted officer of the island.[43] Don José received most of his education in Spain where he studied at the Escuela Naval de Cádiz. He served with distinction in 1806 and 1807, and went to London with British forces in 1808 after experience in the Army of Galicia. A plan which he devised for the rescue of Ferdinand VII was shelved, and the restless Teniente de Navío found an outlet for his energies as commander of *La Tigre* in a British squadron.[44]

The first flush of liberal enthusiasm which suffused the members of the loyal Cortes of Cádiz gave rise to plans for an imperial federation of Spain and the colonies. As an initial step in this hastily abandoned scheme, the American colonies were invited to send representatives to the Cortes. José Álvarez de Toledo was selected to represent Santo Domingo in that body.[45] He sat in various sessions of the Cortes from September 24, 1810, to January 11, 1811. Toledo, as well as other Spanish Americans, soon perceived that the colonies could not hope for an equal voice in imperial affairs. This conviction caused him to write to the captain general of Santo Domingo on December 10, 1810, denouncing the policy of the Cortes. The letter was intercepted and sent to the Regency, which charged that Toledo was engaged in a plot with the English and ordered his imprisonment. With the assistance of the United States consul at Cádiz, Toledo fled from Spain on June 25, 1811, and arrived at Philadelphia in September.[46] He carried with him a

[43] Carlos M. Trelles y Govín, "Un Precursor de la Independencia de Cuba: Don José Álvarez de Toledo," in *Discursos Leídos en la Recepción Pública del Sr. Carlos M. Trelles y Govín* . . . (Habana, 1926), 8.

[44] *Ibid.*, 9.

[45] Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in *loc. cit.*, 202; Mattie Austin Hatcher (ed.), "Joaquin de Arredondo's Report of the Battle of the Medina, August 18, 1813," in *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association* (later, *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*), XI (1907–1908), 227; Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, III, appendix, 4; José García de León y Pizarro, *Memorias* . . . (Madrid, 1894–1897), III, 210.

[46] Philadelphia *Aurora*, December 17, 1811; Onís to Bardaxí y Azara, Philadelphia, September 25, 1811 (No. 180), AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

commission from the American delegation to the Cortes which authorized him to revolutionize the provinces of northern Mexico, organize an army, set up a government, and make all arrangements necessary to carry out these objects.[47] In acting under the doubtful authority granted by this commission, Toledo later came into conflict with Gutiérrez.

Toledo's arrival in Philadelphia was correctly interpreted by Onís as presaging more trouble for the unrecognized Spanish mission. For a short time Onís had believed that his path was to be a little less difficult. Don Miguel Cabral de Noroña, a Portuguese who longed to become a propagandist for Spain, had been made tranquil with a tentative promise of a commission to defend the Spanish cause in the press. The "Octavian peace" described by Onís was rudely shattered by Toledo's appearance. The harassed envoy gave Noroña and others the task of counteracting the former deputy's activities since there was no way to cause his arrest or departure.[48]

Toledo arrived in the United States with only partly formed plans, and his subsequent conduct indicated that he intended to make the most of every opportunity to promote his own interests. His actions would always appear to be in favor of the patriot cause —except for his offer to betray a patriot army—a cause which he always identified with his own welfare. Toledo had, at least in retrospect, an exalted view of his mission. He fled from a Spain bowed under the yoke of the "most ferocious of tyrants" to help

[47] Copias de los Papeles dirigidos por el traidor Toledo desde la Nueva Orleans á los Cabecillas que componen la Junta de Rebeldes de N. España, encl. in Toledo to the President and other Representatives of the United States of Mexico, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, Indiferente General de Nueva España (Archivo General de Indias, Seville), 136-7-9. Hereafter cited as Toledo to the Mexican Congress, AGI IG. A copy of Toledo's commission is in Onís to Pedro Cevallos, Philadelphia, August 7, 1816 (No. 118), AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

[48] Onís to Bardaxí, Philadelphia, September 25, 1811 (No. 180), AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12. See also Philip Coolidge Brooks, "Spanish Royalists in the United States, 1809–1821," in A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), *Colonial Hispanic America* (Washington, 1936), 567.

the Americans escape a similar fate.[49] There is sufficient reason to believe that a moderate amount of Spanish gold would have turned him away from his noble endeavor.

At first, Toledo's intrigues centered around the possibility of revolutionizing the Antilles, a scheme in which he hoped to enlist the support of the United States. With Spanish rule overthrown in the islands, a union might be formed with Mexico and possibly the United States.[50] Whatever his plans, Toledo employed his facile pen in propaganda for independence.[51] This activity caused Onís to fear that Toledo would become Spain's chief enemy in America, nor did the Chevalier fail to note that Toledo was in close communication with Monroe. One way to get rid of the revolutionist would be to lure him on board a warship.[52]

While the Spanish envoy's alarm increased, Toledo made successful efforts to interest Monroe in the proposed Antillean Confederation. In November he assured Monroe that he had important information to reveal and that a visit to Washington with expenses paid would result in great good for the United States, Cuba, and New Spain.[53] Monroe's curiosity was aroused and he asked Alexander J. Dallas, federal district attorney for eastern Pennsylvania, to investigate. If Toledo's communication seemed to warrant the cost, Dallas was to supply him with the means of getting to Washington.[54] Toledo was told that Dallas had been asked to

[49] Justificación de Don José Álvarez de Toledo, encl. in Onís to Cevallos, Philadelphia, December 20, 1816 (No. 202), AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

[50] J. C. [José Cavallero] to Toledo, Santo Domingo, September 20, 1811 (Reservado), Spanish Affairs, 1810–1816 (Library of Congress).

[51] Copies of Toledo's tracts are in Trelles y Govín, "Un Precursor de la Independencia de Cuba: Don José Álvarez de Toledo," in *loc. cit., passim.*

[52] Onís to Bardaxí, Philadelphia, December 5, 1811 (No. 211), AHN Estado, leg. 5555, ex. 12.

[53] Toledo to Monroe, Philadelphia, November 16, 1811 (Confidential), Mexico, Filibustering.

[54] Monroe to Dallas, Department of State, November 25, 1811, The Papers of James Monroe (Library of Congress), IV, 1561. The date appears as November 23 in Domestic Letters (National Archives), XVI, 38.

see him.[55] At the interview with Dallas, Toledo maintained that the British planned to seize Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo, but that the patriots of the islands were willing to form a confederation, with the idea of union with the United States. Dallas concluded, after an interview with Onís, that Toledo was "a man of talents and character; but indiscreet in his correspondence. . . ." [56] During the next three weeks Toledo continued his propaganda activities while Dallas was deciding what to do. The *Aurora* carried his letters and manifestoes, which were clear and strong even in translation. Toledo was an artist with words and the more he wrote the more skillful he became. As a propagandist he appealed to republican sympathies with a liberal use of resounding phrases which showed at least a superficial knowledge of revolutionary philosophy. He was an American, a friend of independence, interested in the fate of Spain and compassionate toward the oppressed brethren of the Peninsula. He would be happy if only he could shed his blood in the Cause.[57] Dallas finally decided that Toledo should see Monroe, and with a gift of $50 for expenses the revolutionist prepared to go to Washington on December 24.[58]

When Toledo reached Washington he found that Gutiérrez had already conferred with the authorities. His own conversations with Monroe were eminently satisfactory: "Monroe seems to have resolved, with Madison's approval, to assist these two men in extending their revolutionary propaganda throughout the West Indies and Mexico." [59] Monroe gave Toledo money for his proposed trip to Cuba and a letter of introduction to William Shaler, a special agent who had gone to the island in 1810 with the intention of

[55] Monroe to Toledo, Department of State, November 25, 1811, Monroe Papers, IV, 1561; Domestic Letters, XVI, 39.

[56] Dallas to the Secretary of State [Philadelphia], December 4, 1811, Miscellaneous Letters, August–December, 1811 (National Archives).

[57] Philadelphia *Aurora*, December 17, 1811.

[58] Dallas to Monroe, [Philadelphia], December 23, 1811, Miscellaneous Letters, August–December, 1811.

[59] Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in *loc. cit.*, 203.

proceeding on to Mexico.[60] But Toledo did not go to Cuba. When he returned to Philadelphia he planned to embark on a brigantine which, he learned from a friend in Baltimore, was about ready to sail from New York. However, he suggested to Monroe that his mission would be expedited if he could be taken to Havana on an American man-of-war.[61] The brigantine turned out to be a Spanish vessel with an agent aboard engaged by Onís.[62] Toledo wisely refused to be lured into the trap which Onís may have prepared for him and soon dropped any intention of promoting revolution in the Antilles.

Villains, Treachery, and Intrigue

Don Luis de Onís did what he could to entertain Toledo in the interim. The envoy's proposal to use Cabral de Noroña to counteract Toledo's activities met at first with a cold reception in Spain,[63] but alarming reports from Onís caused the Regency to authorize the payment of a small pension to the Portuguese adventurer.[64] Noroña had already entered into a journalistic joust with Toledo,[65] and he now wrote a pamphlet to counteract some of the latter's propaganda.[66]

But apparently Noroña was too pacific for Onís's plans. Diego Correa, alias Antonio Gorbalán, a detective-story villain, came to the United States in August or September, 1810. The Cádiz Junta was reported to have employed him to assassinate Napoleon, promising a reward in case of success and the care of his family should the project fail. Correa, somewhat reluctant to seek his quarry in Europe, threatened to stab or poison anyone who knew his secret.

[60] *Ibid.*, 204.

[61] Toledo to Monroe, Philadelphia, January 4, 1812, Mexico, Filibustering.

[62] Toledo to Monroe, Philadelphia, January 7, 1812, Miscellaneous Letters, January–April, 1812.

[63] Bardaxí to Onís, Cádiz, December 11, 1811, AHN Estado, leg. 5555, ex. 12.

[64] [Bardaxí] to Onís, Cádiz, February 18, 1812, *ibid.*

[65] Encl. in Onís to Bardaxí, Philadelphia, December 18, 1811 (No. 223), AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

[66] Onís to Bardaxí, Philadelphia, February 1, 1812, AHN Estado, leg. 5555, ex. 12.

There were several in this classification, and the intended victims swore out a warrant for his arrest. Correa was well equipped for his work as business agent for the undertakers. About his person he carried habitually "a short Spanish dagger, and also kept pistols, powder and balls . . . [and] a box containing vitriol and other drugs" as well as a small vial of poison. The potential murderer "cast his eye" on Toledo.[67] Onís was an interested spectator of Correa's futile efforts to engage Toledo in a duel.[68] The future filibuster complained to Dallas and asked that Onís be placed under a peace bond.[69]

Toledo did not abandon his plan to go to Cuba until the spring of 1812. An anonymous correspondent warned him that precautions had been taken against him in Cuba, that his projects would be discovered, and that it would be better to try to do something for Mexico.[70] Toledo took the advice, and the small amount of money which accompanied it, and began to think about going to Texas.[71] His principal activities during the rest of the year were connected with this project to join Gutiérrez. For a time he lived at the boarding house which sheltered General Ira Allen, a noted figure from Vermont where he was in great disfavor.[72] Allen helped Toledo by gaining adherents to his plan. Nathaniel Coggswell, a shadowy person of uncertain antecedents; Samuel Alden, a young man in search of adventure; Aaron Mower, a printer; a Frenchman vaguely identified as Caliavette; Henry Adams Bullard, a Harvard graduate and law student; and William Prentiss, a merchant, were among those who were attracted to the scheme.[73]

With such encouraging developments under way, Toledo in-

[67] Serurier to Monroe, Washington, June 6, 1812 and encls., Notes from the French Legation (National Archives), Vols. II–III.

[68] Onís to Bardaxí, Philadelphia, February 1, 1812, AHN Estado, leg. 5555, ex. 12.

[69] Dallas to Monroe, [Philadelphia, March 1 (?), 1812] and encl., Miscellaneous Letters, January–April, 1812.

[70] A—— to Our friend Toledo, Havana, March 1, 1812, Spanish Affairs, 1810–1816.

[71] Toledo to my friend A——, Philadelphia, April 4, 1812, *ibid.*

[72] Allen to Monroe, Philadelphia, November 19, 1812, *ibid.*

[73] Allen to Toledo, Philadelphia, April 12, 1812, *ibid.*; [Henry Adams Bullard] in *North American Review*, XLIII (1836), 238.

formed Gutiérrez on July 28, 1812, that he was about to leave for the frontier with various resources.[74] Before this letter could reach Gutiérrez, the invasion of Texas was well started. Augustus W. Magee crossed the Sabine with the main part of the filibustering army on August 8.[75] Governor Claiborne issued a proclamation three days later denouncing this rank violation of the territory of a friendly power.[76] This belated gesture had practically no effect in deterring the progress of the invasion; but when news of the measure reached Philadelphia, Toledo's "angels" were discouraged, and the efforts of Allen, Toledo, and Coggswell were insufficient to regain their support. Toledo's plans were disrupted.[77] Coggswell became suspicious of his motives, and even charged the distressed leader with having been closely connected with Francisco de Miranda,[78] then in disfavor because of the Venezuelan failure.

If the way of the transgressor is hard, that of the destitute filibuster is even less to be envied. Toledo's funds were low, and the threatening pangs of hunger stimulated the latent loyalty which slumbered in his breast. On October 5, 1812, he called on Onís and revealed that he had been in direct communication with the United States government to foment revolution in the Americas. He longed to return to the bosom of his fatherland as an erring son returns to a forgiving father; but first he must give proof of his repentance. He had connived with the United States to take command of a body of two thousand men recruited in Louisiana. This force would join with insurgents in Mexico under Toledo's command. Under an agreement that could be made with Spanish loyalist commanders in Texas, Toledo would deliver his army, and the twelve thou-

[74] Toledo to Gutiérrez, Philadelphia, October [7?], 1812, Spanish Affairs, 1810–1816.

[75] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 18, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[76] Dunbar Rowland (ed.), *Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 1801–1816* (Jackson, 1917), VI, 229–30. Hereafter cited as Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*.

[77] Allen to Monroe, Philadelphia, November 19, 1812, Spanish Affairs, 1810–1816; James Benjamin Wilbur, *Ira Allen Founder of Vermont 1751–1814* (Boston and New York, 1928), II, 441.

[78] Coggswell to Gutiérrez and Magee, Pittsburgh, December 29, 1812, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1812, Shaler Papers.

sand guns and other equipment supposed to be furnished by the United States, into their hands. The betrayal could be effected if Onís would advance the necessary funds. But Onís had no money, and all that he could do would be to dispatch a messenger to a frontier post to facilitate the execution of the proposed plan. The small sum which Onís could offer held no attraction for the supposedly repentant Toledo. It would not permit him to carry out his plan, and so he preferred "to desist from his trip to the frontiers, not wishing to appear at the head of an army against his fatherland." Toledo took his leave, promising to return to give his final decision. He did not do so and Onís feared that Toledo was merely trying to obtain money from him.[79] It is, of course, entirely possible that Toledo was attempting to deceive the Spanish minister and had no intention of going through with the scheme. On June 25, 1816, however, the adventurer visited Father Antonio de Sedella—a secret agent for Spain—in New Orleans and started along the road toward final reconciliation with Ferdinand VII,[80] a monarch whom he had previously called a "mortal imbecile." Toledo's activities up to that time certainly had not been conducive to the success of the royalist cause. The most charitable view which may be taken of his offer to Onís is that he was making a desperate move to obtain funds in order to carry out his plan to lead the revolution in Texas.[81] No matter what Toledo's intentions may have been, Ira Allen assured Monroe that the schemer could be trusted fully.[82]

Following his conference with Onís, Toledo returned to his plans to go to Texas to wrest the leadership of the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition from those two adventurers. Accompanied by a small group of companions, he "embarked at Pittsburg for Natchez in the month of December, on board a small flat-boat,

[79] Onís to Ignacio de la Pezuela, Philadelphia, October 7, 1812 (No. 135), AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

[80] Sedella to Onís, New Orleans, July 6, 1816, AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

[81] There is no reason to suppose that Onís was not telling the truth about Toledo's visit.

[82] Allen to Monroe, Philadelphia, November 19, 1812, Spanish Affairs, 1810–1816.

which had been constructed for that purpose." [83] With him were Juan Mariano Picornell, Aaron Mower, Henry Adams Bullard, and a few others. According to Onís, Toledo had departed "with glowing promises and recommendations from the agents of this Government. . . ." He stated that Toledo carried maps, plans, pamphlets, and a printing press, and that the plotters had gone to New Orleans. They would fortify Tampico, using artillery and gunboats from American ports, in order to have a maritime contact with the United States. The French in New Orleans and elsewhere were said to be co-operating, as were adventurers attracted by the riches of Mexican mines. Onís considered the project to be chimerical and foolish because of the small resources of the rebels and their lack of harmony.[84] These rumors were amplified by the report that Toledo's party had arrived at Natchez in the middle of March with four thousand guns.[85]

As the summer of 1813 gave way to autumn, Onís conceived a modified interpretation of the intrigue engineered by Toledo. He was positive that French agents were mixed up in the project. Two soldiers of fortune, Ducoudray-Holstein and Bartholomé Lafon, arrived at Rapides about June 14,[86] and Onís represented them as engaged with Toledo in a plan to overthrow Gutiérrez.[87] General Jean Joseph Amable Humbert, a former Napoleonic officer, left Philadelphia for New Orleans about August 17, accompanied by a former naval captain, Jean François Achard [88] and several other French and Spanish officers. This event caused Onís to believe that

[83] [Henry Adams Bullard] in *North American Review*, XLIII, 238. For more about Bullard, see Dora J. Bonquois, "The Career of Henry Adams Bullard, Louisiana Jurist, Legislator, and Educator," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXIII (1940), 999–1106.

[84] Onís to the Captain General of Cuba, Philadelphia, March 4, 1813, Papeles Procedentes de Cuba (Archivo General de Indias, Seville), leg. 1837. Hereafter cited as AGI PC.

[85] Diego Morphy to the Viceroy, New Orleans, May 8, 1813, AGN ND, III, f. 214.

[86] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813 (No. 81), postscript dated June 14, Shaler Papers. For Ducoudray-Holstein, see Alfred Hasbrouck, *Foreign Legionaires in the Liberation of Spanish South America* (New York, 1928), 24–25.

[87] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 6, 1813, AGI PC, leg. 1837.

[88] Onís corrupted Achard who had come as a French secret agent. Onís to Bardaxí, Philadelphia, September 19, 1811 (No. 171), AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 14.

France and the United States were jointly fomenting the revolution in Mexico. Humbert was expected to direct operations of the insurgents in Texas under the nominal leadership of Toledo, and Gutiérrez would be displaced "because of his ignorance and cruelty." Again treachery appeared among the self-constituted friends of the Mexican cause. Captain Achard offered to deliver the insurgent army to royalist generals. Onís praised the suggestion and advised the would-be traitor to communicate with General Joaquín de Arredondo or other officials of the Interior Provinces. But the minister had no more faith in Achard than in Toledo, each of whom was capable of any treachery.[89] While these events were transpiring, the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition had enjoyed astounding successes in Texas.

Gutiérrez de Lara's Reception in New Orleans

Prudence and propriety required the United States to be cautious in recognizing the independence of Spain's rebellious colonies. Indeed, there was very little to recognize in 1810, but there were ample opportunities for more or less official observers to be of use. William Shaler, a versatile sea captain with experience as a trader in various Latin-American ports, was one of the men who were to act as such observers. Shaler received a commission as consul at Vera Cruz and as agent for commerce and seamen in Vera Cruz and Havana.[90] When Shaler arrived in Cuba he found that the governor was not disposed to admit such an agent into Mexico.[91] Finally despairing of proceeding to his post directly, Shaler went to New Orleans late in 1811. Although it was difficult to obtain accurate information concerning operations in New Spain, he was able to report that "all is apparently quiet on the frontiers." [92]

[89] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 20, 1813, AGI PC, leg. 1837.

[90] Shaler to Robert Smith, New York, June 21, 1810, Shaler Papers. For Shaler, see Roy F. Nichols, "A New England Apostle of Liberty," in *New England Quarterly*, IX (1936), 71–96. There are brief references to Shaler in Henry Merritt Wriston, *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations* (Baltimore, 1929), *passim*.

[91] Shaler to Smith, Havana, August 5, 1810, Shaler Papers.

[92] Shaler to Monroe, New Orleans, January 4, 1812, *ibid.*

These peaceful conditions must have made him eager to proceed to his post by way of San Antonio. He was planning to leave by barge for Natchitoches about March 19,[93] but a delay occurred which was sufficient to allow for the arrival of Gutiérrez from Philadelphia on March 23.

When Gutiérrez arrived in New Orleans he called almost at once on Governor Claiborne to present the letter of introduction that John Graham had given him.[94] The governor was not certain as "to the degree of countenance proper to show him." A promised letter from Monroe had not yet arrived, but Claiborne decided to act on Graham's statement that "the Government wished his return *to Mexico to be expedited* . . ." and therefore commended Gutiérrez to Shaler's friendly attention. Claiborne decided to ask Shaler to advance money for Gutiérrez's expenses, since his journey could not be expedited without funds.[95] It was under these circumstances that Shaler became the mentor and "angel" of a Mexican revolutionary agent. Gutiérrez played his part so well that Shaler formed an excellent opinion of him. The American agent took considerable care to explain the policy of the United States and the desires of foreign nations, and Gutiérrez promised not to "engage in any plan whatever" without Shaler's approval.[96] This precautionary advice was indeed timely, for "No sooner was the arrival of this Man known in New Orleans, than several intriguers (believed to be acting under foreign influence) made attempts upon him. . . ."[97]

Claiborne's worries were somewhat lightened on April 8 when Shaler and Gutiérrez began their twenty-day journey to Natchitoches.[98] But Luis de Onís could see little sunshine in a sky dark

[93] Shaler to Monroe, New Orleans, March 9, 1812, *ibid.*

[94] West, (ed.), "Gutiérrez Diary," in *loc. cit.*, 289–90; Claiborne to John Graham, New Orleans, March 31, 1812, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 68.

[95] Claiborne to Shaler, New Orleans, April 7, 1812, *ibid.*, 71–72.

[96] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 2, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[97] Claiborne to John Graham, New Orleans, April 13, 1812, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 79–80.

[98] Claiborne wrote to various important people in Natchitoches asking that they aid Shaler. *Ibid.*, 75.

with clouds that presaged the gathering storm. The United States was threatening to establish its boundary at the Río Grande and to absorb Cuba as well. Methods known to Bonaparte and the Roman Republic—intrigue, seduction, and emissaries to encourage dissension—would enable the United States to wrest from Spain some of its fairest provinces. Attempts had been made to bribe officials, to seduce the troops, and to foment civil war. The United States, Onís had reason to fear, had commissioned "a famous lawyer of New Orleans to contact the insurgents in Mexico and to offer them every kind of aid in money, arms, and officers to make war on the troops of the King. . . ." An emissary had already gone to Natchitoches to make arrangements for depositing the supplies which would be sent.[99] Onís may have exaggerated somewhat in his reports, but he had a fairly good understanding of the American attitude in 1812.

Organization of the First Invasion of Texas

When Shaler and Gutiérrez arrived at Natchitoches on April 27 or 28, they began immediately to prepare for the invasion of Texas.[100] Natchitoches had become the center for a lucrative trade with the Interior Provinces which Spanish officials monopolized to their own advantage. Samuel Davenport acted as the Indian agent at Nacogdoches for the governor of Texas, Don Manuel de Salcedo.[101] It was this agent who informed his superiors that Gutiérrez and Shaler had arrived at the border town. Shaler's commission was still an unknown quantity, but the two strangers were inseparable. Davenport wrote that he was unable to gain satisfactory information through conversations with the two agents, but he was able to report that Gutiérrez was being accepted by the people as the Mexican ambassador.[102]

[99] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, April 1, 1812, AGI PC, leg. 1837.

[100] West (ed.), "Gutiérrez Diary," in *loc. cit.*, 291.

[101] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 2, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[102] Samuel Davenport to Bernárdino Montero, Natchitoches, May 6, 1812, Historia, Operaciones de Guerra, Manuel Salcedo, 1810–1812 (Archivo General y Público de la Nación, Mexico), ff. 118–19. Hereafter cited as AGN Salcedo. Montero was commanding officer at Nacogdoches.

Shaler learned from three traders who had been imprisoned by Salcedo for three years that Texas was ripe for a revolution. He made several significant observations which were really prophecies when he reported to Washington:

> From the information I have of the character of those gentlemen [the traders], and from what I hear of their conversations here, I should not be surprized to hear of their again entering that country, and in arms. If such speculations should be inconsistent with the views and policy of the United States, it is probably time that measures should be taken to prevent them, for it appears even the banditti lately assembled on the Sabine would have succeeded if they had not been deserted by their leader *Menchaca;* such at least is the general opinion here, and the practicability of such a Scheme is the general topic of conversation.[103]

Everything seemed to point to the possibility of organizing a strong expedition. Gutiérrez had met with a warm reception; there were merchants whose cupidity was easily aroused; there were the adventurous banditti in the Neutral Ground; and there was Shaler loyally endeavoring to expedite the return of Gutiérrez to Mexico with an army of American frontiersmen! In addition to these elements, there was a company of American soldiers which had been engaged, under Zebulon Montgomery Pike and Augustus W. Magee, in dispersing the bandits collected by Menchaca.[104]

William Shaler apparently believed that the Secretary of State was fully cognizant of the activities which were arousing the people of Natchitoches; at least, a dispatch from Monroe dated May 2, 1812, contained the significant statement that the President approved of Shaler's course.[105] At the time that this letter was written, neither the President nor his Secretary of State could have known

[103] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 2, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[104] Menchaca's activities had aroused uneasiness among the merchants of Natchitoches. Claiborne asked General Wade Hampton to furnish military protection to guard the road to Nacogdoches. Claiborne to Hampton, New Orleans, January 20, 1812, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 35. Pike was ordered to clear the Neutral Ground and did so with the co-operation of Spanish troops from Nacogdoches. For accounts of robberies in the Neutral Ground, see the St. Louis *Louisiana Gazette*, September 19, 1811, January 18, March 28, and May 23, 1812.

[105] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, July 12, 1812, Shaler Papers.

just how far Shaler was preparing to go; but the envoy was acting in accordance with what he thought were the policies of the government.

There was no lack of volunteers willing to enter the adventure. While Davenport was busily assembling supplies,[106] recruits gathered for the trek across the Sabine. They came from the adventurers who remained in the Neutral Ground, from those who had looked with favor on the Aaron Burr expedition a few years before,[107] and from those whose desire for excitement and plunder made them fine material for a filibustering expedition. Among the capable officers and civilians who cast their lot with Gutiérrez were Lieutenant Augustus W. Magee of Fort Claiborne, Reuben Ross, Samuel Kemper, Henry Perry,[108] and Joseph B. Wilkinson, son of the famous general. It was even thought by some of the Spaniards that General James Wilkinson was to station a force of six thousand men on the Sabine to co-operate with Gutiérrez.[109] Shaler reported that "from Natches to Orleans many adventurers might be engaged."[110] Rumors circulating at Natchitoches agreed that the invading force would number about five hundred men.[111] General John Adair was gathering troops at Rapides in June, and more than a hundred men were assembled near the Sabine.[112] Very little urging was required to assemble an army which began to form in

[106] Walter Flavius McCaleb, "The First Period of the Gutiérrez-Magee Expedition," in *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association*, IV (1900–1901), 222.

[107] Walter Flavius McCaleb, *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy* (New York, 1903), 87.

[108] Henry Stuart Foote, *Texas and the Texans; or, Advance of the Anglo-Americans to the Southwest . . .* (Philadelphia, 1841), I, 186–87. Samuel Kemper, a well-known figure in West Florida, had been a carpenter in Fauquier County, Virginia; Reuben Ross had moved to Louisiana from Washington County, Virginia, where he had been a sheriff; Henry Perry, an army quartermaster, came from Connecticut. Washington *National Intelligencer*, September 4, 1813.

[109] Marcelo de Zoto to Montero, Bayou Pierre, June 2, 1812, AGN Salcedo, f. 117. Zoto was justice of the peace. Wilkinson had only 1,700 men or so, scattered and badly armed. James Ripley Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior, Major-General James Wilkinson* (New York, 1938), 277.

[110] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 7, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[111] Manuel de Salcedo to Nemesio de Salcedo, San Fernando de Béxar, September 22, 1812, AGN Salcedo, f. 206.

[112] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 23, 1812, Shaler Papers.

three different groups. One was composed of from three hundred to five hundred idlers; a second was somewhat more respectable and would consist of five hundred men from Mississippi; and a still more respectable force would be raised under the guidance of Reuben Smith, James Patterson, and J. McClanahan, the three traders mentioned previously by Shaler. All of these groups were expected to consolidate under one leader.[113]

Proclamations are an important part of any invasion and Gutiérrez did not neglect that method of preparing Texas for the raid. Early in June he sent a messenger to Nacogdoches with incendiary matter [114] which included copies of a letter from a Frenchman, Captain Bernard Despalier, and a tirade written by Toledo at Philadelphia. Toledo informed the Mexicans that the time had come to throw off the barbarous yoke under which they were laboring.[115] Despalier's letter announced to the Creoles that the projected invasion had the approval of the United States and would be assisted "with very powerful forces" from that country. Gutiérrez was said to have been offered aid by the rulers of Europe, and he had at hand all the forces and supplies necessary for a successful enterprise. Despalier was anticipating somewhat in reporting that the United States was at war with Spain and had taken possession of Pensacola and Mobile. The Anglo-American allies, he assured the Texans, were pledged "to enter our country with no object other than to aid us against the enemies who are opposed to our prosperity." [116] On June 18 a courier was sent to Nuevo Santander with proclamations, letters, and dispatches. Shaler advanced $100 for the expenses of the messenger, since by

[113] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1812, *ibid.*

[114] *Ibid.*

[115] The broadside is reproduced in Montero to Manuel de Salcedo, Nacogdoches, June 8, 1812, AGN Salcedo, ff. 123–24. Nacogdoches, with a tradition of foreign influence since 1778, was a good place to begin the propaganda. See Mattie Austin Hatcher, "Conditions in Texas Affecting the Colonization Problem, 1795–1801," in *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XXV (1921–1922), 94–96.

[116] Montero to Manuel de Salcedo, Nacogdoches, June 8, 1812, encl., AGN Salcedo, ff. 125–26.

this means he would learn within a month about conditions in Mexico.[117] Two more couriers were sent to Revilla to distribute revolutionary publications.[118]

With recruits assembling rapidly in June and July, and with the inhabitants of the Interior Provinces informed as to the course of events, there remained the question of a leader. Gutiérrez, of course, considered himself capable of leading the attack, but Shaler lost confidence in him as the plans matured. Gutiérrez suspected that Shaler was really a spy; while Shaler wrote sarcastically about the Mexican's "ridiculous flights of vanity" and his tendency to picture himself as the immortal hero of the struggle for independence.[119] General Adair was offered the command, according to rumors at Natchitoches, and his refusal caused a belief that he was to be in charge of "a larger and more regular force for the same purpose with the approbation of the government. . . ."[120] The choice finally fell upon Lieutenant Magee, with Gutiérrez in nominal command. The selection of Magee pleased Shaler:

> Mr. Magee the real commander of this expedition, with the rank of Colonel, is a native of Boston of about 24 years of age; he is very tall, very robust, of a handsome person and countenance, of a very commanding appearance as an officer and of prepossessing manners: he passes for one of the best informed officers of his age in the american army, and as far as I have been able to judge of his acquirements, he seems qualified to add lustre to the american name in the career he has chosen. He is accompanied by a number of young men of respectable characters and education.[121]

Shaler undoubtedly played a deciding role in the selection.

[117] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 23, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[118] Montero to Manuel de Salcedo, Nacogdoches, June 27, 1812, AGN Salcedo, f. 181. The couriers, Juan Galván and Felíx Arispe, were Spanish deserters.

[119] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, July 12, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[120] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 18, 1812, *ibid.*

[121] *Ibid.* Magee, a native of Massachusetts, graduated third in his class from West Point on June 15, 1808. He was commissioned second lieutenant in the artillerists on January 24, 1809, and resigned his commission on June 22, 1812. Francis Bernard Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, . . .* (Washington, 1903), I, 683.

Gestures Toward Neutrality

One may well wonder if Madison and Monroe had determined to disregard the neutrality law of 1794 which prohibited just such expeditions as that which was preparing at Natchitoches. Shaler, at least, was thinking in practical terms. Reports that General Ignacio Rayón had disrupted royalist communication between Mexico and Texas, and that the Spanish force had been withdrawn from the Sabine, made him believe that conditions were favorable for an invasion which would overthrow Spanish power and "open the Internal Provinces to our commerce." [122] If the United States did not wish "to tolerate such private military expeditions," Natchitoches would require immediate attention. A military post of five hundred men and a detachment of cavalry should be established on the Sabine, but Shaler was probably not suggesting that the frontier garrison should be used to disperse the filibusters. There was a possibility that in case of war with the United States, Great Britain would move the Cádiz government to Mexico and so expose the frontier to attack. Such an invasion could be avoided by arming, organizing, and otherwise aiding the patriots in the interior of the Mexican provinces. For this purpose five thousand men, with a reserve on the Sabine, would suffice.[123]

Gutiérrez promised that he would take no steps toward invading Texas without Shaler's approbation; but there was "reason to believe that the arrangement is [was] made, for him to join the expedition when assembled on the other side of the Sabine." There is a possibility that Shaler was somewhat in the dark concerning the arrangements made by Gutiérrez, but the following statement was altogether too naïve:

I hope Sir that my inability to give any thing more specific on affairs of this importance passing 'round me, may not be attributed to remissness on my

[122] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 7, 1812, Shaler Papers.
[123] *Ibid.*

part, for as I am suspected to be a public agent, and my opinions are well known, all such information is carefully kept from me.[124]

This statement appears even more ridiculous in view of the fact that Shaler enclosed a copy of a letter which he had helped Gutiérrez write to the patriot leaders.[125] Shaler became alarmed, or so he pretended, at the danger threatening the good name of the United States. He communicated with Governor Claiborne, transmitting all the information he had on the proposed raid, and prevailed upon the American commandant at Natchitoches to communicate with the officer commanding the district.[126] Despite his loss of confidence in Gutiérrez, Shaler believed that the expedition would succeed and that he would proceed to his destination "as soon as there appears to be a shadow of safety." [127] A deserter arriving from Nacogdoches a few days later reported that there would be no resistance there or at San Antonio. The news caused increased activity among the plotters and the expedition planned to get under way within a few days.[128]

Governor Claiborne entertained the typical Western viewpoint in regard to American expansion. Spain's Mexican provinces were alluringly close and Spain could not defend them. He believed that five thousand regulars and fifty thousand muskets in San Antonio would suffice to banish European influence from New Spain.[129] The governor was not too anxious to enforce neutrality; however, he did not want to be responsible for whatever game Madison and Monroe might be playing.

Governor Claiborne received Shaler's warning about the filibustering expedition as early as July 6. He believed that the raid would be postponed until the question of peace or war with Eng-

[124] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1812, *ibid.*

[125] *Ibid.*, encl.

[126] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 23, 1812, *ibid.*

[127] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, July 12, 1812, *ibid.*

[128] *Ibid.*, postscript of July 15. Shaler reported the arrival of reinforcements for Fort Claiborne.

[129] Claiborne to Paul Hamilton, New Orleans, January 23, 1812, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 37–38. Hamilton was Secretary of the Navy.

land was finally settled by Congress; moreover, only a few months had passed since the banditti had been dispersed in the Neutral Ground. Claiborne felt that his orders on that occasion fully covered the present threat.[130] He was aware that "a number of Americans desire to rendezvous at some point west of the Sabine and to join the revolutionary standard." General Adair was being mentioned as the leader of the invasion which would be attempted soon. Not being certain of Monroe's attitude, Claiborne was anxious to receive "orders from the government on this subject." In the meantime he thought it his duty to renew his "instructions to the civil officers at Natchitoches to be vigilant in preserving good order, and on in [*sic*] preventing a violation of the law, which forbids the set[t]ing on foot within the jurisdiction of the United States, a military expedition against the Dominions of a foreign state, at Peace with the United States." [131] There is no doubt that the governor regarded the project as a violation of domestic and international law. He went through the proper gestures to enforce the laws, but he might have been more energetic. However, his political enemies were numerous, especially in New Orleans, and they were "determined to throw every embarrassment" in Claiborne's way and "in the way also of public interest and safety." Although his sympathies were with the Mexican patriots, political considerations and uncertainty as to Monroe's attitude combined to weaken his position.[132] On July 30 and again on August 7, Claiborne wrote to Judge John Carr at Natchitoches to remind him that the neutrality act of 1794 prohibited the formation of such expeditions.[133] Wilkinson was asked on August 9 to order the officer commanding at Fort Claiborne to aid the civil authorities in preventing the expedition.[134] John Dick, the district attorney for Louisiana in

[130] Claiborne to Monroe, New Orleans, July 6, 1812, *ibid.*, IV, 122–23.

[131] Claiborne to Monroe, New Orleans, August 10, 1812, Miscellaneous Letters, August–September, 1812.

[132] *Ibid.*

[133] Claiborne to Judge Carr, New Orleans, August 7, 1812, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 149–50.

[134] Claiborne to Wilkinson, New Orleans, August 9, 1812, *ibid.*, 151–52.

1816, later explained that the entire army had assembled beyond the Sabine and that only a few arrests had been made.[135]

The filibusters who crossed the Sabine did so as hunters, but they became so numerous that Claiborne decided to act. On August 11, 1812, he issued his proclamation to caution the citizens of Louisiana not to enter the undertaking nor countenance it in any way. The act of June 5, 1794, was quoted to show that those engaged in such enterprises were guilty of high misdemeanors against the United States. The civil and military officers were ordered to be vigilant.[136] Three days after the proclamation was issued, Claiborne informed Judge Carr that many volunteers were on their way to Natchitoches; he asked that the officials take the proper measures.[137] Shaler regretted that the proclamation had not been issued a month sooner when it might have done some good. Coming as late as it did, the warning would merely be an irritant and would not arrest the progress of the expedition.[138]

Monroe, likewise, was fully aware of the threatened invasion. Shaler had reported faithfully. Claiborne had asked for advice. Onís had protested. Officially, the Secretary of State followed the proper course. Territorial governors and district attorneys were warned that the projected "visit" was repugnant to the United States and positively forbidden by law.[139] He asked the governor of Tennessee to discourage citizens of that state from gathering with the intention of invading New Spain.[140] But Spanish representatives were not satisfied with American efforts to maintain neutrality. Onís felt that all of his protests had been in vain. Toledo and Gutiérrez had conversed with American officials; munitions and a printing press were on their way to Texas; two thousand Anglo-American vagabonds in New Orleans had been supplied

[135] Dick to Monroe, New Orleans, March 1, 1816, in *Annals of the Congress of the United States* (Washington, 1834–1856), XXXIV (1819), 1653–54.

[136] Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 229–30.

[137] Claiborne to Judge Carr, New Orleans, August 14, 1812, *ibid.*, 163–64.

[138] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 25, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[139] Monroe to Governor Howard, September 3, 1812, Domestic Letters, XVI, 199.

[140] Monroe to the Governor of Tennessee, September 3, 1812, *ibid.*

with weapons; Adair was employed in the insurgent army; and three hundred Anglo-American officers were in Mexico aiding Ignacio Rayón. Upon sending this mixture of rumor and fact to the captain general of Cuba and the Two Floridas, Onís expressed the hope that severe treatment would be meted out to those who might be captured in Spanish territory.[141]

Diego Morphy, Spanish consul in New Orleans, was not very prompt in protesting to Claiborne, but the report that one hundred men had been equipped in New Orleans and were ready to march for Nacogdoches was too much for his patience. He protested vigorously against permitting bodies of armed men to form in Louisiana for an attack against Nacogdoches. It was, he observed, very strange that such activities could be carried on in New Orleans under Claiborne's very eyes.[142] Claiborne advised him to communicate the matter under oath to Judge Dominick A. Hall.[143] Morphy was indignant. Those who had given him the information could not be expected to testify publicly on such a matter, and his own instructions prohibited his addressing any other than the executive authority.[144] And there the matter rested.

The conclusion seems to be justified that Gutiérrez was sent back to Texas with the understanding that he would execute an invasion of the Interior Provinces. American officials provided him with funds and transportation from Washington to Natchitoches. William Shaler was his adviser from the time he left New Orleans until the expedition crossed the Sabine. Recruiting was carried on at Natchitoches with little attempt at secrecy, and Shaler's warnings to Monroe were but poorly camouflaged reports on the progress being made. Claiborne and Shaler acted under the belief that they were carrying out the desires of Madison and Monroe,

[141] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, October 4, 1812, AGI PC, leg. 1837.

[142] Diego Morphy to Claiborne, New Orleans, October 19, 1812, *ibid.*, leg. 1836.

[143] Claiborne to Murphy [Morphy], New Orleans, October 20, 1812, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 193.

[144] Morphy to Claiborne, New Orleans, October 21, 1812, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

and there is little evidence to show that they were wrong in that belief. Claiborne refrained from issuing his proclamation until the invaders were out of reach. Fully aware that a violation of Spanish territory was being planned at Natchitoches, American officials in Louisiana and Washington failed to take effective measures against the leaders of the project.

Chapter 2

The Great Invasion of Texas

First Successes

Governor Salcedo, with every reason to be alarmed for the safety of his province, asked the viceroy for reinforcements. The flood of propaganda from Natchitoches, he complained, was likely to have very harmful effects on the simple people under his care, nor could his troops be trusted to resist the seductive promises of the insurgents.[1] The Anglo-Americans were adept at clever propaganda, but their real purpose was to establish themselves so firmly in Texas as to defy expulsion.[2]

Salcedo's fears were well founded. Information that the people and troops at Nacogdoches were favorably disposed toward the patriot cause encouraged preparations at Natchitoches. Volunteers were still streaming toward the Sabine and Texas when Colonel Magee, to give him his new title, left Natchitoches on August 2 to join his little army. A skirmish occurred west of the river on August 7 between Magee's "advanced piquets" and a party of Spaniards who lost two killed and fourteen prisoners or deserters. This encounter was the signal for the main army to follow. On August 8, 1812, Colonel Magee crossed the Sabine at the head of his entire force of about "one hundred and thirty effective men armed with rifles and shot guns, and pursued the Spaniards on the road to Nacogdoches. . . ." Approximately three hundred Spaniards were reported as comprising the retreating force.[3]

[1] Manuel de Salcedo to the Viceroy, San Fernando de Béxar, June 25, 1812, AGN Salcedo, ff. 110–11.

[2] Salcedo to the Viceroy, San Fernando de Béxar, August 17, 1812, *ibid.*, ff. 185–87.

[3] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 18, 1812, Shaler Papers. In addition to Montero, the luckless Spanish commanders of the defending forces were Juan Zambrano,

The great moment had come for Don José Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara. His labors of more than a year were crowned with success, but he was strangely reluctant to leave the security of Natchitoches. When the hesitant revolutionist finally departed on August 10 to join the army, he was "evidently under the influence of fear: he seemed to be the only person who doubted of the success of his own enterprize." [4] Shaler was disgusted and resolved "that if he should return to give him no further countenance." [5] The invaders had little to fear from the royalist forces at Nacogdoches. The Spaniards retreated to the temporary refuge of Trinidad on August 11 [6] where they joined Captain Ysidro de la Garza's thirty-seven poorly armed men.[7] Many of the royalist troops remained at Nacogdoches to join the patriots, and when five regulars deserted from Trinidad, the retreat was continued to Navasoto, sixteen leagues away.[8] Magee's forces enjoyed a cordial welcome when they entered Nacogdoches on August 12. Fifty Spanish regulars and about 190 townspeople joined the "patriots." A considerable quantity of booty was obtained, including valuable military stores.[9]

The fall of Nacogdoches had a salutary effect on the rebel cause.

Victor Blanco, and Francisco Montes. Christoval Domingues to Francisco Montes, Nacogdoches, June 24, 1812, in Eugene C. Barker (ed.), "The Austin Papers," in American Historical Association, *Annual Report*, 1919 (Washington, 1924), Vol. II, Pt. 1, p. 215. The term "Spaniards" was generally applied to royalist troops, whether Mexicans or Peninsulars.

[4] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 18, 1812, Shaler Papers. George P. Garrison erroneously attributed the first successes to Gutiérrez, and stated that Magee was not with him but was "busy recruiting and sending forward reinforcements." *Texas, A Contest of Civilizations* (Boston and New York, 1903), 118.

[5] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 18, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[6] Manuel de Salcedo to Bustamante, San Fernando de Béxar, August 17, 1812, AGN Salcedo, ff. 188–89.

[7] Salcedo to the Viceroy, San Fernando de Béxar, September 24, 1812, *ibid.*, ff. 194–98.

[8] *Ibid.* Montero arrived at San Fernando on September 2. There is little agreement as to the number of Spanish troops who retreated and who remained to desert. Morphy reported that Zambrano had about 200 men, that Magee entered Nacogdoches with about 180 men on August 11, and that Gutiérrez followed on August 12. Morphy to Onís, New Orleans, September 7, 1812, encl. in Onís to Pezuela, Philadelphia, October 5, 1812 (No. 134), AHN Estado, leg. 5556, ex. 30.

[9] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 18, 1812, Shaler Papers.

Merchants at Natchitoches had at first been opposed to the Mexican Revolution, but now they hastened "to offer their services" and the patriots were assured of a source of supplies.[10] The reason for this change in attitude was probably the chance to profit in the trade that would result. Approximately $100,000 worth of property in wool, horses, mules, and specie had been assembled at Nacogdoches for safety.[11] The patriots took good care of the captured property! Two hundred mules "loaded with wool and other booty" were expected to arrive at Natchitoches in exchange for arms and other supplies.[12] The expectation was fulfilled and the mules were "in constant employ bringing in the booty, and carrying out stores for the expedition." One agent spent his entire time in "procuring supplies from Natchez, and elsewhere." [13]

Shaler had high hopes for the success of the invasion. Magee and his fellow officers maintained good discipline among the troops, while Gutiérrez was docile and filled with good intentions.[14] Shaler expected San Antonio to fall within a month and then he could begin his journey into Texas.[15] Within two months all of Texas should be in the hands of the patriots and "communication with the interior of Mexico" would be open.[16] Parties of men constantly arrived at Nacogdoches from Natchez and other points, and a force of five hundred men was expected.[17] The trickle became a stream and the stream became a torrent:

> The business of volunteering for New Spain has become a perfect mania; I hear of parties proceeding thither from all quarters, and they are constantly

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 25, 1812, *ibid.*

[13] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 5, 1812, *ibid.* Onís again protested to Monroe, denouncing the invaders for having stolen some 500 mules and more than 200 sacks of wool. Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, November 5, 1812, Spanish Notes (National Archives), III.

[14] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 25 and September 5, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[15] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 18, 1812, *ibid.*

[16] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 5, 1812, *ibid.*

[17] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 18, 1812, *ibid.* Magee's forces had increased to 450 men by September 5.

passing thro' this village from Natches: Several young gentlemen of very respectable characters and acquirements have gone on. I suppose the volunteer force cannot now be rated under 600 americans: generally good soldiers, and there is every appearance of its becoming very respectable in a short time: equal even to the intire conquest of the Province of Texas.[18]

Nothing in Shaler's dispatches more clearly expressed his attitude toward Spain's power in Mexico than the following statement:

The volunteer expedition from the most insignificant begining is growing into an irresistable torrent that will sweep the crazy remains of Spanish Government from the Internal Provinces, and open Mexico to the political influence of the U. S. and to the talents and enterprize of our citizens: at least I see no probable obstacle to such results, but a powerful auxilliary aid to the old government from Great Britain.[19]

Gutiérrez again prepared proclamations which were sent to strategic points. A proclamation of September 1, copies of which were seized at San Antonio three weeks later, informed the "beloved compatriots, neighbors, and inhabitants of the Mexican Kingdom" that Gutiérrez had thousands of men at his disposal and was "in command of a large army of valorous Americans and volunteers. . . ." His purposes were to establish an independent nation with a democratic form of government, to free commerce from its restrictions, and to promote agriculture and the arts.[20] The "Notice" to the "Beloved and Honored Compatriots who live in the Province of Texas" promised that "very powerful assistance is coming to us by land and by sea, troops and whatever else we must have and desire." The days of horror and calamity were to disappear forever.[21]

Having secured the booty of Nacogdoches, the invaders, with their effective force increased to about seven hundred men, prepared to move in detachments to Trinidad, where final arrange-

[18] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, October 1, 1812, *ibid.*

[19] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, October 5, 1812, *ibid.*

[20] Proclamation of Gutiérrez, Nacogdoches, September 1, 1812, encl. in Manuel de Salcedo to Nemesio de Salcedo, San Fernando de Béxar, September 22, 1812, AGN Salcedo, f. 201.

[21] *Ibid.*, f. 203.

ments would be made to march against San Antonio.[22] The main part of the army left Nacogdoches on September 13, with the intention of remaining at Trinidad until October 1 when the march to San Antonio would begin.[23] The capital of the province was thrown into confusion by the prospective advance of the Anglo-Americans and their allies. Salcedo imprisoned many who were suspected sympathizers; five hundred of his soldiers could not be relied on.[24] Moreover, a report from Mexico stated that Camargo and Nuevo Santander were the scenes of serious uprisings, and a patriot army was marching against Coahuila.[25] It would be difficult to send reinforcements to San Antonio under such conditions. Prospects for Magee's success were indeed bright. Salcedo withdrew his outposts to San Antonio [26] and reports reached the patriots that Simón de Herrera had replaced Salcedo as governor, a charge which, if true, would give the patriots a friend at the capital.[27] Magee hastened his preparations, and his breaking camp on October 19 caused Shaler to believe that the time had come to ask Monroe for a general passport. It was not proper, he thought, to show the papers he then had, but some means should be available to secure the respect due a public agent. Shaler intended to proceed to San Antonio, where he might obtain information for the United States and exercise an influence in the councils of the patriots.[28]

John Hamilton Robinson's Mission to New Spain

Colonel Magee was making arrangements to continue the expedition when John Hamilton Robinson appeared to worry the patriots. Robinson was a physician who had moved to St. Louis from Virginia in 1804 as a young man of twenty-two. He was

[22] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 5, 1812, Shaler Papers.
[23] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 17, 1812, *ibid.*
[24] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 5, 1812, *ibid.*
[25] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 17, 1812, *ibid.*
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, October 5, 1812, *ibid.*
[28] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, November 10, 1812, *ibid.* Monroe sent the passport on February 5, 1813. Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 3, 1813, *ibid.*

well educated, mature beyond his years, and brave to the point of rashness. Lieutenant Zebulon Montgomery Pike, one of the Far West's great explorers, held him in high regard and was lavish in his praise.[29] When General James Wilkinson sent Pike to explore Louisiana Territory and to secure information about the Interior Provinces, he authorized Robinson to accompany the expedition as a volunteer physician.[30] When Pike's party reached the Conejos River in February, 1807, Robinson went on alone to Santa Fe ostensibly to press for the payment of claims which a trader at Kaskaskia held against his former agent.[31] The Spaniards, doing exactly what Robinson hoped and expected, sent him on to Chihuahua.[32] There he failed to impress the authorities with his feigned intention of becoming a Spanish citizen,[33] and they sent him back to Natchitoches with Lieutenant Pike, who had allowed himself to be captured.[34]

Pike, as has been noted, was engaged in operations against the bandits of the Neutral Ground early in 1812. He was in Washington in June of that year and recommended Robinson as a special agent for a mission to Nemesio Salcedo at Chihuahua.[35] Monroe acted on Pike's recommendation and instructed Robinson to pass through the Neutral Ground to observe conditions and then to proceed to Chihuahua. He was to confer with Nemesio Salcedo as

[29] Elliott Coues (ed.), *The Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike,* . . . (New York, 1895), II, 498–99.

[30] James Wilkinson to Lieutenant Z. M. Pike, Cantonment [Bellefontaine], Missouri, July 12, 1806, *ibid.*, 566.

[31] *Ibid.*, 498–502; Louis Houck, *A History of Missouri* . . . (Chicago, 1908), III, 81.

[32] Pike and his party had been captured in the meantime and the entire group arrived at Chihuahua together. Coues (ed.), *The Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike,* II, 622 *et seq.*

[33] Robinson to Nemesio de Salcedo, April 8 and 23, 1807, encl. in Salcedo to Robinson, January 23, 1813, AHN Estado, leg. 5557.

[34] Coues (ed.), *The Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike,* II, 667 *et seq.* Robinson remained at Bellefontaine as an army surgeon from 1808 to 1810. Houck, *A History of Missouri,* III, 81. Pike's expedition, including Robinson's part in it, is treated in Isaac Joslin Cox, "Opening the Santa Fe Trail," in *Missouri Historical Review,* XXV (1930), 30–66.

[35] Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in *loc. cit.*, 208–209.

to the best means of suppressing the banditti and preventing future assemblages. The action of the United States in Florida was to be explained and the announcement made that East Florida might be occupied to prevent British seizure and Indian troubles. The main purpose of the mission seems to have been to open friendly relations with the Interior Provinces.[36] Onís believed that Robinson's appointment was for the purpose of fomenting the revolution in New Spain,[37] although the latter told Félix Trudeaux, Spanish vice consul at Natchez, that his purpose was to disapprove the conduct of Gutiérrez and to order the Anglo-Americans back into the United States. Trudeaux quite properly observed that the United States had not lacked opportunities to disrupt the venture at its inception.[38]

Robinson soon set out on his mission. He arrived at Natchitoches on or about October 5, 1812, and communicated with Shaler. He planned to leave at once for Texas, but Shaler thought he was marching "too far in the rear of events." The expedition had become a torrent which would sweep away the remains of Spanish government in the Interior Provinces,[39] leaving the new agent accredited to a nonexistent entity. Robinson's appearance at Nacogdoches caused both alarm and anxiety.[40] He explained, when taken before Magee on October 15, that he was on a public mission; but the patriots feared that his real purpose was "to take possession of the Country in the name of the United States. . . ." Magee and all of his companions would oppose such action—at least they made that pretense. A council of war on October 16 decided to release

[36] Monroe to Robinson, Department of State, July 1, 1812, Mexico, Filibustering. Monroe drew $1,056 from the Foreign Intercourse Fund for Robinson's expenses. Monroe to the Secretary of the Treasury, Department of State, July—, 1812, Domestic Letters, XVI, 68.

[37] Onís to Ignacio de la Pezuela, Philadelphia, October 27, 1812, AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 2.

[38] Onís to the Viceroy, Philadelphia, January 5, 1813, AGN ND, II, f. 199.

[39] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, October 5, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[40] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, October 24, 1812, *ibid.* The Anglo-American "patriots" remained suspicious of Robinson even after his return from Mexico.

Robinson, and he was allowed to proceed after signing a pledge not to reveal to the royalists anything he had learned about the invaders.[41]

Both Herrera and Salcedo gave Robinson a cordial reception when he arrived at San Antonio on October 30, and provided an escort for a short distance on the road to Monclova when he left.[42] Pike had given his friend a letter to Herrera which adds to the proof that the United States was attempting to forestall any attack from the Spanish provinces while at war with Great Britain:

> Our old *friend* Doctor Robinson will hand you this. His mission to your country is of an amicable nature and is intended to prevent our Spanish American Brethren from taking an unfriendly stand against us during the present contest between us and Great Britain.
>
> We have put on foot an army of 85,000 men, and at the disposal of the President 100,000 more, when he may deem it necessary to call them into service.[43]

Robinson had done much to damage Magee's chances of success.[44] The agent did inform Herrera that the revolutionists were west of Trinidad and planned to attack San Antonio.[45]

A few days after Robinson's arrival at Monclova, orders came from Salcedo at Chihuahua to send him on by the dangerous northern route. Cordero, royalist commander at Monclova, furnished an escort and Robinson arrived at Chihuahua safely on December 11.[46] The negotiations with Nemesio Salcedo produced nothing but ill will.[47] An agent from the revolutionary junta of

[41] Robinson to Monroe, Washington City, July 26, 1813, Mexico, Filibustering.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] Pike to Colonel Herrera, Washington City, June 28, 1812, Historia, Operaciones de Guerra, Realistos, 1810–1817 (Archivo General y Público de la Nación, Mexico), tomo 43–H, f. 100. Hereafter cited as AGN OG.

[44] Davenport's Report in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, December 25, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[45] Simón de Herrera to Francisco Xavier Venegas, San Fernando de Béxar, October 28, 1812, AGN OG, tomo 43–H, f. 99.

[46] Robinson to Monroe, Washington, July 26, 1813, Mexico, Filibustering.

[47] For details see Cox, "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents," in *loc. cit.*, 211–13.

Guanajuato approached Robinson to deliver a message asking for aid from the United States, and an agent from New Mexico assured him that the people there were friendly toward the United States and were willing to add that province to Louisiana.[48] On his return journey, Robinson stopped at Presidio del Norte on the Río Grande, where he offered to mediate between the rebels and the government, but the overture was refused.[49] It was here that he met Ignacio Elizondo, the same officer who had betrayed and captured Hidalgo. Elizondo was suffering from a serious illness and Robinson's professional services were most welcome. Apparently, the Mexican Judas was still inclined to view the rebel cause with favor, for he told Robinson:

I have always been known to be friendly to the Revolution. The Capt. Gen. procured this Commission for me, rather through fear than love for me, and I accepted it rather to oppose a Banditti, than oppose anything which would tend to emancipate us from European Tyranny, but Sir, if the President of your Government will extend to us his hand, even his countenance, we shall be Free.[50]

Everything was in confusion at San Antonio when Robinson reached the capital on his way back to Natchitoches. The officers bitterly condemned Nemesio Salcedo for not having provided sufficient forces to repel the repeated Indian raids.[51] Robinson continued to Natchitoches and arrived there on April 7 "after a perilous and fatiguing voyage," with the intention of leaving at once for Washington.[52] His trip had inspired him with a desire to become a filibuster in the belief that an expedition to Texas could be successful. He received encouragement from Toledo, who was then at Natchitoches, and decided to lay his plans before the government when he returned to Washington "and desist from them if disapproved of. . . ." [53] Monroe decided that Robinson's services

[48] Robinson to Monroe, Washington, July 26, 1813, Mexico, Filibustering.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] *Ibid.*
[52] Robinson to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 12, 1813, *ibid.*
[53] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 2, 1813, Shaler Papers.

were no longer required and that he need not continue to Washington.[54] Robinson's failure to accomplish anything justified his being dropped from the service. His mission served only to increase Spanish suspicions of the United States and to determine Robinson himself to become a filibuster.[55]

The Siege of La Bahía

Salcedo was not inactive while Magee was making ready to attack San Antonio. He withdrew his forces from La Bahía, the present Goliad, and concentrated them on the road from Nacogdoches to San Antonio at a position on the Guadalupe River, twelve leagues from the capital.[56] This maneuver caused Magee and Gutiérrez to attack La Bahía instead of the capital. La Bahía, practically undefended, was taken easily on November 7, 1812. The inhabitants offered no opposition; instead, they asked Gutiérrez to form a government for Texas with Americans in command of the towns.[57] In spite of this favorable attitude, Shaler believed that Magee had made a mistake since the royalists would have time to bring up forces and so protract the campaign.[58] Salcedo, pursuing the patriots to La Bahía, arrived before the village six days after the invaders took possession.[59] Magee was jubilant and eager to fight when he wrote to Shaler:

> We are in possession of this place, and our enemy in sight. They are a rascally set of treacherous cowards. God never made greater villains. I have tried to get a fight out of them. Yesterday we killed 7 or 8 and wounded many. I had sent Captain Slocum and eighteen men to dare them to fight[:] he was opposed to one hundred and fifty. We had one man killed, or rather

[54] Monroe to Robinson, Department of State, June 25, 1813, Domestic Letters, XVI, 92.

[55] Onís blamed Robinson for the desertions in San Antonio which, he charged, enabled the rebels to take that city. Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, September 7, 1813, Spanish Notes, III.

[56] Davenport's Report in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, December 25, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[57] Gutiérrez to Shaler, La Bahía, November 25, 1812, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, December 25, 1812, *ibid.*

[58] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, November 29, 1812, *ibid.*

[59] Davenport's Report in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, December 25, 1812, *ibid.*

butchered as they killed him after they took him, and one wounded. Nothing has taken place to day. The fort is a square stone work with two bastions. Each side is one hundred yards long, it contains a large well built stone church, one building a hundred feet long for quarters, and a guard house. We have plenty of beef and bread and do not want; if they were not so treacherous.[60]

The pugnacious Magee soon had plenty to worry him. Salcedo and Herrera were joined by reinforcements that increased the royalist forces to a strength of at least eight hundred men.[61] Desertions from the patriot ranks caused Magee to call a meeting of his officers, at which a decision was reached to propose that Herrera and Salcedo allow the Americans to retire. At a resulting conference with the royalist commanders the proposal was accepted on condition that no pardon would be granted to Mexicans who had joined the revolution. The Americans then determined "to die with their arms in their hands rather than deliver up a single individual of the government that had taken up arms with them. . . ." Hostilities were resumed on November 23.[62]

Samuel Davenport, the unfaithful Spanish Indian agent who had accompanied Magee with the rank of captain, left La Bahía on November 25 to look after his affairs in Nacogdoches. When he arrived at Natchitoches on December 17, he delivered letters which caused Shaler to despair for the expedition. Magee wrote that the people were treacherous and he could depend on no one but his Americans. His hopes of effecting a revolution were blasted, but he could still open a road wherever he wished to go. Gutiérrez had proposed that the United States take possession of the country to the Río Grande, according to the desire of the inhabitants,[63] but he imposed two conditions: that Shaler continue to guide him and

[60] A. W. Magee to Shaler, La Bahía, November 14, 1812, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, November 29, 1812, *ibid.*

[61] Washington *National Intelligencer*, February 25, 1813.

[62] Davenport's Report in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, December 25, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[63] Magee to Shaler, La Bahía, November 25, 1812, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, December 25, 1812, *ibid.*

that a military force be sent quickly.[64] Shaler reassured Magee with the prophecy that war with Spain would be declared, and stated that if the patriots could take San Antonio, "then the situation of your Mexican friends will be eligible, and your prospects fair." [65]

After the failure of negotiations, Salcedo launched an ineffectual attack against the fort. Magee countered with a night attack on November 25 which the Spaniards repulsed at considerable loss to themselves.[66] Reuben Ross was then sent to Nacogdoches to guide Indian and white volunteers to La Bahía and to deny rumors of a republican defeat.[67] This force was to rendezvous at Trinidad on January 25, 1813; [68] but when the Caddo chief arrived at Natchitoches he refused to serve under any but the American flag.[69] Rumors were heard that two hundred Alabamas, Conchattas, and Choctaws were waiting for Ross at the Trinity; [70] but efforts to enlist Indians failed for the most part, largely because of the efforts of the Caddo chief.[71]

Colonel Magee was ill when Ross left La Bahía. Lack of ability, illness, or some other reason, caused the army to lose confidence in him. He even ordered a retreat, but when the officers started to pack the order was withdrawn. Samuel Kemper would succeed to the command in case of Magee's death. Gutiérrez had the title of general, but did nothing except "to give a Mexican character to the army." [72] On February 6, 1813, "the Colonel was called on

[64] Gutiérrez to Shaler, La Bahía, November 25, 1812, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, December 25, 1812, *ibid.*

[65] Shaler to Magee, Natchitoches, December 20, 1812, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, December 25, 1812, *ibid.*

[66] Washington *National Intelligencer*, February 23, 1813.

[67] D. W. C. Baker, *A Texas Scrap-Book* (New York, 1875), 225.

[68] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, January 10, 1813, Shaler Papers. Ross left La Bahía December 22 and arrived at Natchitoches on January 9. Up to that time the patriot losses had been slight.

[69] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, February 6, 1813, *ibid.*

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 3, 1813, *ibid.*

[72] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, January 10, 1813, *ibid.*

command in another world." [73] Gutiérrez was not sorry to lose his companion and remembered him with distaste:

> [Magee] was a vile traitor as was afterwards shown by his wickedness in promising to sell me to Salcedo for fifteen thousand pesos and the position of colonel in the Royalist ranks. For this reason he was always opposed to my using strategy and other means by which I could have harmed the enemy greatly. But the divine Omnipotence who always favored us, permitted this villain to fall sick and die, as a result of some poison which he had taken to avoid being shot.[74]

The siege of La Bahía drew to a close quickly after Magee's death. The decisive engagement on February 10 began when Captain Miguel Menchaca was given seventy men and placed in a position to trap the advance guard of the royalists. A fog obscured the action until an hour after sunrise and then the engagement became general.[75] Salcedo attacked with more than a thousand men but was repulsed with a loss of fifty-one prisoners and two hundred killed and wounded.[76] Another attack on February 13 was likewise repulsed and the Spanish army was thrown into confusion.[77] The royalists retreated six days later, leaving the patriots "in full possession of allmost the whole Province." The invaders, unprepared for pursuit, allowed Salcedo's army to straggle back to San Antonio without serious embarrassment.[78]

The astonishing success of the filibusters at La Bahía once more caused Shaler to see the desired result of his plans. He was on good

[73] Anonymous to Sibley, La Bahía, March 5, 1813, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 3, 1813, *ibid.*

[74] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 12. An incorrect account states that Reuben Kemper succeeded Magee in command. J. F. H. Claiborne, *Mississippi as a Province, Territory and State*, . . . (Jackson, 1880), 310.

[75] William Fisher to Anonymous, La Bahía, February 15, 1813, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, March 13, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[76] Anonymous to Sibley, La Bahía, March 5, 1813, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 3, 1813, *ibid.*

[77] Washington *National Intelligencer*, May 8, 1813.

[78] Anonymous to Sibley, La Bahía, March 5, 1813, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 3, 1813, Shaler Papers.

terms with the leaders and they understood what was expected of them:

> Our republican friends of intelligence are eager to form a treaty of friendship and intercourse with the U. S. as soon as circumstances will permit; the reciprocal advantages of such a treaty are incalculable, and I trust the day is not distant when this desirable object may be effected with honor to both Republics.[79]

The extent of Shaler's complicity in the expedition does not necessarily appear in the following extract, but there is ample reason to suspect that he thought himself in control of the situation:

> If the revolution in the Province of Texas is now conducted with only a little address, its success seems certain, and its effects on the general revolution in Mexico must be incalculably great. Don Bernardo has been informed of the importance of giving the most liberal encouragement to foreign commerce, and of the facility of em[p]tying the magazines of Jamaica and New Providence into the Port of Matagorda. . . . Nothing now Sir prevents me from proceeding on my journey but the fear of being regarded as a partizan in the revolution, and thereby committing the government: these reasons I think will soon cease by the submission of San Antonio.[80]

But the fall of San Antonio brought with it a series of events which the impatient agent could not foresee.

Arredondo's Preparations to Recover Texas

Spanish officers in Texas realized before the filibuster was actually on the march that they had inadequate forces to meet the Anglo-American "hunters" and their allies. Governor Manuel de Salcedo mobilized his forces, and his frantic requests for reinforcements from the other provinces resulted in about two hundred men being sent to aid in the siege of La Bahía. Royalist officers had plenty to do in attempting to defeat rebel leaders in Mexico south of the Río Grande. Arredondo, the most competent royalist officer, withdrew troops from Nuevo Santander to aid in the cam-

[79] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 3, 1813, *ibid.*
[80] *Ibid.*

paigns he was conducting. Don Ramón Díaz de Bustamante, ad interim governor of Nuevo Santander and governor of Nuevo León, was jealous of Arredondo and displayed little desire to co-operate in the defense of New Spain. He complained, with reason, that his forces were so depleted that he found it impossible to aid Salcedo in the siege of La Bahía. He did find it possible to raise some 250 men whom he expected to send into Texas to join the reinforcements from Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya.[81]

The commandant at Aguayo, Juan Fermín de Juanicotena, informed Arredondo that the situation in Texas was truly serious and his whole division would be required to suppress the rebels.[82] Arredondo decided to march at once to oppose the "infamous Bernardo Gutiérrez," although his army was weary from previous exertions.[83] Bustamante, unable to see any reason for Arredondo's advance into Texas, recommended that his rival should operate against rebel forces in the region of San Luis Potosí.[84] Arredondo then complained that Bustamante had been deceived and could have won a victory at La Bahía had he co-operated effectively with Salcedo.[85]

The fall of San Antonio acted as a means of co-ordinating royalist efforts. A refugee from the capital arrived at Monterrey on April 6 to inform Bustamante of the disaster.[86] This information caused Bustamante to urge Arredondo to push his advance and he promised that reinforcements would be gathered at Laredo.[87]

[81] Bustamante to Félix María Calleja, Camargo, January 19, 1813, AGN Arredondo, III, ff. 326–27. Calleja was viceroy from 1813 to 1816. José Joaquín de Arredondo y Mioño, Cavallero del Orden de Calatrava, Coronel del Reximiento Ynfª de Vera Cruz, Governador Político y Militar de la Provincia del Nuevo Santander, was appointed by Calleja as Comandante General de las Provincias Internas Orientales. Calleja to Bustamante, Mexico, [May 25], 1813, *ibid.*, f. 322.

[82] Juanicotena to Arredondo, Aguayo, March 10, 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 205–206.

[83] Arredondo to Venegas, Valle del Maís, March 21, 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 216–18.

[84] Bustamante to Arredondo, Monterrey, March 30, 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 236–37.

[85] Arredondo to Calleja, Aguayo, April 19, 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 222–27.

[86] Deposition of Guillermo Saldaña, Laredo, April 6, 1813, encl. in Bustamante to Arredondo, Monterrey, April 8, 1813, *ibid.*, f. 240.

[87] Bustamante to Arredondo, Monterrey, April 8, 1813, *ibid.*

Arredondo had reached Aguayo where a council of war decided that Bustamante should be allowed to handle the situation in his own way, but the decision was reversed when the royalists learned that San Antonio had fallen.[88] The merchants of Altamira were asked to contribute 40,000 pesos to equip the army, but only 5,500 pesos were obtained.[89] A proclamation to the people of Nuevo Santander warned them against the intrigues of the invaders who planned to take Texas, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Nuevo Santander.[90] Nemesio Salcedo at Chihuahua ordered his forces to cooperate with Arredondo.[91] A portion of the army was sent forward from Aguayo on May 6 to effect a junction with the troops from Coahuila at Laredo. A delay occurred at Laredo while an uprising at Refugio was suppressed and horses were obtained for the cavalry.[92] Arredondo sent an officer to Revilla to prevent an Indian uprising and to capture Gutiérrez de Lara's wife and family, but the prey escaped and made their way to San Antonio.[93]

The Fall of San Antonio

Kemper and Gutiérrez remained at La Bahía for a month after the royalists retreated to San Antonio. The final stage of the conquest began on March 19,[94] with an effective force of about eight hundred men.[95] No opposition was met with until the invaders had arrived within eight miles of San Antonio. Then, at a place near the Rosillo, Herrera's army of twelve hundred men attacked in full force on March 29. Samuel Kemper and Reuben Ross led

[88] Arredondo to Calleja, Aguayo, April 19, 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 222–27.

[89] Arredondo to the Viceroy, Aguayo, April 24, 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 269–71.

[90] Arredondo to Calleja, Aguayo, April 26, 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 299–300. The viceroy put an end to the quarrel between Bustamante and Arredondo by appointing the latter to take Simón de Herrera's place as Commanding General of the Eastern Interior Provinces.

[91] Nemesio de Salcedo to Arredondo, Chihuahua, May 2, 1813, *ibid.*, f. 324.

[92] Arredondo to Calleja, Linares, May 11, 1813, *ibid.*, f. 320.

[93] Arredondo to Calleja, Laredo, July 11, 1813, *ibid.*, IV, ff. 74–76.

[94] Manuel de Salcedo to Miguel Serrano, San Fernando de Béxar, March 23, 1813, *ibid.*, III, f. 239. Serrano was commandant at Laredo.

[95] Anonymous to Sibley, La Bahía, March 5, 1813, postscript of March 12, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 3, 1813, Shaler Papers.

a furious charge which changed the battle into a complete rout after a half hour of combat.[96] "The valor and intrepidity of the american volunteers," Shaler boasted, "reflects honor on the national character. Several officers particularly Major Ross exhibited in single combat with Spanish officers the most romantic gallantry." [97]

The royalist defeat was complete, and effective resistance was at an end. Kemper and Gutiérrez led their forces to the Alamo where they camped and opened negotiations with Herrera and Salcedo for the capitulation of San Antonio.[98] The Spanish commanders suggested twelve provisions as terms of surrender,[99] but the patriots demanded and received an unconditional capitulation. The officers and members of the cabildo, or town council, were required to surrender in a body.[100] Kemper, Ross, and other American officers dined with Salcedo and passed the night of April 1 with him, "while Bernardo penned himself up with the army in the stone enclosures of the Mission *de las Alomas* one and a half mile distant. . . ." This indiscretion was bad enough, but Shaler regretted, too, that the republicans overlooked "the most flattering and brilliant circumstance of victory, that of requiring the vanquished to pile their arms before the conquerors. . . ." Governor Salcedo disarmed his men in their barracks on April 2.[101] Eight hundred men and officers of the royalist army joined the revolution.[102]

An act of barbarism soon occurred which cast opprobrium on the patriot cause and justified Shaler's fear that Gutiérrez would be "a just object of dread if he should come into the possession of un-

[96] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 7, 1813, *ibid.*

[97] *Ibid.*

[98] Gutiérrez to Shaler, St. Fernando, April 11, 1813, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 14, 1813, *ibid.*

[99] The terms proposed may be found in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, *ibid.*

[100] *Ibid.*

[101] *Ibid.*

[102] *Lamar Papers*, I, 280.

controuled power." [103] Some of the officers escaped from San Antonio with three hundred men,[104] but fourteen Spanish officers remained as prisoners. Herrera and Salcedo were charged with having bribed Elizondo to betray Hidalgo and with having lured Captain José Menchaca to San Antonio to be executed. The Menchaca family was influential in gaining a verdict of death for the defendants.[105] The Americans did not know that the verdict was so severe and believed that the prisoners, who left under guard on April 3, were to be conducted to Matagorda where they would be placed on a vessel, or would be imprisoned at La Bahía. The captain in charge of the prisoners proceeded "about a mile and a half below the town, to the point of a small ridge that runs down the river; and there, on the east bank of the stream, the prisoners were stripped and tied, and their throats cut!" [106] The guard returned the next day, bringing the horses and personal possessions of the dead officers.[107] The Americans were incensed at this outrage for which Gutiérrez was responsible. They went to the scene of the atrocity and buried "the remains of the unhappy victims which were stripped and left unburied by the perpetrators and their barbarous chief." Shaler could find no words to express his horror of that "black action," [108] and a number of the Americans, including Warren D. C. Hall, deserted the expedition after this outrage.[109]

[103] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, October 5, 1812, Shaler Papers.

[104] Morphy to the Viceroy, New Orleans, May 21, 1812, AGN ND, III, ff. 215–16; Washington *National Intelligencer*, June 26, 1813.

[105] *Lamar Papers*, I, 280–81. For more about Menchaca, see Salcedo to Menchaca, January 21, 1812; Manuel de Salcedo to Antonio Cordero, February 20, 1812; and Cordero to Nemesio de Salcedo, March 8, 1812, Spanish Archives (University of Texas Library).

[106] H[enderson] Yoakum, *History of Texas from its First Settlement* . . . (New York, 1856), I, 169. Among the victims were Simón de Herrera, Nemesio de Salcedo, Manuel de Salcedo, Gerónimo Herrera, Miguel de Arcos, Joaquín de Ugarte, Juan Ignacio de Arramvide, José Amador, and Antonio López.

[107] See Morphy to the Viceroy, New Orleans, May 21, 1813, AGN ND, III, ff. 215–16; Washington *National Intelligencer*, May 10, 1813.

[108] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 14, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[109] Homer S. Thrall, *A Pictorial History of Texas* . . . (St. Louis, 1883), 549. Hall was a practicing lawyer at Natchitoches in 1812.

Augustus W. Magee was the real leader of the invasion of 1812. Under his guidance the filibusters captured and plundered Nacogdoches and occupied La Bahía. Before the latter village was taken in November, 1812, Monroe sent John Hamilton Robinson to the Interior Provinces to obtain information and to open more friendly commercial intercourse between New Spain and the United States. The results of this mission were to increase Spanish resentment, arouse insurgent opposition, and determine Robinson himself to become a filibuster. Magee's somewhat mysterious death at La Bahía brought Samuel Kemper and Reuben Ross into prominence. Under their leadership the expedition repulsed a Spanish force that had laid siege to La Bahía, defeated it again before San Antonio, and captured the capital of Texas on April 1, 1813.

The Spanish defense of Texas was wholly inadequate until nearly a year after the invasion began. Jealousy between commanders, lack of troops and supplies, and rebel operations in Mexico combined to prevent a strong effort to overcome the filibustering raid. These obstacles were surmounted when Arredondo was made commanding general of the Eastern Interior Provinces. The Spanish commanders could not rely on their troops nor could they depend on the loyalty of the people. Insurgent propaganda was partly responsible for this situation. Throughout the course of these events, William Shaler was earnestly hoping for the success of the invasion. He was in constant communication with the filibusters and waited impatiently for an opportunity to go on to San Antonio where he might exercise an influence in their councils.

Chapter 3

The Rise and Fall of the Republic of Texas

Provisional Government of the State of Texas

Leaders of the filibustering army, flushed with their magnificent success against numerically superior forces, proceeded to organize a provisional government. On April 6, 1813, a temporary constitution was drafted which stated:

> We, the People of the Province of Texas, protesting the rectitude of our intentions before the Supreme Judge of the Universe, declare that the chains which bound us under the domination of European Spain are forever dissolved; that we are free and independent; that we have the right to establish our own Government; and that henceforth all legitimate authority shall emanate from the People, to whom alone this right belongs; that henceforth we are forever absolved from duty and obligation to any foreign power.

The hastily framed document continued to indict Spain for its misrule and to provide for a provisional government. Conditions in Spain had thrown the colonies upon their own resources, and after so long a period of suffering under a tyrannical government, the people were justified in changing to one better suited to their needs. They had been despoiled by intruders who monopolized public offices and commerce. Paths leading to fame and honor were closed. In a country abounding with riches the people were in want of food and clothing. Justice was a mockery. Loyalty to the monarchy in its dark days of trial had been repaid with even more oppression. Their "illustrious liberator," José Bernardo Gutiérrez, was given power to appoint a junta of six members, with a president and a secretary, to form a government, correspond with

foreign states, maintain an army, and defend the Holy Religion and the "sacred rights of man." The junta was likewise charged with selecting "a Governor with the title of President Protector of the Provisional Government of the State of Texas" whose powers would be defined in the constitution. Commerce, police, taxation, and defense were to be under the junta's control.[1]

The junta, duly appointed, made Gutiérrez the governor. Shaler considered the whole business as "nothing more than an absurd revolutionary farce. . . ." The new governor had "taken possession of the treasury, and every valuable; he is served in plate, and lives in the style of an Eastern Basha, while everything around him is penury and want." Nothing good could be expected from such conditions.[2] Nor did Governor Claiborne like the turn of events in Texas under the guidance of Gutiérrez:

> The Revolutionists have got possession of the Capitol of their Province, St. Antonio and are likely for the present to maintain their possession— Their Chiefs manifest no disposition to be Dependent upon the American Government, or to grant any peculiar privileges to the American people;—their objects seem to be, to encourage emoration [emigration] to fill their armies with adventurers from all Nations, & to set up for themselves;— They may become useful Neighbours,—but as we have no certainty of it, I wish sincerely, it comported with the Policy of the American Government to take possession of the country as far as the River Grande.[3]

Claiborne was definitely an expansionist.

Whatever his failings may have been, Gutiérrez knew the value of propaganda. A proclamation of April 18 invited freemen of all nations to take up their residence in Texas.[4] Then he wrote to

[1] Encl. in Arredondo to Calleja, Laredo, June 7, 1813, AGN Arredondo, IV, ff. 9–12. The provisional government was installed the same day, April 6. Deposition of Feliciano Franco Vela and Guadalupe Caso, Laredo, April 15, 1813, *ibid.*, III, f. 309.

[2] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 14, 1813, Shaler Papers. Shaler planned to leave for Texas on May 17. *Ibid.*

[3] Claiborne to Anonymous, New Orleans, June 21, 1813, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 228.

[4] "Proclamation by Jose Bernardo Gutierrez, Governor of the State of Texas, and the Junta thereof to freemen of all nations," encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 14, 1813, Shaler Papers.

Shaler urging him to encourage American emigration from Missouri, Louisiana, "and other remote parts . . . less improved than this part of New Spain, to settle either on the frontier or the interior of this province." [5] Proclamations were also sent to invite the Mexican people to throw off the yoke that oppressed them.[6] Proclamations and declarations were undoubtedly called for, but provinces could not be conquered by documents alone. In Washington it was reported that an army of five or six thousand men would be ready in the fall to march for Mexico and conquer at least three provinces.[7] But the indolent Gutiérrez had little desire to proceed.[8] With an opportunity to give "a blow to the Spanish power in Mexico that would have been felt to the shores of the pacific ocean," he concerned himself with organizing the government and allowed more than a hundred Americans, including Samuel Kemper and other officers, to return on furlough.[9] No provisions had been made for either offense or defense. The junta was composed of ignorant persons with the exception of Louis Massicolt, a Frenchman whom Shaler had known in Havana. Massicolt was probably in control of the situation,[10] a prospect which did not give Shaler much pleasure.

There was treachery in the ranks of the patriots which Gutiérrez did not suspect and which was never known to Shaler. Colonel Ignacio Elizondo sent one José Nicolás Benites to treat with Gutiérrez. Benites, according to his story, was captured at the mission of Concepción, when the invaders arrived there on March 31, 1813.

[5] Gutiérrez to Shaler, St. Fernando, April 18, 1813, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 14, 1813, *ibid.*

[6] Encls. in Arredondo to Calleja, Laredo, June 7, 1813, AGN Arredondo, IV, ff. 1–8.

[7] Washington *National Intelligencer*, June 10, 1813.

[8] Gutiérrez maintained that he had planned to march to the aid of patriots in other provinces, but that the Americans and others had refused to go. Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 15–16.

[9] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, Shaler Papers. Kemper arrived at St. Francisville, Louisiana, on May 26, 1813, from one of "the most extraordinary expeditions ever undertaken, that of Cortez not excepted [!]." St. Francisville *Time Piece*, May 27, 1813, quoted by the Washington *National Intelligencer*, June 26, 1813.

[10] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, Shaler Papers.

He escaped to search for the royalist troops, but failing to find them he remained to observe the actions of the patriots. Benites actually joined the patriots, or at least pretended to do so, and his name was among the signers of the Declaration of Independence on April 6, 1813. He was in communication with Elizondo and Cordero, and together with other royalist officers secretly prevented the patriots from marching at once against Monclova. Benites left San Antonio on May 12 after this good work for his superiors, and rejoined Elizondo seven days later.[11]

Gutiérrez reached the highest point in his career as a revolutionist when he became President Protector of the State of Texas. The honor was a nebulous one, to be sure, and the perquisites of office were largely illusory. An avalanche of difficulties engulfed the nascent government and stifled it at birth. An empty treasury, a fickle populace, counterattacking royalists, and inevitable friction with the Anglo-American filibusters were alone sufficient to have defeated a much better man than Gutiérrez. The President Protector carried on a correspondence with Shaler, who had lost all confidence in him; his secretary, Louis Massicolt, was of doubtful loyalty. His family, safe for a time after their flight from Revilla, afforded some consolation; but for them, too, Gutiérrez felt concern. While troubles multiplied for the provisional government in San Antonio, events were transpiring on the Louisiana frontier that were to result in disgrace—although a fortunate one—for José Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara.

Toledo's First Attempt to Assume Command

Nathaniel Coggswell was not through with José Álvarez de Toledo when the two parted company in Pennsylvania.[12] If fame and honor were to be won in Texas, Coggswell determined to prevent his former companion from enjoying the fruits of revolution. On December 29, 1812, he composed a long letter to Gutiérrez

[11] Benites to Antonio Cordero, Monclova, May 28, 1813, AGN Arredondo, IV, f. 25.
[12] See pp. 17 *et seq.*, *supra*.

and Magee. After relating his activities in Pennsylvania in favor of the revolution, Coggswell charged Toledo with being an agent of Spain, a correspondent of the Marquis of Villa Franca, and a member of the Regency. Toledo's object was to eliminate the leaders and then to assume command for the purpose of destroying the expedition. In fact, Toledo had told General Allen that Gutiérrez would be easy to handle and only Magee would cause trouble.[13] Toledo's companions, Juan Mariano Picornell and a young Frenchman from New Orleans vaguely identified as La Tour or Caliavette,[14] were equally untrustworthy in Coggswell's opinion. Coggswell's final warning was strangely prophetic:

> Toledo, Picornell, and La Tour, are one and the same—and rely upon it, and I am willing to put my life on the issue, that if you allow either of them to set a foot into the territory over which you preside, or to have the least connection whatever, even as common soldiers, with your expedition, you will in the end, rue it in tears of blood.[15]

Gutiérrez was grateful for information and promised to be on his guard. He was entirely convinced of Toledo's treachery. Coggswell's request that he be appointed an agent of the filibuster was not granted, but hope was held out that later such an arrangement might be made.[16] With Gutiérrez in so unfavorable a frame of mind, Toledo was certain to have difficulties in carrying out his intention to go to Texas.

General John Adair was considered as the possible commander of the expedition when it was first organized, but he declined the honor. Now that success was apparently assured, he appeared at Rapides on March 15, 1813. Rumor had it that he intended to go on to Texas to assume command, and Shaler believed an impor-

[13] Coggswell to Gutiérrez and Magee, Pittsburgh, December 29, 1812, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[14] Not to be confused with Arsène Lacarrière Latour, another engineer and mapmaker of New Orleans.

[15] Coggswell to Gutiérrez and Magee, Pittsburgh, December 29, 1812, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[16] Gutiérrez to Coggswell, San Antonio, April 11, 1813, *ibid.*

tant change would take place in the expedition if he did so.[17] But, if Shaler was correct, the general could not make up his mind, and returned to Natchez to recruit men from Tennessee.[18] He was there shortly after Toledo arrived from Pittsburgh the middle of March, accompanied by Picornell and other satellites. Toledo, sporting a uniform and calling himself a general, announced his intention to assume command of the expedition in Texas.[19] General Adair saw in Toledo's arrival a blow to his own prospects, and so he attempted to determine the nature of his rival's plans. A meeting was suggested, to take place at some neutral point; but Toledo replied that he could be seen at his lodgings, and the interview failed to materialize.[20] Toledo left Natchez on March 30 to go to Natchitoches, but Adair was not through. Letters had been sent ahead to Rapides; and, when Toledo arrived there, he found the people inclined to regard him as a French agent. After escaping an attempted arrest, Toledo arrived in Natchitoches on April 4 [21] with a letter of introduction to John Hamilton Robinson. Shaler, disbelieving that Toledo was a French agent, caused the people to receive him favorably.[22]

There was some basis for suspecting that Toledo had dealings with French agents. Jean Jacques Paillette, acting under authority given by the French consul in New Orleans, assured Toledo that France was disposed to aid the revolution in return for commercial concessions. Paillette cited Robinson's mission to Mexico as an example of American duplicity, and showed letters from Gutiérrez which indicated that an understanding had been reached with him. Toledo told Shaler that he encouraged Paillette in order to discover the plot fully.[23]

[17] Shaler to Monroe, Fort Claiborne, March 20, 1813, *ibid.*

[18] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 3, 1813, *ibid.*

[19] Morphy to the Viceroy, New Orleans, May 8, 1813, AGN ND, III, f. 214.

[20] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 18, 1813 (No. 77), Shaler Papers.

[21] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 2, 1813, postscript of April 4, *ibid.*

[22] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, April 18, 1813, *ibid.* Robinson returned to Natchitoches on April 7 from his trip to the Interior Provinces.

[23] *Ibid.*

Toledo sent Picornell on to San Antonio and prepared to leave on April 19 for Nacogdoches. Shaler believed the revolution would progress rapidly if this untried leader became its head,[24] but Gutiérrez had other ideas. He received Picornell with no manifestations of pleasure and sent him back to the frontier with a letter clearly stating his own attitude. This communication was couched in polite language that by no means concealed its author's anger. No one, Gutiérrez wrote, had any confidence in a person who had been so closely connected with the Spanish government. Under the circumstances it would be best for Toledo to return to Natchitoches.[25] Since the time was not ripe for Toledo's appearance in Texas, he agreed to retire in the interest of harmony and the well-being of his "beloved country."[26] The would-be filibuster had ingratiated himself with the people of Nacogdoches, where he had been since April 26, sufficiently to raise a small force of volunteers who suggested that he defy Gutiérrez; but Toledo was willing to wait,[27] and so he made no objection when an officer arrived from San Antonio to take charge of the village.[28]

Shaler now thought the time had come for him to take a more active part in affairs. He felt that his presence in San Antonio was demanded in the interests of humanity and that Toledo should be in charge of the expedition. So, promising to be prudent and hoping for Monroe's approval,[29] he proceeded to Nacogdoches where he arrived on May 20, 1813.[30] Disconcerting discoveries awaited him. When John Hamilton Robinson returned to Washington he informed Monroe that Gutiérrez had asked for assistance from

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Gutiérrez to Toledo, [San Antonio, April 17, 1813], *ibid.*

[26] Toledo to Gutiérrez, Nacogdoches, April 26, 1813, *ibid.*

[27] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, *ibid.*

[28] Toledo to his friend Mr. S[haler], Nacogdoches, May 6, 1813 (Reservada), encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, Shaler Papers. Toledo planned to leave Nacogdoches on May 6. *Ibid.* However, he was still there on May 10. Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 21, 1813, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[29] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, May 7, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[30] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, *ibid.*

France through the consul in New Orleans. That official, according to Robinson, offered 3,000,000 francs, 15,000 stand of arms, officers to drill the army, and supplies which would be transported in small craft to Matagorda.[31] Shaler may have been told the story when Robinson was in Natchitoches after his return from New Spain; but he received confirmation of French dealings with Gutiérrez when he was in Nacogdoches. An agent arrived there from San Antonio on May 25, "and surely so miserable a wretch was never before sent on a public mission. . . ." The "wretch" bore dispatches for one Pierre Girard in New Orleans and sought Shaler's advice. He was told that such a mission bordered on high treason, and the poor envoy "departed the next day in very great terror." The plan was apparently to raise a force of six hundred Frenchmen under an officer from Santo Domingo. They would proceed to Matagorda to join the expedition. Massicolt, then with Gutiérrez, was back of the scheme with the intention of making Texas an asylum for French adventurers. The intrigue caused Shaler to warn the Americans and to inform Monroe that Gutiérrez would not remain in command much longer.[32] This announcement must be considered as additional proof of Shaler's responsibility and complicity in the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition.

The charges made by Gutiérrez against Toledo demanded Shaler's attention. Depositions from Bullard, Alden, and Mower, all of whom were with Toledo at Nacogdoches, convinced Shaler that there was no truth in Coggswell's charges which Gutiérrez had repeated. An examination of the evidence, he believed, would vindicate Toledo.[33] Shaler and his new protégé returned to Natchitoches on June 4 to prepare the intrigue that was to remove Gutiérrez from command.

[31] Robinson to Monroe, Washington City, July 26, 1813, Mexico, Filibustering. Louis Tousard was the French consul at that time.

[32] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, Shaler Papers. Shaler wrote to Reuben Ross revealing the plot. Shaler to Ross, [Natchitoches], June 9, 1813, *ibid.*

[33] Shaler to Gutiérrez, Nacogdoches, May 28, 1813, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, *ibid.*

General Ira Allen had not forgotten his adventurous friends. He expected to visit Washington in May, 1813, at which time he hoped to see Gutiérrez or some other person in the capital as a representative of the patriots.[34] His letters in May encouraged the establishment of a republican form of government,[35] and reported that political events favored the independence of Spanish America.[36] In June he wrote to Picornell, Toledo, and Gutiérrez, urging the importance of sending a minister to Washington and holding out the hope that recognition would be granted before the next session of Congress.[37] Allen received letters from Gutiérrez and Toledo regarding the quarrel which had arisen between them. He called attention to the necessity for co-operation and warned against becoming involved with members of Aaron Burr's expedition.[38] Picornell was told that the intrigue was the work of designing persons who hoped to break up the expedition, and that cessation of Indian hostilities in the United States would release many men to join the patriots.[39] General Allen was too far from the scene to be of any use, and events in Texas soon brought to an end his efforts in behalf of Mexican independence.

Defeat of Elizondo

Colonel Ignacio Elizondo, in command at Presidio del Norte on the Río Grande, was destined to suffer the third major defeat of royalist forces in Texas. Gutiérrez wrote to him on April 6, 1813, to ask for the surrender of Zambrano, who had escaped from San

[34] Allen to Toledo, Philadelphia, March 21, 1813, Spanish Affairs, 1810–1816.

[35] Allen to Toledo, Philadelphia, May 11, 1813, *ibid.*

[36] Allen to Toledo, Philadelphia, May 28, 1813, *ibid.* At Natchitoches, Aaron Mower printed the *Gaceta de Texas*, dated Nacogdoches, May 25, 1813. This newspaper was followed by *El Mexicano* on June 19, 1813, intended to abuse Gutiérrez. Kathryn Garrett, "The First Newspaper of Texas: Gaceta de Texas," in *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XL (1936–1937), 200–15.

[37] Allen to Toledo, Philadelphia, June 10, 1813, Spanish Affairs, 1810–1816.

[38] Allen to Bernardo [Gutiérrez], Philadelphia, September 12, 1813, *ibid.*

[39] Allen to Pickanel [Picornell], Philadelphia, September 12, 1813, *ibid.*

Antonio. God was on the patriot side and Elizondo, too, was asked to join.[40] Although Elizondo retorted with a threat to move a large army against the patriots and "to carry fire and blood" to them,[41] the fireworks were postponed for another two months. Arredondo decided to co-operate with Elizondo's force of seven hundred men, but he was delayed at Laredo.[42] The rumor that Gutiérrez was retreating caused Elizondo to advance to besiege San Antonio,[43] although Arredondo insisted that he should not expose his forces needlessly.[44] No attempt to offer battle should be made, Arredondo believed, until the royalist forces could be united.[45]

Elizondo's approach threw the patriots into confusion. The royalist army encamped a short distance from San Antonio, and an officer was sent to the filibusters proposing that the Americans retire unmolested after surrendering Gutiérrez and sixty others.[46] It was at this time that a Mexican Aida caused a split in the patriot ranks. Major Ross "became attached to a lady, the daughter of an officer in the army of the Enemy." When the army was ordered to assemble on June 16, no Mexicans appeared. The explanation, according to the "lady" who interested Ross, was that the Mexicans planned to join the enemy and massacre the Americans. When a council of war was called and Ross advised a retreat, the girl went to Elizondo's camp and told her father what had occurred. The American officers finally refused to support Ross, and so he

[40] Gutiérrez to Elizondo, San Fernando de Béxar, April 6, 1813, in Juan E. Hernández y Dávalos (comp.), *Colección de Documentos para la Historia de la Guerra de Independencia de Mexico de 1808 a 1821* (Mexico, 1877–1882), V, 31–32. Hereafter cited as Hernández, *Documentos*.

[41] Elizondo to Gutiérrez, General Headquarters on the banks of the Río Grande del Norte, April 26, 1813, *ibid.*, 32–33.

[42] Arredondo to Calleja, Laredo, June 7, 1813, AGN Arredondo, IV, ff. 21–23.

[43] Elizondo to Arredondo, Campo de Batalla al frente de Béxar, June 18, 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 97–98.

[44] Arredondo to Elizondo, Laredo, June 19, 1813, *ibid.*, f. 99.

[45] Arredondo to Elizondo, Laredo, June 21, 1813, *ibid.*, f. 98.

[46] Shaler to Monroe, Fort Claiborne, July 10, 1813 (No. 83), Shaler Papers. Gutiérrez asserted that the Americans agreed to accept $9,000 for the surrender of the leaders. "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 17. The offer was made on June 16 or 17.

left San Antonio the night of June 16, succeeded in command by Major Henry Perry.[47]

Perry soon organized the patriot forces to withstand Elizondo's expected attack. The demand to surrender San Antonio was ignored, and on the morning of June 20 Perry led his army to battle. The opposing forces numbered about nine hundred men each, but Elizondo should have had the advantage. His camp was on an eminence about four miles southwest of San Antonio, protected by a small creek, probably the Alazán. Three masses were said in the royalist camp, but the patriots continued to advance. Elizondo's disorganized force fled in confusion after a resistance of not more than two hours. The rout was complete. The royalists lost more than three hundred men killed and wounded and almost all of their baggage, arms, munitions, and supplies, as compared with a patriot loss of less than fifty men.[48] The victorious patriots returned with their booty to San Antonio where they were soon joined by Bullard, Wilkinson, and Alden, who were trusted with the intrigue to force Gutiérrez from command.

The Downfall of Gutiérrez

The attack against Gutiérrez, planned by Shaler and Toledo, proceeded along three fronts. Coggswell's charges that Toledo was an agent of Spain and a member of the Regency were made to appear ridiculous, publication of a newspaper was begun, and agents were sent to San Antonio to win the support of the Americans. Coggswell was disposed of on June 29 at a meeting between Fort

[47] "The Battle of Medina—Taken from Capt. Gaines, on the Sabine in 1835—," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 281–82. "While Ross was speculating on the probable cause of the mysterious disappearance of his allies, he was startled by a visit from his lady-love, who, hurrying into his presence, her bright eyes dim with tears, threw herself into his arms, and implored him to fly for life. . . ." William Kennedy, *Texas: The Rise, Progress, and Prospects of the Republic of Texas* (London, 1841), I, 281–82.

[48] Elizondo to Arredondo, Quartel Subalterno de Río Grande, June 23, 1813, AGN Arredondo, IV, ff. 100–102. Elizondo reported 40 dead as against 100 patriot fatalities; but a letter from Natchitoches gave the royalist loss as 274 killed, 430 wounded, 67 prisoners. Boston *Columbian Centinel*, August 25, 1813.

Claiborne and the Sabine. Shaler and Toledo, accompanied by a small group of friends, met Coggswell and his party to consider the charges. Coggswell was so discredited as a result of the conference that his followers deserted to Toledo.[49]

Before Coggswell's charges were finally exposed as baseless, Shaler and Toledo began to publish a weekly newspaper in Spanish and English to report on the revolution.[50] Toledo wanted to proceed at once to San Antonio, but Shaler restrained him in order to allow time for the newspaper propaganda to take effect and for Americans at the capital to prepare a demand for his appearance. Shaler justified his action by the state of affairs in Texas:

> The most deplorable system of terror, rapine, and misrule has been followed: arbitrary imprisonments, & confiscations, constantly succeed each other; all the resources of the country have been pillaged, and squandered away without any public benefit; and suspicion and discontent are general and at their heigth [*sic*]. It is estimated that more than 1200 persons have deserted since the reduction of San Antonio, and they are daily disappearing. The republican force at present consists of about 400 americans and 800 mexicans but in about 500 of the latter little confidence is placed.[51]

The approach of Elizondo to San Antonio with the force which Perry subsequently defeated, caused Gutiérrez to play anything but the role of a hero. Consequently, after Elizondo's defeat on June 20, the Americans sent a special messenger to Shaler urging him to come on. They promised to receive Toledo or any other person Shaler might recommend as commander. Shaler's response was interesting, especially in view of the fact that he was still an agent of the United States:

> As their situation is really desperate from the cause avowed to them, I determined to recommend Genl. Toledo directly to the american chiefs and vol-

[49] Shaler to Monroe, Fort Claiborne, July 10, 1813, Shaler Papers; Boston *New-England Palladium*, August 27, 1813. Coggswell died at Rapides about August 1. Shaler to Monroe, Fort Claiborne, August 7, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[50] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, June 12, 1813, *ibid.*

[51] *Ibid.*

unteers as their commander, I have pledged my word for his honor and integrity, and he left here the 3d instant.[52]

Shaler, too, was ready to leave within twenty-four hours, but he wanted to be certain that there was no danger of a retreat.[53]

Toledo left for Nacogdoches before he learned of the latest events at San Antonio. Henry A. Bullard, Joseph B. Wilkinson, and their companions were sent ahead early in June to work for him. They went first to La Bahía, where they learned of Elizondo's defeat. Gutiérrez ordered them to remain there to protect that post, but Bullard disobeyed because of his "duty" to Toledo. The disobedience was not serious, for on the way a messenger met them with a request that Bullard proceed to become Gutiérrez's secretary since Massicolt had been killed at the battle of the Alazán. Bullard was favored at San Antonio until he put in a word for Toledo. Gutiérrez then demanded to know if his new secretary was a Frenchman and Toledo's companion—and that was the end of Bullard's employment as Secretary of the State of Texas.[54] The ousted secretary lost no time in carrying out the purpose of his mission. He induced the American officers to sign a petition asking for Toledo, and the junta met to consider the matter. Bullard and Wilkinson were the main actors in the final stages of the intrigue against Gutiérrez. They defended Toledo before the junta at the meeting of June 27, and when that body wavered, Wilkinson obtained the unqualified support of Major Henry Perry and Colonel Miguel Menchaca by the use of a letter which Shaler had written to Reuben Ross. A second meeting of the junta on June 28 and Per-

[52] Shaler to Monroe, Fort Claiborne, July 10, 1813, *ibid.* Shaler wrote to Samuel D. Forsythe, one of the American officers, to recommend Toledo. Forsythe to Shaler, San Fernando, July 17, 1813, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, August 7, 1813, *ibid.*

[53] Shaler to Monroe, Fort Claiborne, July 10, 1813, *ibid.* It will be observed that throughout this period in which Shaler was advising the filibusters from the border, he was waiting for an opportunity to go on into New Spain in order to carry out the purpose of the mission which had originally taken him to Havana. See pp. 14–15 *supra.*

[54] This aversion for Frenchmen is hard to understand in Gutiérrez. He was friendly with Pierre Girard and Louis Toüsard in New Orleans, and his closest advisers at San Antonio were Louis Massicolt and two other Frenchmen.

ry's threat to leave with all the Americans resulted in the agreement to send for Toledo under certain restrictions insisted on by Gutiérrez. Captain Slocum was sent to Nacogdoches to bring the new commander,[55] while Shaler was urged to come with Picornell, who would have revenge for the inconsiderate manner in which Gutiérrez treated him. The situation was represented as being desperate. While the army and supplies were diminishing, Gutiérrez spent his whole time in "lolling on his sofa and catching flies. He does not know the number of his forces nor in fact any part of the business." Only Shaler's immediate action could save the army from disaster.[56] When Slocum arrived at Nacogdoches on July 10 with a copy of the conditions imposed by the junta, Toledo sent him on to Natchitoches with a letter asking Shaler's advice.[57] He was told to go on, and did so with an escort of more than fifty armed men.[58] The new commander arrived at San Antonio on August 4 to take charge of the army.[59]

Shaler finally carried out his intention to start for San Antonio and got as far as Nacogdoches where he received a letter from Monroe, dated June 5, which caused his immediate return to Fort Claiborne. The United States, Monroe stated, was at peace with Spain and intended "to preserve that relation with whatever government may exist." [60] Shaler's reply was an attempt to justify his actions:

I regret exceedingly having taken any step that does not meet the approbation of the President, as it has ever been my endeavor to conform strictly to the spirit of my instructions. My object has been to keep a vigilant eye on

[55] Bullard to Shaler, San Antonio, June 27, 1813, and Wilkinson to Shaler, San Fernando de Béxar, June 27, 1813, encls. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, July 14, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[56] Bullard to Shaler, San Antonio, June 27, 1813, *ibid.*

[57] Toledo to Shaler, Nacogdoches, July 10, 1813, encl. in Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, July 14, 1813, *ibid.*

[58] Shaler to Monroe, Fort Claiborne, August 7, 1813, *ibid.*

[59] "Copias de los Papeles dirigidos por el traidor Toledo . . . ," encl. no. 1 in Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, AGI IG, 136–7–9, ff. 3–4.

[60] Monroe to Shaler, June 5, 1813, quoted by Nichols, "A New England Apostle of Liberty," in *loc. cit.*, 95.

what was passing, and I have never failed to communicate any thing in its fullest extent. The part I took respecting Toledo was entirely personal, his character was attacked and I defended it on its own intrinsic merits: and also against aman [*sic*] who had prostituted the name of the government from Pittsburg to this place by declaring in every manner, that he was leading above 1500 men into Mexico with the approbation of the american gov^t. . . .

The first adventurers in this expedition assembled on the desolate banks of the Sabine. Since that time there has never been within the territory of the United States the least appearance of armament, or military preparation, the volunteers went out either singly, or in small bands, usually armed as hunters, and what few supplies have been procured here have been furnished in the common way of trade.[61]

The administration must have been satisfied with Shaler's conduct, for we find him as an observer with the commission sent to negotiate the treaty with England in 1814. Perhaps his greatest stroke of good fortune was the delay he suffered at Nacogdoches while he was on his way to San Antonio. Within two weeks the patriot army was routed and its remnants were straggling back to the United States. The hunters were tired of hunting.

The Battle of Medina River

General Toledo, after he succeeded Gutiérrez,[62] had little time to prepare the army for defense against Arredondo. On the same day that he took command, August 4, 1813, news arrived from La Bahía that Arredondo's force of sixteen hundred men had crossed the Nueces and camped on the Laredo road about thirty-five leagues from San Antonio. There he would be joined by more than twice that number under Elizondo. Toledo prepared to march at once to prevent the union of the royalist armies. Colonel Miguel Menchaca, who held his commission from Gutiérrez although he had been a part of the plot to expel that leader, endeavored to prevent the army from moving. Toledo overcame the intrigue and ordered Perry to follow him with his two regiments of about 450 men each.

[61] Shaler to Monroe, Fort Claiborne, August 7, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[62] Gutiérrez set out for Natchitoches on August 6 with three companions and a mule. Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 20–21.

Joseph B. Wilkinson, who was acting as Toledo's aide, was sent back, after the advance force had moved a short distance, in order to find out why Perry did not march. He was told that Perry was ill. Toledo then returned to San Antonio where he found Menchaca still active against him. Opposition was finally overcome by various means, including a dance for the officers, and on August 6 a second attempt was made to begin the march. Again the effort failed and again the exasperated leader returned to San Antonio.[63] The period of inactivity and the intrigue displacing Gutiérrez apparently demoralized the filibuster army beyond repair.

After these annoying delays the army finally left on August 15, too late to prevent the union of Elizondo and Arredondo.[64] Two days later the opposing armies were about nine miles apart, and early in the morning of August 18 the patriots took an advantageous position.[65] Toledo advanced two miles through the sand and dust beyond the steep ravine where the Medina trickled. His forces were

> drawn out in order of battle, having the road in the centre, the artillery on each side, and a corps of cavalry and some friendly Indians on each wing, concealed in skirts of woods. In front of the line was a small prairie; and such was the position of the troops that the enemy might approach within rifle shot without suspecting their presence.[66]

The accounts of what followed are so much at variance that it is almost impossible to reconstruct the action with any assurance of accuracy. Scouts must have revealed Toledo's position to Arredondo, for he sent an advance force of 180 cavalry under Elizondo to lure the enemy toward the main body of royalists.[67] After a brisk

[63] "Account of an eye witness of the operations since the arrival of General Toledo to San Antonio . . . ," in the Lexington *Reporter*, encl. in Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, AGI IG, 136–7–9, f. 4.

[64] *Ibid.*

[65] "Copias de los Papeles dirigidos por el traidor Toledo . . . ," encl. no. 1 in Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, AGI IG, 136–7–9, ff. 8–9.

[66] [Henry Adams Bullard] in *North American Review*, XLIII, 241.

[67] Hatcher (ed.), "Joaquin de Arredondo's Report of the Battle of the Medina, August 18, 1813," in *loc. cit.*, 223–24; Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, I, 192.

exchange of shots, Elizondo retreated according to plan and the filibusters obligingly followed. At this point Toledo wisely ordered a retreat to the river,[68] but Samuel Kemper and Miguel Menchaca refused to obey. The advance was continued until the main royalist force was encountered,[69] but there was very little order in the ranks of the attackers. Arredondo's men stood their ground surprisingly well; but they were on the point of retreating when a deserter from the filibusters reported that they, too, were on the point of leaving the field. Arredondo rallied his men and the filibuster army fled in complete confusion.[70] The victor was unable, however, to follow his advantage immediately. His artillery was silenced or captured, a large number of his men were killed or wounded, and many more were scattered at a discreet distance from the field. Altogether he was able to rally not more than five hundred men to pursue the escaping foe, and several days were required to collect that many.[71]

Pacification of Texas

Refugees from the battle of Medina soon began to arrive in Louisiana. Joseph B. Wilkinson was in Natchitoches on September 4 and confirmed rumors of disaster. Toledo expected to make a stand at Nacogdoches, but Shaler believed that further resistance was impossible at that time.[72] Toledo, Kemper, and many others arrived on September 7 and were followed by about three hundred men, women, and children, with their livestock and household

[68] "Copias de los Papeles dirigidos por el traidor Toledo . . . ," encl. no. 1 in Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, AGI IG, 136–7–9, f. 9.

[69] "The Battle of Medina—Taken from Capt. Gaines, on the Sabine, in 1835——," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 283; Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, AGI IG, 136–7–9, f. 9; Philadelphia *Weekly Aurora*, October 12, 1813, from the Alexandria *Red River Herald*.

[70] Hatcher (ed.), "Joaquin de Arredondo's Report of the Battle of the Medina, August 18, 1813," in *loc. cit.*, 225; Arredondo to Calleja, San Antonio de Béxar, September 13, 1813, AGN Arredondo, IV, ff. 179–93.

[71] H. M. Brackenridge to Monroe, Baton Rouge, October 30, 1813, Miscellaneous Letters, October–December, 1813.

[72] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 5, 1813, Shaler Papers.

goods. Another six hundred were reported as having taken refuge at Bayou Pierre, Opelousas, and Attakapas.[73] The Lipans, with about five hundred warriors, moved toward the Sabine for protection and caused Claiborne considerable alarm. Altogether, more than twelve hundred refugees crossed the Sabine to escape royalist vengeance.[74]

Colonel Elizondo, sent to pursue the fugitives,[75] was peculiarly lenient toward the Americans who fell into his hands. More than fifty of the filibusters were captured, but Elizondo gave them horses, a rifle for every five men, and passports back to the United States. He was bitter in his denunciation of Gutiérrez, but was glad that Toledo had escaped. Apparently, the most severe punishment suffered by his American captives was a reprimand and a warning not to do it again.[76] Elizondo could have captured Toledo, but instead he sent nine pardoned Anglo-Americans to Nacogdoches to apprehend their leader.[77] The result was to be expected. Not until September 5 did he himself start for Nacogdoches, and by that time Toledo had left. Shaler believed that the Spaniards would destroy Nacogdoches and Trinidad "so as to leave a vast desert between our frontier and their settlement," [78] but Elizondo did not go on to Nacogdoches and many of the refugees returned to their homes.[79] By September 12 the royalist avenger had executed seventy-one prisoners and had decided that there was no further danger from the filibusters. He turned his force back toward San Antonio.[80]

[73] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 19, 1813, *ibid.*

[74] Claiborne to L. B. Macarty, Natchitoches, October 16, 1813, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, II, 273–74.

[75] Arredondo to Calleja, San Fernando de Béxar, September 13, 1813, AGN Arredondo, IV, f. 187.

[76] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 19, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[77] Elizondo to Arredondo, Campamento Español en el Puesto de Trinidad, September 2, 1813, AGN Arredondo, IV, ff. 215–17.

[78] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 5, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[79] Shaler to Monroe, Natchez, October 4, 1813, *ibid.*

[80] Elizondo to Arredondo, Campamento del Ojo de Agua de los Brazos, September 12, 1813, AGN Arredondo, IV, f. 218. Elizondo was murdered by one of his officers on the way back.

After learning the results of Elizondo's punitive expedition, Arredondo recommended that a force be stationed at Nacogdoches to prevent future invasions of Texas, and until that could be done he garrisoned the post with two hundred cavalry.[81] But the viceroy needed all of his force to operate against rebels in Mexico, so Arredondo would have to depend on his own laudable resolution to defend the Interior Provinces.[82]

The victor of Medina established a stern military rule in San Antonio and then called upon the people of Texas to be loyal, to abandon contraband trade, and to be patient until Matagorda could be opened as a port of entry for foreign goods.[83] This proclamation was followed on October 10 by another which extended the royal pardon to refugees who would present themselves at Nacogdoches, Villa Salcedo (Trinidad), or Béxar within forty days. The leaders, including Gutiérrez and Toledo, were not to be pardoned because of their complicity in the deaths of Spanish officials at San Antonio. Samuel Davenport and other prominent figures were also proscribed because of ingratitude for benefits they had received from the Spanish government. A reward of 500 pesos was offered for the killing of Gutiérrez or Toledo, and that sum would be increased if either were brought in alive. The other archenemies were valued at 250 pesos each. Any foreign Catholic could earn 500 pesos and a passport to Texas by killing any one of the proscribed men. A grant of land would be added for bringing one of them back alive. Foreign Protestants could earn the same rewards, except that the cash payment would be only 250 pesos.[84]

The viceroy had reason to be well pleased with Arredondo's success, and perhaps there was a grim smile on his lips as he wrote to Don Luis de Onís:

[81] Arredondo to Calleja, San Fernando de Béxar, September 13, 1813, *ibid.*, f. 196.

[82] [Calleja] to Arredondo, [Mexico], November 30, 1813, *ibid.*, f. 198.

[83] Mattie Austin Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 1801–1821* (University of Texas Bulletin No. 2714, April 8, 1927, [Austin, 1927]), 341–42.

[84] Arredondo to the Governor of the Province of Texas, Béxar, October 10, 1813, *ibid.*, 342–43.

. . . the greater number of those who perished in this battle [of Medina] and of its results were Anglo-Americans. [Being] convinced that the administration of those States has not aided the revolution of Texas and that its subjects who were found there were none other than offending vagabonds, I hope that if you find it convenient you will inform that Government that the vagabonds who attempted to compromise it are punished, according to our laws, for the violation of territory and other trespasses they committed, which should give it satisfaction.[88]

The great invasion of Texas was ended and the Spaniards had their revenge.

The government organized at San Antonio in April, 1813, was little better than a farce. Gutiérrez demonstrated clearly his incapacity as a leader, and the American officers lost confidence in him. A condition was thus established that was favorable to Toledo. Available evidence seems in a large measure to substantiate the charges brought by Coggswell, but Shaler's efforts cleared Toledo of suspicion and made it possible for Bullard and Wilkinson to complete the downfall of Gutiérrez. Shaler was prevented from joining the army at San Antonio by the opportune arrival of a warning from Monroe, which indicates that up to June 5, at least, the administration at Washington did not oppose his actions.

Elizondo's defeat was a serious but not fatal blow to Arredondo's plans, and was the direct result of the former's insubordination. Reuben Ross proved unable to retain the confidence of the American officers and his flight to Natchitoches brought forward Henry Perry as the ranking officer under the nominal command of Gutiérrez. When Toledo assumed command of the army, he was required to overcome intrigues engineered by Colonel Menchaca. His efforts to move the army showed clearly that lack of authority was an overwhelming obstacle to success. There is no credible evidence to show that Toledo deliberately betrayed the army to Arredondo at the battle of the Medina River. The defeat must be charged to insubordination, American impetuosity, and the deser-

[88] Calleja to Onís, Mexico, September 5, 1813, AGN ND, III, f. 227.

tion of one of the filibusters. The disastrous termination of the expedition was to have a baneful effect on the plans of future filibusters.

Chapter 4

Rivalry on the Sabine

Robinson's Plans and Propaganda

The tide of enthusiasm for martial exercises ran out quickly after the defeat at the Medina. Although men were scattered from Natchez to New Orleans along the bank of the Mississippi, they were unarmed, uncertain as to their leaders, and "sunk in apathy." Persons of property were more fearful of Negro insurrections than of a foreign enemy. A competent observer believed that "the situation of the inhabitants is not the most secure: and they are less capable of self-defense than any other part of the union." [1] Under such conditions it is not surprising that efforts to revive the filibustering movement met with scant success.

Dr. John Hamilton Robinson did not foresee the sad events in Texas that shattered the plans of Special Agent William Shaler. He had returned from his mission to New Spain when there were flattering prospects of success for the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition. Robinson decided to turn his varied talents into a filibustering enterprise. He made no effort to conceal his intention from Toledo and Shaler when he was resting at Natchitoches in April, 1813, after a difficult trip from Texas. When he left the village later in the month, he missed Monroe's letter dismissing him from the government's service.[2] Going on to Washington, he wrote an excellent account of his mission and attempted to convince Monroe

[1] H. M. Brackenridge to Monroe, Baton Rouge, September 14, 1813, Miscellaneous Letters, September–October, 1813.

[2] Monroe to Robinson, Department of State, June 25, 1813, Domestic Letters, XVI, 92.

that public welfare required American intervention in the Mexican Revolution.

Robinson's experiences with Magee's army led him to believe that the Anglo-Americans then in Texas would oppose any claim by the United States to territory in that province. The expedition, therefore, demanded immediate attention. He feared that the patriot army would become "a receptacle for all those who are disaffected with our Govt." [3] These persons would endeavor to arouse opposition to the United States and would endanger the chances for friendly relations in the future. There was another reason for alarm:

> Sir, you may Calculate with Certainty that they will receive aid from Europe, ere long, unless measures be adopted by this Govt. to prevent it which may be effected either by taking possession of that Country or favouring their revolutionary views; *that, would be a Safe, but this, a Noble Policy.*[4]

After repeating a rumor that England would aid Spain in return for the Floridas, New Orleans, and Cuba, and that Russia would aid the Mexicans, Robinson made two practical suggestions. The United States should exclude European influence and secure Mexican commerce by aiding the revolution; that part of Louisiana claimed by the United States should be occupied. Robinson was an expansionist, as he showed clearly in his concluding statement:

> Sir, under existing circumstances it is much to be wished by every lover of Our Country that our Govt. may adopt such measures relative to the Mexican revolution as will aid them in the establishment of their Independence and thereby secure and fortify Our Own.
>
> This revolution is more important, since on its destiny depends the Liberty and Independence of all South America. In taking a view of this highly interesting subject, I have not, in my mind, limited the Liberties of American [*sic*] by the Is[t]hmus of Darien or even the Amazonian Mountains, but I have viewed the whole space comprehended between Louisiana and Cape Horn, divided into many free and independent governments, enjoying the blessings of liberty and Peace, and holding the oldest Republic of America by

[3] Robinson to Monroe, Washington, July 26, 1813, Mexico, Filibustering.
[4] *Ibid.*

the hand of friendship, bid defiance to the Storm and Thunders of European Tyrants.[5]

The storm and thunders of tyrants were not sufficient to restore Robinson to favor with the administration, but he did not give up his plan to lead a filibustering raid. During August he was active in Philadelphia with propaganda favoring such an attempt. A meeting attended by eighteen "democrats" was held in a tavern to honor Robinson and to hear his communications. Robinson opened the meeting by stating that he was sent from Texas by the patriots who asked aid in the form of gallant youths to join Toledo's army of two thousand men, and he urged that societies be formed to aid the revolution.[6] Onís protested to Monroe that Robinson had violated the confidence of the administration. He cited Robinson's declaration at Natchitoches in October, 1812, that the United States disapproved of the Gutiérrez expedition, and Claiborne's proclamation as evidences of American good faith. The meeting in Philadelphia, Onís maintained, was unfriendly to Spain and he urged Monroe to thwart the plan to involve the United States and Spain in a war which neither desired.[7]

Robinson persisted in his efforts to attract Monroe's attention. He made a secret trip to Washington to ask several important questions; but Monroe was away and Robinson wrote to him from Chambersburg, allowing his queries to reveal his plans:

> Should the Mexican patriots take possession of East Florida— Will the United States permit them, by *capitulation,* to retire through their Territory to the Western Frontier, taking with them the munitions of war which they may have procured in that country?—On or before the first of April next, there would be upwards of Four thousand good Troops, and by that time well disciplined.—If they should pass to the Island of Cuba and render it independent of European influence, would the U. States give Her aid, or would this Government admit Her into this Union?—If there can be a good understanding on this subject, I pledge myself to affect [*sic*] that object.[8]

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 31, 1813, AGI PC, leg. 1837.

[7] Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, September 7, 1813, Spanish Notes, III.

[8] Robinson to Monroe, Chambersburg, November 5, 1813, Mexico; Filibustering.

Robinson's plan at that time, then, was to lead a force into East Florida, secure munitions from the Spanish garrisons, surrender the province to the United States, and then march for Texas or proceed to revolutionize Cuba with the hope of adding it to the Union.

Robinson, having failed in his attempt to meet Monroe, went on to Pittsburgh where he issued a rhetorical proclamation on November 19, 1813. The Americans were urged to awake "and aid in establishing on a noble and widely extended basis, those principles of Republicanism, which shall secure to our beloved country, her future Peace, Tranquility and Independence." [9] It didn't matter what royal house ruled in Spain, but the revolution in the colonies was vitally important to the United States. Great Britain was allied with Spain and might use its force to suppress the revolution in Mexico and turn that country's resources against the United States. The chief motives responsible for filibustering expeditions were neatly summarized:

> Fellow Citizens, there is no country in the world which presents so noble and glorious [*sic*] for men of military fire, or such immense prospects of wealth to the enterprizing merchant; nor is there a country on earth in which there is so great a certainty of independent fortunes for the gentlemen of professions and trades.[10]

Those who aided Mexico would be eligible for citizenship, a liberal compensation, and a section of land. There were opportunities in the army, in the professions and trades. Pensions would be granted to the disabled and to the families of those who lost their lives. Pay during the period in service would range from $25 per month for privates to $5,000 per year for brigadier generals. Individuals were invited to raise companies and rendezvous at Nacogdoches. This expedition was to be no joyous picnic:

> I invite you to emulate the deeds of your Fathers, by taking the field—braving the stern blast of winter—The Scorching rays of a vertical Sun, the

[9] Spanish Notes, III.
[10] *Ibid.*

fatigue of many dreary campaigns,—and by giving to an oppressed people, the Blessings of Liberty and Independence.[11]

Robinson was not the only protagonist of liberty who was interested in the prospects of the filibustering raid. There were at the same time in Philadelphia two Frenchmen whose activities aroused considerable apprehension in the Spanish representative. These men, General Jean Humbert and General Irenée Amélot de Lacroix, apparently agreed with Robinson that the three of them should join Toledo, even though they probably had no explicit invitation. Although General Humbert left Philadelphia for New Orleans in August, 1813,[12] Robinson could have met him and made arrangements to co-operate in Texas; but Onís believed that Humbert expected to join Toledo[13] who was then preparing for the encounter with Arredondo. A proclamation which appeared in the newspapers in October and November invited foreigners to cast their lot with the Texan revolution. The proclamation was dated San Antonio, September 27, 1813, and was supposedly signed by Toledo and Carlos José de la Cruz, Secretary of State ad interim.[14] General Lacroix was probably its author. He was expected to go down the Ohio and the Mississippi to Natchez with two hundred young men to join either Robinson or Humbert.[15] The fact that Lacroix was with Picornell and Humbert when they arrived in New Orleans from the Sabine in January, 1814,[16] indicates that he was not co-operating directly with Robinson—at least not then.

Humbert's Plot Against Texas

General Jean Humbert was still an ambitious man when he arrived in the United States early in the summer of 1813. His career during the French Revolution and under Napoleon had been ex-

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 20, 1813, AGI PC, leg. 1837.

[13] Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, September 7, 1813, Spanish Notes, III.

[14] Boston *New-England Palladium*, November 19, 1813.

[15] Toledo to Captain Lockett, Nashville, January 10, 1814, Mexico, Filibustering.

[16] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, January 4, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

citing and crowded with adventure. The expedition against Ireland in 1798 was under his command,[17] and he was with General Charles Victor Emmanuel Leclerc in Santo Domingo in 1802. When Onís met him on a boat bound for Philadelphia in July, 1813, Humbert seemed to be about forty years of age, and even then somewhat *loco*. Onís, whose position was unknown to Humbert, was certain that Bonaparte had sent his erratic general to command forces in Cartagena or Texas. Humbert boasted that he could raise a large body of Irish troops and with no other assistance could take Canada, but the United States government had refused to receive him. His offer to establish a military college was also refused, and it was suggested in Washington that he should go to Texas or to Cartagena. Humbert was discouraged and told Onís that he was going to retire on a plantation near New Orleans. Onís tried to dissuade him from descending to the level of the insurgents; the minister was convinced that the plantation talk was nonsense.[18]

Humbert spent approximately a month in Philadelphia before he sailed for New Orleans with several French and Spanish officers. Onís believed that the United States and France were working together to foment the revolution of Mexico, and that Humbert was going to Texas to command the expedition then under the leadership of Gutiérrez.[19] Toledo was to have nominal command of the insurgent army, and Gutiérrez was to be dispossessed "because of his ignorance and cruelty."[20] Onís reported that Humbert would have a force of six hundred French, Irish, and

[17] Accounts of Humbert's Irish expedition are in Theobald Wolfe Tone, *The Autobiography of Theobald Wolfe Tone (1763–1798)* (Dublin, 1910), II, 346–48; William Theobald Wolfe Tone, *The Life of Theobald Wolfe Tone* . . . (London, 1828), 290–92; W. H. Maxwell, *History of the Irish Rebellion in 1798*, . . . (London, 1887), 223 *et seq.*; E. Guillon, *La France & L'Irlande sous le Directoire, Hoche & Humbert* . . . (Paris, 1888), 362–413; [Joseph Stock], *A Narrative of What Passed at Killalla*, . . . (London, 1800).

[18] Onís to Pedro Labrador, Philadelphia, July 12, 1813, AHN Estado, leg. 5557. Humbert was born in 1755, so he must have been well preserved.

[19] By this time Gutiérrez had returned to the United States, but Onís could not have heard of Toledo's successful intrigue.

[20] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 20, 1813, AGI PC, leg. 1837. It was on this occasion that Achard offered to betray the expedition.

American recruits who would go in small parties to join the Texan insurgents. He asked Monroe to obtain orders from the President to frustrate the plot.[21] The fears of Onís were confirmed by news from Shaler at Natchitoches. French residents there were attempting to revive the expedition and offered Toledo the means to overcome all opposition. Toledo refused the offer, but the French activity continued. There were many talented French officers in New Orleans, where sentiment was favorable to the expedition. The Baratarians were co-operating, and with their vessels available, Texas "would immediately become an asylum for all the foreign adventurers in the U. S. who would probably so strengthen themselves . . . as to render their expulsion in any course of events a doubtful enterprize." [22]

Humbert was active in New Orleans and must have made quite a stir among the people. Late in October he wrote to Albert Victor Lancelli, a Frenchman in Natchez, that he had fifteen hundred Frenchmen ready to march to Texas if he could procure the means of putting them in motion. He was acting in Toledo's name and hoped for his co-operation.[23] Toledo replied, when he received this information from Lancelli, that he had nothing to do with Humbert, would not accept his support, and hoped that the Frenchman would cease to use his name.[24] Samuel Kemper was invited to join Humbert with the remnants of the army from Texas. These men, added to the thousands being raised by Robinson and to Humbert's fifteen hundred, would make a formidable army.[25] But Kemper was in bad health and he refused to have anything to do with the scheme.[26] Humbert was not discouraged because of his failure to attract other leaders to his expedition immediately. He received sufficient encouragement from his countrymen in New Orleans to raise

[21] Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, September 7, 1813, Spanish Notes, III.

[22] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 19, 1813 (No. 88), Shaler Papers.

[23] Lancelli to Toledo, Natchez, November 8, 1813, encl. in Shaler to John Graham, New York, February 7, 1814, *ibid.*

[24] Toledo to Lancelli, Nashville, November 25, 1813, encl. in Toledo to Shaler, Nashville, November 28, 1813, *ibid.*

[25] Humbert to Samuel Kemper, New Orleans, October 27, 1813, Mexico, Filibustering.

[26] Kemper to Toledo, St. Francisville, November 20, 1813, *ibid.*

his hopes much higher than the conditions warranted. Some arrangement seems to have been made with the brothers Pierre and Jean Laffite whereby the Baratarians would head a naval expedition to Matagorda and possibly to Tampico, while Humbert led a land expedition from Nacogdoches.[27] The Baratarian part of the plot was similar to the arrangement which Gutiérrez was reported to have made earlier in the year.[28]

Toledo's Activities After the Battle of Medina

José Álvarez de Toledo was out of a job and practically penniless when he arrived at Natchitoches on September 7 after the humiliating defeat by Arredondo. There was a chance for him to join one of the numerous French intrigues which were under way, but he refused to countenance any of them and retired to Tennessee.[29] Shaler and Toledo traveled together as far as General John Overton's home near Nashville, where Toledo became an uncomfortable and not too welcome guest. General Overton was in bad health, Mrs. Overton was very sad and far from robust, and Toledo had lost his mule. Captain Bullard, also in Nashville, was ill. General Humbert in New Orleans was conferring with the French consul, and Toledo was certain that the invader of Ireland was a Napoleonic emissary. Toledo went to Nashville to ask General Andrew Jackson for a position in the army, but Jackson did not reply to his request.[30] Twilight was descending on Toledo.

[27] Toledo to Shaler, General Headquarters west of the Sabine River, May 30, 1814, *ibid.*

[28] Gutiérrez was apparently in hiding at the time Humbert was active in New Orleans, but Pierre Girard was very much in the open. He was with Humbert at Natchitoches about November 24, 1813. Juan Cortés to Toledo, Natchitoches, November 28, 1813, *ibid.* Humbert apparently left New Orleans on or about November 10, when Pedro Marín Argote reported that the Frenchman had recruits for an expedition and might be headed for Pensacola. Argote to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 10, 1813, AGI PC, leg. 1836. Diego Morphy Sr. died about October 17, and Argote assumed charge of the consulate on October 18. Argote to Apodaca, New Orleans, October 18, 1813, *ibid.* Onís appointed Diego Morphy Jr. as vice-consul as of October 17, 1813. Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, December 1, 1813, *ibid.*

[29] Shaler to Monroe, Natchitoches, September 19, 1813, Shaler Papers.

[30] Toledo to Shaler, Nashville, November 28, 1813, encl. in Shaler to John Graham, New York, February 7, 1814, *ibid.* The letter is also in Mexico, Filibustering.

But there was still a chance to lead another expedition into Texas. Refugees from Medina met at Natchitoches on September 12, 1813, and gave full powers to Toledo should he wish to re-form the filibustering organization. All contracts and obligations entered into for that purpose would be honored religiously.[31] When he arrived at Alexandria on September 20, reports went out that he had "the entire approbation of the officers and men generally. . . ." [32] This faith gave promise of bearing fruit in November when Colonel John Smith of St. Louis met Toledo in Nashville and offered to place five hundred armed men under his orders. Toledo accepted the proposal and had hopes of obtaining large quantities of powder and arms from an unnamed person.[33] But plans to revive the expedition proceeded slowly and the refugee chafed at the delay. Other plots were going ahead. Robinson was on the frontier, Humbert was up to something, and the mysterious Lacroix was making absurd claims.

Information about Lacroix came from James T. Johnson, one of Toledo's acquaintances. As major general of the Third Division, Lacroix assumed the power to issue commissions.[34] Napoleon, he asserted, promised to supply munitions, men, and money. Johnson himself had received a commission as first lieutenant.[35] Toledo believed that Lacroix was preparing to descend the Ohio with two hundred young men and urged Captain Lockett to break up the party by making known the real object of the French,[36] whatever that was. Colonel Smith left Nashville to look over the ground at Natchitoches. Toledo desired to prevent Robinson and Humbert

[31] "Copias de los Papeles dirigidos por el traidor Toledo . . . ," encl. no. 1 in Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, AGI IG, 136–7–9, f. 12. Toledo asserted that the original was signed by everyone.

[32] Washington *National Intelligencer*, October 23, 1813.

[33] Toledo to Shaler, Nashville, December [?] 6 and 7, 1813, encl. in Shaler to John Graham, New York, February 7, 1814, Shaler Papers.

[34] James T. Johnson to Toledo, Nashville, January 9, 1814, encl. no. 2 in Toledo to Shaler, Nashville, January 10, 1814, Mexico, Filibustering.

[35] The commission was signed by Jno. Brazier, Morelos Chase, and James Wilcox. *Ibid.*

[36] Toledo to Luckett [Lockett], Nashville, January 10, 1814, encl. no. 1 in Toledo to Shaler, Nashville, January 10, 1814, *ibid.*

from succeeding with their plans, hence he offered to lead another expedition if the Mexicans would promise not to join his rivals. He received the promise, probably from a group of refugees around Natchitoches, and left for Natchez to obtain supplies.[37] His second invasion of Texas would not have the blessing of the Department of State nor the guidance of one of its agents.

Gestures Toward Neutrality

American officials, as was the case in 1812, made belated efforts to enforce neutrality. Onís protested that Robinson and Lacroix had not been arrested, and he suggested that the United States do its part in maintaining friendly relations with Spain.[38] Monroe then ordered Alexander James Dallas, the district attorney for Pennsylvania, to proceed against the would-be filibusters.[39] When Dallas complained that he lacked documentary evidence on which to base a legal action, Onís showed him documents to prove that Robinson and Lacroix were working together and that the latter had enlisted a staff of officers with whom he planned to join Toledo.[40] Although Monroe forwarded evidence to Dallas,[41] he was not eager to have Lacroix brought to trial. When the Frenchman promised to behave himself, Monroe suggested that he be released from confinement.[42]

The efforts to apprehend Robinson continued, but Monroe's warnings and instructions were always behind the active physician. Robinson sent a copy of a circular calling for recruits to Ninian Edwards, governor of Illinois Territory. Edwards sent the circular

[37] Toledo to Shaler, General Headquarters west of the Sabine River, May 30, 1814, *ibid.*

[38] Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, December 8, 1813, Spanish Notes, III.

[39] Monroe to Dallas, Department of State, December 15, 1813, Domestic Letters, XVI, 225–26.

[40] Onís to Auto Cavo Manuel, Philadelphia, January 12, 1814, AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

[41] Dallas to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1814, Miscellaneous Letters, January–February, 1814.

[42] Monroe to Dallas, January 15, 1814, Domestic Letters, XVI, 228.

on to Washington and Monroe informed him that the attempt against Texas was contrary to law. If Robinson was in Illinois, efforts should be made to apprehend him.[43] Similar instructions were sent to the governor of Missouri Territory.[44] The ink was scarcely dry on these dispatches when Robinson wrote to Monroe on January 25, probably from Natchez. The annoyed Secretary of State reminded his former agent that such activities were illegal and especially reprehensible in view of his recent mission to the Interior Provinces. It might be inferred that Robinson was still acting under authority from the United States, and if he did not cease at once, decisive measures would be taken to enforce the law.[45] The governors of Louisiana and Mississippi Territory were informed that the United States had no connection with Robinson and that the President expected them to frustrate the plans against Texas.[46] The order was later extended to cover Toledo's activities as well.[47] Monroe also wrote to Robinson—hoping to catch him at Natchez—to reprimand him severely.[48]

Governor Claiborne informed Madison of Humbert's activities in New Orleans and of his departure for Natchitoches. Such irregular expeditions had little chance to succeed, but the governor of Louisiana would aid the filibusters if the administration desired. With another invasion of Texas imminent, Claiborne wanted to know the policies of the government in the matter.[49] When he was informed that no official approval could be given to the plotters, Claiborne issued a proclamation against them on March 23, 1814,

[43] Monroe to Edwards, January 21, 1814, *ibid.*, 229; Monroe to the District Attorney of Illinois Territory, January 21, 1814, *ibid.*, 228.

[44] *Ibid.*, 230.

[45] Monroe to Robinson, February 14, 1814, *ibid.*

[46] Monroe to the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi Territory, February 14, 1814, *ibid.* A similar letter was sent to the Governor of Tennessee on March 12, 1814. *Ibid.*

[47] Monroe to Tully Robinson, February 17, 1814, Monroe Papers, IV, f. 1563, p. 549; Domestic Letters, XVI, 230.

[48] Monroe to Robinson, February 14, 1814, *ibid.*

[49] Claiborne to Madison, New Orleans, November 29, 1813, Miscellaneous Letters, November–December, 1813. Claiborne wrote that he would be glad to see a successful revolution. *Ibid.*

and asked for warrants against Robinson and Toledo.[50] Onís complained that the proclamation was ineffective.[51] But in the meantime things had happened and were happening on the Sabine.

Humbert's Provisional Government of the Interior Provinces

General Humbert was so encouraged in New Orleans that he went on to Natchitoches in November, 1813, with Pierre Girard and three other companions. He told refugees in Opelousas, Natchitoches, and Rapides that he came to fight for the cause of Mexican independence. Two thousand French and Irish recruits were available in various parts of Louisiana, and Humbert offered this imaginary army to the patriots on condition that a provisional government be formed to give order to the affair. Humbert also claimed to have large subscriptions with which to pay his troops who would rally to the cause. Each corps of recruits would be immediately subject to officers of their own nationality, and all would be under the orders of a Mexican general.[52]

The refugees and friends of Mexican independence at Natchitoches were sufficiently impressed with Humbert's absurdities so that they proceeded to form the framework of a government. A meeting was held on Mexican soil across the Sabine from Natchitoches on November 25 and the "government" came into existence. Juan Mariano Picornell was elected president with two advisers and a secretary.[53] Resources were scarce and the government must obtain more support. For this reason Picornell, Humbert, and Lacroix soon went down the rivers to New Orleans.[54] Picornell explained matters to Toledo in a letter written while he was on his

[50] Claiborne to Monroe, New Orleans, April 17, 1814, Miscellaneous Letters, March–April, 1814; Monroe to Claiborne, February 17, 1814, Domestic Letters, XVI, 231.

[51] Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, July 18, 1814, Spanish Notes, III.

[52] Juan Cortés to Toledo, Natchitoches, November 28, 1813, Mexico, Filibustering.

[53] Diego Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, January 4, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[54] *Ibid.* Lacroix must have been at Natchitoches when the government was formed, but the writer has found no record of his arrival there.

way down the Red River. Only his desire to see the revolution terminate successfully induced him to accept the presidency of the new government. The associates counted on Toledo's aid and hoped that they would be joined by the Kempers, Perry, and Doctor Robinson, thus uniting the soldiers of various nations who were interested in the cause. An attempt would be made to deal impartially with all foreign powers, but there would be no hesitation in granting special privileges to some powers if others assumed an unfavorable attitude. Picornell planned to publish a manifesto in New Orleans to inform the people as to actual conditions and to reconcile those who were hostile to their plans.[55] Toledo was frank in reprimanding his former colleague and warned the self-appointed liberators of Texas that success would not attend such hasty proceedings. He advised against publishing the manifesto and refused to recognize a European as the head of any branch of the public administration. The Americans agreed with the Mexican leaders in this matter, and so it must be. Picornell's remarks about relations with foreign governments were beside the point, since only a legitimate general government could enter into negotiations with foreign powers.[56]

Diego Morphy believed that the arrival of Picornell, Humbert, Lacroix, and their few companions at New Orleans was conclusive proof that Humbert's hopes were at an end. The battle of Medina, they believed, had infused such terror into the souls of those who observed its results that the Interior Provinces would be tranquil forever.[57] Picornell gave Morphy some reason to doubt the accuracy of the forecast when he published his proclamation

[55] Picornell to Toledo, Rio Colorado [Red River], el 13 de Diziembre de 1813 a bordo de la barca de Mr. S., Mexico, Filibustering.

[56] Toledo to Picornell, Nashville, January 5, 1814, *ibid.* The writer has found no evidence that Picornell received this reprimand.

[57] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, January 4, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836. Morphy sent a similar dispatch to Onís on January 3. *Ibid.* Juan Ruíz de Apodaca became viceroy of New Spain in 1816. He had been ambassador to Great Britain and captain general of Cuba and the Two Floridas. He was given the title Count of Venadito after Xavier Mina's defeat in 1817.

in *L'Ami des Lois* on January 6, 1814. The Interior Provinces, according to the manifesto, were wealthy and favored by a healthful climate. All nations were interested in bringing about their independence and would help in preserving it. Unfriendly nations would be excluded from commercial advantages with the new republic. Mexican independence was certain to be won, and the ten armies then in the field could overthrow the Spanish tyrants without foreign aid. The republican army nearest to Texas had more than 55,000,000 pesos at its disposal, and the union of the forces under rebel leaders would make the money available for the revolution. Three factors had prevented success up to that point: lack of a capable government, lack of regular troops commanded by officers of known military talent, and lack of money. There would be no more volunteer companies and in the future all groups would be organized as regular regiments under strict discipline. Three thousand men, in addition to a thousand Indian warriors, were then available, and they would be led by Generals Humbert and Ducoudray-Holstein. Under such conditions it was only necessary to start the expedition to assure independence for the provinces and to join the other patriot forces. Only lack of money prevented the plan from being executed, and that would be supplied by asking subscriptions for voluntary donations and loans.[58]

Louis Tousard, the acting French consul in New Orleans, acknowledged a visit from Picornell and addressed him as "His Excellency Don Juan Picornell President of the Provisional Government of the Free Men of the Interior Provinces of Mexico." The French emperor, according to Tousard, was favorably disposed toward the Spanish colonies and had no objections to recognizing their independence. Picornell was urged to communicate with the French minister in Washington, but no aid could be expected from France if either England or Russia were favored.[59]

[58] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, January 7, 1814, encl., AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[59] Louis Tousard to Juan Mariano Picornell, New Orleans, January 4, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

Apparently, Tousard was not prepared to offer very substantial aid, for Morphy reported that Picornell and his companions were without the necessities of life.[60] This was just the situation that Father Antonio de Sedella knew how to use to great advantage.

Antonio de Sedella was an old inhabitant of Louisiana. During the Mexican Revolution he became an unofficial representative of Spain and an invaluable informant for the regular officials.[61] Sedella formed a bold plan. He would cause Picornell to desert his companions and enter the service of Spain! With the co-operation of God and the "Paternal Benignity" of the captain general, there were hopes that "from a Saul we shall see Picornel become converted to a Paul." [62] Picornell was ready for the transformation.

The object of Sedella's scheme was among the first of those bold spirits who embraced the revolutionary cause. His career as a rebel began in 1795 when, with Manuel Cortés, he tried to foment a republican revolution in Madrid. His motive, he asserted, was "to attack the arbitrary power of the Prince of the Peace who endangered His Majesty's throne and threatened the ruin of Spain. . . ." Only the removal of this ambitious intriguer and drastic measures by the Cortes could restore "that divine union that should subsist between the Monarch and the Nation for the security and happiness of both." [63] But, after attracting some three hundred adherents, the plot was discovered. Picornell was sentenced to life imprisonment in America; but he escaped from "the most inhu-

[60] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, January 7, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[61] See Clarence Wyatt Bishpam, "Fray Antonio de Sedella, An Appreciation," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, II (1919), 24–37. Sedella came to Louisiana in 1779, one of six Spanish Capuchins. He was appointed parish priest in New Orleans on November 25, 1785. Thereafter he engaged in several disputes with his superiors and earned the title "the scourge of religion in Louisiana." John Dawson Gilmary Shea, *A History of the Catholic Church within the Limits of the United States . . .* (New York, 1886–1892), II and III, *passim*. See also John Ernest Rothensteiner, *History of the Archdiocese of St. Louis . . .* (St. Louis, 1928), I, 237–42, and Caroline Maude Burson, *The Stewardship of Don Esteban Miró, 1782–1792* (New Orleans, 1940), *passim*.

[62] Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, February 4, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

[63] Petition of Juan Mariano Picornell, New Orleans, July 2, 1814, AHN Estado, leg. 5558, ex. 12. This was Picornell's second petition.

man torments" of a nineteen-month incarceration and sought refuge in Trinidad. In 1798 he tried to arouse the people of Caracas by publishing copies of "The Rights of Man with various moral precepts and a long preliminary discourse." [64] Being imprisoned in La Guaira, he escaped to Trinidad and plotted with Governor Thomas Picton to revolutionize the mainland. From Guadeloupe and Curaçao he scattered more incendiary material, and in January, 1799, the Spaniards decided to hang him if he were caught.[65] Apparently he was in the United States from 1799 until 1801 or 1802, and then went to France via the West Indies. About five years later he was in Martinique and then he went to Caracas to take part in the republican movements of 1810 to 1812. After writing many revolutionary tracts, Picornell became Minister of Police, a post which he held until royalists and the earthquake put an end to Miranda's government. Following this misfortune he fled to the United States where "he put himself to practicing medicine, giving himself the name of a famous French doctor. . . ." Through a friend he indicated to Onís a desire to be reconciled with Spain; but then Toledo "offered to take him along as a pamphleteer, or fabricator of proclamations to the Province of Texas," and Picornell could not resist the temptation to make himself famous.[66] Subsequent misfortunes made him once more ready to be reconciled.

With the assistance of Angel Benito de Ariza, a merchant of New Orleans, Sedella convinced the pamphleteer of the error of his ways. On February 12, 1814, the *Moniteur* carried the announcement that Picornell renounced the position as President of the Provisional Government of the Free Men of the Four Interior Provinces of Mexico.[67] On the same day he signed a petition for pardon. He wished to reconcile himself with the present government of Spain, since the Spanish constitution of 1812 brought all of his hopes into realities, and his enterprises had always been

[64] *Ibid.*

[65] Memorandum of the Council of the Indies, June 10, 1816, *ibid.*

[66] Onís to the Duke of San Carlos, Philadelphia, October 3, 1814, *ibid.*

[67] Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, February 14, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

undertaken in the service of Spain. Henceforth he promised not only to abandon the insurgents, but to work in favor of the royal cause.[68] Sedella was enthusiastic about his future value to Spain, especially since he had been extremely useful to the royalist party in San Antonio during Toledo's expedition.[69] Picornell may have engaged in some intrigue with Miguel Menchaca in San Antonio to delay Toledo's departure before the battle of Medina, but Sedella was the first to indicate that such was the case. Onís conceded Picornell's ability, but believed that he could not be trusted. Nevertheless, it would be better to give him a pardon and have him on the royalist side than to allow him to continue as a rebel.[70]

Robinson and the Friends of Mexican Emancipation

John Hamilton Robinson arrived at Natchez in the closing days of 1813 with 150 muskets and the belief that his propaganda in the northern states would cause 2,000 men to turn out in the spring. The sum of $10,000 was appropriated by some group somewhere to purchase arms and a consignment should arrive in February, according to rumors. Final arrangements for the expedition were to be made at Natchitoches. Men of military merit, including the ubiquitous General Adair, would come out in the spring, and Robinson suggested that Toledo should gather recruits in Tennessee.[71] But Toledo refused to countenance Robinson's plan, which the United States was endeavoring somewhat feebly to render abortive. In view of the wild dreams of Robinson, those efforts were probably sufficient.

[68] Petition of Juan Mariano Picornell, New Orleans, February 12, 1814, encl. in Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, February 23, 1814, *ibid.* For a more complete treatment of Picornell, see Harris Gaylord Warren, "The Early Revolutionary Career of Juan Mariano Picornell," in *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXII (1942), 57–81.

[69] Sedella to Morphy, New Orleans, July 10, 1814, encl. no. 2 in Morphy to Onís, New Orleans, July 12, 1814, AHN Estado, leg. 5558, ex. 12.

[70] Onís to the Duke of San Carlos, Philadelphia, October 3, 1814, *ibid.* Picornell's pardon was granted February 10, 1816. Pedro Cevallos to Onís, Madrid, February 10, 1816, encl. in Onís to Apodaca, Philadelphia, May 20, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[71] Robinson to Toledo, Natchez, January 4, 1814, Mexico, Filibustering.

Robinson was not without support in Natchez where he was fairly well known. The so-called "Friends of Mexican Emancipation" met there on January 18, 1814, to organize the expedition. This self-constituted junta of Americans declared that it was expedient to take possession of Texas and establish a garrison in the province. Robinson received full civil and military power from this junta and was authorized to perform "all other acts and things for the good government and welfare of the people . . . according to his discretion." Members of the junta were pledged to support the cause as they might "deem fit and proper." Robinson was to arrange for procuring supplies and for appointing some person to obtain funds necessary to carry out the resolutions of the junta.[72]

The junta adopted Robinson's plan to obtain arms and other supplies by capturing Pensacola. With this equipment the raiders would retire to Texas. Pensacola had no supplies worth such an effort, but that consideration apparently bore no weight with the junta. Anthony Campbell and Dr. Nathan Kennedy, members of the Natchez junta, were sent to Florida to reconnoiter while Robinson went on to Natchitoches to form another junta to co-operate with the Natchez group. The Natchitoches junta was likewise predominantly American in character. Such prominent citizens as John Sibley, John C. Carr, and John Nancarrow confirmed the action of the Natchez junta and decided that Sibley should be the governor-general of the Interior Provinces. Carr, Nancarrow, and William Bullett were to form a company with exclusive trading privileges.[73] Liberty was to be based firmly upon a commercial foundation.

[72] Robinson to Col. John Smith, Republican Camp (in Texas), April 12, 1814, encl. in Toledo to Shaler, General Headquarters west of the Sabine River, May 30, 1814, *ibid.* Reference to the covering letter will be omitted in subsequent citations to enclosed matter. The following men were present at the Natchez meeting on January 18, 1814: Anthony Campbell, John H. Robinson, John Galvin, Nathan Kenedy [Kennedy], Joshua Child, Sam'l Parkins, William Fisher, H. A. Bynum, William Parker, Zach. B. Nettles, John Witheret, James Flacket, Isaac Parkins, Pleasant B. Cook, Joseph Dunlop, Ross Bird, Morris Flaherty, and Isaac Williams. Bynum was the chairman, Fisher the secretary. *Ibid.*

[73] Toledo to Shaler, General Headquarters west of the Sabine River, May 30, 1814, *ibid.*

Robinson's activities were being carried on while Toledo was in Nashville worried by the rumors which reached him concerning General Lacroix. Samuel Kemper had informed him of Humbert's plotting in New Orleans, and his old friend Picornell was in New Orleans with his pretentious title. Toledo was certain that Humbert and Robinson were involved in a French intrigue. When he heard about the Natchez meeting of the "Friends of Mexican Emancipation," he decided to go to the frontier. Toledo's wife was in Natchez, and when her husband failed to arrive she believed the rumors that Creeks had killed him on the way. But the rivers were low in February and the journey required nearly a month. Toledo arrived in Natchez early in March to find all Louisiana "burning with intrigue." He was soon in communication with members of the "canalla" who revealed the plots in which Robinson was engaged. After he obtained all the details from a member of the Natchez junta, Toledo, accompanied by the faithful Bullard, left for Natchitoches where they arrived the day before Robinson was to cross into Texas.[74] Toledo's arrival postponed Robinson's departure. The French intrigue charge was raised by Toledo and a committee met on March 18 to investigate. A decision was reached which vindicated Robinson, and the committee tried to pacify Toledo by holding that his fears were but natural in view of evidence in his possession.[75] Robinson and Toledo then became rivals for the support of the drifters willing to invade Texas.

There were some four hundred refugees in Natchitoches while this rivalry was going on, and the display of arms and ammunition gave a martial aspect to the village. There was no secret about the jealousy between the two leaders, and the findings of the committee healed the breach in appearances only.[76] Volunteers were expected daily, but the failure of the former campaign discouraged many

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] *Ibid.* The committee was composed of Samuel Davenport, Charles Slocum, William Bullett, John Galvin, John Sibley, John C. Carr, and John Nancarrow. *Ibid.*, encl. no. 1.

[76] John Windship to William Plumer Jr., Natchitoches, March 20, 1814, in Everett S. Brown (ed.), "Letters from Louisiana, 1813–1814," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XI (1924–1925), 573.

from taking part; nor was support at Natchitoches unanimous among the residents:

> The situation of the Spanish Provinces is terrible. The Royalists rob & murder those whom they find of the Natives because they are suspected of defection to loyalty. Our Americans go out over the Sabine & rob the poor Natives whom they call *Quotchipins* [Gachupines]. It is enough to have property. Robbers & Murders disgrace the Causes—There is no Law to restrain them. . . .
>
> As is usual, the prejudices & passions of the People have been awakened "by the voice of Reason & Liberty," while the Leaders are stimulated by avarice and ambition. Royal Honors, Dukedoms, Principilities [*sic*] &c are forever rising before them. The guilded Tombs [MS. torn] of Mexico are not too remote for their mercenary vision.[77]

More men and arms arrived at Natchitoches late in March, and it was reported that several thousand men would assemble in the spring. There was reason for Monroe's fear that Robinson's former connection with the government would be remembered on the frontier, since John Windship reported that "Dr. Robertson [Robinson], who had already marched to the Sabine, seems to possess the confidence of the Executive."[78] There was no Spanish force to oppose Robinson when he crossed the Sabine late in March or early in April, and established his camp with a handful of men.[79]

Toledo's Rival Expedition

After the committee cleared Robinson of the French intrigue charge, Toledo returned to Natchez to gain support. Morphy expected his efforts to be fruitless since he lacked money for traveling expenses.[80] On the way down the river from Natchitoches, Toledo met Colonel Smith and authorized him to collect what force he

[77] *Ibid.*, 573–74.

[78] Exeter [John Windship] to William Plumer Jr., Natchitoches, April 2, 1814, *ibid.*, 574.

[79] Morphy's correspondent reported that Robinson had some fifty Spanish and American fugitives from San Antonio. Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, May 10, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[80] *Ibid.*

could to impede Robinson's progress.[81] Smith arrived at Natchitoches too late to prevent Robinson from crossing the Sabine. Three days were spent in an exchange of letters. On April 10 Robinson invited Smith to call, but the latter replied that he had orders from Toledo to take possession of Texas. Robinson then asserted that this was an entirely new expedition, thoroughly American, and unconnected with any former attempt. Since a new organization would be effected after the army assembled, there could be no conflict between them.[82] Smith refused to consider anyone but Toledo as the commander,[83] and after more letters were exchanged without bringing an understanding, Smith announced his intention to cross with his men; Robinson could remain where he was, pending Toledo's arrival.[84]

While Robinson and Smith were busy with their correspondence, Toledo was in Natchez trying to learn more details of Robinson's plan. After hearing that he had attempted to unite with Humbert and that Aaron Burr was invited to join the expedition, Toledo fled to Natchitoches to escape the warrant that had been issued for his arrest.[85] He crossed the Sabine on May 2 [86] and found Robinson a prisoner at Smith's camp.[87] One of his first acts was to issue a pompous manifesto ordering Mexican citizens in Natchitoches, Bayou Pierre, Rapides, and their environs to present themselves at headquarters within eight days under penalty of being considered enemies. Others were given a month in which to appear.[88] The next problem was the disposal of his two prisoners, Robinson and John W. Winn. A group of armed men, led by Nancarrow,

[81] Toledo to Shaler, General Headquarters, May 30, 1814, Mexico, Filibustering.

[82] Robinson to Smith, April 11, 1814, *ibid.*

[83] Smith to Robinson, April 11, 1814, *ibid.*

[84] Smith to Robinson, April 12, 1814, *ibid.*

[85] Toledo to Shaler, General Headquarters, May 30, 1814, *ibid.*

[86] "Copias de los Papeles dirigidos por el traidor Toledo . . . ," in Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, AGI IG, 136–7–9, f. 20.

[87] Toledo to Shaler, General Headquarters, May 30, 1814, Mexico, Filibustering.

[88] Toledo's Manifesto, encl. in Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, May 27, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

came from Natchitoches to demand their release.[89] Toledo was inclined to argue the point until he became fearful of the consequences. He released the two men on May 6 after exacting a pledge from Robinson to aid the Mexican Revolution.[90] On the same day Toledo attempted to be rid of the annoying Americans by informing the commandant at Fort Claiborne that a party of armed men was pillaging the Mexican territory under Robinson's leadership.[91] A committee of prominent citizens at Natchitoches made another attempt to reconcile the rival leaders,[92] but Toledo refused the overture. He was the head of the Mexican patriots[93] and intended to remain in that position. The committee, after expressing regret over Toledo's refusal to co-operate, announced its determination to support an expedition to establish a permanent republican government in Texas.[94]

For a few weeks the rival expeditions remained in Texas. Toledo camped with about 120 men a few leagues from Robinson's little party. Morphy reported that the expeditions were disunited because of the jealousy of the leaders, and so there were two threats against the Interior Provinces despite the steps that the United States pretended to take against them.[95] Toledo eventually collected about three hundred men, including Henry A. Bullard and Joshua Child. Residents of Natchitoches feared that a year would be required to gather a formidable force; and if the revolution failed, a most lucrative trade must be abandoned.[96] When Toledo's contractors withdrew their support in August, he prepared to go to New Orleans.[97]

[89] Nancarrow to Toledo, May 5, 1814, encl. no. 6 in Toledo to Shaler, General Headquarters, May 30, 1814, Mexico, Filibustering.

[90] Toledo to Nancarrow, Camp Independence, May 5, 1814, encl. no. 7, *ibid.*

[91] Toledo to Lafontain [?], May 6, 1814, encl. no. 12, *ibid.*

[92] Orr *et al.* to Toledo, Old Field, May 9, 1814, encl. no. 3, *ibid.*

[93] Toledo to Orr, Camp Independence, May 10, 1814, encl. no. 4, *ibid.*

[94] Orr *et al.* to Toledo, Old Field, May 10, 1814, encl. no. 5, *ibid.*

[95] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, June 18, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[96] Exeter [John Windship] to William Plumer Jr., Natchitoches, July 7, 1814, in Brown (ed.), "Letters from Louisiana, 1813–1814," in *loc. cit.*, 579.

[97] Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, AGI IG, 136–

The rival expeditions led by Robinson and Toledo, together with Humbert's pretentious intrigues, must be viewed as an aftermath of the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition. The ingredients of a successful filibuster raid were still available on the frontier with one exception. No master-mind appeared to co-ordinate efforts; no person enjoying the confidence of all parties, including the governments of Louisiana and the United States, came forward to point the way to Texas. New Spain was left without its deliverer until General Xavier Mina cast himself in the role of political messiah some two years later.

7–9, ff. 21–22. Toledo probably arrived in New Orleans about November 10, 1814. Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 11, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

Chapter 5

Smugglers, Pirates, and Heroes

The Smugglers of Barataria

Throughout the filibustering period the names of Pierre and Jean Laffite appear in varying degrees of importance. These very much maligned and misunderstood adventurers first entered American history in the role of smugglers. After a brief and profitable career as leaders and agents of the smugglers, pirates, and privateers who gathered at Barataria, the brothers Laffite made a temporary peace with the United States by aiding in the defense of New Orleans against the British in the War of 1812. Upon the conclusion of that conflict they established themselves successively at Vacas Island and Galveston Bay. The brothers Laffite were involved in every filibustering threat against New Spain from 1815 to 1821, but never as leaders. Their vessels under various captains sailed as privateers. They themselves preferred to remain in New Orleans or at Galveston. Contrary to popular belief, they were not inveterate mariners. With promises of payments from Spain they betrayed the secrets of the filibusters. Their vessels preyed on the commerce of all nations whose merchantmen ventured into the Gulf of Mexico. The captured cargoes of many slavers were smuggled into the United States under their supervision. During all of these activities the brothers Laffite were the royal family of contemporary racketeers.

The origin of Pierre and Jean Laffite was until recently a matter of controversy. Jean, more socially inclined than Pierre, told a different story whenever the question of antecedents arose. In all

probability they were the sons of a French father and a Spanish mother, and were born in Bayonne: Pierre in 1776 and Jean in 1780 or 1781. At an undetermined date the family emigrated to Hispaniola and lived in or near Cap François.[1] Revolutionary disturbances on the island probably drove the Laffites away with other Europeans; but just when, no one seems to know. Nor has the date of their arrival in New Orleans been fixed with certainty, but it may have been early in 1804.[2] Information about their activities for the next four years is meager. Either Jean or Pierre may have conducted a fencing school for a time,[3] and it is said that they owned a blacksmith shop on Saint Philip Street before their smuggling became notorious.[4] The brothers Laffite began their picturesque career as agents for the smugglers, privateers, and pirates who needed such persons to dispose of their prize goods and to hold auctions at which they were sold. Joseph Sauvinet, a leader of the Baratarians and a prominent citizen of New Orleans, aided them in establishing their supremacy first as agents and later as leaders of the dominion in the swamps.[5] Jean Laffite and Vincent Gambi, or Gambio, apparently shared command over the four hundred or more adventurers of Barataria.[6]

[1] Stanley Faye, "The Great Stroke of Pierre Laffite," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXIII (1940), 744–45. Vincent Nolte, a resident of New Orleans in 1813, wrote that the brothers were from Bayonne. *The Memoirs of Vincent Nolte* (New York, 1934), 189. Claiborne described Jean Laffite as about 36 years of age in 1813. Clipping from an unidentified New Orleans paper in Miscellaneous Letters, May–June, 1814. Marquis James calls the brothers natives of Bordeaux. *The Life of Andrew Jackson* (Indianapolis, 1938), 186.

[2] Lyle Saxon, *Lafitte the Pirate* (New York and London, 1930), 16. Louis Laffite, captain of the privateersman *La Soeur Chérie*, was in New Orleans in April, 1804. Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, II, 97–98. See also W[illiam] B[ollaert], "Life of Jean Lafitte, the Pirate of the Mexican Gulf," in *Littell's Living Age*, XXXII (1852), 433–46, and Henry Adams, *History of the United States of America* (New York, 1921), VIII, 321.

[3] Washington *National Intelligencer*, October 22, 1814; Alcée Fortier, *A History of Louisiana* (New York, 1904), III, 86.

[4] Charles Gayarré, "Historical Sketch of Pierre and Jean Lafitte, the Famous Smugglers of Louisiana, 1809–1814," in *Magazine of American History*, X (1883), 285.

[5] *Ibid.*, 288.

[6] Stanley Clisby Arthur (ed.), "Laffite Pirates. . . ." (typed copy in National Archives).

The cause of the Spanish-American revolutionists was popular with the people of New Orleans, and many a pirate passed as a privateer serving the cause of democracy. It is very difficult to distinguish between piracy and privateering as practiced by persons like Louis Aury, Dominique You, Vincent Gambi, René Beluche, and others of similar stamp.[7] French privateers, under commissions issued by authorities at Guadeloupe, swarmed the Gulf during the Napoleonic wars. Many of the Baratarians operated under such commissions, and many later accepted commissions from Cartagena. There is no evidence available to show when the Laffites became privateers for the Cartagena government, but it was probably in 1811. That government issued commissions freely, and in 1812 its agents made efforts in the West Indies to attract privateers to the standard of Cartagena.[8] The United States, likewise, issued commissions to privateers after the declaration of war with Great Britain. The Gulf of Mexico thus became the scene of operations for three groups of raiders operating against British and Spanish commerce. The South American privateers under commissions from Buenos Aires and Cartagena, and the French privateers under commissions from Guadeloupe, were joined by privateers operating from ports in the United States. It is no wonder, then, that Barataria became replete with prizes and prize goods. Prior to the war with Great Britain, vessels of the United States patrolled the Gulf coast; but the patrol was weakened by the withdrawal of some of the vessels, and this circumstance favored the smugglers and privateers.[9]

Public opinion, which had more than tolerated the brothers Laffite prior to the declaration of war in 1812, now became overwhelmingly in favor of the adventurers who made it possible for

[7] For an excellent discussion of these privateersmen, see Stanley Faye, "Privateersmen of the Gulf and Their Prizes," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXII (1939), 1012–1094.

[8] Manuel Ezequiel Corrales (ed.), *Documentos para la Historia de la Provincia de Cartagena de Indias* (Bogotá, 1883), I, 669.

[9] Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, November 27, 1812, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

New Orleans merchants to obtain an abundant supply of goods at such low prices. Pierre and Jean Laffite fraternized with prominent persons like August de Castera Davezac and John Randolph Grymes, the United States district attorney who "was sometimes seen drinking coffee with either or both of them in Tremoulet's Coffee House." [10] Governor Claiborne made efforts to secure money and men for an expedition against the Baratarians, but he met with no success.[11] Finally, Captain Andrew Hunter Holmes led a small force of forty men against the smugglers' stronghold.[12] Holmes failed in this attempt; but on November 16, 1812, the Laffites and twenty-five of their men were apprehended while convoying a shipment of smuggled goods.[13] Jean and Pierre, released on bonds, failed to appear at the trial in spite of efforts to catch them.[14]

Governor Claiborne was handicapped by an apathetic legislature and a somewhat hostile public opinion in his efforts to proceed against the Baratarians. Nevertheless, he issued a proclamation on March 15, 1813, which gave a good description of the smuggling activities and indicated the attitude of the people. The smugglers were ordered to disperse, citizens were warned to have no intercourse with them and were urged to assist the authorities in sup-

[10] Saxon, *Lafitte the Pirate*, 47–48. Grymes resigned as district attorney to defend the Laffites after their indictment by a federal grand jury in July, 1814. Gayarré, "Historical Sketch of Pierre and Jean Lafitte, the Famous Smugglers of Louisiana, 1809–1814," in *loc. cit.*, 392–95. Slaves introduced by the Baratarians were a surly lot. Many of them were prominent in the insurrection which occurred in the "parish of St. John Baptist, about thirty-six miles above New Orleans" in 1811. John W. Monette, *History of the Discovery and Settlement of the Valley of the Mississippi . . .* (New York, 1846), II, 491. For details of this insurrection see Barker (ed.), "The Austin Papers," in *loc. cit.*, 184.

[11] Gayarré, "Historical Sketch of Pierre and Jean Lafitte, the Famous Smugglers of Louisiana, 1809–1814," in *loc. cit.*, 290–92.

[12] Washington *National Intelligencer*, October 22, 1814. Bollaert stated that Lieutenant Magee made a raid against the smugglers in 1812. "Life of Jean Lafitte, the Pirate of the Mexican Gulf," in *loc. cit.*, 434. The writer has found no evidence of such a raid.

[13] Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, November 27, 1812, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[14] Saxon, *Lafitte the Pirate*, 66.

pressing their nefarious practices.[15] Claiborne designed this proclamation as "precautionary advice to the Officers & Citizens of this State" and did not believe that the Baratarians would take it seriously.[16] He did hope that the proclamation might "tend to excite the vigilance of the officers of this State & to prevent the Citizens from Countenancing such violations of the Laws."[17] He recommended that Wilkinson take vigorous measures and offered his co-operation. The governor was correct in his estimate of the effect of the measure. The smugglers continued to appear openly in New Orleans and to carry on "their trade with its citizens without much danger or impediment."[18] Wild rumors circulated about the Baratarians and the incredible vitality of legend has kept them circulating in fiction and cinema. Their number was placed somewhere between five hundred and fifteen hundred. They threatened to "become the strongest force in Louisiana! Such a nest of pyrates has never been known on the continent." At this den of "debauchery and villany" one could buy the best wine "for a doller per gallon, Irish linnen for six dollers a picce & superfine broadcloth at four dollers."[19] No wonder the Laffites and their associates were popular! But they became too bold and soon overplayed their hand.

One of the weak efforts made to interfere with the smugglers was that in which Walker Gilbert, a revenue officer, seized a quantity of contraband which Jean Laffite recaptured. This bold action caused Claiborne to issue a second proclamation on November 23, 1813. The contraband trade was declared to have increased, and civil and military authorities were commanded to be vigilant in enforcing the laws. A reward of $500 was posted for delivering Jean Laffite to the sheriff of the Parish of New Orleans, or to any

[15] Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 232–33; Charles E. Gayarré, *History of Louisiana* (New York, 1854–1866), IV, 289–90.

[16] Claiborne to Thomas H. Williams, New Orleans, March 17, 1813, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 217. Williams was the collector at New Orleans.

[17] Claiborne to Wilkinson, New Orleans, March 17, 1813, *ibid.*, 216–17.

[18] Gayarré, *History of Louisiana*, IV, 290–91; Fortier, *A History of Louisiana*, III, 84.

[19] Brackenridge to Shaler, Baton Rouge, December 27, 1813, Mexico, Filibustering.

other sheriff in the state.[20] Jean Laffite was not greatly concerned about the governor's proclamation, and "the next day this Buccaneer offered a reward of $1000 for the head of the Governor, & his hand Bill was distributed through the City." [21] Needless to say, neither reward was ever paid.

The Threat Against Tampico

General Humbert arrived at New Orleans in the midst of Claiborne's efforts to obtain action against the Baratarians. In spite of these efforts, the smugglers were still active. Their ships were many and an unknown number of banditti could be summoned for an excursion that promised adventure and profit. Humbert, as has been indicated, wasted no time in stirring up the hornets. The Baratarians agreed to participate in a maritime expedition against Tampico or some other Mexican port, while Humbert went on to Natchitoches to prepare for the land invasion. We have already noted the results of his efforts to organize a government in Texas. When he returned to New Orleans, about January 3, 1814, with Picornell, Lacroix, and probably Pierre Girard, there were hopes that the dual enterprise would actually take place. The brothers Laffite had aroused the hostility of the governor and their open violation of the revenue laws could not continue forever. New projects were therefore particularly attractive to them.

The Baratarians had two prospects before them. They could continue in the smuggling operations which had proved very profitable, or they could gamble on the eventual realization of General Humbert's plan. Although nothing had been done as yet about the proposed expedition against Tampico, there was plenty to do. Hunting had been good in the Gulf, and there were prize goods waiting to be sold. Claiborne learned on January 20, 1814, that the Laffites were about to sell a large number of Negroes at a

[20] Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 279–80.

[21] Exeter [John Windship] to William Plumer Jr., Natchitoches, April 2, 1814, in Brown (ed.), "Letters from Louisiana, 1813–1814," in *loc. cit.*, 576.

public auction at the Temple, a Baratarian rendezvous. A small force of men under a temporary collector of the revenue was repulsed while attempting to interfere with the sale and the officer was killed. Claiborne asked that the legislature provide for breaking up the Baratarian settlement, but nothing was done.[22] So many of the merchants of New Orleans were interested in the smuggling trade that it was considered "almost impracticable to dispossess them [the smugglers]." [23] The power of the governor was so weak that enforcement of the revenue laws was almost impossible, especially when fortunes were being made easily and European merchandise was cheaper than before the Embargo.[24] A combination of circumstances, then, prevented Claiborne from dispersing the Baratarians. Public opinion supported them, merchants dealt with them to their profit, and they had friends in the legislature.[25]

Claiborne's proclamations of March 15 and November 23, 1813, were directed against the Baratarians as smugglers, but he soon had occasion to include them in a proclamation against invasion of the territory of a friendly power. The threatened land expedition against the Interior Provinces was dropped temporarily after Picornell's resignation, but the scheme to co-operate with the Baratarians still existed. The corsairs, with aid from Cartagena, planned to sack Tampico and then locate a stronghold at Matagorda.[26] Recruiting activities in Humbert's behalf had practically ceased when Governor Claiborne, in response to Monroe's letters of February 14 and 17, issued his proclamation of March 23, 1814, against preparing hostile expeditions to invade the Spanish provinces. The neutrality act of 1794 was again cited as prohibiting such enterprises within the United States.[27] The plotters gave little heed to the proclamation, and when Gutiérrez arrived in New Orleans in

[22] Gayarré, *History of Louisiana*, IV, 312–16.

[23] Exeter [John Windship] to William Plumer Jr., Natchitoches, April 2, 1814, in Brown (ed.), "Letters from Louisiana, 1813–1814," in *loc. cit.*, 576.

[24] *Ibid.*, 575–76.

[25] Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, January 18, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[26] Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, February 23, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

[27] "Proclamation of William C. C. Claiborne, Governor of the State of Louisiana . . . ," AGI PC, leg. 1836.

April, 1814, he became the center of a new plan to invade Mexico. A meeting was held by interested persons who decided to recruit two thousand men with Gutiérrez as commander.[28] Morphy soon had enough information about the new plan to warn the governor of Vera Cruz that Gutiérrez and Humbert were conspiring with the "pirates" of Barataria to attack some point on the coast.[29]

The new plan seemed to be progressing satisfactorily until Gutiérrez made an attempt to collect funds. Some of the subscribers found it difficult to sell property to raise their share of the expenses and the affair became public.[30] The plotters were not entirely discouraged but conceived a modified plan on a much more modest scale. Instead of the original grand invasion by land and by sea, two or more Baratarian vessels would cruise before Tampico in order to intercept craft bound for that port. General Humbert would be on board one of the vessels to command a landing force if an opportunity for pillaging arose.[31] Morphy believed that even the plan against Tampico was abandoned by June 10,[32] and a week later it was learned that Humbert had left Barataria on a corsair for a cruise in the Gulf.[33] Gutiérrez then wrote to Alexandre Pétion, dictator over the southern portion of Haiti, on June 22 to ask for aid. Pétion replied that Haiti had decided to remain perfectly neutral and could offer no assistance.[34] Under these circumstances, there was reason for Sedella to report complacently that Picornell's desertion had paralyzed the projects against Mexico, although it was feared that Humbert planned to make a raid against some Mexican port.[35] The bombastic Frenchman had indeed left Barataria early in June as a passenger on the *Tigre*, Cap-

[28] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 22.

[29] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, June 3, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[30] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 23.

[31] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, June 3, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[32] Morphy to the Governor of Vera Cruz, New Orleans, June 10, 1814, quoted by Carlos María de Bustamante, *Cuadro Histórico de la Revolución Mexicana, . . .* (Mexico, 1843–1846), IV, 173.

[33] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, June 18, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[34] Pétion to Gutiérrez, Port-au-Prince, August 15, 1814, in Hernández, *Documentos*, V, 175.

[35] Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, July 10, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

tain Dominique You (Frederic Yeux). The *Tigre* put in at Nautla on June 19 with a cargo of powder, and General Humbert opened negotiations with the Mexican leaders.[36] Early in September, 1814, Humbert was back in New Orleans with a Mexican "minister," Don Juan Pablo Anaya, and Colonel Ellis P. Bean, a survivor of the ill-fated Nolan expedition of more than a decade before. These men were expected to make effective arrangements with the smugglers of Barataria, but before they could do so Baratarians were in flight and New Orleans was apprehensive of a British attack.

The End of Barataria

Pierre Laffite was compelled to appear in New Orleans frequently to carry on business matters connected with the thriving Baratarian enterprise. During one of these visits the United States marshal, Pierre L. B. Duplessis, succeeded in serving the warrant which had been issued many months before. On July 8, 1814, Pierre was imprisoned.[37] The active management of the Baratarian business rested for the time being with Jean, who was soon compelled to make an important decision.

It was at this time that the British were preparing for the invasion of Louisiana, and efforts were made by them to enlist the Baratarians against the United States. The Laffites controlled a force of sufficient size to make it worth securing. The naval contingent of the marauders at Barataria in the summer of 1814 "consisted of four schooners perfectly armed and equipped" with some five hundred men.[38] It was partly for the purpose of obtaining the aid of these men and ships in the invasion of Louisiana that the British made their offer to Jean Laffite.

Barataria itself possessed considerable strategic importance. The

[36] José Antonio Pedroza to Ignacio Rayón, Nautla, June 21, 1814, in Hernández, *Documentos*, V, 547.

[37] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, September 5, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[38] Testimony of Mariano Medina y Madrid, encl. in Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, May 20, 1814, *ibid.*

bayous, canals, and channels were so shallow that only boats of light draft could navigate the inner waters. A force of men, properly equipped and commanded by officers familiar with the region, could be sent against New Orleans from Barataria. The Committee of Safety, composed of prominent citizens of New Orleans,[39] recognized Barataria as one of the possible approaches to New Orleans, and decided that it should be defended with "a few pieces of Cannon established at a place called the Temple and a blockhouse or two at the forks below. . . ."[40] Jean Laffite, when he communicated the details of the British offer, reminded Claiborne that "This point of Louisiana, which I occupy, is of great importance in the present crisis."[41]

One of the motives which caused the British to dispatch the expedition against New Orleans was certainly a part of the policy to divide and conquer. New Orleans was a key position in the southwest, and if the British could capture that city, they would be in possession of an extremely important point. As early as January, 1811, the British chargé recommended the seizure of New Orleans in case of war with the United States. This strategy, he thought, might cause a separation of the West from the Union.[42] There may have been another motive significant in British policy, a motive of great weight in the projects of the friends of Mexican independence. The editor of *Bell's Weekly Messenger* may have released a cat from the English bag when he asserted that one object of the expedition was "probably, the destruction of New Orleans and thereby to check at least the present intrigues of the Americans against the Spanish settlements." New Orleans was

[39] See John Spencer Bassett (ed.), *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson* (Washington, 1926–1935), II, 54, and William B. Hatcher, *Edward Livingston, Jeffersonian Republican and Jacksonian Democrat* (University, La., 1940), 205.

[40] Committee of Safety to Jackson, New Orleans, September 18, 1814, in Bassett (ed.), *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, II, 53.

[41] Jean Laffite to Claiborne, [Barataria], September 4, 1814, in A. Lacarrière Latour, *Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814–15* (Philadelphia, 1816), appendix, xiii.

[42] Rippy, *Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America (1808–1830)*, 37.

regarded as being the headquarters of official and private intrigue against Spanish America.[43] If this purpose was in the minds of the British cabinet members, the offer to Jean Laffite assumes a new aspect. By gaining the adherence of the Baratarians, the British would have possessed an important approach to New Orleans, and they would have had a better chance to remove one center of intrigue against the Spanish colonies while increasing their effective forces.[44]

Captain W. H. Percy anchored his vessel, the *Sophia,* at a safe distance from Barataria on September 3, 1814, and sent two officers to find Jean Laffite. They bore dispatches from Colonel Edward Nicholls, commanding the military expedition against Louisiana, and Captain Percy. Nicholls offered Laffite a captaincy and land grants, while Percy added a threat to use force if the offer were refused. Laffite asked for a delay of a fortnight while he considered the matter, and the next day he wrote to Jean Blanque, a member of the Louisiana legislature, and to Governor Claiborne, revealing the British offer. Blanque was asked to deliver the papers to Claiborne and to intercede on behalf of Pierre Laffite.[45] Jean's letter to Claiborne is sufficiently interesting to warrant its reproduction in full, as polished in translation by Major Latour:

SIR,

In the firm persuasion that the choice made of you to fill the office of first magistrate of this state, was dictated by the esteem of your fellow-citizens, and was conferred on merit, I confidently address you on an offer on which may depend the safety of this country.

[43] London, January 22, 1815, p. 29.

[44] For a concise treatment of British motives in attacking Louisiana, see Rippy, *Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America (1808–1830),* 47–48.

[45] Charles E. Gayarré, *Essai Historique sur la Louisiane* (New Orleans, 1830), II, 132–33. For a brief account of the British offer, see François-Xavier Martin, *The History of Louisiana from the Earliest Period . . .* (New Orleans, 1882), 362–63; Zachary F. Smith, *The Battle of New Orleans . . .* (Louisville, 1904), 20–21; [François] Barbé-Marbois, *The History of Louisiana, . . .* (Philadelphia, 1830), 382–84. Nicholls's letter to Laffite is in Gayarré, *History of Louisiana,* IV, 357. Laffite's letters to Jean Blanque are in *ibid.,* 361–62. All of the letters, including Nicholls's Florida proclamation, are in Latour, *Historical Memoir,* appendix, vii–xv. Latour is the most reliable authority on the British offer.

I offer to you to restore to this state several citizens, who perhaps in your eyes have lost that sacred title. I offer you them, however, such as you could wish to find them, ready to exert their utmost efforts in the defence of the country. This point of Louisiana, which I occupy, is of great importance in the present crisis. I tender my services to defend it; and the only reward I ask is that a stop be put to the proscription against me and my adherents, by an act of oblivion for all that has been done hitherto. I am the stray sheep, wishing to return to the sheepfold. If you were thoroughly acquainted with the nature of my offences, I should appear to you much less guilty, and still worthy to discharge the duties of a good citizen. I have never sailed under any flag but that of the republic of Carthagena, and my vessels are perfectly regular in that respect. If I could have brought my lawful prizes into the ports of this state, I should not have employed the illicit means that have caused me to be proscribed. I decline saying more on the subject, until I have the honour of your excellency's answer, which I am persuaded can be dictated only by wisdom. Should your answer not be favorable to my ardent desires, I declare to you that I will instantly leave the country, to avoid the imputation of having co-operated towards an invasion on this point, which cannot fail to take place, and to rest secure in the acquittal of my own conscience.

I have the honour to be
Your excellency's &c.
J. LAFFITE.[46]

Jean Blanque hastened to deliver the letters to Governor Claiborne who summoned a council of war. The council was inclined to believe that the whole affair was a sample of Baratarian trickery, especially since Pierre Laffite had escaped from jail, although Jean could not have known about the escape at the time he wrote the letters. The decision of the council was to proceed with plans to break up the Baratarian establishment.[47]

Governor Claiborne had become impatient with the refusal of the legislature to take the steps necessary for the destruction of Barataria, and it was with no little pleasure that he could inform

[46] Jean Laffite to [Claiborne], [Barataria, September 4, 1814], in Latour, *Historical Memoir*, appendix, xiii–xiv. Jean almost invariably signed his name "Jn Laffite." Cf. James, *The Life of Andrew Jackson*, 817, n. 11.

[47] Latour, *Historical Memoir*, 17 *et seq.* Pierre escaped on September 4. Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, September 5, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

General Jackson of a plan to remove the "hellish banditti" from the vicinity of New Orleans. "The Pirates and Smugglers," he wrote, "who have so long infested the shores of Barataria . . . are still in force and, in the daily violation of all laws human and divine." Being unable to direct a force of militia against the establishment, Claiborne asked Colonel George T. Ross of the 44th Regiment and Captain Daniel T. Patterson of the naval station to combine against the Baratarians.[48] The approach of the British toward Mobile aroused apprehension in New Orleans and caused Claiborne to question the wisdom of undertaking an enterprise which would deprive the city of an important body of troops. The British overtures to Jean Laffite might also have caused the governor to fear an ambush; but Patterson wished to continue with the expedition.[49]

Preparations to break up the Baratarian headquarters proceeded rapidly. Morphy was able to report with considerable satisfaction that an old source of constant irritation was about to be removed: "It is to be hoped that this time the expedition may have more fortunate results than on former occasions, since now there can be no doubt that those of Barataria rob indiscriminately every ship, American as well as from every other nation; and that consequently there remains no recourse other than that of driving them forever from these coasts. . . ." [50] Six gun boats, a launch, and the schooner *Caroline* sailed from New Orleans on September 11 with a portion of the 44th Regiment commanded by Colonel Ross. On approaching Barataria the expedition found "extensive military and maritime preparations consisting of schooners and other vessels amassed in order of battle and a force on land consisting of about 500

[48] Claiborne to Jackson, New Orleans, August 21, 1814, in Bassett (ed.), *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, VI, 437.

[49] Claiborne to Jackson, New Orleans, September 8, 1814, *ibid.*, 438–39. Daniel T. Patterson was a lieutenant in the navy in 1812, receiving his full pay of $40 per month and three rations per day. He became master commandant on July 24, 1813, and was stationed at New Orleans. His captain's commission was granted on February 28, 1815, and he became commanding officer of the New Orleans naval station. *American State Papers, Naval Affairs* (Washington, 1834), I, *passim*.

[50] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, September 12, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

men. . . ." The privateers and smugglers refused to fight and scattered through the swamps, with buyers from New Orleans discreetly leading the way. The "force" of from four to five hundred men on land was made up of sailors, buyers of smuggled goods, and purveyors of supplies to the establishment.[51] The expedition was entirely successful; and, although the brothers Laffite escaped with some of their property, the power of the smugglers was broken with practically no resistance.

Three days after the attack refugees began to appear in New Orleans,[52] where they remained to participate in the defense against the British. Governor Claiborne, in reporting the outcome of the expedition to Monroe, recommended that a naval force be stationed at New Orleans to prevent the pirates from reassembling at Barataria.[53]

The effect of the expedition was one which Claiborne should have foreseen. So many refugees from Barataria went to New Orleans that the governor was alarmed, and he observed that "Among them are some St. Domingo negro's [*sic*] of the most desperate characters and probably no worse than most of their white associates." [54] Claiborne was present at a meeting of the city council on September 20 and "strongly urged the necessity of adopting some strong measures of police and particularly as related to slaves, and the visits and Residence of strangers." [55] The Baratarians certainly were not strangers to New Orleans! Claiborne's report aroused Jackson to express "extreme regret and astonishment, that those wretches, the refugees from Barataria and its dependencies, should find an asylum" in New Orleans. He requested that the fugitives be arrested and detained to prevent the country from being

[51] "D. T. Patterson & G. T. Ross & Others vs. Certain vessels goods & merchandise, libel filed Oct. 17, 1814," transcript in Arthur (ed.), "Laffite Pirates."

[52] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, September 19, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[53] Claiborne to Monroe, New Orleans, October 25, 1814, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 291.

[54] Claiborne to Jackson, New Orleans, September 20, 1814, in Bassett (ed.), *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, II, 56.

[55] *Ibid.*

ravaged and the "city reduced to ashes by these incendiaries." [66] Within a short time the crusty Indian fighter was very grateful for the aid of the fugitives who occupied such a low place in his esteem.

Juan Pablo Anaya's Mission to the United States

The Ross-Patterson expedition against the smugglers of Barataria coincided with the arrival of Juan Pablo Anaya at New Orleans. The account of how Anaya came to be a Mexican foreign agent indicates the conditions in Mexico which in some ways were responsible for the final failure of attempts to obtain aid from the adventurers of New Orleans.

General José María Morelos was especially in need of arms and ammunition for his troops in the early months of 1814. He had come to trust the American adventurer, Colonel Ellis P. Bean, who had survived the Nolan expedition of 1800–1801. He asked Bean to go to the United States for arms and to arrange for a campaign against Texas. Bean was without resources, but he managed to collect about $10,000 from wealthy patriots in Tehuacán. With this sum he made his way to Nautla where he spent several days in a futile effort to equip a large open boat for the voyage to New Orleans. While Bean and his men were struggling with their boat, one of the Baratarian schooners appeared off the coast. The vessel was the *Tigre,* commanded by that expert artilleryman, Dominique You. Dominique paid no attention to Bean's signals and went on down the coast toward Vera Cruz. After sailing a short distance the *Tigre* fell in with an armed British merchantman. Dominique displayed his superiority both in sailing and gunnery, with the result that the English vessel was vanquished. Colonel Bean watched the *Tigre* sail away after its victory, then he turned again to his

[66] Jackson to Claiborne, Mobile, September 30, 1814, *ibid.*, 63. On October 17, 1814, Ross and Patterson libeled the schooners *Petit Milan* (alias *Eagle, Aguila*), *Dorada* (*Dorade*), *Harlequin* (*Experimente*), *Surprise, Comet, Fly, Wasp,* and a felucca, as well as the schooner *General Bolivar,* all taken in the raid. *American State Papers, Naval Affairs,* I, 542.

preparations. News came to him the day after Dominique's encounter with the English brigantine that a small schooner was drifting about near the mouth of the river. Bean took possession of the schooner, but there was little chance to proceed to New Orleans. His newly acquired vessel was not equipped for the voyage and he himself knew nothing of navigation. But Captain Dominique and his crew celebrated their victory in a manner definitely alcoholic, and the drunken crew ran the *Tigre* ashore about six miles north of Nautla. The two groups of men combined, with a sobered Captain Dominique supervising preparations to sail Bean's small schooner to Barataria. The return voyage was made without incident. Bean went on to New Orleans where he saw Claiborne, and then made a trip to Natchez and Natchitoches where he found only dispirited Mexicans.[57]

General Humbert and the Baratarians were co-operating early in 1814 for an attack against Tampico and Texas, and so the return of Dominique with Colonel Bean was certain to have some influence on the scheme. Bean had enough money with him to interest the Laffites in sending a cargo to Mexico. Humbert's chances of carrying out his wild plan were not too promising in May, 1814, and it is logical to suppose that he was quite willing to take advantage of the opportunity to go to Mexico with Dominique You.[58]

It is impossible to say exactly what happened to the disabled *Tigre,* but late in May or early in June, Captain Dominique sailed from Grande Terre with General Humbert on board a vessel by that name. They arrived off Nautla on June 19, 1814,[59] and were soon involved in one of the petty quarrels which were perennial among the rival revolutionary leaders. Don Juan Pablo Anaya was a partisan of General Juan N. Rosains, and Father José Antonio Pedroza favored General Ignacio Rayón. These two subordinates became rivals in trying to conduct General Humbert to their re-

[57] W. P. Yoakum (ed.), *Memoir of Col. Ellis P. Bean Written by Himself, about the Year 1816* (Austin, 1930), 93–97. No dates are given in Bean's account.

[58] See p. 104 *supra.*

[59] Pedroza to Rayón, Nautla, June 21, 1814, in Hernández, *Documentos,* V, 547.

spective superiors. Humbert and the cargo were considered worth fighting about! He showed Pedroza papers which the insurgent accepted as indicating that he was sent by the United States to make an alliance with the Mexican patriots. Pedroza was also interested in the cargo of powder which the *Tigre* carried. Other vessels from Barataria were to follow, including the *Dorada* (or *Dorade*) and the *Philanthrope*.[60] General Rayón was so jubilant that he issued a proclamation to announce that their tears had finally won a consolatory glance from Heaven.[61] Humbert was represented as an officer of the United States army who offered an alliance. Rayón sent an agent to receive Humbert, but General Rosains was ahead of him. Anaya had induced Humbert to go to San Andrés to interview Rosains, but a royalist force drove the insurgents away before the meeting could take place.[62] Father Pedroza, disgruntled by the turn of events, let it be known that the Mexican Congress had ordered the arrest of Rosains and Anaya, and so the latter hastened to depart from Nautla. He named a subordinate to succeed him in command of the coast of Vera Cruz, sold the supplies brought by Dominique, and obtained a commission from thirteen complacent inhabitants naming him agent to the United States. Anaya collected about $5,000, some bars of silver and gold, and set sail for Grande Terre with Father Pedroza as a kidnapped guest.[63] They arrived in New Orleans on September 6, 1814,[64] after a stop at Grande Terre where Bean joined them.

Enthusiasm for the insurgent cause revived with the appearance of Anaya; and the armorers of New Orleans, with the Baratarians, agreed to join a project against New Spain.[65] Anaya made arrangements for the Baratarians to use a Mexican flag and sent

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, Vol. IV, appendix, doc. 3, pp. 6–7.

[62] *Ibid.*, 100–103.

[63] Pedroza's Manifesto, New Orleans, October 30, 1814, encl. in Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 3, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[64] Letter from Ellis P. Bean, New Orleans, October 21, 1814, in Winchester *Kentucky Advertiser*, January 14, 1815.

[65] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 3, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

more than two hundred commissions to Rosains,[66] apparently to be signed. These plans received a serious blow when Ross and Patterson carried out their expedition against the smugglers of Barataria on September 16, 1814; but there was an advantage in having so many prospective recruits congregated in New Orleans, and the plotters continued their plans. Morphy and Picornell directed their efforts toward learning the names of the principals in the new plot against Tampico, and then determined to divide the leaders in order to cause the public to lose confidence in the project.[67] They received unexpected aid from Father Pedroza. The kidnapped cleric nursed his grievances for a few weeks, and then went to the Spanish consulate to reveal the whole plot to Morphy and Picornell. With information supplied by Pedroza, Picornell wrote a manifesto for the clergyman to sign.[68] The manifesto charged Anaya with being a deserter, a traitor, a thief, and a murderer who had no power whatever to issue letters of marque, grant commissions, and enlist foreign troops.[69] Morphy was confident that Pedroza's manifesto, which was published in the French, Spanish, and English newspapers, would have an important influence in delaying the planned expedition and would give the Spaniards time to perfect plans to oppose the scheme.[70] Anaya replied by calling Pedroza an ungrateful liar.[71]

Morphy's pleasure at this exchange of insults and charges was destined to be cut short promptly. José Álvarez de Toledo, after his failure to gather recruits for an invasion of Texas at his camp beyond the Sabine, had started for Washington in the fall of 1814 when he heard of Anaya's arrival in New Orleans.[72] Accompanied by his wife, Toledo arrived in that city about November 10, 1814,

[66] Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, IV, 104. Cf. Anaya to the President, [New Orleans, November ?, 1814], Consular Despatches, Mexico, 1811–1825.

[67] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 3, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[68] José de Soto to Apodaca, Pensacola, April 24, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1796.

[69] Encl. in Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 3, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[70] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 3, 1814, *ibid.*

[71] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 22, 1814, *ibid.*

[72] See p. 112 *supra*.

and made himself known to Anaya.[73] Here was a situation that might well have exhausted the patience of any loyal Spaniard, and Diego Morphy was no Job. Gutiérrez, Bean, Anaya, Humbert, Toledo, and the Baratarian refugees were all in New Orleans. The brothers Laffite, dispossessed at Grande Terre, were available for any mad enterprise. Under the circumstances Morphy did what he could. Picornell gave invaluable assistance in discovering the plans of the plotters. Spanish officials were warned that a vessel might be sent to Nautla, and with Toledo in New Orleans, anything could happen.[74] Three days after this warning Morphy verified his fears. Toledo and Anaya had come to an agreement. San Antonio was to be attacked, Matagorda and another port were to be opened to trade, and the United States would aid the insurgents. From thirty to forty thousand poor Americans from the north were ready to march into Texas to acquire lands! This was the same plot that had been brewing for more than a year, the same scheme that Toledo and Shaler had been commissioned to carry out. A ship would be sent to Nautla with communications for the insurgent Congress requesting its co-operation.[75] But another situation was rapidly shaping to a climax. The British were threatening Louisiana, and when General Jackson arrived in New Orleans early in December, 1814, the attention of the inhabitants was directed toward protecting their city. Spanish officials were to be given a brief respite from the machinations of their enemies in Louisiana.

The Heroes of Barataria

Anyone acquainted with conditions in New Orleans during the period of Baratarian supremacy would not be surprised at the presence of the fugitives in the city. The smugglers had learned, in a manner strangely like modern gangsters, the value of proper legal representation. Edward Livingston, the noted jurist who was

[73] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 11, 1814, AGI PC, leg. 1836.
[74] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 22, 1814, *ibid.*
[75] Morphy to Onís, New Orleans, November 25, 1814, *ibid.*

later to become Secretary of State under Andrew Jackson, wrote a significant letter to President Madison in behalf of the discomfited privateers. Since the seizure of papers at Barataria would expose many prominent persons to prosecution, a general pardon would do much to quiet the public mind, and at the same time "add to our Maritime Strength at least 500 sailors who have Embraced that kind of life more from an idea that their Commissions were good than from any piratical Design. . . ." [76] Livingston was certainly in a position to speak with authority regarding the strength of the Baratarians, but one wonders if he thought that their South American commissions also applied to smuggling prize goods into the United States!

Jackson found the defenses of New Orleans in a lamentable condition when he arrived. Supplies were scarce, fortifications were entirely inadequate, and soldiers were few indeed. These conditions might have been caused by the expectation that the main attack would be delivered against Mobile; but the defenses of New Orleans were fairly on a par with those in other important ports of the country. One of the most important measures taken by the legislature during the emergency was the resolution which promised intercession in behalf of the Baratarians who would join the land or naval forces of the United States "for the defence of the state during the Present occasion, or while the Enemy shall remain on the coast. . . ." In return for such services, the legislature promised that it would "earnestly recommend to the President of the United States to grant a full pardon" to the offenders, while at the same time the district attorney would be urged "to enter a nolle prosequi against all such persons now confined" for the violation of the laws.[77] In accordance with these resolutions, Governor Claiborne issued a proclamation on December 17 which was, in effect, a promise of amnesty to all Baratarians who rallied to the flag.[78]

[76] Livingston to Madison, New Orleans, October 24, 1814, The Papers of James Madison, 1793–1846 (Library of Congress), LVII, 26.

[77] Bassett (ed.), *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, II, 114.

[78] Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books*, VI, 324. Cf. Grace King, *New Orleans, The Place and the People* (New York, 1928), 203–204.

grandiose scheme to attack San Antonio and open a port on the Gulf coast of Texas. The plans were interrupted by the British invasion in which the insurgent agents and the Baratarians fought valiantly for General Jackson.

Chapter 6

Herrera's Mission to the United States

Revival of the Plot Against New Spain

There was rejoicing in New Orleans after the defeat of the British. General Jackson was hailed as a hero and his assistants were not forgotten. José Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara, the "monster," was received honorably and "the revolutionary flags of Cartagena of the Indies and of the Mexican Republic" were raised "at the side of those of European Powers on the occasion of the fiestas to celebrate the peace concluded between England and these States." [1] There was an era of good feeling in New Orleans, and for the time being Toledo, Humbert, Anaya, and Gutiérrez were more or less in agreement.

Various attempts were made to organize another expedition against Spanish possessions. The New Orleans associates, composed of the lawyers, merchants, and general scoundrels who were interested in filibustering and privateering projects,[2] offered to furnish men and munitions for an attack on Florida to be led by Gutiérrez. The arsenal at Pensacola was supposed to contain twenty thousand guns, as well as other war materials, which could be used in an invasion of Texas. Money might be obtained by selling Florida to the United States for two or three million dollars. Gutiérrez wanted an assurance that the United States would recognize the capture as being lawful and would not relieve him

[1] Onís to the Viceroy, Philadelphia, May 1, 1815, AGN ND, III, f. 257.

[2] Spanish officials referred to this group as an association. The organization was informal, and membership was contingent upon occasional co-operation in enterprises that ranged from smuggling to outright piracy. Livingston, Grymes, Davezac, Duncan, West, the Laffites, Nolte, Lafon, and others were in the band.

of the province without compensation. The New Orleans associates could not give this assurance, so Gutiérrez refused further consideration of the plan.[3] Many of the disbanded soldiers were interested in joining an expedition against Texas, but Gutiérrez could not come to an agreement with these volunteers and advised them to wait until the main expedition could get under way in June or July.[4]

During February and March, in addition to the proposals made to Gutiérrez, the plan to attack Tampico and to invade Texas was revived by Toledo, Humbert, and their associates. Gutiérrez was to aid preparations at Natchitoches, while Dominique You would lead the naval expedition against Tampico.[5] General Humbert showed no sign of being any less *loco* than formerly when he published a proclamation on February 7, 1815, in the attempt to arouse interest in the proposed foray.[6] The general was suffering under his usual delusions, and in all likelihood the New Orleans associates would have been pleased had the garrulous old Frenchman been somewhere else.

Toledo directed his efforts toward gaining co-operation from the nebulous and itinerant Mexican "Congress." He informed that body that he had "400 well armed men" and could count on two thousand more who could be raised quickly. A brilliant campaign could be carried out in conjunction with the Indians of the Interior Provinces if funds were available. Captain Julius Caesar Amigoni, a well-known Baratarian, procured an excellent ship to carry dispatches to Mexico, and Toledo recommended that he be given a command with the rank of captain. Letters of marque should be sent so that a fleet of privateers could be collected; officers, too, would be needed for the army. It was advisable, Toledo suggested, to open a port to ensure safe and easy communication between

[3] Gutiérrez, "Memorial," in *Lamar Papers*, I, 26.

[4] Encl. in Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, April 22, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

[5] Onís to the Viceroy, Philadelphia, May 1, 1815, AGN ND, III, f. 257; José de Soto to Apodaca, Pensacola, March 4, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1796. Soto was *comandante interino* at Pensacola.

[6] Lexington *Kentucky Gazette*, April 17, 1815.

Mexico and New Orleans. An accomplished person, with powers to conclude a treaty with the United States and to deal with foreign powers, should be sent with funds and a secretary.[7] In the midst of his feverish letter writing the schemer asked Governor Claiborne for a letter which would add weight to his assertions that the United States would recognize a minister. Claiborne was careful not to exceed the limitations of his office in his reply and merely expressed his wishes that some day Mexico might be free and the "United States of North America may recognize the Mexican People as a free and independent nation, and thus . . . remain faithful allies and true friends." [8]

Captain Amigoni was having difficulties in obtaining permission for the schooner *Aguila,*[9] owned by John K. West, to leave New Orleans with the agents who were to carry Toledo's dispatches to Mexico. The vessel finally got away in ballast on February 18, 1815, with General Jackson's permission.[10] One of the Laffite vessels, the *Bolivar,* which was captured by Ross and Patterson in their raid against the Baratarians, was purchased by Abner L. Duncan and sailed the Gulf as the *General Jackson.* This vessel was preparing to sail to Nautla in April, 1815, with more dispatches and to bring back the minister from the Congress.[11] Toledo prepared his second batch of dispatches late in March and took occasion to urge again the appointment of a minister.[12]

Perhaps Toledo expected Captain Amigoni to sail directly for

[7] Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, February 10, 1815, AGI IG, 136-7-9, ff. 13-24.

[8] Claiborne to Toledo, February 18, 1815, encl. in Toledo to Bean, New Orleans, February 17, 1815, *ibid.*, f. 31.

[9] For other names of the *Aguila,* see Faye, "Privateersmen of the Gulf and Their Prizes," in *loc. cit.,* 1035-36.

[10] John Dick to Richard Rush, New Orleans, August 19, 1815, Miscellaneous Letters, June-August, 1815; encl. in Dick to Rush, New Orleans, August 25, 1815, *ibid.* Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, April 10, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1836, gives the date as February 24.

[11] Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, April 10, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1836. The *Bolivar* was originally the *Caridad,* then the *Atlanta,* then the *Cubana.* Arthur (ed.), "Laffite Pirates."

[12] Toledo to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, March 23, 1815, AGI IG, 136-7-9, ff. 33-36.

Nautla with his letters and passengers; but that would not have given the *Aguila*'s master a chance to use the six- or nine-pounder which he had concealed in the hold under the ballast. Toledo knew that Amigoni intended to do some privateering, and there is no reason to suppose that the *Aguila*'s owner, John K. West, was averse to diverting Spanish property to his own account. Once clear of the Mississippi, Amigoni made for Barataria—as was customary with privateers clearing from New Orleans—where he took on twenty muskets, two cannon, cutlasses, gunpowder, and a few more men. Then the *Aguila,* with Vincent Gambi now in command, turned toward Mexico and captured a Spanish schooner on the way. At Boquilla de Piedras the passengers were landed and soon Amigoni had a Mexican commission for his vessel. In subsequent cruising he captured two Spanish schooners, one the *Santa Rita* with a cargo of dry goods, which were sent to Barataria. Being somewhat damaged, the *Aguila* followed to the corsairs' haven where it was seized with the *Santa Rita* by a gunboat sent out by Patterson from New Orleans. Amigoni, Gambi, and two members of the crew were charged with piracy. Toledo was arrested in April, and on May 16 a federal grand jury indicted him for having furnished and armed the *Aguila.* At the July term of court the jury was not satisfied with the circumstantial evidence introduced against him and Toledo was acquitted. His reputation was somewhat damaged by the indictment which had hung over him from May to July but he continued his efforts in the cause of Mexican independence.[18]

A semblance of harmony appeared among the plotters in July, 1815, after Anaya's elimination from the inner circle. They decided to concentrate on a dual expedition against New Spain, abandoning the project against Pensacola which had been proposed to Gutiérrez. Recruits would be gathered from Tennessee, Kentucky, and Louisiana. Colonel Henry Perry was selected as the leader of

[18] John Dick to Richard Rush, New Orleans, August 19, 1815, Miscellaneous Letters, June–August, 1815. The piracy charge against the others was not proved to a jury's satisfaction, so Gambi and Amigoni went free.

one army that would rendezvous at Belle Isle and go by water to Matagorda Bay. A second army, with Gutiérrez raising the Indian tribes, would follow the northern route taken by Magee in 1812. The two armies would meet at La Bahía and then attack San Antonio together. Gambi, with six or eight schooners and smaller craft, was to command the naval attack on Tampico.[14] Perry displayed considerable energy in carrying out his share of the plan, but the announcement that he circulated in July was a little too bold. The enterprise, he announced, offered "an easy road to distinction, and promises a glorious reward for merit." Commissioned officers discharged from the United States Army would be among the five hundred men to be gathered at Belle Isle. Arms, ammunition, and a thousand men already enlisted promised success.[15]

Governor Claiborne was away from New Orleans for three months, and he told Monroe that he did not learn of the plan until late in July. His communication indicates that he believed he was the scapegoat for the administration in Washington. He maintained that the civil authority of Louisiana was not competent to suppress such expeditions, and if the government wanted them disrupted it would have to apply force. People in Louisiana were favorably disposed toward the filibusters because of the impression that they were countenanced by the administration.[16] James Miller, a customs officer stationed at New Iberia, sent Monroe a copy of Perry's circular and reported that the filibusters were boasting of having official favor.[17] Patterson was far from diligent in his efforts to discover the Belle Isle gathering. Perhaps visibility was so poor that the personnel of the cutter *Fox* failed to see what was common knowledge to the fishermen.[18]

[14] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 14, 1815, encl. no. 1 in Captain General to Lardizabal y Uribe, Habana, November 7, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1856.

[15] *Niles' Weekly Register* (Baltimore), IX (September 16, 1815), 33.

[16] Claiborne to Monroe, Parish Iberville, July 26, 1815, Miscellaneous Letters, June–August, 1815.

[17] James Miller to Monroe, Nova Iberia, July 28, 1815, *ibid.*

[18] Daniel T. Patterson to John Dick, New Orleans, September 29, 1815, encl. in Dick to Monroe, New Orleans, September 29, 1815, Miscellaneous Letters, September–December, 1815.

Diego Morphy observed considerable activity directed toward consummating the expedition. Recruits were reported to be on their way from Kentucky, two cannon and a thousand guns were sent to Natchez, and bands of American adventurers were leaving for Natchitoches.[19] Perry began his collection of recruits and supplies at Belle Isle, waiting for vessels and barges to move on to Matagorda Bay. About 350 men, almost all of them Americans, gathered and spent their time in erecting barracks and determining Indian sentiment.[20]

Toledo lost no time in resuming his activities against the dominions of Ferdinand VII after his acquittal on the *Aguila* charge. Toward the end of July he planned to sail to Mexico with several armed vessels. Felipe Álvarez, an insurgent leader near Vera Cruz, was asked to have everything ready to avoid delay in picking up the expected minister, the money, and the men from the *Aguila*.[21] Colonel Ellis Bean, who returned to Mexico early in the year, was informed that the United States would recognize the independence of Mexico as soon as a minister arrived, and it was therefore important that no delay occur in carrying out arrangements in Mexico.[22]

Toledo had good reason to announce his departure with well-armed vessels. The New Orleans associates, including Edward Livingston, Abner L. Duncan, John K. West, and August de Castera Davezac, saw an opportunity to profit from the revolution in Mexico. This "junta," as Morphy called it, was composed almost entirely of Americans who planned to put into execution the old plan against the Interior Provinces. Military stores, Morphy asserted, were taken publicly from government warehouses and loaded on vessels in the port. Some were destined for Boquilla de Piedras, and others were preparing for the maritime expedition against

[19] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, July 10 and July 20, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[20] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, March 12, 1816, *ibid.*

[21] Toledo to Álvarez, New Orleans, July 24, 1815, encl. in Morphy to Onís, New Orleans, September 27, 1815, AGN ND, I, f. 34.

[22] Toledo to Bean, New Orleans, July 24, 1815, encl. in Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, October 2, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

Matagorda, Galveston, and the Interior Provinces. More supplies and arms were purchased from merchants and private citizens. Money for these transactions, Morphy reported, was said to have come from agents of the United States.[23] Additional support was given to this charge when the federal arsenal was broken into on October 1 and robbed of muskets, five or six hundred linen bedsacks, uniforms, and axes.[24]

Don Luis de Onís was not inactive while Perry, Toledo, and their associates were planning to invade New Spain. Morphy kept him fully informed, and in August he protested to the United States against allowing such enterprises to form within its territory.[25] Monroe replied that he would inform the governors of various states about the preparations at New Orleans. The United States, he assured Onís, was not inattentive to Spanish complaints, but mere suspicion was not sufficient to justify stringent measures.[26] But Onís kept up his protests. Information from New Orleans clearly called for action, and the district attorney at that city must prosecute such cases as that of Perry who advertised his violation of law. On September 1, 1815, Madison issued the proclamation which Perry's activities and the protests from Onís made unavoidable. The administration thus warned and enjoined "all faithful citizens, who have been led, without due knowledge or consideration to participate in the said unlawful enterprises, to withdraw from the same without delay. . . ." Civil and military authorities of the United States were ordered to bring the guilty persons to justice and to seize all vessels, arms, and other supplies that had been collected for the expedition.[27] Spanish officials had little faith in

[23] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, October 2, 1815, encl. no. 2 in Apodaca to Lardizabal y Uribe, Habana, November 7, 1815 (No. 54), AGN ND, III, ff. 310–12.

[24] New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette*, October 5, 1815.

[25] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 14, 1815, encl. no. 1 in Captain General to Lardizabal y Uribe, Habana, November 7, 1815 (No. 54), AGI PC, leg. 1856.

[26] Monroe to Onís, August 17, 1815, Notes to Foreign Legations, II (National Archives).

[27] Monroe to Dick, Department of State, September 1, 1815, Domestic Letters, XVI, 190; Charles G. Fenwick, *The Neutrality Laws of the United States* (Washington, 1913), 33–34; *American State Papers, Foreign Relations* (Washington, 1834), IV, 1.

Madison's proclamation. The captain general of Cuba hastened his preparations to strengthen the squadron patrolling the Gulf.[28] Onís was convinced, when he received copies of Toledo's letters from Morphy, that the United States was secretly aiding the insurgents and would recognize their independence.[29]

John Dick, the federal district attorney at New Orleans, had the courage to inform Monroe that rumors of the Perry expedition were vague and uncertain. At no time had there been reason for him to interfere, and danger to New Spain was grossly exaggerated. Commander Patterson had given orders for the gunboats to disperse any gathering of men.[30] Governor Claiborne ordered Major Winfrey Lockett to "use every effort to prevent this expedition from being carried into effect." [31] There is no evidence to show that these preparations and efforts in any way interfered with the plans for the expedition. Editorial comment indicated that people understood the difference between official and private sentiments.[32]

The proclamation could not have reached New Orleans before Toledo embarked on the *Petit Milan* (alias *Aguila*) with several Americans, including Lieutenant Colonel Henry D. Peire, with a cargo of arms and supplies. P. L. B. Duplessis, the collector of customs, assured Morphy that he had no power to prevent the departure of the vessel.[33] Morphy's suspicions regarding the complicity of the United States were confirmed when he learned that Commander Patterson sent the *Firebrand,* formerly the Baratarian *Dorada,* to escort the *Petit Milan* to Boquilla.[34]

[28] Captain General to Minister of the Indies, Habana, October 9, 1815 (No. 49), AGI PC, leg. 1856.

[29] Onís to the Viceroy, Philadelphia, October 26, 1815, AGN ND, I, ff. 31–32.

[30] Dick to Monroe, New Orleans, September 29, 1815, Miscellaneous Letters, September–December, 1815.

[31] Claiborne to Lockett, Parish of Iberville, October 25, 1815, in Rowland (ed.), *Claiborne Letter Books,* VI, 388.

[32] *Niles' Weekly Register,* IX (September 15, 1815), 34.

[33] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, September 4, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1836. John K. West owned the *Petit Milan.*

[34] Morphy to Onís, New Orleans, September 22, 1815, encl. in Onís to Cevallos, Philadelphia, October 27, 1815 (No. 92), AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12. The *Dorada* had been seized by Patterson at Barataria on September 16, 1814. *Gaceta del Gobierno de*

Herrera's Initiation into the Filibustering Fraternity

The revolutionary government of Mexico received Toledo's letters toward the end of May, 1815, recommending the appointment of a commissioner or minister to the United States. Don José Manuel de Herrera received the appointment and he left his refuge in the middle of July to go to Boquilla de Piedras to wait for a vessel bound for New Orleans.[35] He was on the verge of returning to Tehuacán when Toledo arrived with the *Petit Milan*.[36]

Herrera was soon in deep water, partly because the cargo was not expected and partly because Toledo may have misunderstood the purposes which induced West and his associates to send the *Petit Milan* to Boquilla. They had assured Toledo, who certainly should have been—and probably was—more sophisticated than to believe them, "that the object of the expedition was not so much pecuniary interest as that of aiding the patriots for the purpose of expediting communication between both cities [New Orleans and Boquilla]." [37] Peire,[38] who was in charge of the cargo, finally came to an agreement with Herrera whereby the cargo could be unloaded and the bill settled in New Orleans.[39] Herrera was dubious about the fate of his $23,000 when he contemplated the future reckoning, but Toledo reassured him.[40] The munitions remained

Mexico (Mexico), V (November 25, 1814), 1301. After various transactions it was bought by the United States and became the *Firebrand*, Lieutenant Thomas Cunningham. Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, December 27, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

[35] Herrera to General D. Ciriaco del Llano, Puebla, May 13, 1817, Audiencia de Mexico (Archivo General de Indias, Seville), 90–2–9, papeleta 4, no. 2, f. 1. Hereafter cited as AGI AM. Boquilla de Piedras was the port then in Guadalupe Victoria's power. Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, IV, 365.

[36] Herrera to del Llano, Puebla, May 13, 1817, AGI AM, 90–2–9, papeleta 4, no. 2, f. 1.

[37] Toledo to the Supreme Mexican Government, New Orleans, November 25, 1815, encl. in [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, April 6, 1816, AGN ND, I, ff. 102–103.

[38] Henry D. Peire was a major in the Louisiana volunteers, 1812–1813; a major in the 44th Infantry, August 1, 1813; breveted lieutenant colonel December 23, 1814; given an honorable discharge June 15, 1815. Heitman, *Historical Register*, I, 781.

[39] Toledo to the Supreme Mexican Government, New Orleans, November 25, 1815, encl. in [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, April 6, 1816, AGN ND, I, ff. 102–103.

[40] Herrera to del Llano, Puebla, May 13, 1817, AGI AM, 90–2–9, papeleta 4, no. 2, ff. 1–2.

on the coast and were used by the insurgents to extend their "operations to Oaxaca, Orizava, Cordova, and many other towns in the intendancy of Puebla." [41] If Toledo intended to remain in Mexico to lead insurgent troops, he certainly changed his mind in a hurry. Viceroy Calleja heard that he was afraid to stay and returned to New Orleans for more supplies and reinforcements.[42]

The voyage to New Orleans was a rough one and Herrera was considerably relieved when the Mississippi was reached on October 29, 1815.[43] The *Petit Milan* had no sooner anchored than West came on board to inquire about the sale of the cargo. Toledo appeared embarrassed by West's insistence upon being paid for the twelve hundred muskets. Herrera was relieved of his $23,000,[44] and he spent a bitter night "given over entirely to the most melancholy meditation." [45] In spite of meditations and protests, the insurgent minister was forced to pay $30 each for the muskets,[46] a price that gave West a very handsome profit. An agreement was finally reached whereby Herrera paid $13,000 on account and placed $6,000 on deposit against future shipments. This arrangement left him with a sum insufficient to aid Toledo as the so-called Mexican "Congress" intended, so he asked for an additional $100,000.[47]

New Orleans was not lacking in friends of Mexican independence. General Humbert had found merchants and Baratarians ready to plan an expedition against the Interior Provinces in 1813 and 1814. Herrera now found that their interest had not died away.

[41] Félix Calleja to the Minister of War, Mexico, December 3, 1815, in [Manuel Palacio Fajardo], *Outline of the Revolution in Spanish America; . . .* (London, 1817), 334.

[42] Calleja to the Minister of War, Mexico, December 31, 1815, *ibid.*, 336.

[43] Herrera to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, November 9, 1815, encl. in [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, April 6, 1816, AGN ND, I, ff. 92–93. Herrera arrived in New Orleans during the first week of November.

[44] Herrera to del Llano, Puebla, May 13, 1817, AGI AM, 90–2–9, papeleta 4, no. 2, f. 2.

[45] Herrera to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, November 26, 1815, encl. in [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, April 6, 1816, AGN ND, I, ff. 83–84.

[46] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 20, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[47] Herrera to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, November 26, 1815, encl. in [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, April 5, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 86.

His experiences with West and Duncan served to disillusion him somewhat as to the objects of the merchants, but the cordial reception which many influential persons gave him aroused his hopes. Edward Livingston entertained the Mexican agent and invitations showered upon him. When his official character was established, the city officials gave frequent and significant signs of friendship. Governor Claiborne refused to open a correspondence, but Herrera consoled himself with the assurance that Claiborne had "secret instructions from his government to treat with whoever should come authorized by the Mexican nation. . . ." Herrera visited Claiborne, who asked to see his credentials; but the wary envoy considered that such a presentation would not be decorous conduct for an accredited minister.[48]

Several meetings were held at which Toledo, Herrera, and Livingston conferred with the "principal armorers and captains of the Baratarian pirates. . . ." [49] Herrera refused a proposal to ship an immense quantity of armaments, clothing, and other articles of war under conditions calling for immediate payment. It was agreed, however, that a cargo of supplies would be sent to Mexico. Patterson would order the *Firebrand* to carry Herrera's correspondence, returning with dispatches and money from Mexico. The *Firebrand* would cruise off the coast of Vera Cruz for thirty days waiting for replies.[50] This activity was undertaken in the attempt to encourage the patriots to capture a Mexican city that could be used as a port of entry. Lack of a port was a distinct disadvantage to the patriot cause, and Patterson asked Herrera to exert his influence in Washington to have the New Orleans squadron sent to blockade Vera Cruz.[51] Another American vessel, probably the ketch *Surprise,* was prepared for a voyage to Boquilla with arms, a printing press, proclamations, and dispatches urging the Congress

[48] *Ibid.*, ff. 83–87.

[49] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 20, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[50] Herrera to the Mexican Congress, New Orleans, November 26, 1815, encl. in [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, April 6, 1816, AGN ND, I, ff. 85–86.

[51] *Ibid.*, f. 88.

to concentrate on the capture of Tampico and Vera Cruz.[52] The *Petit Milan* prepared to depart at the end of November with another cargo and Colonel John Galvin, who bore dispatches.[53]

Herrera had reason to be jubilant. He had the co-operation of influential persons, the Baratarians, and a small part of the United States Navy. The *Petit Milan* was to take supplies to Boquilla, and the *Surprise* and the *Firebrand* were on their way to Mexico with contracts and correspondence. There were prospects that Tampico could be taken at once and Matagorda might be used as a port later in the season. General Humbert had left with fifty men to join Perry near the mouth of the Sabine, and the corsairs of Barataria would supply a ready-made navy.[54] Toledo was ready to join the men at the mouth of the Sabine and shipments of supplies were sent ahead; but a meeting of the associates on November 27 led to the conclusion that he should not leave until the recruits from Kentucky and Tennessee could arrive.[55]

Herrera's intrigue with the New Orleans associates had a maritime and a land phase. The main purpose of the maritime project was to open a suitable port on the Mexican coast which would permit an army to gather for conquering the interior, and which would act as a base for some sixteen or twenty corsairs with two or three thousand marines. The *Bolivar, Morelos,* and two or three other vessels, would carry men and supplies to Mexico and to the coast of Texas. Joseph Sauvinet and Gutiérrez were responsible for the *Morelos,* which was to carry twelve blank commissions to Louis Aury at Aux Cayes. Aury, with Pierre Girard, was to attack Tampico with seven corsairs.[56] With thirteen hundred recruits Perry would march to a point below San Antonio where his army would be joined by reinforcements to be landed at Matagorda or La

[52] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 20, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[53] Herrera to the Supreme Mexican Government, New Orleans, November ?, 1815, encl. in [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, April 6, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 100.

[54] Picornell to Onís, New Orleans, November 24, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

[55] Picornell to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 28, 1815, *ibid.*

[56] See encl. in Cienfuegos to the Viceroy, Havana, September 24, 1816, AGN ND, II, ff. 263-65.

Bahía. In spite of the delay caused by the failure of these recruits to arrive, Perry prepared to move on to Galveston. One contingent left in November "and landed opposite the east end of Galveston, at a point, to which the name of Bolivar was given by Col. Perry." [57] Another group was wrecked at Galveston later in the month with the loss of most of the men and supplies. The remainder of the expedition, to follow in barges, waited for aid from Toledo. Nothing came but letters and so the men dispersed.[58]

Juan Mariano Picornell, loyally attempting to disrupt the plots of Herrera and the New Orleans associates, was in a quandary. Since he had no pecuniary resources at his command, the only way he could succeed in breaking up the threatening schemes would be to recruit one of the trusted plotters. Very carefully he reviewed "the character of each one of those who met in the secret councils" which were held. Vincent Nolte, Abner L. Duncan, John Randolph Grymes, Daniel T. Patterson, Pierre Duplessis, Edward Livingston, Henry Peire, and others were passed by in favor of that notorious smuggler, the unsung hero of the Battle of New Orleans—Pierre Laffite. The audacious undertaking met with little success until Angel Benito de Ariza returned to New Orleans and added his efforts to those of Picornell. Finally, the two wooers of the Baratarian suggested that they visit Father Sedella who would add his prestige to their promises. On the night of November 17, 1815, the three men called on the padre.[59] Sedella was pleased with Picornell's work in winning an adherent who could give an exact account in advance of the machinations of Spain's enemies.[60] He promised Laffite a pardon for his offenses against Spain, pecuniary aid, protection for two of his vessels against capture at sea, and par-

[57] *Lamar Papers*, VI, 443.

[58] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, March 8, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[59] Picornell to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 28, 1815, AHN Estado, leg. 5558, ex. 12.

[60] Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, November 20, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1815. Jean Laffite was in Washington at this time attempting to obtain a restoration of part of his property. Jn Laffite to the President, Washington, December 27, 1815, Madison Papers, 1793–1846, LXI, 21.

don for two other persons to be named by Pierre.[61] The newly converted one then gave the Spanish agents a variety of information about the plans being matured by Toledo and Herrera, most of which they already knew.

Pierre Laffite had entered the service of Spain, but in return he made it possible for his brother and himself to enter the good graces of the Spanish monarchy. It is hardly probable that Pierre and Jean ever intended to take up their residence in Spain, but their new connection might bring them unforeseen advantages. Yet, in view of the exceedingly dangerous situation they occupied as Spanish spies, they were sincere in their desire to deliver Spanish enemies to the court instead of delivering Spanish goods to their friends. Pierre co-operated closely with Picornell in discovering plots of the filibusters and in taking "every measure possible in order to frustrate at the time all the diabolical projects" formed by Spain's enemies.[62] So it was that Sedella could recommend *el nuevo recomendado* to the Chevalier Luis de Onís, and so it was that Onís confirmed the conditions upon which Pierre Laffite proposed to act as a Spanish agent, and ordered Picornell to "promise him everything he asks, in the name of the King" while he himself sought His Majesty's approval.[63]

Spanish Protests

Onís protested vigorously against allowing preparation for an invasion of New Spain to go forward in New Orleans and the border states. Madison's proclamation did little to allay his fears, and when a proposal was brought up in Congress to increase the strength of the army to twenty-five thousand men, the jittery agent believed "that this Government has hostile intentions against the dominions of His Majesty." [64] Onís had been waiting more than

[61] Jean Laffite and Laurent Maire, captain of the *Dos Hermanos*.

[62] Picornell to Onís, New Orleans, November 24, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1815; Sedella to Onís, New Orleans, December 29, 1815, encl. in Onís to the Captain General, Washington, January 29, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1837.

[63] Onís to the Viceroy, Washington, January 8, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 61.

[64] Onís to the Viceroy, Philadelphia, December 7, 1815, *ibid.*, f. 53.

six years to be recognized as the Spanish minister, and that recognition was finally granted on December 20, 1815. He was now in a position to believe that his protests would be given more attention. The viceroy of New Spain also expressed the belief that recognition of Onís would prevent the reception of Herrera at Washington, "which, if it took place, would be equivalent to a tacit declaration of war." [65] Ten days after his reception, the Spanish minister delivered a protest stronger than any of his previous communications. He asked Monroe to obtain orders for the prosecution of Toledo, Anaya, Herrera, Robinson, Humbert, Perry, Peire, and their followers, and for the dispersion of the troops already gathered. The President must have observed that his proclamation had not interfered with the plans against New Spain.[66]

When he received Morphy's dispatches announcing that the expedition was delayed for a time to allow the arrival of troops from Kentucky and Tennessee, Onís sent another protest to the Department of State. He warned Monroe that unless the activities of the plotters were stopped, "the king . . . will have reason to suspect, that if those meetings are not authorized by the government, they are at least tolerated." Furthermore, he believed, pacification of New Spain would be accomplished quickly if the insurgents ceased to obtain aid from the United States. There was another reason why aid should not be given to the revolutionists. If Mexico became independent, its great natural resources would divert the course of immigration from the United States whose industries would suffer great injuries. He concluded by asking again that the leaders be brought to trial and an arms embargo be declared.[67]

Monroe gave the irate envoy two weeks to contemplate the "crimes" being committed against His Majesty's dominions, and then replied by asking for more definite information about the alleged violations of neutrality. The Department of State had re-

[65] [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, March 1, 1816, *ibid.*, f. 46.

[66] Onís to Monroe, December 30, 1815, in William R. Manning (ed.), *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations* (New York, 1925), III, 1892–93.

[67] Onís to Monroe, January 2, 1816, *ibid.*, 1895–96.

ceived information that "no men are collected, nor is there any evidence of an attempt or design to collect any in Kentucky, Tennessee, or Georgia, for the purpose stated. . . ." Toledo's men were Frenchmen and Spaniards, and if Americans were involved, their conduct was unauthorized and illegal. Moreover, "This force is not within the settled parts of Louisiana, but in the wilderness, between the settlements of the United-States and Spain, beyond the actual operation of our laws." If such a force were found within the United States, the proper steps would be taken to disperse it and to prosecute the guilty parties.[68] Onís believed that there was little danger of war between the United States and Spain, since "the manner in which they have made [war] on us for six years . . . presents them no risk. . . ." The publicity given to his dispatches was also regarded as lessening the danger of an open break, but Onís had no confidence in Monroe's promises.[69]

John Dick, the district attorney for Louisiana, supplied Monroe with rebuttal material for the debate with Onís. He admitted that frequent attempts to violate the laws had been made, but they were unsuccessful "except where conducted under circumstances of concealment that eluded discovery, and almost suspicion; or were carried on at some remote part of the coast, beyond the reach of detection or discovery." [70] On the same day that Dick was writing this rather weak defense, the viceroy wrote to Onís that he had intercepted Herrera's correspondence with the rebel General José María Licéaga which gave additional proof of connivance between the government of Louisiana and the insurgent plotters in New Orleans.[71] He repeated the charge in April when he forwarded copies of the correspondence to Onís and expressed the hope that "the laws of good neighborhood may be observed by the citizens of those States." [72] However, more than a hundred years were to

[68] Monroe to Onís, January 19, 1816, *ibid.*, I, 19–20.

[69] Onís to the Viceroy, Philadelphia, February 17, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 70.

[70] Dick to the Secretary of State, March 1, 1816, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 104.

[71] [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, March 1, 1816, AGN ND, I, ff. 46–47.

[72] [Viceroy] to Onís, Mexico, April 6, 1816, *ibid.*, f. 78.

elapse before this "good neighbor" policy, desired by the viceroy, was to take effect.

Toledo's Reconciliation with Spain

While Onís was busy with his protests, events in Mexico were shaping to cause the complete failure of the extensive plans to attack New Spain. The position of the revolutionary Mexican Congress southwest of Valladolid was precarious, so it was decided to move to Tehuacán where there were many patriots and where supplies, which were expected from New Orleans, could be brought with little difficulty. General José María Morelos was captured on November 5, 1815, while covering the retreat of the Congress. After a quick trial by the Inquisition, he was unfrocked and turned over to the civil authorities for the execution that took place on December 22.[73] This unfortunate occurrence was not known in New Orleans for several weeks, and the plotters continued with their plans. About December 20, 1815, the ketch *Surprise*, which was sent to Mexico in November, arrived from Boquilla with $13,000 for Herrera.[74] Toledo and Herrera were still hoping to have a fleet of five vessels, of which the *Petit Milan* would carry munitions to Mexico, and the others would serve as transports.[75] Herrera made ready to go on to Washington while Toledo went to the Sabine.[76] The *Firebrand*, after carrying insurgent dispatches to Mexico, had returned and was to go back for the answers and money from the Mexican Congress.[77] The *Petit Milan* left New Orleans on January 15, 1816, with a cargo of munitions and a supply of proclamations on what was destined to be its last voyage.[78]

Patterson continued to use vessels of the American navy to serve the insurgents. Several merchants in Vera Cruz were reported as

[73] Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, IV, 303–34.

[74] Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, December 27, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

[75] Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, December 27, 1815, *ibid.*

[76] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, December 23, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[77] Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, December 27, 1815, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

[78] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, March 1, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

having a half million pesos for Toledo and Herrera, and recommended that an American war vessel be sent to carry the money to New Orleans.[79] These reports led to the sending of the *Firebrand* on its third voyage to Mexico. The ardor of the New Orleans contractors cooled when they learned of Morelos's capture, and they delayed carrying out their agreements until more news could be had from Mexico.[80] Toledo arranged with Patterson to buy the *General Bolivar* for $12,000, expecting to pay that sum when the *Firebrand* returned with the money from the Congress.[81] The American warship, acting as advice boat for the insurgents, brought only promises and bad news when it returned from Boquilla on February 20, 1816.[82] The *Petit Milan* was reported lost and the Mexican Congress was unable to send Herrera the $275,000 it had ready. Picornell was quick to take advantage of the situation. He induced a friend to tell Patterson that Toledo had no intention of carrying out his agreement regarding the *General Bolivar*. Patterson demanded the money, and Toledo replied that the request was unreasonable since it was well known that the *Firebrand* failed to bring the expected funds. Toledo had spent $2,000 in preparing the vessel, but Patterson was not impressed.[83] He sold the schooner to Abner L. Duncan, who equipped it for trade with the insurgents.[84] Pierre Laffite then disembarked from the *Dos Hermanos* the guns, bricks, lime, and other supplies which were destined for use in establishing a port at Matagorda. The other vessels which were to have formed a part of Toledo's fleet also remained in port. Patterson refused to send the *Firebrand* back to Boquilla, but offered to send the *Surprise* to bring the messengers and Herrera's contracts.[85] He must have relented, since Laurent Maire, captain

[79] Onís to Félix María Calleja, Philadelphia, July 14, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 115.

[80] Herrera to del Llano, Puebla, May 13, 1817, AGI AM, 90–2–9, papeleta 4, no. 2, f. 2.

[81] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, March 1, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[82] Sedella to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 21, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

[83] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, March 1, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

[84] Herrera's Deposition at Puebla, May 21, 1818, encl. in Apodaca to the Minister of Hacienda, Mexico, June 26, 1818, AGI AM, 90–2–9, papeleta 4, no. 1, f. 9.

[85] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, March 1, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1836.

of the *Dos Hermanos,* saw both the *Bolivar* and the *Firebrand* at Nautla in May.[86]

After his defeat on the Medina River, Toledo's career was a succession of ambitious plans and discouraging failures. The capture of Morelos and the inability of the Mexican Congress to send funds for the enterprise added to his despair. Without resources and hounded by his creditors,[87] he decided to return to the bosom of his fatherland and petition for a pardon from the king whom he had so recently called a "mortal imbecile." Father Antonio de Sedella was available to offer comfort to disheartened revolutionists. Toledo was in need of such comfort on the night of June 24, 1816, when he met Francisco Martínez Pizarro, the very capable secretary of Diego Morphy. Who among the Spaniards of New Orleans, Toledo inquired, was the one to whom he might disclose "some very confidential matters of great importance to the Spanish Government"? Martínez was quick to recommend Padre Sedella—not his chief, Diego Morphy. Toledo asked Martínez to arrange an interview. It was exactly nine o'clock when Martínez carried the good news to Sedella, and at nine in the morning Toledo appeared and announced his determination to seek the pardon of the "very beloved Monarch, Ferdinand VII, for all the mistakes that he had committed. . . ." With his soul "full of a pleasure without equal," Sedella could do no less than praise this noble resolution. During the next few days Toledo poured forth a stream of information and advice about how to defeat the plans then being formed by the filibusters. In these activities he had the daily advice of Sedella, Martínez Pizarro, and Picornell.[88]

Toledo's suggestions were fairly sound, especially when he recommended that the revolutionary leaders—with the exception of Gutiérrez—be pardoned.[89] And for once in his life Toledo was

[86] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, June 21, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[87] Mauricio de Zuñiga to Apodaca, Pensacola, April 18, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1796. Zuñiga was commandant-elect of Pensacola.

[88] Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, July 2, 1816, AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

[89] For Toledo's plan, see Harris Gaylord Warren (ed.), "José Álvarez de Toledo's

telling the truth. Of course, he had done it before; but one could never be sure. There is no question that he was tired of being a poverty-stricken conspirator. One is entitled to believe that this was his main reason for abandoning the cause in which he had been engaged for so many years, although he gave other reasons before he sailed back to Spain. At that time Toledo announced that winning independence for Mexico was impossible and the struggle would ruin the country. The United States and England promised aid merely to spread destruction by encouraging the revolution, and then they would reap all the benefits through control of commerce. The most respectable classes in Mexico opposed the revolution; only selfish and ambitious persons supported it.[90] Since ambition and deceit were the two controlling factors in his own conduct, he was able to recognize these influences in others. Throughout his career as a revolutionist, Toledo seemed to believe that the fate of liberty, democracy, and fraternity depended on his own efforts. He always saw himself as the leader of every movement from the United States against New Spain. He gave advice freely and occasionally had a good idea. Toledo was first a traitor to Ferdinand VII and then to the Mexican insurgents. He served one master always, and that one was José Álvarez de Toledo.

Toledo's conferences with Sedella were kept a deep secret from the New Orleans associates and friends of Mexican independence. Even Herrera continued to accept him as a true patriot and placed complete confidence in him.[91] But New Orleans was not a healthy place for a traitor to the cause, and Sedella thought it best that Toledo should go to Philadelphia to confer with Onís. He sailed from New Orleans about July 10 with the padre's blessing and was

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Reconciliation with Spain and Projects for Suppressing Rebellion in the Spanish Colonies," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXIII (1940), 827–63.

[90] Justification of Don José Álvarez de Toledo, Philadelphia, December 1, 1816, encl. in Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, December 26, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[91] Onís to Cevallos, Philadelphia, August 7, 1816, AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

in Alexandria, Virginia, early in August. There he spread the yarn that he had narrowly escaped assassination in New Orleans.[92]

Onís looked upon Toledo's plea for pardon as the greatest single event since the Mexican Revolution began. In his enthusiasm the minister declared that Americans regarded Toledo as the Washington of the rebellion, endowed with qualities that made him vastly superior to all the other leaders.[93] His reconciliation was worth more to the royalist cause than "the destruction of a couple of armies," and when the secret was revealed it caused profound dismay in Mexico, England, and the United States. Not even the capture of Hidalgo, Morelos, and Xavier Mina caused as much sensation in England and America![94] With such sentiments Onís welcomed Toledo at Philadelphia about the middle of August.[95] Toledo's plans and information were sent on to Cuba and Mexico where they "contributed infinitely to extinguish the revolution of Mexico."[96] Onís started Toledo on three projects to disrupt various schemes in the eastern cities, but his treachery became known and his usefulness was at an end. On December 22 he embarked for Bordeaux with his wife, expecting to receive the king's pardon and to offer advice on how "to suffocate the revolutionary germ that bores in His Majesty's possessions on this continent."[97]

Galveston as a Port of the Mexican Republic

Toledo had deserted the cause, but a more important man appeared to bolster the rolls of the filibusters. Louis Aury enjoyed a rapid rise to prominence during the revolution in New Granada. He entered the navy as a lieutenant in May, 1815, and in August was given command of the insurgent squadron at Cartagena. A

[92] Philadelphia *Weekly Aurora*, August 20, 1816.

[93] Onís to Cevallos, Philadelphia, December 4, 1816, AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

[94] Onís to the King, Madrid, September 17, 1819, *ibid.*

[95] He was in Washington on August 11. William Thornton to Gual, Washington, August 13, 1816, The Papers of William Thornton (Library of Congress), IV, f. 739.

[96] Onís to the King, Madrid, September 17, 1819, AHN Estado, leg. 5554, ex. 12.

[97] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, December 26, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

Spanish fleet blockaded the port, but Aury succeeded in forcing his way through and escaped to Aux Cayes, Haiti.[98] The main leaders of the revolt, including Bolívar and others, also escaped and planned another expedition from Aux Cayes. But jealousy developed between Aury and a rival naval figure, and so when the expedition sailed in the spring of 1816, Aury stayed behind.[99] The New Orleans associates communicated with him [100] and enlisted his support in an expedition against Mexico. President Alexandre Pétion refused to allow Aury to leave until he had settled affairs satisfactorily with Bolívar, and on March 19, 1816, he was allowed to weigh anchor.[101]

The point of rendezvous for Aury's fleet was at Little Tortuga where business boomed for a few weeks. Early in July the privateer schooner *La Centinela* captured the merchant frigate *La Feliz,* and took it to Tortuga. Within a few days five other privateers flying the Cartagena flag arrived with several prizes. While some of the corsairs returned to their cruising, Aury manned the prizes and with his fleet set sail for the coast of Texas.[102] He sent a vessel to New Orleans with a letter for Herrera, announcing his intention to establish himself at Matagorda or Galveston and describing the force that he commanded.[103] The captain of this vessel was in New Orleans on July 11 to consult with the insurgent plotters and to get fourteen commissions. Herrera sent word that Aury could locate

[98] Bancroft, *History of the North Mexican States and Texas,* II, 35 n.; Aury to the Honorable Assembly of Representatives, Fernandina, December 12, 1817, in New York *Advertiser,* January 20, 1818.

[99] See H. L. V. Ducoudray-Holstein, *Memoirs of Simón Bolívar,* . . . (London, 1830), I, 281–84.

[100] New York *Advertiser,* January 20, 1818.

[101] Vicente Lecuna, "Expedición de los Cayos," in *Cultura Venezolano,* No. 86 (1928), reprint, 32. The best account of Aury is by Stanley Faye, "Commodore Aury," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly,* XXIV (1941), 611–97.

[102] Deposition of José Peña, New Orleans, September 30, 1816, in *Diario del Gobierno de la Habana,* October 16, 1816, encl. in Juan M.ª Echeverri to Apodaca, Habana, October 18, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 254. Hereafter cited without reference to the covering dispatch.

[103] Herrera to del Llano, Puebla, May 13, 1817, AGI AM, 90–2–9, papeleta 4, no. 2, f. 3.

at or near Barataria with safety, and, by co-operating with the forces to be sent from New Orleans, he would have greater chances for success.[104] After Aury's fleet passed the mouth of the Mississippi, the *Belona* put in at Barataria to allow another messenger to go to New Orleans and announce, for the benefit of merchants, that the prizes and their cargoes would be at Matagorda or Galveston.[105] Aury intended to establish his fleet at Matagorda, but the place was not inviting since the entrance could be blocked too easily. He sent for pilots to direct the fleet to a better location,[106] but attempted to cross the bar at Galveston before they arrived. His impatience resulted in the loss of all but two of his prizes and much of their cargoes.[107]

Diego Morphy was considerably mystified when he contemplated the activity in New Orleans. He knew that a plan was on foot to co-operate with Aury, but he was not certain as to its nature. There was a possibility that Pensacola might be taken for use as a pirate stronghold, with Matagorda as a second choice. Many armed vessels were preparing in New Orleans, and groups of men were leaving by sea and land for Barataria.[108] Pierre Laffite was able to offer more reliable reports after a meeting of the associates on August 5 when Aury's messenger arrived. Duncan, Pierre Le Breton Duplessis, Captain Patterson, Pierre Laffite, Livingston, Peire, and Aury's agent François Dupuis were members of the group involved in the scheme then under preparation. In spite of Toledo's defection, the plan to establish a port, capture Vera Cruz, and invade the Interior Provinces would not be dropped. The associates paid Herrera's debts and he prepared to leave at once to take possession of the port in the name of the Mexican Republic.

[104] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, July 9, postscript of July 11, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[105] Deposition of José Peña, New Orleans, September 30, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 254. See Harris Gaylord Warren (ed.), "Documents Relating to the Establishment of Privateers at Galveston, 1816–1817," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXI (1938), 1090–96.

[106] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, August 2, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[107] Faye, "Commodore Aury," in *loc. cit.*, 632–33.

[108] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, July 31, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

A prize court would be set up, letters of marque issued, and the expeditions organized. Arms and supplies would be furnished by the New Orleans merchants. Recruits would be gathered from Kentucky, and from the filibusters' port naval expeditions would sail to attack royalist cities on the coast. With the scheme thus far advanced, Laffite planned to leave for Matagorda to gain more information about the status of affairs there.[109]

Although this was by no means a new scheme, there was another aspect which made it a serious threat. Dr. Pedro Gual, an agent from Cartagena to the United States, wrote to Toledo on February 8, 1816, that he had support from exporters and capitalists in the United States and England for an expedition against the coast of Vera Cruz. With such a port established, huge supplies of arms and other war materials would be sent from Baltimore and New York.[110] Gual planned to have a fleet of twenty-six vessels for the attack which would be directed primarily against Nautla and Tampico.[111] Later, this expedition was reduced in fancy to eighteen or twenty ships, which Onís reported as preparing in New York and Baltimore.[112] If these expeditions from New York, Baltimore, and Matagorda could combine, important ports on the Mexican coast could certainly fall to the insurgents.

There was considerable confusion at Galveston as a result of the numerous wrecks on the bar. Aury put his Negroes, recruited at Aux Cayes, to work at salvaging the cargoes and erecting rude fortifications. The Negro recruits and the prisoners taken with various prizes had little liking for their task. Aury and his officers were reported to have forced this motley gang to work without food while they urged greater efforts with unwelcome language. This was not the sort of thing Aury promised when he gathered his force at Aux Cayes. The Negroes expected to cruise in the Gulf

[109] Sedella to the Captain General, New Orleans, August 5, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1815; New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette*, August 5, 1816; St. Clairsville *Ohio Federalist and Belmont Repository*, September 19, 1816.

[110] Sedella to Apodaca, New Orleans, May 4, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1815.

[111] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 3, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[112] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 25, 1816, *ibid.*

and to take their prizes to New Orleans where the spoils would be divided. Instead they had been taken "to a desert and in the midst of such sand bars. . . ." The deceit was too much, and on the night of September 7–8 a sailor from the *Belona* led a mutiny of more than two hundred of the men. The uprising, which began on the *Criolla,* spread to other vessels. A group of the mutineers on land entered Aury's *cabaña* to demand his surrender. Aury reached for his dagger and was shot by one of the Negroes. With the leader of the establishment apparently mortally wounded, the remaining officers were bound and the prisoners set free. They were told that no harm would come to them and they could leave on one of the vessels. When morning came the mutineers collected all the plunder they could, fired the *Belona,* and sailed for Santo Domingo with about two hundred men and three vessels, leaving Aury with about the same number of Negroes.[113]

The mutiny was a serious blow to Aury. Most of his plunder, including treasure and supplies, was gone, and he was seriously wounded. He decided to leave for New Orleans, but assistance soon arrived.[114] The meeting of the New Orleans associates on August 5 resulted in the decision to send Herrera to Galveston with supplies for Aury and to establish a port for the Mexican Republic. Two or three vessels sailed carrying Herrera, Peire, Humbert, Joseph Savary, and Sauvinet. They arrived at Galveston on September 9 and sent for Aury to complete plans for the "government." [115] Herrera showed his credentials and was received in his official capacity. An agreement, or convention, was signed on September 12 declaring Galveston a *puerto habilitado* of the Republic of Mexico.[116] Aury and his men took an oath of "obedience and fidelity" to the Republic, after which the flag was raised with

[113] Deposition of José Peña, New Orleans, September 30, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 254. The *Belona* was not destroyed. It entered New Orleans on December 9, 1816. Consular Letters, Galveston, 1817–1841 (National Archives), I.

[114] Encl. in Felipe Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 14, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[115] *Ibid.*

[116] New York *Advertiser,* January 20, 1818.

much ceremony. On September 17, 1816, Herrera issued a decree naming the officers for the new government.[117]

On the same day that Herrera appointed the officers at Galveston, Morphy reported from New Orleans that many small vessels were leaving with supplies, speculators, and passengers "who say they are going to seek their fortune in the Kingdom of Mexico." [118] Beverly Chew, the customs collector at New Orleans in 1817, described Aury's men as Barataria refugees, mulattoes, and French and Italian mariners "who have been hanging loose upon society in and about New Orleans, in greater or smaller numbers, ever since the breaking up of the establishment at Barataria." [119] The Galveston organization certainly included many desperate characters, but they were in pretty good hands.

With the government at Galveston passably well organized, Herrera decided to return to Mexico in November in order to report to the Congress and secure its approval of his actions.[120] He left at a time when business was booming. Captain William Mitchell, a privateer who had difficulty with the courts in New Orleans, captured a richly laden vessel "carrying two hundred and seventy-eight thousand pesos in silver and eight hundred and seventy ceroons (bales) of indigo worth perhaps seven hundred dollars a ceroon in the North American market." [121] Late in December, Sauvinet, Mitchell's armorer and adviser, added $180,000 to his bank account.[122] Some of this money was used to buy a brig for the supply service from New Orleans to Galveston, a matter in which Humbert was concerned. Onís used these incidents, and other bold attacks on Spanish vessels, as the basis for another pro-

[117] Washington *National Intelligencer*, November 21, 1816. Cf. Faye, "Privateersmen of the Gulf and Their Prizes," in *loc. cit.*, 1065–66.

[118] Morphy to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 17, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[119] Chew to Crawford, New Orleans, August 1, 1817, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 134.

[120] Herrera to del Llano, Puebla, May 13, 1817, AGI AM, 90–2–9, papeleta 4, no. 2, f. 4.

[121] Faye, "Privateersmen of the Gulf and Their Prizes," in *loc. cit.*, 1053.

[122] Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, December 4, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

test against the filibusters.[123] Activities of the privateers certainly bordered on piracy, not only because of the dubious nature of their commissions, but also because of their failure to distinguish between Spanish and other flags. Perhaps Onís would have had more success with his protests had it not been for the general attitude of American citizens who probably agreed with Mr. Niles that the privateers "have behaved quite as well, if not better, than could have been expected. It is not to be supposed that everyone who commands a privateer must needs be a prudent and judicious man." [124]

The revived plot against New Spain involved, as usual, a maritime expedition and a land expedition. Henry Perry began to collect recruits while Toledo continued to urge the Mexican government to send a minister to the United States with money to promote the intrigues which were under way. He was aided by the New Orleans associates who played a dominant role in the plots. Onís protested against this new threat, and Madison issued his ineffective proclamation of September 1, 1815. Machinations continued in New Orleans, especially after the arrival of Herrera as minister from the Mexican rebels. Herrera was too poorly supplied with funds to satisfy the greed of merchants whose interest in Mexican independence was directly proportional to the profit they hoped to make from the munitions trade. On the whole, the royalist agents in New Orleans fared rather well. Picornell, faithful to Ferdinand VII, won Pierre Laffite to the cause. Toledo, tired of his misfortunes, betrayed the filibusters in exchange for a promised pardon. These gains were offset somewhat by Aury's arrival at Galveston where the New Orleans associates, under the cloak of Herrera's authority, established a port for the almost nonexistent Mexican Republic.

[123] Onís to the Secretary of State, Washington, February 10, 1817, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 187.

[124] *Niles' Weekly Register*, XI (November 30, 1816), 223. Aury's establishment at Galveston sent 19 cargoes through the customs at New Orleans between October 31, 1816, and June 11, 1817, on which $36,933.76 in duties was paid. Consular Letters, Galveston, 1817–1841, I.

Chapter 7

The Origin of General Mina's Invasion of Mexico[1]

Guerrilla Leader and Refugee

Guerrilla warfare in Spain was an important factor in developing the "Spanish ulcer" which played no inconsiderable part in the downfall of Napoleon. Two of the greatest leaders in this irregular warfare were Don Francisco Xavier Mina and his uncle, General Espoz y Mina. The younger Mina was born in Idocín, Navarre, on December 3, 1789. He was a student in the University of Zaragoza in 1808 and took up arms against the French invaders shortly after the famous Dos de Mayo. His action was inspired in part by the desire for revenge against French soldiers who had pillaged many homes in Idocín in retaliation for the murder of a French officer in that city. Mina's father was one of the citizens who suffered at the hands of the French, so patriotism found a companion motive in personal hatred. Many deeds of valor and daring were attributed to him, both as a volunteer soldier and as a spy among the French. The Central Junta of Seville gave him a command in Navarre in recognition of his services, and the Aragonese Junta appointed him as commanding general of Upper Aragon.[2] In this region General Mina made life miserable for his French enemies.

[1] This chapter is a revision of the writer's article by the same title in *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XLII (1938–1939), 1–20, reproduced here by permission of the editors.

[2] Francisco de Paula de Arrangoiz [y Berzábal], *Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1867* . . . (Madrid, 1871–1872), I, 343–45; William Davis Robinson, *Memoirs of the Mexican*

Mina began his career as a guerrilla with twelve men, a nucleus that developed into a formidable force.[3] His uncle, Francisco Espoz y Mina, joined the band as a volunteer.[4] The exploits of the *guerrilleros* under young Mina were so exasperating that the French made great efforts to capture him and succeeded in doing so on April 1, 1810.[5] But the name of Mina was not so easily eliminated as an inspiration to the Spanish patriots. What was left of the guerrilla division accepted Espoz y Mina as their leader and continued the fight.[6] After his capture at Labiano, Francisco Xavier was taken to France and imprisoned until 1814.[7] The restoration of Ferdinand VII was expected to mark the consummation of those liberal gains which were declared in the Constitution of 1812; however, it was not to be. "The Constitution was abolished and the very one whom Spain had ransomed with rivers of blood and with immense sacrifices, made her bow again under the tyranny and fanaticism from which illustrious Spaniards had rescued her." [8]

After his release from prison, Mina returned to Spain and found the old tyranny restored. It seemed as though the main fruits of his sacrifices were completely lost. The court was taking measures

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Revolution: Including a Narrative of the Expedition of General Xavier Mina . . . (London, 1821), I, 75–83; Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of Mexico* (San Francisco, 1886), IV, 660 n.; "Boletín I de la Division Auxiliar de la Republica Mexicana," encl. in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, June 14, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900, hereafter cited as Mina, "Boletín." The first part of the "Boletín" was largely the work of Pedro Gual. Mier's Declaration, October 6, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 807. For a short biography of Mina, see *Biographie Universelle*, LXXIV (1843), 108.

[3] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[4] Francisco Espoz y Mina, *Breve Extracto de la Vida del General Mina* (London, 1825), 10–15, gives an account of Espoz y Mina's services.

[5] D. Julio Zárate, *La Guerra de Independencia* (Barcelona, 1888), 558.

[6] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900. Espoz y Mina won a great reputation as a guerrilla. A colorful, fanciful story of his exploits is the "Account of the Celebrated Guerilla, Colonel Don Francis Espoz y Mina, translated from the Spanish of Colonel Don Lorenzo Ximenes," in London *Annual Register*, LIII (1811), 353–57.

[7] Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 84.

[8] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900. For an account of the printer of the "Boletín," see Lota M. Spell, "Samuel Bangs, the First Printer in Texas," in *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XI (1931), 248–58. Aaron Mower, not Bangs, was the first printer in Texas.

to subdue the rebellious colonies, and Don Manuel de Lardizábal, minister of the Indies, offered the former guerrilla chieftain the command of a division to be sent to Mexico. Mina was indignant:

> . . . as though the cause that the Americans defend was different from that which raised the Spanish people to glory, as though my principles resembled those of the egoists who are sent to desolate America for our injury, as though the right of the oppressed to resist the aggressor were new, and as though I was destined to be the executioner of an innocent people who lament the chains that bind their fellow citizens.[9]

Mina had other plans. Francisco Espoz y Mina joined his nephew in a plot to capture Pamplona and hold that place as a refuge for the "*beneméritos* of the Fatherland who had been proscribed or treated like criminals." Their success lasted for a day only, and when General Espoz y Mina's regiment refused to turn against their monarch, the plot collapsed. Francisco Xavier escaped to France, and after a brief imprisonment at Bayonne, went on to England in October, 1814, with the determination to defend the cause of liberty wherever an opportunity existed.[10] He was granted a pension by the English government,[11] and before long became the principal of a plot to invade Mexico.

Preparations in London

England was a favorite asylum for liberals and revolutionists who entertained opinions favoring the emancipation of Spain's colonies. English merchants were active in supplying munitions of war to the rebellious colonials, and men like Thomas Cochrane, William Miller, and Gregor MacGregor took an active part in the struggles in America. The London atmosphere was one in which Mina could thrive. Here he was in communication with

[9] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[10] *Ibid.*; Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 86–89; Zárate, *La Guerra de Independencia*, 559. Lardizábal warned the colonial officials that Mina might attempt an attack on Mexico.

[11] The pension was between 1,500 and 2,000 pounds sterling per annum. Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 89; Mier to Sres. P. and A., Baltimore, September 15, 1816, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 917. This figure is probably exaggerated.

the author and priest, Father José Servando Teresa de Mier Noriega y Guerra. Mier was a native of Mexico who had been sent to Spain as a prisoner for having preached a sermon against Our Lady of Guadalupe. The French invaders freed him and he went to England.[12] Mina was in London when Mier returned from a trip to Paris, and the priest convinced the guerrilla general that an invasion of Mexico would succeed.[13] Another Mexican revolutionist assured Mina that he would gain strong reinforcements in Mexico,[14] and he received encouragement from other sources.

General Winfield Scott, the brilliant American soldier, was in England at the end of July, 1815. Scott left the island shortly after his arrival and went to France where he remained until the middle of January, 1816, and then returned to London.[15] The vacationing general was favorably disposed toward the cause of the Spanish colonies in America, and hoped that the United States would openly declare for them.[16] Scott had an opportunity to meet some of the revolutionists at the home of Lord Holland where he dined frequently during his stay in London. Holland arranged for an interview between Scott, Mina, and Mier.[17] Mina was especially interested in learning about the kind of reception he might expect in America should he touch at one of the ports on his way to Mexico. Scott assured him that he "had no doubt, but that *in the event of our being at war,* he would be able to purchase in our ports, the arms &c, which he requires to complete his equipment." [18]

[12] "Statement or Account of Mina's Expedition by J. M. Hebb [Isaac W. Webb] . . . ," encl. no. 3 in Venadito to the First Secretary of State, Mexico, April [30?], 1819, Papeles de Estado, Audiencia de Mexico (Archivo General de Indias, Seville), leg. 14. Hereafter cited as Webb, "Account of Mina's Expedition," AGI PE AM.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Onís to Apodaca, Philadelphia, July 23, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[15] Charles Winslow Elliott, *Winfield Scott, The Soldier and the Man* (New York, 1937), 197–98; Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL. D., Written by Himself* (New York, 1864), 157, 168.

[16] Scott to Monroe, Paris, November 18, 1815, quoted by Elliott, *Winfield Scott,* 203.

[17] *Ibid.,* 207.

[18] Scott to Monroe, Liverpool, March 19, 1816, Miscellaneous Letters, March, 1816.

Upon reporting the interview to Monroe, Scott stated that Mina and his companions would "constitute an important acquisition to the patriots." [19] Father Mier asserted that Mina was introduced to the American general "as a person worthy of all his confidence and that of the United States to effect the liberation of Mexico." [20] General Scott would have earned the gratitude of historians had he left a more complete record of his relations with Mina; but in spite of this omission the assumption is justified that Scott assured his revolutionary friends of a warm welcome in the United States. This assumption also helps to explain why Mina attracted so many young American army officers to his standard, and why the American government failed to take measures to prevent his departure from the United States. Before Scott parted from Mina he gave him a letter to Dr. William Thornton,[21] head of the Patent Office, architect, inventor, and ardent friend of the revolutionists.

Mina believed that an attack on Mexico would strike at a source of Ferdinand's revenue and deprive the aristocracy of many offices to sell. Liberal principles, once established in the New World, would spread until the centers of despotism were overthrown.[22] Encouraged by General Scott and London merchants, Mina made preparations for the expedition. He obtained the *Caledonia,* loaded it with supplies, and sailed for the United States with fifty companions,[23] leaving from Liverpool on May 15, 1816.[24] Two of the company later declared that the *Caledonia* carried "2,500 muskets, 50 pair Pistols, 2 Boxes Swords, 100 saddles and Bridles complete; a quantity of clothing for Soldiers, 50 barrels Powder, 9 Eighteen

[19] Elliott, *Winfield Scott,* 207.

[20] Mier to Sres. P. and A., Baltimore, September 15, 1816, in Hernández, *Documentos,* VI, 916–17.

[21] Scott to Thornton, [London, March ?, 1816], Thornton Papers.

[22] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900; Robinson, *Memoirs,* I, 89.

[23] Mier's Declaration, November 13, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos,* VI, 816. It should be noted that Mier instructed a correspondent to address him in care of General Scott after he had arrived in Norfolk. Mier to Frasquito ———, Norfolk, July 1–13, 1816, *ibid.,* 909.

[24] Onís to Apodaca, Philadelphia, July 23, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898. Scott arrived at Baltimore on the *Franklin* on May 10, 1816. Elliott, *Winfield Scott,* 207–208.

[eight?] Pounders, with the necessary beef for the voyage." There was also a printing press and a general's unused uniform.[25]

Preparations in the United States

After a long voyage the *Caledonia* dropped anchor at Norfolk on June 20.[26] Mina, Mier, and an American named Anderson made a hurried trip to Washington,[27] a record of which is lacking. It would be interesting to know whom Mina saw in Washington and what he was told. Some sort of encouragement must have been offered, either then or later, and perhaps Dr. Pedro Gual, revolutionary agent from Venezuela, exercised an influence in his favor. Gual sent on to Thornton the letter of introduction which Scott had given Mina in London.[28] A week later Thornton acknowledged receipt of the letter, and expressed his desire "to hail that distinguished Patriot & the worthy Doctor Mier, of Mexico."[29] Thornton expected to see Mina on July 24,[30] but the meeting failed to materialize. There is also the question as to General Scott's influence. The Spanish consul in New York informed Onís that various revolutionists, including Mina, had had conferences with General Scott and port officials.[31] Scott's aid would be important in gaining officers for the expedition.

After his Washington trip Mina arrived in Baltimore in time to dissuade some of his passengers from carrying out their intention to reveal his plans to Onís in return for a pardon. The English crew, with the exception of the captain, the cook, and a boy, jumped ship at Baltimore, but an offer of $20 a month and a bonus was sufficient to attract another crew almost at once.[32] One

[25] José Morales y Dondé and Jh Ferdo Martín Pasamontes to Onís, New York, August 28, 1816, encl. in Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, August 29, 1816, Spanish Notes, IIIa.

[26] Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 93; Zárate, *La Guerra de Independencia*, 559.

[27] Mier's Declaration, October 6, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 806.

[28] Gual to Thornton, Baltimore, July 18, 1816, Thornton Papers, V, f. 825.

[29] Thornton to Gual, Washington, July 25, 1816, *ibid.*; IV, f. 736.

[30] Thornton to Toledo, Washington, July 24, 1816, *ibid.*, f. 732.

[31] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 21, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[32] Onís to Apodaca, Philadelphia, July 23, 1816, *ibid.*

of Mina's men, an Italian named Ginni Atagno, visited Onís and told him that the *Caledonia* had a cargo of cannon, muskets, powder, and clothing. According to this informant, Mina intended to join the insurgents at Boquilla de Piedras. Onís did not believe Atagno's assertion that Mina was incapable of carrying out his plan to invade Mexico.[33]

Mina and Mier found many sympathizers in Baltimore. They were in communication with Miguel Santamaría of Vera Cruz, Juan Vicente de Bolívar's friend José Rafael Revenga, and a revolutionary propagandist.[34] Baltimore was probably more important than New Orleans as the headquarters for the enemies of Spain at this time. Many French refugees were there and at Philadelphia, as were José Miguel Carrera from Chile and Mariano Montilla from Caracas. José Álvarez de Toledo soon arrived from New Orleans.[35] Gual took an active part in preparing Mina's expedition "with naval, and warlike stores enough to assure the communication of the co[a]st with the interior of that country."[36] Gual acted as Mina's press agent to some extent and caused a notice to be published in the Baltimore newspapers vouching for the young general.[37] The Baltimore *American,* in its issue of July 17, announced Mina's arrival and recommended him to the people of the United States.[38]

Mina's activities in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York were directed toward securing supplies and American officers to command the forces he expected to join him in Mexico.[39] Carrera made a vain attempt to divert the expedition to South America. He had

[33] Onís to Apodaca, Philadelphia, July 14, 1816, *ibid.*

[34] Mier to Srcs. P. and A., Baltimore, September 15, 1816, in Hernández, *Documentos,* VI, 918; Zárate, *La Guerra de Independencia,* 560. Revenga came to the United States with Telésforo de Orea and Juan Vicente de Bolívar in April, 1810, as their secretary. Francisco José Urrutia, *Los Estados Unidos de América y las Repúblicas Hispano-Americanas de 1810 á 1830. Páginas de Historia Diplomática* (Madrid, 1918), 3.

[35] Felipe Larrazábal, *Vida del Libertador Simón Bolívar* (Madrid, 1918), II, 47–48.

[36] Gual to Thornton, Baltimore, July 18, 1816, Thornton Papers, V, f. 825.

[37] Mier's Declaration, October 6, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos;* VI, 806.

[38] Winchester *Kentucky Advertiser,* August 10, 1816.

[39] Mier's Declaration, October 6, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos,* VI, 807.

arrived at Annapolis in January, 1816, and occupied himself with efforts to obtain aid for the revolution in Chile. He urged Mina to go to that area instead of to Mexico; but the young Spaniard was not to be moved from his original plan, and the Chilean was forced to look elsewhere for aid.[40] Although Mina was not willing to assist Carrera, he wrote to General Bolívar on July 21 giving an account of his preparations.[41] He invited Bolívar to co-operate in the enterprise against Mexico, and after exterminating Spanish power there, Mina would serve under Bolívar's orders in Venezuela.[42]

Among the Baltimore merchants who were willing to risk their capital in the glorious cause of independence and profits were Dennis and Alexander Smith. With other merchants, the Smith brothers provided the *Calypso,* arms, munitions, supplies, and $110,000.[43] With such promising preparations going forward in Baltimore, Mina visited other cities to interest recruits.[44] The *Weekly Aurora* announced on July 30, when Mina was in Philadelphia: "It is not improbable that he will join the standard of liberty in South America." More free advertising was given in the notice that

> the revolutionists of the southern republic, appear to derive vigor from disaster. They are very solicitous to obtain *officers* and *artificers* from the United States—and hold out very strong inducements, by their private letters.[45]

Mina, with his chief of staff, went to New York early in August for more recruits and supplies. New York exporters were interested in the Mexican prospects as well as in Carrera's propositions. Two

[40] Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, *El Ostracismo de los Carreras* . . . (Santiago de Chile, 1857), 45.

[41] Bolívar to M. Maxwell Hyslop, Port-au-Prince, October 4, 1816, in Vicente Lecuna (ed.), *Cartas del Libertador* (Caracas, 1929), I, 253.

[42] Larrazábal, *Vida del Libertador Simón Bolívar,* II, 48.

[43] Mier's Declaration, November 13, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos,* VI, 817. Mina bore letters of credit against Baltimore merchants. Onís to Apodaca, Philadelphia, July 14, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[44] Mier's Declaration, October 6, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos,* VI, 807.

[45] Philadelphia *Weekly Aurora,* August 6, 1816.

schooners were dispatched with arms and ammunition with the intention of joining the *Caledonia* at Baltimore. Joseph Bonaparte, then living in Philadelphia, was reported as having given the expedition letters of credit for $100,000 against London banking houses. In view of all these preparations, the United States did no more than to make futile gestures to prevent them.[46] The appearance of so many revolutionists in New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia caused Onís to fear that nothing would be done to prevent an expedition of eighteen or twenty vessels from sailing to attack Mexico.[47]

Spanish Efforts to Block the Expedition

Mina's final preparations coincided with the appearance of Toledo at Philadelphia to confer with Onís in his efforts to win the king's pardon. Onís gave him the task of disrupting Mina's expedition. Toledo began by attempting to take command of the martial excursion as a Mexican general, and when Mina refused to give way, the Spanish spy began to organize an expedition on his own account.[48] Such an enterprise might be expected to attract some of Mina's followers, but at the end of August some two hundred French and American officers were embarking on the *Caledonia* at Baltimore and four other armed ships were prepared to sail.[49] Onís was convinced that Mina intended to join Aury's squadron in the Gulf, land at Boquilla, arm the natives and the Indians, join forces with Victoria, and attack Mexican ports in the hope of causing a general uprising. Mina, he believed, hoped to proclaim himself Emperor of Mexico, and was already assuming the "airs" of that position. Colonel Guilford Dudley Young was mainly responsible for "seducing . . . a number of young men of the first families who will embark . . . and who in their enthusiasm ex-

[46] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 21, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898. Cf. *House Documents*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess. (Washington, 1818), Vol. II, no. 12, p. 7.

[47] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 25, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 244.

[48] Mier's Declaration, October 6, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 807.

[49] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 21, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

pect to make rapid and brilliant fortunes." All of this military activity was carried on in plain sight of authorities in New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, but they refused to act on Onís's protests.[50]

There was no possibility that the indefatigable minister would neglect filing a protest with the Department of State. Upon informing Monroe of the *Caledonia*'s arrival from England, Onís gave enough details of the proposed expedition to have caused a genuinely friendly nation to take steps against it.[51] Monroe replied that the Spanish consul at Baltimore had already given him the same information and that "measures were immediately taken to prevent any breach of the law on the part of that vessel."[52] Although his experience with the Department of State had been constantly discouraging, Onís made another attempt to induce the United States to thwart the expedition. He hoped that the President, upon being informed "of the nature of this Expedition and the iniquitous objects to which it is directed," would take the necessary steps to avoid the "disagreeable consequences to the two Nations, which might follow from the tolerance of an armament diametrically opposed to the Laws of this Republic. . . ."[53] Moreover, Onís asserted that some of the deluded volunteers had passed by his house "with Knapsacks and guns, and lodged at a Tavern opposite and have published without disguise their enlistment and object of their Journey to Baltimore."[54] Onís enclosed a translated copy of a declaration made by two lieutenant colonels who accompanied Mina. According to these men, Mina was an impostor, calling himself a general "when it is public and notorious

[50] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, August 28, 1816, AGN ND, I, f. 249. Guilford Dudley Young was a native of Connecticut. A volunteer in 1812, he became a lieutenant colonel in 1815. An honorable discharge terminated his regular army career on June 15, 1815. Heitman, *Historical Register*, I, 1067.

[51] Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, July 22, 1816, Spanish Notes, IIIa.

[52] Monroe to Onís, Department of State, August 16, 1816, Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 168–89.

[53] Onís to the Secretary of State, Philadelphia, August 29, 1816, Spanish Notes, IIIa.

[54] *Ibid.*

that there never existed any other General by that name but General Espoz y Mina. . . ." These informants declared that Mina was going to carry on war against both patriots and royalists, to plunder anyone who had money, to carry on his activities wherever he could, and then retire to Europe with the spoils.[55]

American officials were inclined to agree thoroughly with the views expressed by Onís. It remained only for them to translate agreement into action. A memorandum attached to the Onís note of August 29 indicated that the proper gestures would be made to prevent the expedition's departure:

> The case must be considered, under the Act of June 1794, as unlawful, whether devised as a military expedition against one, or both, of the parties to the civil war in South America.
>
> It is suggested, therefore, that the following course be pursued.
>
> 1. Mr. Onis to be informed, that by our laws criminal process cannot issue against any person, unless founded upon oath; and that the witnesses be requested to attend, without delay, before the Magistrate at Baltimore, who will be designated to them by the District Attorney.
>
> 2. The District Attorney and Collector to be instructed to ascertain the facts, and to bring the proper process for apprehending the accused, upon competent evidence.[56]

There was ample time for these steps to be carried out against Mina himself, since he did not sail until September 26; but the *Caledonia* was taken out before Onís's vigorous protest reached the State Department. A note to this effect was dispatched to Onís on September 12;[57] but he had already entered another protest, complaining that neither the President's proclamations nor the representations of Spanish consuls sufficed to end the abuses. There were six armed ships, in addition to the *Caledonia,* ready to sail from Baltimore with one thousand armed men. American officials, fully aware of the preparations, refused to take action "without legal and convincing proofs." What proofs, Onís asked, could

[55] Encl. in Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, August 29, 1816, *ibid.*

[56] Marginal note in Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, August 29, 1816, *ibid.*

[57] Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 171.

be more convincing than those already offered? Again he called attention to American statutes which specifically prohibited such violations of neutrality.[58] But nothing effective was done to impede Mina's movements.

While Onís was protesting in vain, Toledo continued his efforts to disrupt the filibustering raid. He was assisted in his efforts by Don Segundo Correa, son of the man whom Onís had engaged to assassinate Toledo some years before, who had come from London at Mina's expense. Correa also decided to seek the king's pardon and Onís gave him a dangerous mission—that of staying with the expedition and attempting to cause dissension among the men, possibly even to assassinate Mina.[59] Correa promised to serve the king faithfully, but the interception of the Spanish legation's correspondence in November revealed the scheme.[60] Fortunately for Correa, he was safe in New Orleans when his treachery became known.

Toledo did not give up hope that he could prevent the expedition's departure or cripple it seriously. Mina and Mier, who did not at that time know of Toledo's reconciliation with Ferdinand VII, asked him to keep quiet. Two vessels were ready to sail with recruits and supplies, but Toledo informed the merchants that "the Congress had been dissolved . . . that all was in anarchy . . . that the insurrection was almost suppressed, that the General . . . would soon be assassinated and his officers expelled."[61] The merchants withdrew their support for the time being, and in order to make the best of the situation, the two vessels were sent to Port-au-Prince.[62] In this emergency Dennis Smith honored a draft which Mina drew against London merchants. Through Mier's friendship with Alexander Smith, three of the merchants agreed to go

[58] Onís to Monroe, Philadelphia, September 11, 1816, Spanish Notes, IIIa.

[59] Mier to Anonymous, Galveston, February ?, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 902.

[60] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, December 8, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[61] Mier to Antonio Sesma, Galveston, December 14, 1816, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 911.

[62] *Ibid.*

through with the plans, and Dennis Smith assumed responsibility for the expedition.[63] Mina's equipment consisted of several pieces of heavy artillery, large quantities of munitions, supplies for erecting bridges and mounting cannon, a brig of eighteen guns, and much more—all of which Smith paid for, trusting Mina to make good in Mexico.[64]

Final plans for the departure of the expedition were made after a conference with Pedro Gual. It was decided to send two emissaries to Jamaica in an attempt to gain support from Venezuelan insurgents supposed to be there; Mier was to go to New Orleans and then to Matagorda to confer with José Manuel de Herrera and Louis Aury; and Mina would leave for Port-au-Prince on the *Calypso*. No interference was expected from the United States government, and Mier asserted that for three months Onís had been unable to meet the Secretary of State in order to present a protest personally. Officials at Washington "repeated the security of operation promised by their envoy in London; but as the Mexican minister [Herrera] was not here, we were unable to meet the conditions for assistance that this Government had proposed."[65] Mier left Baltimore on September 19, 1816, to carry out his part of the plan.[66] A storm off the coast of Florida prevented completion of the voyage, but a second attempt was successful and he arrived in New Orleans about the end of October.[67] Mina delayed his departure on the *Calypso* until September 26 and then sailed for Port-au-Prince, where he arrived on October 13, 1816.[68] Mina's

[63] Mier to Sres. P. and A., Baltimore, September 15, 1816, *ibid.*, 919.

[64] *Ibid.* An announcement appeared in the New York *Advertiser* on April 30, 1817, that Dennis Smith of Baltimore was paying his debts!

[65] Mier to Sres P. and A., Baltimore, September 15, 1816, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 917–23.

[66] Mier to Antonio Sesma, Galveston, December 14, 1816, *ibid.*, 911.

[67] Mier's Declaration, October 6, 1817, *ibid.*

[68] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900. Robinson fixed the date of departure as September 27. *Memoirs*, I, 100. He also states that Mier was sent to Boquilla de Piedras on a fast-sailing schooner before Mina left Baltimore, that he was alarmed at bad weather in the Gulf, landed at New Orleans, and sent the schooner on to Boquilla. *Ibid.*, 108–109.

expedition was finally under way, but there were to be vexatious misfortunes and delays before it arrived to engage in the Mexican rebellion.

A Period of Misfortunes

There was trouble at Port-au-Prince when Mina arrived. Storms played havoc with shipping in the region of Florida and the West Indies during the last two weeks of September. A severe hurricane at Port-au-Prince caused considerable damage to the *Caledonia* and its companion schooner which had arrived the day before the storm struck. A merchant in the city loaned Mina money to repair his ships and President Alexandre Pétion may have given some assistance.[69] The delay caused by the storm did not improve the temper of Mina's recruits. Many of the officers were displeased with the treatment they received and abandoned the expedition. The desertions continued until nearly one half of the adventurers had sailed for the United States, sick, disgusted, or tired—satisfied with having seen that much of the world although they had won no laurels in the fight for freedom.[70] Some of these disillusioned youths were back in Philadelphia and Baltimore by November 22, bringing reports that discouraged the merchants from giving further support to the expedition.[71] The faithful recruits demanded that Mina inform them as to their destination, and they wanted to see the troops they had been promised at Santo Domingo. Mina and Young quieted the discontent by saying that troops were at Galveston.[72] The desertions were somewhat remedied by the enlistment of sea-

[69] Mier's Declaration, November 13, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 816–17; Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 101. The *Caledonia* lost its foremast and suffered other damages. Boston *Independent Chronicle*, October 24, 1816.

[70] Washington *National Intelligencer*, November 21, 1816. Correa reported that 70 of the men deserted. Onís to the Captain General, Washington, February 28, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[71] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, November 22, 1816, *ibid.*

[72] Webb, "Account of Mina's Expedition," AGI PE AM, leg. 14. Webb's chronology is unreliable for this period of the expedition.

men from a French frigate and other merchantmen, some of which lost most of their crews.[73] Other recruits came from the refugees from Cartagena.[74]

Mina's efforts to obtain aid from Pétion were not very successful because of lack of funds and competition from Bolívar. Pétion offered three battalions of colored soldiers with the necessary arms and equipment, but Mina was unable to pay for the supplies.[75] He decided to sail for Galveston to join Aury, having received news that he, too, was planning to attack Mexico.[76] His fleet of four vessels weighed anchor on October 27.[77] Yellow fever broke out among the adventurers with disastrous results, killing more than 30 before Galveston was reached on November 22,[78] and leaving an effective force of about 140 officers and men.[79]

Aury could not be expected to consider Mina's arrival as an occasion for rejoicing. The situation at Galveston was already sufficiently complicated to demand all of his energies without the added factor of another expedition. Supplies were comparatively scarce; he had just recovered from wounds received in the mutiny of his followers on September 8; and his authority was by no means firmly established among those who remained nominally loyal.

[73] Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 101; Lexington *Kentucky Gazette*, December 16, 1816.

[74] Corrales (ed.), *Documentos para la Historia de la Provincia de Cartagena de Indias*, II, 245.

[75] Webb, "Account of Mina's Expedition." AGI PE AM, leg. 14; Onís to the Captain General, Washington, February 28, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1898. Onís was reporting information which he had received from his spy, Segundo Correa, in letters written at Galveston, December 11, 1816, and at New Orleans, January 25, 1817.

[76] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[77] *Ibid.*; Webb, "Account of Mina's Expedition," AGI PE AM, leg. 14. Apparently only the *Caledonia* and *Calypso* completed the voyage. Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 102.

[78] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900. Robinson gives November 24 as the date of arrival at Galveston. *Memoirs*, I, 102.

[79] Onís to the Captain General, Washington, February 28, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1898. An informant, Lozano, testified that Mina had 160 men, and that Captain Menchaca arrived from somewhere in the interior with 25 men about the same time that Mina reached Galveston. Felipe Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 14, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900. Another account credits Mina with having 250 men. Extract of a letter from Natchitoches, February 4, 1817, *House Documents*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. II, no. 12, p. 7.

Eight days passed before the two leaders could come to an agreement; only then was Mina permitted to land his men.[80] Father Mier arrived early in December, after conferring with the New Orleans merchants, lawyers, and privateers who were always willing to aid the Mexican insurgents if profits were to be had.[81] Those conferences led to rumors that Mina was going to lead an attack against Pensacola,[82] and the promises of aid that were made to Mier were probably conditioned upon Mina's undertaking that project.

While Mina was organizing his skeleton regiments at Galveston, Aury attempted to communicate with the Mexican Congress.[83] The failure of successive attempts must have been discouraging to everyone at Galveston, especially to Mina. One of his companions, Mariano Montilla,[84] arrived at New Orleans about January 1, 1817, accompanied by Juan G. Roscio, formerly secretary to the Caracas junta. Morphy had reason to believe that Montilla would be joined by three hundred recruits from the interior.[85] Sometime during his stay at Galveston, probably in December, 1816, Mina was in communication with Joshua Child to whom he sent commissions for a regiment and other "powers authorities etc—." Child received another letter, possibly from Mier, "stating that Mina was not an—adventurer—that he had letters of unlimited credit from the House of Baring & Co—England—11,000 British—muskets—as many suits of uniform—24—pieces of ordonnace [*sic*]—and ap-

[80] Onís to the Captain General, Washington, February 28, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[81] Diego Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, December 4, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[82] Morphy to José Masot, New Orleans, December 23, 1816, encl. no. 1 in Masot to the Captain General, Pensacola, January 10, 1817 (No. 29), AGI PC, leg. 1874.

[83] Aury to the Honorable Assembly of Representatives, Fernandina, December 12, 1817, New York *Advertiser*, January 20, 1818.

[84] Montilla fought at the siege of Cartagena as a colonel late in 1815, escaped to Jamaica on the *Constitución*, and then went on to Aux Cayes, Haiti. Here he had a serious dispute with Bolívar and sailed for the United States before Bolívar's Aux Cayes expedition left. Lecuna, "Expedición de los Cayos," in *loc. cit.*, 23, 24; Corrales (ed.), *Documentos para la Historia de la Provincia de Cartagena de Indias*, II, 248.

[85] Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, January 7, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

pointments for an army of 15,000 men—." Child was asked "to hover on the frontier of Texas—and distract the attention of Gen—— Arredondo—while he should be arming the people in the neighborhood of Marina del Soto—[Soto la Marina]." Joshua Child entered the scheme fortified with the transitory enthusiasm that characterized most of the filibusters. He wrote to "Captain David F—— [Forsythe?] on the Sabine" asking him to hold his refugees and Indians in readiness. As soon as the Mississippi went down, Child would join him with three hundred men and together they would attack San Antonio. But Captain David did not get the letter. Child's messenger delivered it to the Spanish agent at Natchitoches who forwarded a copy to Arredondo.[80] This letter was apparently the basis for Morphy's fears about the three hundred recruits for Montilla. Morphy had still more cause for worry when Mina came from Galveston for a conference with the New Orleans associates.

The Mina expedition thus far exhibited far more audacity than was displayed in the Gutiérrez-Magee raid. Mina, a refugee from Spain, had won support from the English government and prominent merchants in England and the United States. He had recruited men and solicited ships and supplies, including munitions of war, in two countries at peace with Spain. There was little secrecy about his movements in the United States; but the American officials, fully aware of their obligations under the neutrality act of 1794 and the treaty of 1795 with Spain, refused to stir from their lethargy and allowed Mina to depart on an expedition avowedly hostile to Spanish dominions. This serious breach of international law would have justified the recall of Onís; but, as in the Gutiérrez-Magee raid, Spain had more to lose than to gain from such a course.

Mina and the Pensacola Plot

The Floridas constituted a great temptation to public officials and private citizens of the United States. A portion of West Florida,

[80] Joshua Child to John Quincy Adams, [Natchitoches ?], January 15, 1818, Miscellaneous Letters, January, 1818.

the Baton Rouge area, became a part of the expanding republic by means of a dubious transaction in which a group of adventurers expelled the Spanish officials and then "surrendered" to American troops.[87] This affair was ever in the minds of Spanish officials when they contemplated the probable results of filibustering expeditions into Spanish provinces. Any movement of troops toward the southern boundary, any rumor of an expedition being formed in New Orleans, Baltimore, Savannah, or elsewhere, with Florida as a possible goal, induced a serious epidemic of nervous apprehension among Spanish agents. They were fully justified in their fears.

Rumors of an attack against Apalachicola and Pensacola were current in New Orleans in 1816. Gutiérrez was said to have agreed with insurgent leaders and Americans to make the invasion in the name of the Mexican Republic and then allow the Americans to take possession.[88] It would be a repetition of the Baton Rouge incident. From five to six hundred men were to go by land against either Pensacola or Apalachicola; the whole scheme was said to be under the guidance of American officials. Seven warships were supposed to be arming for the attack, four of which would act as transports.[89] This expedition failed to materialize and the insurgent plotters concerned themselves with the Aury establishment at Galveston until Mina's arrival once more turned their attention to Florida. It is probable that Mariano Montilla and Joseph Sauvinet left New Orleans early in January to broach the subject to Mina.[90] There is no reason to doubt that Mina's agent in New Orleans had been approached by "certain persons, who wished to make an

[87] Isaac Joslin Cox, *The West Florida Controversy, 1798–1813, . . .* (Baltimore, 1918), 358–436, 487–505; Dunbar Rowland, *History of Mississippi, the Heart of the South* (Chicago and Jackson, 1925), I, 448 *et seq.*

[88] Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, June 26, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[89] Declaration of José Duro, Havana, July 13, 1816, encl. in Morphy to Apodaca, New Orleans, June 26, 1816, *ibid.*

[90] One of Mina's vessels left New Orleans about January 21 with supplies and arms. Luis Piernas to Masot, Campo San Carlos de Barrancas, February 18, 1817, encl. no. 2. in Masot to Cienfuegos, San Carlos de Barrancas, February 21, 1817 (No. 69), AGI PC, leg. 1874.

attack upon Pensacola, and who offered to furnish him with men, arms, &C. &C. for that purpose." [91]

The overtures were sufficiently interesting to cause Mina and Colonel Young to sail for New Orleans, where they arrived on February 22, 1817.[92] Mina's arrival "caused much clamor . . . , occasioning large meetings and emboldening the insurgent group to the extreme." The principal matter with which the meetings were occupied was the projected attack on Pensacola.[93] Rumors were soon circulating that the expedition would materialize, but the rumors were wrong, at least in part. Mina could not agree with the New Orleans associates and "discovered that it was merely a mercantile speculation, from which no advantage would result in favour of his views on Mexico." [94] Pensacola would have been a good place to organize an expedition against Mexico, but Mina refused to accept the terms that were offered.[95] He managed to obtain sufficient credit to purchase two vessels, the *Cleopatra* and the *Neptune*,[96] and on March 1 the former cleared for Galveston.[97] Mina's relations with the New Orleans associates had failed and Pensacola was relieved of one danger, at least. He left New Orleans with the intention of proceeding with his expedition as soon as possible, and Morphy reported that an attack would be made in the near future against some place south of Texas.[98]

Mina's departure from New Orleans did not put an end to the plot against Pensacola and the rumors that he would play an important part in the attack. An American naval officer reported that Mina still meditated an attack on Florida which was merely de-

[91] Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 120.

[92] Morphy to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, February 26, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[93] *Ibid.*

[94] Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 133. For a more extended treatment of the plots against Pensacola, see Harris Gaylord Warren, "Pensacola and the Filibusters, 1816–1817," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXI (1938), 806–22.

[95] Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, March 10, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[96] Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 133.

[97] New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette*, March 4, 1817.

[98] Morphy to the Captain General, New Orleans, March 10, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900. Mina returned to Galveston on March 16. Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 133.

layed because of lack of funds, and that the expected invasion would have the approval of the United States, according to rumors at New Orleans.[99] Although Mina was interested in the possibilities of an attack on Florida, it is not certain that he was favorably disposed toward such an operation with Toledo before he sailed for Port-au-Prince in 1816. The principal authority for such an assumption is the description drawn up by Vicente Pazos Silva, an Argentine editor in exile, in February, 1818, with the aid of Dr. William Thornton. According to Pazos, Mina and Toledo were co-operating in a Florida enterprise which was disrupted by the hurricane at Port-au-Prince.[100] There can be scarcely any basis for this statement, since all of Toledo's actions in and around Philadelphia in the fall of 1816 were for the purpose of disrupting Mina's expedition. Pazos knew of Toledo's treachery to the insurgent cause and that there could have been no serious arrangement with Mina.

Final Arrangements at Galveston

Mina had reason to believe that harmony would reign at Galveston during his absence. He left with the assurance that Aury's supplies would be available for the comfort of his men, and that there would probably be nothing more exciting than the operation of his printing press.[101] Aury, dissatisfied with Galveston's harbor, decided to move on to Matagorda [102] and nearly precipitated a miniature civil war on Snake Island. When Henry Perry refused to countenance the removal unless Mina's forces be included, Aury

[99] Extract of a letter from Captain Charles Morris, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States' Frigate Congress, off the Balize, March 14, 1817, in *State Papers and Publick Documents* . . . (Boston, 1819), XI, 363.

[100] *Ibid.*, XII, 407. Cf. A. C. Wilgus, "Spanish American Patriot Activity Along the Gulf Coast of the United States, 1811–1822," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, VIII (1925), 205 n.; Lockey, "The Florida Intrigues of José Álvarez de Toledo," in *loc. cit.*, 145–78.

[101] The printing press was under the direction of Dr. Joaquín Infante and was operated by Samuel Bangs, a young Bostonian. Douglas C. McMurtrie, "Pioneer Printing in Texas," in *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XXXV (1931–1932), 173–93; Spell, "Samuel Bangs, the First Printer in Texas," in *loc. cit.*, 248–58.

[102] Mier's Declaration, October 9, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 808.

prepared to fight on the issue. He mounted a cannon in front of his tent, drew up his sailors and Joseph Savary's colored troops, and then wisely changed his mind. Perry was too much of an expert at the game of bluff to be frightened by such maneuvers. He rallied the Americans to his side and called on Colonel Montilla, commanding Mina's men, for aid.[103] Montilla marched his division between the hostile parties and warned Aury not to begin a conflict that could result only in his defeat. The leaders then held a conference and agreed that Mina should be recognized as the military chief and Aury as the naval commander of the establishment. With peace restored, preparations went forward for moving to Matagorda; but Mina arrived on the *Cleopatra* on March 16 and put a stop to the movement.[104] Aury made one last effort to regain control of the situation when he saw Mina's vessel approaching. One of his privateers was outside the harbor with passengers from New Orleans, waiting for a storm to subside. In accordance with signals from Aury, the corsair fired on the *Cleopatra*.[105] The battle was of short duration, probably because of the storm and because Montilla and Perry were too close to Aury for the latter's peace of mind.

Mina landed at Galveston and called his staff together to inform them of his plans.[106] Information obtained from intercepted dispatches and from one Inojosa in New Orleans caused Mina to decide on the mouth of the Santander River as the place to land his army.[107] The last few days of March and the first week of April were spent in embarking troops and supplies on the vessels

[103] Deposition of Juan Domingo Lozano, New Orleans, May 9, 1817, encl. in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 14, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[104] Mier's Declaration, October 9, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 808; Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 133; Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 14, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[105] Jean Laffite's Diary, encl. no. 1 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900. This diary is translated and edited in Warren (ed.), "Documents Relating to the Establishment of Privateers at Galveston, 1816–1817," in *loc. cit.*, 1086–1109.

[106] Deposition of Juan Domingo Lozano, New Orleans, May 9, 1817, encl. in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 14, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[107] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, *ibid.*

that were to take the expedition to Mexico. Montilla had no desire to continue with the enterprise and tried to convince Aury that greater success could be had in giving assistance to Caracas. Roscio, Revenga, and another officer also stayed at Galveston.[108] The fleet remained at anchor outside the bar for eight days while preparations continued for the departure. On April 7 the weather was favorable, and Mina sailed away on the final adventure of his career.[109] There are various estimates and accounts that describe Mina's fleet. Eight vessels can be accounted for and identified with reasonable certainty.[110] The flotilla was joined by the *Ellen Tooker*, Captain Adam Pond, a swift schooner bound from New York with a cargo of munitions for anyone who would buy them. After a stop at the Balize, Captain Pond made for Nautla where he arrived on March 23.[111] He failed in an attempt to communicate with the insurgents and then sailed for Galveston where he arrived on April 5. Mina made arrangements to purchase the cargo, and the *Ellen Tooker* joined the expedition on its voyage to the Santander

[108] Mier's Declaration, October 9, 1817, in Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 808. Revenga felt that he had fulfilled his duty toward Mina, having "left him in intercourse already with the government, and with one of the patriot generals. . . ." Revenga to Thornton, Philadelphia, June 20, 1817, Thornton Papers, V, f. 775.

[109] Jean Laffite's Diary, encl. no. 1 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900. Robinson states that the departure was on March 27. *Memoirs*, I, 135. April 5 is the date given in the Boston *Independent Chronicle & Boston Patriot*, June 18, 1817, and Fatio reported April 6. Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, June 14, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900. In other words, the expedition left early in April.

[110] Two brigs, prizes to a Mexican privateer and a Buenos Aires "cruiser," were brought in while the fleet was at anchor. As there was no time to go through the regular condemnation procedure, the prizes were added to the expedition. Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 134. One of these prizes was the brig *El Paz*, captured by José Almeida on the schooner *El Congreso* in February. The other was probably the *Dorado*. Deposition of Don Blas Muros [Muñoz], New Orleans, June 13, 1817, encl. in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, June 14, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900. The frigate *Cleopatra*, the brig *Calypso*, the schooner *Dolphin*, the sloop *August*, and the frigate *Neptune* were the other vessels. Webb, "Account of Mina's Expedition," AGI PE AM, leg. 14. The *Calypso* was then known as the *Congreso Mexicano*, and Robinson states that it was in New Orleans. *Memoirs*, I, 152. Webb, whose memory was not too accurate, may have confused *El Congreso* with *El Congreso Mexicano*. The *Neptune* was a store ship. Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 135. Of this fleet, only the *Cleopatra* and the *Neptune* fell into Spanish hands at Soto la Marina.

[111] For the *Ellen Tooker* and Captain Pond, see Faye, "Privateersmen of the Gulf and Their Prizes," in *loc. cit.*, 1088 *et seq.*

River.[112] Mina already had enough supplies for his army of about 350 men,[113] hence this cargo was probably to be sold to insurgent leaders.

Contrary winds impeded the progress of the fleet so much that a stop was made on April 11 or 12 at the mouth of the Río Grande to take on fresh water. Information about the location of royalist forces was obtained from a guard that had been stationed there. This detachment, seeing the Spanish flags on Mina's fleet, aided the rebels to round up some wild cattle for fresh meat and to replenish their water casks.[114] Mina took advantage of the occasion to issue an uninspiring proclamation to his men on April 12.[115] A storm scattered the vessels when they set sail again,[116] but they were all together off the bar of the Santander River about a week later, and on April 21 Mina gave the order to land.[117]

Activities at Soto la Marina

Fifteen leagues up the Santander lay the village of Soto la Marina, almost untouched by the revolutionary currents that eddied and swirled through Mexico. Had it not been for the presence of Lieutenant Colonel Felipe de la Garza and his small force of royalists, the people would have had little reason even to be aware of the viceroy's government. Those who ventured to go downstream in their boats might spend a night or so in the dilapi-

[112] Smith *et al.* v. Universal Insurance Company, *United States Reports*, 6 Wheaton 176–79.

[113] Jean Laffite's Diary, encl. no. 1 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900; Deposition of Don Blas Muros [Muñoz], New Orleans, June 13, 1817, encl. in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, June 14, 1817, *ibid.*; Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 135.

[114] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900. Robinson is the authority for the statement regarding the Spanish flags. *Memoirs*, I, 136. Mariano Torrente states that Mina was unable to carry out his intention of landing at the Río Grande, and so he continued to Soto la Marina. *Historia de la Revolución Hispano-Americana* (Madrid, 1829–1830), II, 373.

[115] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[116] Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 137–38. Robinson's dates are wrong. He gives April 11 as the date of arrival at the river, and April 15 as the date of landing.

[117] Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900.

dated barracks that once housed the viceroy's soldiers at the river's mouth. It was in these quarters that Mina's band of invaders spent their first night on Mexican soil.[118]

This somewhat insignificant party of adventurers numbered less than 250 men. There were imposing names for the regiments into which the force was divided.[119] The superabundance of officers is to be explained by Mina's expectation that they would be needed to command numerous recruits from revolutionary Mexico. Supplies for an army of about two thousand men were landed and moved to Soto la Marina.[120]

No royalist forces challenged Mina on his way to the village. Garza retreated when the advance guard came in sight, but first he warned the people that the foreigners were going to commit the worst of atrocities. Those who remained in spite of this warning welcomed the filibusters with as much ceremony as the circumstances permitted. When Mina arrived on April 24 he was greatly encouraged by his reception and anticipated bringing to an end those evils from which Mexico had suffered so long.[121] The press he had acquired in England was soon turning out copies of a bulletin. After a brief review of Mina's career, this *Boletín* announced that his desire to uphold liberal principles in the New World and to attack the source of Ferdinand's strength led him to Mexico. He would show the Mexicans that not all of the Spaniards were like those who had bathed the land in blood.[122]

Mina made a fatal error when he decided to split his force and leave a detachment in a fort at Soto la Marina. Haste was essential if he was to avoid a pitched battle with the vastly superior forces which were approaching under General Arredondo. The poorly

[118] *Ibid.*

[119] Webb, "Account of Mina's Expedition," AGI PE AM, leg. 14.

[120] Arredondo to Apodaca, Soto la Marina, June 30, 1817, AGN Arredondo, IV, ff. 257–59.

[121] Webb, "Account of Mina's Expedition," AGI PE AM, leg. 14; Mina, "Boletín," AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[122] A copy of the bulletin was sent to Felipe Fatio. Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, June 14, 1817, *ibid.*

placed fort was hurriedly constructed of adobe; then into this structure were brought the surplus supplies which had been deposited on the coast before Aury went back to Texas with all but two of the vessels that had sailed early in April.[123] Even before the fort was completed, Mina crossed the Santander and marched away with about two hundred men.[124] His belief that the fort would hold out until he could return with reinforcements helps to explain this maneuver, but if he had listened more attentively to accounts of the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition his respect for General Arredondo would have been deeper. Guerrilla warfare, the only kind that Mina knew, required movements by a highly mobile force encumbered with only the bare necessities of warfare. He could not be bothered with large quantities of supplies, but a magazine for replenishment of his equipment was necessary. If Major José Sardá, who commanded the garrison left in the fort, could defend his position against the royalists, Mina would have a base of supplies as well as a source of replacements.

Henry Perry's experiences in the United States Army and with the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition were sufficient to give him a reasonable insight into military operations of the kind Mina was beginning. His support of that Spanish *guerrillero* on Galveston Island indicated a belief that the expedition had a chance for success; but belief changed to doubt during the march from Soto la Marina. Mina called a halt after six leagues had been covered and went into camp for a few days.[125] The best explanation for the delay seems to be the dispute that had arisen between Mina and

[123] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, *ibid.*; Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 152.

[124] Webb, "Account of Mina's Expedition," AGI PE AM, leg. 14. Webb gives the figure as 208; but Arredondo reported that Mina had 150 of his original troops and 165 deserters from his own army. Arredondo to Apodaca, Soto la Marina, June 30, 1817, AGN Arredondo, IV, f. 253. William Thompson, one of the officers captured by Arredondo in the fort, asserted that there were only 100 men under Sardá and that Mina began his march with an army of 600. Letter dated Havana, May 1, 1818, in the Washington *National Intelligencer*, copied by the New York *Evening Post, for the Country*, June 24, 1818.

[125] Webb, "Account of Mina's Expedition," AGI PE AM, leg. 14.

Perry. The latter announced his intention to return along the coast to Texas and about fifty men agreed to go with him. In the circumstances Mina could do nothing to deter them. Perry and his men marched northward to La Bahía and demanded the surrender of the presidio on June 18.[126] The approach of Governor Antonio Martínez from San Antonio saved the garrison and Perry started for Nacogdoches.[127] Martínez overtook the fleeing filibusters and practically annihilated them.[128] Henry Perry's adventurous career was ended. In all of the filibustering period he was the only prominent American adventurer to die on a Texas battlefield.

Another disaster soon cast an ominous shadow over Mina's expedition. General Arredondo laid siege to the weak fort at Soto la Marina on June 11, eight days before Perry's death by suicide at El Perdido. Father Mier deserted the defenders in time to save his life for further services to Mexico.[129] When it was obvious that no hope could be expected from Mina and that Arredondo must eventually win the unequal struggle, Sardá surrendered the fort. Mina lost, as a result of Arredondo's victory, 129 men and a valuable store of supplies. The Spanish loss was trifling.[130]

The capture of the fort at Soto la Marina on June 15 and Mina's union with Pedro Moreno on June 23[131] at Fort Sombrero, or Comanja, marked the end of the filibustering phase of the invasion. Thereafter the invaders merged with the Mexican rebels, and their activities properly belong to the history of the revolution in

[126] Félix Trudeaux to Fatio, Natchitoches, August 5, 1817, AGN ND, II, f. 62.

[127] Martínez to Apodaca, Béxar, June 23, 1817, in *Gaceta Extraordinaria del Gobierno de Mexico*, VIII (July 16, 1817), 787. Martínez assumed office on May 27, 1817. Martínez to the Viceroy, Béxar, May 31, 1817, Nacogdoches Archives (Edward E. Ayer Collection, Newberry Library), file 1817–1818.

[128] Martínez to Apodaca, Béxar, June 23, 1817, in *Gaceta Extraordinaria del Gobierno de Mexico*, VIII (July 16, 1817), 787.

[129] Hernández, *Documentos*, VI, 812.

[130] Arredondo to Apodaca, Soto la Marina, June 30, 1817, AGN Arredondo, IV, f. 254. The names of Arredondo's prisoners, found in this dispatch, show clearly the American character of the filibustering force.

[131] Robinson, *Memoirs*, I, 201.

Mexico. On the whole, Mina's career after he joined the rebels was disappointing; but he was fighting for a cause which had lost its Hidalgo and its Morelos. In a few short campaigns—if his guerrilla tactics may be so dignified—Mina revealed excellent qualities of leadership. He was a capable guerrilla fighter but he must have been a keen disappointment to his backers in England and the United States. The merchants who furnished him with ships and supplies lost not only their investment but also a market for future shipments of materials. Be that as it may, Mina's efforts in Mexico made him one of the lesser heroes of the protracted struggle for freedom.

The expedition led by General Mina broadened the scope of filibustering activities. Here was a dashing young leader of the Spanish liberals attempting to strike at the tyranny of Ferdinand VII by aiding rebellion in Spain's colonies. Supported by merchants in England and the United States, favored by General Winfield Scott, and joined by capable American officers, Mina's raid promised to be a major embarrassment to the royalists of New Spain. As in 1812, so in 1816 the United States failed to regard the obvious obligations of a neutral and tolerated a flagrant violation of its laws. Perhaps Mina could have won a larger share of glory had he joined Bolívar or Carrera, but his egotism and his devotion to an original purpose held him to his course. He refused to be diverted toward Florida when the New Orleans associates suggested such a conquest; he refused to follow Perry into Texas. His death before a firing squad in Mexico was a fitting climax to a heroic career.

Chapter 8

Plots and Counterplots

Jean Laffite's Coup d'Etat at Galveston

Father antonio de sedella's two great passions in life were the welfare of his people and the preservation of the Spanish empire in New Spain. He could expect, with reasonable certainty, that the Almighty would help him care for his flock around the St. Louis Cathedral; but to confound the enemies of Spain in New Orleans he needed more aid than could ever be expected from Diego Morphy, Juan Mariano Picornell, and the brothers Laffite. An avalanche of worries descended upon him from all sides. Mina's expedition, rumors of a Napoleonic Confederation, Joseph Bonaparte's schemes, corsairs in the Gulf, and a horrible plot to cause a servile insurrection in Cuba—these were the troubles of Padre Sedella.

Jean Laffite spread the rumor of the plot against Cuba. He learned about it while on a trip to Washington and northern cities late in 1815 and on that occasion refused to have anything to do with the scheme. Upon receiving a communication from Philadelphia in 1817, asking his co-operation, Jean turned the matter over to Sedella.[1] He had also discovered that an organization had been projected to unite all persons in the United States who favored the Mexican Revolution. Unless this formidable group could be prevented from perfecting its schemes, dire results were certain to follow. Number 13-dos, as Jean Laffite was called in the Spanish correspondence, offered to overthrow the project and would "con-

[1] Anonymous to Jean Laffite, Philadelphia, December 21, 1816, encl. in Sedella to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, February 23, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

sider himself sufficiently paid by serving the cause of humanity." A competent person should be sent from Havana to be introduced among the conspirators and to plan for their overthrow.[2] After consulting with Sedella, the Laffites selected Arsène Lacarrière Latour, engineer and mapmaker of New Orleans, to represent them at Havana and to urge the appointment of a special agent.[3]

It so happened that when Latour arrived in Havana, one of Spain's most capable agents was also there. Felipe Fatio had been a trusted subordinate of the Spanish legation for more than a decade.[4] No better person was available for the important task indicated in the communications from Fray Antonio and the brothers Laffite. Captain General Don José Cienfuegos commissioned Fatio to treat with the reformed Baratarians, to examine into their character and their present activities. Fatio was to give particular attention to any plans that the Laffites might propose in the interests of Spain, and if he found "that any one of their propositions is practicable and advantageous without compromising Spanish honor and character," he was to "adopt and assist it by all the decorous and active means" at his disposal. An important object of the mission was to obtain information about the strongholds of the pirates, where they obtained their arms and crews, and where they disposed of captured merchandise.[5]

The New Orleans associates were trying to interest Mina in the plan to attack Pensacola while Latour was in Havana. A fortnight after Mina left for Galveston at the termination of his unsuccessful conferences with the New Orleans group, Jean Laffite decided that

[2] Jean Laffite's memorandum in Sedella to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, February 23, 1817, *ibid.*

[3] Pierre and Jean Laffite to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 26, 1817, *ibid.*

[4] Onís to the Viceroy, Philadelphia, May 4, 1810, AGN ND, II, f. 10. Fatio had held the title of consul at Charleston but did not assume his duties. As early as 1815 he had been commissioned consul to succeed Morphy at New Orleans, but did not take up his post. Stanley Faye, "Consuls of Spain in New Orleans, 1804–1821," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXI (1938), 683–84.

[5] "Instrucciones dadas por el Excelentisimo Señor Capitan General de la Isla de Cuba al Señor Don Felipe Fatio sobre la Comision Reservada," encl. in Cienfuegos to Fatio, Havana, April 12, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

it was time for him to see what was going on at Aury's port. He sailed from New Orleans on March 16 and arrived a week later.[6] Mina had persuaded Aury to assist him in landing on the Mexican coast and the combined fleet was at anchor in anticipation of the departure when Jean arrived. The Baratarian adventurer conferred with both Aury and Mina. Aury planned to abandon Galveston in favor of Matagorda after leaving Mina in Mexico, and Jean Laffite saw a golden opportunity for a bold stroke. He would take over Aury's government and become master of Galveston!

Aury left a skeleton organization in charge of Louis F. de Rieux, but that did not prevent Jean Laffite from carrying out his plan. On April 8, the day after Aury's departure with Mina, he formed a "government" of his own. Officers were appointed for the new organization,[7] apparently without protest from Aury's disloyal followers. Bartholomé Lafon arrived within two or three days with his schooner *Carmelita* from New Orleans, bringing with him Luis Yturribarría who had been there since the middle of February with a commission from Herrera.[8] Yturribarría did not favor lending his official sanction to Laffite's government,[9] but he finally agreed to administer the oath of allegiance to the officers on April 15.[10] The record of this official act shows clearly that Rieux was not entirely faithful to his absent leader.[11] There were between thirty and forty persons at Galveston when the new or-

[6] Jean Laffite's Diary, encl. no. 1 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Morphy reported that "The insurgent Yturribary has been given recognition in the papers of this city as the representative of the Mexican Government, with the perverse aim of giving legality to the letters of marque against us, and to augment this infamous traffic even more." Morphy to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, February 26, 1817, *ibid.*

[9] Yturribarría to Rieux, New Orleans, May 15, 1817, encl. no. 3 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, *ibid.*

[10] Chew to Crawford, New Orleans, August 1, 1817, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 135. This organization was scarcely formed when the *General Artigas*, Captain Guy R. Champlin, arrived with the prizes *Enriqueta* and *Petronilla*. Captain Maurice Jolly also put in with his prizes.

[11] *House Documents*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., vol. 2, no. 12, p. 44.

ganization was effected on Lafon's *Carmelita.*[12] Rieux was made governor, and other officers were appointed.[13] In accordance with a public notice which was posted, a group of owners and captains of vessels at Galveston met on April 20 to acknowledge the authority of these officials and to agree on the mode of meeting governmental expenses. One important item in the agreement was the recognition of debts incurred at Galveston by the old government before April 15, 1817.[14]

Jean Laffite must have played his part superbly. Had his associates suspected that the colorful Baratarian, for whom Lafon was acting, was a Spanish agent, the sands of Snake Island might have had another unmarked grave and makers of romance would have been deprived of the chance to perpetuate much of the nonsense that has been written about Jean Laffite. The "government" was entirely without legal status, even that of a revolutionary character. John Ducoing, the admiralty judge, testified a few months later that no one at Galveston had any intention other than that of capturing Spanish vessels. They did not even believe that there was an independent Mexican government.[15]

Jean Laffite's stay at Galveston was of short duration. The new establishment needed supplies and recruits, and a report must be made to Sedella. Leaving Lafon in charge, he sailed from Galveston on April 18.[16] One of his first acts in New Orleans was to inform the editor of *L'Ami des Lois* that an important change had occurred in the government of Galveston and that there was considerable activity in the port. "New authorities have been appointed at Galverstown [*sic*]. . . . The commerce of the port is very considerable for so young an establishment. From the 30th of March to the 17th of April, seventeen vessels had entered, of which two

[12] Testimony of Richard Espagnol, [New Orleans], October 7, 1817, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 137–38.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *House Documents,* 15 Cong., 1 Sess., vol. 2, no. 12, pp. 44–45.

[15] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 137.

[16] Jean Laffite's Diary, encl. no. 1 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

were direct from Venezuela, and ten had sailed from thence." [17] Such publicity would ensure even more activity in the young establishment. Jean was anxious to return to his new venture at Galveston, but he delayed long enough to inform Padre Sedella that he had "interesting news relating to the expedition which has just left for Santander, or Soto de la Marina, near Tampico, commanded by General Mina who told me matters of great importance." The situation at Galveston "had turned out satisfactorily," and Sedella was urged to make some definite arrangements as soon as possible regarding matters upon which Latour had been sent to Havana. Laffite added a postscript to the effect that he had received information revealing more about the insurrection and that Quakers were to supply the funds.[18] Thus did a prince of smugglers play upon the fears of the beloved padre of New Orleans.

The Plot to Capture Aury

Jean Laffite did not return to Galveston as he had planned. The vessel bringing Felipe Fatio to New Orleans [19] arrived at the end of April, and on May 8 the brothers Laffite and Fatio met to discuss matters of importance, especially a plan to capture Galveston and destroy the corsairs individually as they returned to the port. Not only would the privateers thus be captured, but Aury and Mina would be separated from their base of supplies.[20] Armed launches were to be used for the capture of Galveston, and then two frigates were to be stationed outside the harbor, flying the Mexican flag, to lure returning corsairs to their doom. The force required for the plan was modest: a corvette, a brigantine, one or two schooners, and two armed launches, all under the command of Laffite. A

[17] Boston *Independent Chronicle & Boston Patriot*, June 18, 1817.

[18] Laffite to [Sedella], New Orleans, April 28, 1817, encl. in Cienfuegos to Apodaca, Havana, May 14, 1817, AGN ND, II, f. 279.

[19] Fatio had asked for an armed vessel to take him to his post. Fatio to the Captain General, Havana, March 20, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[20] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, *ibid.* Juan and Pablo Rodón, Sedella, and Ariza were also at the meeting.

successful termination of the project would result in putting an end to privateering in the Gulf and the illegal business of the New Orleans armorers.[21] The plan was a bold one, but Fatio believed it was feasible. "I am not a credulous person . . ." he assured Cienfuegos, "but having examined and reflected prudently on the possibilities of these plans, and having considered the result of whatever deceit may be intended on their part, I confess that it is so small and insignificant in comparison with the advantages that will accrue to their following the path of Honor and of truth, that I see no motive for refusing them that confidence which the proposed plan requires for achieving the desired result."[22] Fatio promised to be on his guard against "any contradiction between their promises and their conduct." The capture of Galveston should be made within a short time in order to avoid the storms that were certain to appear early in the autumn. Cienfuegos was requested to have the squadron stationed off Pensacola by July 15 to await orders, since the royal navy was an indispensable part of the plan.[23]

In the meantime important events had occurred at Galveston. Aury left Mina at Soto la Marina and proceeded to establish himself at Matagorda Bay. After two weeks at the new post, he decided to return to Galveston to gather the remainder of his force.[24] He arrived on May 3 and the next day called a meeting of the officers. Aury is supposed to have expressed his satisfaction with what had been done during his absence; but he refused to give up his rights and "in consequence pretended and hoped to be recognized as Governor and Treasurer General." The meeting broke up in disagreement.[25] The members of Laffite's government dispersed. Yturribarría, his authority flouted by Aury, returned to New Orleans where he threatened to reveal the whole business to the newspapers.[26] Aury remained at Galveston until May 18, when,

[21] *Ibid.*, encl. no. 2.

[22] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, *ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] New York *Advertiser*, January 20, 1818.

[25] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, May 24, 1817, encl. no. 4, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[26] Yturribarría to Rieux, New Orleans, May 15, 1817, *ibid.*

with a force of three armed schooners, eleven prize vessels, and 250 men, he sailed to establish his combined force at Matagorda Bay. This movement caused a revision of the plan to capture the corsairs, and Fatio recommended that they should not be allowed to settle at the new location. Pierre Laffite left for Galveston on June 3 and Jean remained in New Orleans.[27]

Fatio was thoroughly convinced of the importance of adopting the plan proposed by the brothers Laffite and prepared to put it into execution without first receiving the captain general's approval. He secured the services of an excellent pilot, prepared a list of supplies needed for the expedition, and purchased a ship to transport them. The cargo, to be ready late in June, was to include "Bread, meat . . . and a little wine, brandy, and vinegar. . . ." The vessel was to be ready to sail as soon as the royal navy could co-operate in the plan. Fatio's hopes were high:

> N. 13 two [Jean Laffite], in his own name as well as in that of [number] one, agrees to what has been done; and they promise in good faith to comply scrupulously with their promise to Your Excellency and to the Government; if the plan both have devised be followed exactly, he says that in a few months we shall have no enemies to fear in this part of the world.[28]

Fate was also co-operating with Fatio. Matagorda Bay was not a hospitable place for Aury and his men, especially since the Karankawas were hostile. Almost all of Aury's vessels were wrecked on sand bars or found it impossible to get out of the poor harbor. Aury gave up the struggle and sailed away, leaving the bay dotted with the wrecks of his fleet.[29] He was back at Galveston about the middle of June [30] and ran into more trouble, although Fatio was too optimistic when he wrote to the captain general that the quarry was once more "in the desired rat-trap." [31]

[27] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, June 7, 1817, *ibid.*

[28] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, June 18, 1817, *ibid.* Fatio also purchased the schooner *Antonio Bonifacia* from the Laffites for $3,000.

[29] Martínez to the Viceroy, Béxar, June 13, 1817, Nacogdoches Archives, Newberry file 1817–1818.

[30] New York *Advertiser*, January 20, 1818.

[31] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, July 11, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

Another Wild Scheme to Invade New Spain

A situation developed in June and July, 1817, which indicated that the scheme of 1816 to invade Texas had been revived on a grand scale. The details of this plot, together with a plan to frustrate it, were communicated to Fatio at the time that Aury's "rat trap" was being fashioned. The brothers Laffite found it comparatively easy to win Bartholomé Lafon to the service of Spain. Lafon had been an inhabitant of Louisiana before its sale to the United States and had taken part in corsair activities while waiting for his real estate holdings to become productive.[32] He acted as Jean Laffite's agent in the Galveston *coup d'etat* in April, 1817, and it is reasonable to assume that he was soon informed of his friend's connection with the Spanish officials in New Orleans.

Lafon had interesting information to disclose. He pretended to have intercepted dispatches intended for Gutiérrez at Natchitoches, which revealed a far-flung plot against New Spain. The main objects of the plan were to capture Mexican ports and subdue the Interior Provinces. Detachments of patriots would engage the scouting parties of the royalists to prevent reconnoitering while insurgent forces were gathering, and also to interrupt royalist communications. The land forces of the insurgents would operate in four divisions, with the Indians taking a prominent part. The first division, composed of Comanche Indians and their allies, was to operate from Santa Fe, San Sabá, and the upper Río Grande. The second division, composed of Almagres Indians, would hold themselves in readiness to terrorize the province of New Mexico. General Humbert would command a third division "of Americans and all other kinds of people," which would follow a northern route through Texas and into Mexico on a pillaging expedition. Gutiérrez, at the head of the desperate collection of Indians, would attack La Bahía at the same time that a fleet took possession of Matagorda. Pirates would make forays from the vessels of this fleet to pillage, burn, and murder. Lafon did not think it was necessary to explain

[32] *Ibid.*, postscript of July 16.

the plan in detail, but he assured Fatio that everything was "prepared and settled" for carrying it out.[33]

Of the three leaders named by Lafon, only Louis Aury had the resources to carry out his part of the plan. Aury was paying the expenses incurred by Gutiérrez in January and February, if not later. But who were the main leaders of the plot? And why did Aury sail away from Galveston late in July, thus severing his relations with the New Orleans associates? Neither Galveston nor Matagorda offered a safe harbor for an establishment such as Aury desired as a rendezvous for privateers and corsairs; but that was probably not the whole story. Aury undoubtedly lost the support of the New Orleans associates before his departure for Mexico with Mina. If the ambitious scheme related by Lafon actually existed, John K. West, Joseph Sauvinet, John Randolph Grymes, August Davezac, and the latter's brother-in-law, Edward Livingston, would be enlisted as backers. They could count on the assistance of Pierre Lamaison, Nicolas Maurice Joly, Guy R. Champlin, and other sea raiders. Colonel Henry D. Peire, General Gutiérrez, and General Humbert could be relied upon for some sort of military leadership. For twenty years or more these men had been involved in smuggling, privateering, piracy, and filibustering. Some, if not all of them, were probably involved in the plot described by Lafon.

Mina's departure for Mexico, the uncertainty of Aury's existence, and the failure of the Pensacola plot, were probably factors which turned the New Orleans associates away from the scheme to invade New Spain in 1817. The Pensacola plot was abandoned by Duncan, Grymes, Livingston, Beluche, and Peire late in May or early in June, 1817.[34] If these men had succeeded in selling Pensacola to the United States for a considerable sum, funds would have been available for an invasion of Texas on the scale Lafon indicated. The Texas scheme seems to have been abandoned also by July 16, when Lafon had his interview with Fatio. If that was

[33] Encl. no. 2 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 29, 1817, *ibid.*

[34] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, June 7, 1817, *ibid.*

true, then "the best engineer and map-maker in these States" was trying to sell a very white elephant to the usually astute consul.

Lafon suggested to Fatio that the danger to New Spain could be removed through the use of strategy, force, intrigue, and money. Intrigue would suffice to arouse dissension among the forces from the north. The southern Indians could be turned against one another by the use of titles, presents, and money. The savages near Santa Fe might be attacked by royalist troops after a formal declaration of war against them.[35] Humbert and Gutiérrez were to be involved in the contraband trade with Texas. Soldiers, disguised as traders, would join Humbert and aid in capturing him at the Colorado. Gutiérrez would be more difficult to capture and might be induced to fall into a trap prepared for him and the "miserable Mexican patriots" who would join him at Trinidad or Orcoquizac.[36] According to Lafon's estimate, forty or fifty men and $50,000 would be required to carry out this counterplot. Half of that sum would be needed for first expenses and the remainder to complete the scheme. The Indians could be handled with $10,000; the contraband trade would take some $15,000; and a payment of $6,000 would satisfy Lafon's requirements in getting the intrigue under way.[37] Fatio thought well enough of the scheme to pay Lafon a retainer of $700 while waiting for the viceroy's approval.[38] He was thoroughly alarmed, and he reported that the conspiracy to invade New Spain extended throughout the United States. Foreigners were settling on the frontiers, there were three hundred Americans and Irishmen north of Natchitoches ready to join another thousand men, and an undetermined number of Indians ready to fight in Texas.[39] Nothing more was heard of this grandiose project, except the viceroy's refusal to take it seriously, and Fatio turned his attention once more to Galveston.

[35] Encl. no. 2 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 29, 1817, *ibid.*

[36] *Ibid.* and encl. no. 1.

[37] Encl. no. 7 in Fatio to Apodaca, New Orleans, September 15, 1817, AGN ND, II, f. 80.

[38] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 29, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[39] Fatio to the Viceroy, New Orleans, July 26, 1817, AGN ND, II, ff. 84–85.

Spanish Co-operation with the Galveston Corsairs

The plan of the brothers Laffite to capture Aury and other corsairs was again made feasible when the intended victim returned to Galveston about the middle of June, 1817.[40] Jean Laffite's "government" enjoyed only a short existence as a result of Aury's return, but Pierre was able to restore his brother's work. After conferring with Fatio and his advisers and agreeing on the plan, Pierre left New Orleans on June 3 to arrange affairs at Galveston.[41] Aury's men were easy victims for Pierre's blandishments, and so many deserted that Aury left Galveston on July 21,[42] disclaiming all responsibility for whatever might occur there in the future.[43] Pierre wrote to Jean urging him to send out supplies and to come himself if possible. Pierre was not in good health, an attack of the itch made him long for some sulphur ointment, and there was an argument with Captain Champlin to be settled. He asked Jean to meet with the "friends" [44] and to *"tell them and assure them that I am able to do everything and dispose of the place because I am considered as the Chief, and nothing is done without my advice. . . ."* Pierre was thus in a position to dispose of Galveston as he desired.[45] It was no wonder that Jean became impatient for a decision from the "friends" regarding their intentions.

In this critical situation Fatio received a discouraging letter from the captain general, who did not favor the plan against Aury. Fatio replied that he was being discreet in his commitments while maintaining the expectations of the brothers Laffite.[46] The time was in-

[40] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, July 11, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[41] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, June 7, 1817, *ibid.*

[42] [Pierre Laffite to Jean Laffite], Galveston, July 23, 1817, encl. no. 5 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 29, 1817, *ibid.*

[43] Chew to Crawford, [New Orleans], October 17, 1817, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations;* IV, 136. Aury cruised in the Gulf for a while and then appeared at Amelia Island. T. Frederick Davis, "McGregor's Invasion of Florida, 1817," in *Quarterly of the Florida Historical Society,* VII (1928), 27–30.

[44] Fatio, Sedella, Ariza, the Rodóns, and Picornell.

[45] [Pierre Laffite to Jean Laffite], Galveston, July 23, 1817, encl. no. 5 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 29, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[46] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 29, 1817, *ibid.*

deed scarcely favorable for a friendly consideration of Lafon's plan, but Fatio submitted the "Miras Generales" to the captain general.[47] He observed that Lafon's plan and the maritime project of the Laffites against the corsairs could be combined to deliver a mortal blow to the plotters who threatened the king's dominions. Lafon, encouraged by the retainer of $700, had already succeeded in persuading Humbert to go to Natchez.[48]

Fatio's request for vessels to co-operate with the Laffites had been taken to Pensacola and delivered to the commander of the fleet who referred it to Havana. The consul was notified of this action; but the brothers Laffite were impatient, and some reason must be advanced for the delay. The "friends" agreed that they must not be abandoned. Jean was, therefore, informed that the advanced season and "other unforeseen occurrences had interfered" with the plans, and that the captain general desired more information on the subject. This explanation for sending a vessel to Havana apparently was accepted:

> No. 13 two [Jean Laffite] appeared pleased and well satisfied . . . but observed at the same time that it was necessary to aid No. 13 one [Pierre Laffite], and that he had counted on the Spanish Government to supply the means and supplies for the group at Galveston. . . . We saw ourselves in this dilemma: either to abandon the plan entirely, which would have resulted in a serious risk and danger to us, or to temporize with him, agreeing in part to his wishes; we had frequent meetings, and the decision was that No. 13 one would be given a supply of the articles indispensable for the purpose of maintaining himself in possession of the Port of G[alveston] pending Your Excellency's decision. . . .[49]

Thus did Felipe Fatio announce positively his determination to go through with the plan of aiding the brothers Laffite to establish themselves at Galveston. It was one way to avoid the ire of the famous Baratarians, even though they did use Galveston as a base

[47] The plan had been submitted to the viceroy on September 15, at which time Fatio recommended Lafon and the Laffites as persons who might perform valuable services for Spain. Fatio to Apodaca, New Orleans, September 15, 1817, AGN ND, II, ff. 89–93.

[48] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 29, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[49] *Ibid.*

from which their own and other corsair vessels attacked shipping in the Gulf. The frequent meetings to which Fatio referred resulted in the payment of some $2,658 to Jean Laffite between August 21 and September 9. On May 22, prior to Pierre's departure for Galveston, the brothers received $4,000 from Fatio. In addition to this sum of $6,658, Jean obtained $7,323 from sixty-day notes, and $2,800 from a mortgage on his home in New Orleans. He used these funds to purchase supplies for the Galveston establishment, expecting to be repaid by the Spanish government; and the "friends" encouraged him to continue with his purchases.[50] Beverly Chew reported on August 30 that "Laffite is now purchasing a large quantity of provisions, and the first cargo will soon sail. . . ."[51] Laffite was indeed making extensive commitments, and on September 12 he presented the bill for $14,465, which included $7,500 for the two vessels carrying the supplies. Fatio refused to pay the bill without authorization from the captain general.[52]

Chew considered the Galveston establishment another nest of smugglers. The Baratarians, having been driven from their former place of refuge, had merely moved to Galveston to continue the same sort of business. The Laffites were recognized as being the leaders of the new settlement "and most actively engaged in the Galveston trade, and owners of several cruisers under the Mexican flag. Many of our citizens are equally guilty, and are universally known to be owners of the same kind of vessels." The New Orleans authorities refused to recognize the unauthorized establishment at Galveston, and made several detentions and arrests, much to the chagrin of important persons who were allied with the Laffites. An important trade in prize goods had developed:

> The prizes made by the privateers under the Mexican flag are to a very large amount of merchandise, such as jewelry, laces, silks, linens, britannias, mus-

[50] A statement of the account is encl. no. 6, *ibid.*

[51] Chew to Crawford, New Orleans, August 30, 1817, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 135.

[52] Encl. no. 6 in Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 29, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

lins, seersuckers, calicoes, &c.; all of which are repacked in small bales, of convenient size for transportation on mules, and the greatest part introduced clandestinely. Other articles, such as iron, nails, tallow, leather, glass ware, crockery, cordage, beef, &c., are brought in their prizes.[53]

The establishment was also used for smuggling slaves into the United States, the Laffites and other speculators participating in the trade.

Jean Laffite sailed for Galveston early in September "with the supplies and other articles on board the two vessels . . . to consolidate his force and maintain himself master of that place" which was at the captain general's disposal whenever he thought it convenient to take possession, although Jean "recommended that it be at the time mentioned in the combined plan proposed by them and B. L. [Lafon] since then they promise that the harvest will be complete. . . ." [54] Fatio had some misgivings as to the attitude of the Laffites because of their not having been reimbursed for the expenditures they had made. The "friends" and he were "convinced of the good faith of the Nos. 13, and of the value which they, as well as B. L., have for the complete extirpation of our enemies by sea and land." At the same time, Spain could not make a mistake by maintaining friendly relations with their spy-creditors:

> The influence and the power they have with those people [Spain's enemies] is great, and the knowledge they possess makes them capable of performing everything they have offered.
>
> But at the same time that I announce this to your Excellency, I must not conceal from you that as enemies they would be most dangerous, and perhaps the first victims of their anger, in case they should be abandoned, would be those who have been closely associated with them in this country. I shall not on this account fail in fulfilling my duty, since at all times and in the midst of the greatest dangers I shall know how to meet them like the faithful vassal that I am of the King Our Master.[55]

[53] Chew to Crawford, New Orleans, August 1, 1817, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 134–35.

[54] Fatio to Cienfuegos, New Orleans, September 29, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[55] *Ibid.*

Pierre Laffite returned to New Orleans with his itch and left Jean in charge at Galveston. Upon his arrival in the city, Pierre requested that Fatio pay the obligations undertaken for the Galveston enterprise. Fatio admitted that he did not know what to do; he found himself "between the sword and the wall. . . ." He was not able to meet Pierre's demands, and yet he did not wish to refuse since "it would be impolitic to abandon them in this moment of crisis." If the Laffites were favored at that time, Spain could depend on them in any emergency; but if they were abandoned, the Baratarians would never forgive the insult.[56] The expectation that the privateers, certain to be evicted from Amelia Island, would return to Galveston, once more made it possible to carry out the original plan, and Pierre was still available.[57]

If Fatio entertained hopes that the viceroy would supply funds to mollify his dangerous friends, he was soon disillusioned. Apodaca replied to Fatio's dispatch of September 15 in most discouraging terms. He promised to take Lafon's plan under consideration, but the treasury lacked funds sufficient to satisfy the requirements, nor would he ever adopt the proposal that money might be raised from duties on a licensed trade.[58] Fatio would have to find some other way to save himself from the anger of the brothers Laffite. Within a short time General Antoine, Baron Rigau arrived at Galveston with the first contingent of the Lallemand expedition, and the plan to capture Aury was directed against these new adventurers in Texas.

The web of intrigues woven in 1816 and 1817 was a complex fabric with various patterns loosely related. The nebulous scheme to cause servile insurrections in the Spanish West Indies resulted in sending the trusted and experienced Felipe Fatio to New Orleans. This official was primarily concerned with plans to suppress

[56] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, November 1, 1817, *ibid.*
[57] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, November 2, 1817, *ibid.*
[58] Apodaca to Fatio, Mexico, November 7, 1817, AGN ND, II, f. 97.

the corsairs, although his mission was made more difficult by the grandiose plot in which Gutiérrez, Humbert, and Aury were to be leaders in an attack against New Spain. The Spanish representatives apparently decided that Aury's corsair fleet constituted the principal danger. Fatio, therefore, combined with the brothers Laffite to devise a scheme intended to destroy the marauders of the Gulf. The consul, of course, did not intend to aid in establishing a piratical settlement. His mission to New Orleans and his instructions were interpreted as justifying his relations with the brothers Laffite. The net result, however, was that a Spanish official gave material assistance to those colorful adventurers in setting themselves up at Galveston in 1817. The Spanish empire had indeed fallen upon evil days. The glory of Charles I and Philip II was gone forever.

Chapter 9

The Plot of the French Exiles

The Society for the Vine and the Olive

Spanish concern over the machinations of the Bonaparte family did not cease with the success of the Peninsular War. Joseph Bonaparte was no longer the unwelcome king of Spain, no longer *el rey intruso;* but the Spaniards had good reason to fear that the brother of the Little Corporal would attempt to establish himself as ruler of an empire in the New World, an empire which would be carved out of the Spanish colonial possessions. These fears were increased by the appearance in the United States of many French officers who had fled from France after the Bourbon restoration. Several of Napoleon's prominent subordinates, such as Emmanuel, Marquis de Grouchy, Charles, Comte de Lefebvre-Desnouëttes, and the brothers Charles and Henri Lallemand, were among the exiles who began to appear in the United States singly and in small groups.[1] They had lived so long in the service of the fascinating Corsican that they were imbued with the restless dreams and fantastic ambitions of their fallen leader.

The French refugees found many sympathizers in the United States, especially in Philadelphia where the famous merchant

[1] Jesse S. Reeves, "The Napoleonic Exiles in America. A Study in American Diplomatic History, 1815–1819," in Johns Hopkins University *Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Series XXIII, Nos. 9–10 (1905), 539. Joseph Bonaparte arrived in New York on August 28, 1815, on the brig *Commerce*. *Ibid.* He was said to have brought with him treasures amounting to 45,000,000 francs. George Duruy (ed.), *Memoirs of Barras* (New York, 1895–1896), IV, 377. On September 16, 1815, Onís reported that Joseph had arrived in Philadelphia. Onís to Calleja, Philadelphia, September 16, 1815, AGN ND, III, f. 270.

prince Stephen Girard gave them moral encouragement and financial assistance. Girard aided and befriended Joseph Bonaparte, Marshal Grouchy, General Lefebvre-Desnouëttes, and many others. When Grouchy reached Baltimore with his two sons in January, 1816,[2] he communicated with Girard, who honored his drafts on a Paris banking house.[3] Lefebvre-Desnouëttes, who arrived in Baltimore in June, 1816, conferred with Girard about a scheme to plant a colony in Louisiana.[4] The Napoleonic group was joined by Bertrand, Comte de Clausel early in the same year, and a few months later by the future filibuster, General Charles François Antoine Lallemand. This famous general, who had tried to secure Napoleon's escape from St. Helena, after various adventures landed at Boston on a voyage from Smyrna,[5] probably in the summer of 1816.[6] Henri Lallemand, perhaps the equal of his older brother in military ability, escaped from France to London and finally made his way to the United States on April 24, 1817.[7] Prior to his arrival, plans were under way for two projects in which the exiles might be engaged. Adventurous spirits could participate in a plot against New Spain, and the more timid expatriates could live out their days in peaceful cultivation of the vine and the olive in their new country.

Most of the French emigrants were probably seriously interested in plans to rescue Napoleon and to make Joseph king of the Indies.

[2] Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 545; Philadelphia *Weekly Aurora*, February 6, 1816. A biographical sketch of Grouchy appeared in the issue of April 9.

[3] John Bach McMaster, *The Life and Times of Stephen Girard, Mariner and Merchant* (Philadelphia, 1918), II, 319–22. Grouchy used the aliases Charles Gauthier and Edmund Green.

[4] *Ibid.*, 324–25.

[5] *Niles' Weekly Register*, XII (May 3, 1817), 158.

[6] Charles Lallemand delivered a letter from Lefebvre-Desnouëttes to Stephen Girard, which was written in August, 1816. McMaster, *The Life and Times of Stephen Girard*, II, 324–25. Cf. Édith Philips, *Les Réfugiés Bonapartistes en Amérique (1815–1830)* (Paris, [1923]), 21.

[7] On the schooner *Triton* from Liverpool. New York *Advertiser*, April 30, 1817. Henri married Harriet Girard, niece of Stephen Girard, on October 28, 1817. *Niles' Weekly Register*, XIII (November 8, 1817), 166; Nolte, *The Memoirs of Vincent Nolte*, 145.

Many of them were involved in such schemes, but a much more prosaic enterprise claimed the attention of the majority. In the fall of 1816 the French Agricultural and Manufacturing Society was organized. The company was known by various names, including "the Society for the Cultivation of the Vine and Olive, the French Emigrant Association, and the Tombigbee Association." [8] The ostensible plan of the society was to settle a colony of French refugees on the banks of the Ohio or the Mississippi, for the purpose of planting the olive and the vine.[9] The closing months of 1816 were spent in prospecting for a site. This was the object of the trip which took Lefebvre-Desnouëttes through Lexington and St. Louis on his way to New Orleans, where he arrived on December 21, 1816.[10] Other prominent exiles, such as Grouchy, Clausel, and Lallemand were expected to appear at New Orleans.[11] General Charles Lallemand passed through Lexington early in November, 1816, on his way to St. Louis and New Orleans,[12] and must have arrived in Louisiana late in December or early in January. One can well imagine that these Napoleonic exiles were doing something more than merely seeking a place where they might pass the remainder of their lives in cultivating the vine and the olive. It is not likely that General Humbert, who was in New Orleans at that time, was left in ignorance of the plans being formed by the Lallemand group. Be that as it may, General Humbert was one of the French officers who sailed on the *Intrepide* to join Lallemand at Galveston a little more than a year later.

[8] Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 558.

[9] Among the shareholders were Grouchy and his sons, the brothers Lallemand, and other prominent refugees. Charles Lallemand was the first president. *Ibid.* An American, William Lee, directed the information office. Philadelphia *Weekly Aurora*, November 18, 1816.

[10] New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette*, December 4 and 23, 1816.

[11] Masot to the Captain General, Pensacola, January 11, 1817 (No. 31), AGI PC, leg. 1874. Masot's correspondent, who wrote from New Orleans, reported that Lefebvre-Desnouëttes arrived on December 18 or 20. *Ibid.*

[12] New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette*, December 4, 1816, from the Lexington *Kentucky Reporter*. Lefebvre-Desnouëttes was in St. Louis on October 25.

Sentiment in favor of the victims of the Bourbon restoration was partly responsible for a movement to obtain a large tract of land for them. The exertions of Colonel Nicholas Parmentier, secretary of the French company, resulted in the act of March 3, 1817, which granted four townships on the Tombigbee River in Alabama. The terms were liberal. Each settler could purchase 320 acres at $2 per acre, and have fourteen years in which to pay the $640. Final title would be given only when each settler fulfilled his contract.[13] This provision was expected to prevent speculation which would defeat the purpose of Congress in making the grant. The exiles were not welcomed cordially on all sides. An editorial in *Niles' Weekly Register* characterized the grant as one of "the *splendid fooleries* which have at times amused a portion of the American people, as well as their representatives in congress. . . ." The United States had enough troubles with its own citizens without encouraging a settlement of foreigners.[14]

A group of sixty French exiles left Philadelphia for the Tombigbee on August 27, 1817. The site selected was "a little below the confluence of the Black Warrior . . . and the Tombigbee," a place especially favorable because of the climate, fertility, and proximity to navigable rivers.[15] In April, 1818, the *McDonough* sailed from Philadelphia with another group of emigrants who "took with them an assortment of vines and olive plants. . . ." The vessel was driven ashore off Point Bowyer and the rescued emigrants enjoyed a public dinner at Mobile. A government barge took the colonists up the Tombigbee to Fort Stoddart. Two settlements, Demopolis and Aigleville, were begun but each proved to be outside of the designated territory. With the exception of Lefebvre-Desnouëttes, none of the settlers became well established. The Lallemands made no effort to improve their claims personally. At-

[13] *The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America* . . . (Boston, 1850), III, 374.

[14] XIV (August 8, 1818), 393.

[15] Extracts from the Philadelphia *L'Abeille Américaine*, in Fatio to the Captain General, October 8, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

tempts to cultivate the vine and the olive proved unsuccessful, and most of the colonists scattered after experiencing the hardships to be encountered by a pioneering community.[16]

The Napoleonic Plot Against New Spain

Spanish officials, especially the diplomatic and consular officers in the United States, would have been well pleased had all of the French exiles used their energies in a futile struggle with the Alabama wilderness. But some of those officers who carried Napoleon's eagles to triumph and to defeat could not be satisfied with a career of that kind. New Spain, almost defenseless and in turmoil, beckoned them on to new adventures and, perhaps, to riches. The first French exiles who arrived in the United States aroused the fears of the Spaniards. When Joseph Bonaparte made a trip to Washington, the event was duly reported by Onís to Viceroy Calleja. This intelligence reached Mexico at the time when the plotters in New Orleans were maturing their plans for a land and naval attack against New Spain. Calleja believed that the French exiles were connected with these schemes, and he urged the minister of war to send land and naval forces to Vera Cruz. No faith, he wrote, could be placed in the United States since that country was interested in the emancipation of New Spain and in extending its own form of government.[17]

Rumors of a plot to put Joseph on a Spanish-American throne

[16] Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 560–65. Other treatments of the Tombigbee enterprise are: Gaius Whitfield, Jr., "The French Grant in Alabama, A History of the Founding of Demopolis," in *Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society, 1899–1903*, IV (1904), 321–55; Anne Bozeman Lyon, "The Bonapartists in Louisiana," in *Gulf States Historical Magazine*, I (1903), 325–36; Albert James Pickett, *History of Alabama, and Incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi, from the Earliest Period* (Charleston, 1851), II, 366–99; Philips, *Les Réfugiés Bonapartistes en Amérique (1815–1830)*, 84–91. A contemporary French writer asserted that many of the French exiles went into debt so heavily before the grant was made that they found it necessary to sell their rights to American speculators. Louis François L'Héritier, *Le Champ-D'Asile, Tableau Topographique et Historique Du Texas . . .* (Paris, 1819), 15–17.

[17] Calleja to the Minister of War, Mexico, December 31, 1815, in [Palacio Fajardo], *Outline of the Revolution in Spanish America*, 336–37.

appeared in England as well as in the United States. One English newspaper asserted that the exiled generals had urged Joseph to co-operate with them "to establish a mighty empire on the shores of the Pacific." Only the refusal of the United States to participate in the scheme caused its failure.[18] It was not surprising, according to the *Quarterly Review* about a year later, that adventurers should be attracted to the cause of independence, but it was altogether ridiculous for Joseph to think of gaining a throne in the New World.[19] Ridiculous or not, the rumor persisted. In December, 1816, the Chevalier de Onís was warned again that the French refugees had offered the crown of Mexico to Joseph Bonaparte, and the crown of Peru to his brother Lucien. Toledo, who conveyed this information to Onís, had no faith in the French agents.[20] But it was known that Generals Lefebvre-Desnouëttes and Charles Lallemand had gone to New Orleans by way of Lexington and St. Louis, and the harried Spanish minister made great efforts to secure information. There was a traitor in the group around Joseph Bonaparte, and this person, apparently a Spaniard, revealed his information to Onís with the expectation of receiving a Spanish pardon. According to this informant, General Lallemand was continuing the plot developed by the New Orleans associates in 1816. At first Joseph had refused to countenance the scheme because it had little chance to succeed; but Napoleon ordered him to aid the project, and so he placed some of his funds at the disposal of the Lallemand group. Several officers had been sent to Texas to organize an army while recruits were awaited from New York, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, and various ports in Europe. The force would eventually include six or eight thousand men, sufficient to conquer Mexico and place Joseph on the throne, under the pretext that "he had not renounced his right to the Kingdom of the Indies." The main object, however, was to gain control of the

[18] *Niles' Weekly Register*, XI (September 21, 1816), 60. The comment "Manufactured" indicated the editor's opinion.

[19] (London), XVII (1817), 534–44.

[20] Onís to the Captain General, Philadelphia, December 26, 1816, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

mines, from which funds might be obtained for freeing Napoleon by bribery, force, or intrigue. The informant added that the plotters were waiting to see the outcome of the negotiation between Spain and the United States for the cession of Florida, and the course that various nations would follow as a result.[21]

Onís was not alone in believing that some fantastic enterprise was being directed toward the rescue of Napoleon. "An intelligent French gentleman" at Natchez assembled an interesting variety of gossip in a letter which he composed on September 3, 1817. Immensely rich persons who were interested in the Tombigbee colony were making arrangements for mechanics, ship builders, carpenters, and other tradesmen to build a fleet somewhere on the seacoast. This fleet would be manned by Yankee tars, and with the co-operation of forces from France and Italy it would sail to rescue Napoleon. The correspondent added that South American agents had offered to recognize Joseph as king of Spain, and that a revolution would occur in Spain for the purpose of placing him on the throne.[22] The wealthy individuals referred to may well have been Stephen Girard and Joseph Bonaparte. Girard, of course, was an intimate of the French officers and aided them financially. It was rumored in New Orleans that he had given $50,000 to the expedition, and that Joseph and "other distinguished Frenchmen have also contributed very considerable sums." [23]

These rumors, various as they were, may be considered typical of the reports that circulated in the United States for more than a decade. No project, however unreasonable or fantastic, failed to excite the imagination of adventurers and the fears of Spanish officials. The fact that several of the almost quixotic schemes actually materialized was sufficient justification for constant suspicion and vigilance.

[21] Onís to Cienfuegos, Washington, May 12, 1817, copy in Cienfuegos to Apodaca, Havana, June 18, 1818, AGN ND, II, f. 323.

[22] New York *Evening Post*, February 25, 1818.

[23] Extract from the New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette*, April 2 [March 31?], 1818, encl. in José Masot to Apodaca, Pensacola, April 22, 1818, AGN ND, II, f. 506. The writer is inclined to doubt the veracity of these reports.

The existence of a Napoleonic conspiracy seemed to be determined beyond a doubt when the Baron Hyde de Neuville in August, 1817, obtained possession of some letters addressed by Joseph Lakanal to the Count de Survilliers, as Joseph Bonaparte was known in the United States.[24] The plans revealed by those papers were so extraordinary that the French minister at first considered them as deliberate attempts at deception or as the dreams of a fool.[25] An organization called the Napoleonean Confederation was attempting to build up an army to invade New Spain and place Joseph on the throne as king of Spain and the Indies. Frenchmen who had found a refuge in the United States were at the bottom of this plan.[26] Lakanal's "Report" to Joseph Bonaparte revealed that plans were under way to send 150 commissioners to the west to obtain men and supplies. The nucleus of the invading force would consist of 900 men, a quota of five for each commissioner. These men would be expected to contribute something to the expenses, which would total about 150,000 francs, of which Joseph was asked to give 65,000 francs.[27] Hyde de Neuville informed Onís of his discovery of Lakanal's schemes and the Spanish minister demanded that the United States require the exiles to be on their good behavior.[28] Onís did not need to rely on his French colleague for information regarding the Napoleonic exiles. The reconciled Toledo, who had sounded the warning in December, 1816, gave additional evidence of the plans against Mexico. He reported that a colony for political exiles would be founded by Joseph and other Frenchmen somewhere in Louisiana. All of the followers of Napoleon, as well as colonial insurgents, would be in this colony, the real

[24] Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 570–71. Lakanal had settled in Kentucky, ostensibly to pursue scientific studies. Neuville to Rush, Philadelphia, August 30, 1817, Notes from the French Legation, IV. Jean Guillaume, Baron Hyde de Neuville, was French minister from January 14, 1816, to November 13, 1822.

[25] Neuville to Rush, Washington, September 7, 1817, *ibid.*

[26] Neuville to Rush, Philadelphia, September 12, 1817, *ibid.*

[27] Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 577–82.

[28] Onís to Rush, Philadelphia, September 16, 1817, Spanish Notes, IV; Onís to Adams, September 6, 1817, cited by Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 590.

purpose of which was "to make our Americas the theater of their rapine and of the new adventures of their iniquitous ambition." [29]

With protests and information from the French and Spanish ministers before him, President Monroe asked William Lee, who had been associated with the exiles, to investigate the plot. Lee's discoveries verified Neuville's charges. When Lallemand was in New Orleans in 1817, Lee reported, he sent a French officer to Mexico to make inquiries. Two rich Mexicans were supposed to have offered large sums of money and ten thousand undisciplined troops to the French officers. A rendezvous would be established on the Red River where fifty officers and four hundred men would prepare to invade Mexico. As the Lallemands had already engaged about eighty officers and a thousand men, the advance force should be easy to assemble. Funds were to be obtained by selling shares of the Tombigbee grant to Philadelphia merchants, but the hostility of most of the French officers to the whole conspiracy interfered with this arrangement. Lee denounced the plot to the elder Lallemand and elicited a promise to postpone its execution or to abandon it entirely if the administration disapproved.[30] The Secretary of State certainly disapproved of such an enterprise and believed that the United States should take measures to prevent its execution.[31]

The inquiries made by Lee apparently convinced Lallemand that he should reassure American officials. The French exiles, he wrote to Lee, were aware of their deep obligation to the United States and would not violate its hospitality. They had no intention of

[29] "Ideas of José Álvarez de Toledo," Papeles de Estado, América en General (Archivo General de Indias, Seville), leg. 3.

[30] Lee to the Secretary of State, September 27, 1817 (No. 33), General Correspondence, John Quincy Adams, 1817–18 (Massachusetts Historical Society); Lee to Monroe, September 27, 1817, cited by Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 585–87. Apparently the officers interested in the expedition did sell their Tombigbee shares. Biddle informed Monroe that these sales were the source of their funds. Nicholas Biddle to Monroe, Philadelphia, February 25, 1818, Monroe Papers, XVII, 2126.

[31] John Quincy Adams to Monroe, Washington, September 29, 1817, Monroe Letters, 1817.

renouncing the property which Congress had given to them.[32] General Lallemand also desired to convince Adams of his good faith; accordingly, early in November, Lee asked permission to introduce the Frenchman. Adams declined the honor, but Lallemand came to his office the next day, introduced himself, and obtained an appointment.[33] At the interview on November 9, Lallemand denied that he ever "contemplated engaging in any project contrary to the laws of the United States." He had refused to join Gregor MacGregor at Amelia Island,[34] and would take no part "in some other projects of a similar nature. . . ." If he had aroused suspicion he offered to leave the country. Adams assured him that he was not "an object of uneasiness to this Government"; but his name was connected with various rumors to put Joseph on a Mexican throne, and to conduct an expedition to Mexico in violation of American laws. Lallemand denied any connection with Lakanal, and assured Adams that Joseph had refused to receive letters from that schemer.[35] These explanations did not satisfy President Monroe, and Nicholas Biddle was asked to watch the exile's movements in Philadelphia.[36] Although his information about Lallemand was far from complete, Adams assured Hyde de Neuville that "no such levies of men [as reported by the French minister on September 12] have been carried into effect, and that whatever absurd projects may have been in contemplation of one or more individuals, nothing is to be dreaded from them in regard to the Peace

[32] Charles Lallemand to Lee, Philadelphia, October 3, 1817 (No. 38), General Correspondence, John Quincy Adams, 1817–18.

[33] Charles Francis Adams (ed.), *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, . . .* (Philadelphia, 1874–1877), IV, 17. In this whole affair Adams seems to have been genuinely desirous of maintaining neutrality.

[34] MacGregor took possession of Amelia Island on June 29, 1817, and held it until September when Aury usurped control from Jared Irwin and Ruggles Hubbard. American forces occupied the island on December 23, 1817. Documents relating to this episode are in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, *passim*. See also Davis, "MacGregor's Invasion of Florida, 1817," in *loc. cit.*, 3–71, and Faye, "Commodore Aury," in *loc. cit.*, 639–48.

[35] Adams (ed.), *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, IV, 18–20.

[36] Biddle to Monroe, Philadelphia, February 7, 1818, Monroe Papers, XVII, 2122.

of the United States and the due observance of their Laws." [37]

Lee continued his investigation and found that the Generals Lallemand were "purchasing arms and ammunition in New York." Agents were at work in Louisiana and Mississippi recruiting men. Others had been sent to the West Indies for the same purpose. They were already assured of three hundred men from the United States, and Aury's force was said to be ready to join the expedition. The island of St. Thomas was to be the rendezvous of the forces which, numbering fifteen hundred men, would cross the Isthmus of Panama, sail to Guayaquil, and from there proceed to attack Peru.[38] This report presents a variation in the plans of the Lallemands and is explained by a letter from one J. B. Novion to Aury. According to Novion, the Lallemands and other Frenchmen were in New York during the last week of December, 1817, and left that city on December 31. The action of the American forces against Aury at Amelia Island had prevented Lallemand from sending the emissary he had previously promised. General Rigau had been sent to Mobile with a contingent of French officers, and Lallemand was going on to New Orleans with his party to increase the group of French recruits, already numbering seven hundred men, who had gathered there. He expected a force of about a thousand men with which he would go to Galveston and prepare an attack against Tampico. If this plan failed, it would be easy to divert the expedition to New Granada. Lallemand wanted Aury to "join him with the greatest number of people" possible, and at least to add the *Calypso* to the expedition if other ships could not be

[37] Adams to Hyde de Neuville, Department of State, December 5, 1817, Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 261.

[38] Lee to Adams, Washington, January 20, 1818 (No. 125), General Correspondence, John Quincy Adams, 1817–18; Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 589–90. After being introduced by Poinsett, José Miguel Carrera had numerous interviews with Marshal Grouchy and other Napoleonic exiles in August, 1816. They considered the possibility "of organizing an expedition that might liberate Chile and which they called *the little expedition.*" William Miller Collier and Guillermo F. Cruz, *La Primera Misión de los Estados Unidos de América en Chile* (Santiago de Chile, 1926), 218. These discussions may have given rise to the rumor regarding Peru.

gathered. Aury would be "the admiral of Mexico and would have absolute command of everything relating to the navy." The forces would gather at a port convenient for Aury.[39] The action of the United States in expelling Aury from Amelia Island prevented any possible co-operation of that adventurer with the Lallemand expedition.

Spanish Efforts to Delay the Expedition

While Lee was conducting his investigations of the Napoleonic plot, Onís was attempting to disrupt the organization. He informed Felipe Fatio of the danger to New Spain, and Fatio relayed the information to the captain general. The governor of Pensacola was warned to be on his guard and to discover all he could about the conspiracy.[40] Onís sent copies of Lakanal's papers to the viceroy, with information that Joseph had not fallen into the snare and that the United States had taken care of the French exiles by granting them land on the Tombigbee.[41] Onís did not confine his activities to warnings and protests, but sought to break up the plot at its source. He pointed out to the French officers that the project was "unworthy of their honor, and of the glory they had won. . . ." He also held out the hope that the Spanish king "would grant them an establishment in the Province of Texas, and even receive them in his service if they would offer to live tranquilly as good vassals." This proposition had the desired effect, and Lallemand attempted to make satisfactory arrangements with Onís. The general finally became impatient, and on December 27, 1817, he sent a messenger to the Spanish minister to say that his men were restless and because of their poverty and increasing numbers some action must be taken soon. Lallemand intended to establish himself in Texas, and if the king desired to receive the group into the royal service,

[39] Novion to [Aury], New York, January 2, 1818, encl. in Cienfuegos to Apodaca, Havana, September 9, 1818, AGN ND, II, f. 337.

[40] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, October 8, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[41] Onís to the Viceroy, Washington, December 28, 1817, encl. in Apodaca to the Minister of State, Mexico, March 31, 1818, AGI PE AM, leg. 13.

the general "would respond to His Majesty from the Province of Texas. . . ." If no reply came in six or eight weeks, Lallemand would go to Mexico to see the viceroy. Confronted with this ultimatum, Onís gave Lallemand a letter of introduction "with the condition that he make his voyage by sea, and not by the interior." The viceroy could admit him or not, and Fatio would issue the passport.[42]

Apodaca would have been justified in using strong language in his reply to Onís; but the viceroy contented himself with stating categorically that he could not permit Lallemand's entrance into any part of New Spain. Such a person would have a disquieting effect on the people, and Lallemand's proposal to establish himself in Texas was simply a scheme to facilitate the invasion of Mexico.[43] The viceroy gave orders to the commanders of Vera Cruz and Tampico that if Lallemand appeared with the letter and passport, the documents should be seized and sent to Mexico and their bearer should not be allowed to disembark.[44] The governor of Texas was ordered, on April 7, to seize the papers if they were presented to him, and on the following day similar instructions were issued to the commanding general of the Western Interior Provinces.[45]

Apparently tired of the delay, Lallemand gave orders for General Rigau to sail in the *Huntress*. The vessel left Philadelphia December 17, 1817,[46] ten days before Lallemand sent his messenger to Onís. This vessel was the one which Biddle mentioned as having left Philadelphia with about 150 men shortly before the brothers Lallemand sailed for New Orleans.[47] Biddle stated, in his

[42] *Ibid.*; L'Heritier, *Le Champ-D'Asile*, 18–19.

[43] Apodaca to Onís, Mexico, March 31, 1818, encl. in Apodaca to the Minister of State, Mexico, March 31, 1818, AGI PE AM, leg. 13.

[44] Apodaca to the Military Commandant of Tampico and the Acting Governor of Vera Cruz, Mexico, April 8, 1818, encl., *ibid.*

[45] Encls. in Apodaca to the Minister of State, Mexico, March 31, 1818, *ibid.*

[46] Hartmann et Millard, *Le Texas, ou Notice Historique sur le Champ D'Asile* . . . (Paris, 1819), 22 *et seq.* Cf. Philips, *Les Réfugiés Bonapartistes en Amérique (1815–1830)*, 116.

[47] Nicholas Biddle to Monroe, Philadelphia, February 25, 1818, Monroe Papers, XVII, 2126.

report to Monroe, that other vessels were expected to unite with them, "probably in the Gulf of Mexico." Money for the expedition had been raised by selling the Tombigbee lands. Biddle was positive that the Lallemand group was "not going to cultivate vines, &, it is equally certain that they are destined against some of the possessions of Spain in South America." Lallemand's relations with Onís were either common knowledge, or Biddle had some reason to suspect the relationship, since he stated that the Spanish minister could have bought the expedition for $12,000 "to repay the expences of it incurred before sailing. He would not however, bid so high. Instead of buying off the party, he has bought only the secret of their destination." [48] The Lallemands might yet be induced to sell their services to Onís for the royalist cause, and they had no designs on American possessions.[49]

The departure of the *Huntress* under Rigau's command, and the subsequent departure of the brothers Lallemand for New Orleans, definitely marked the beginning of the expedition which was to establish Le Champ d'Asile on the Trinity. But the Spaniards had not exhausted their resources in the attempt to forestall this new violation of their territory. Pierre and Jean Laffite were yet to play their part in New Orleans and at Galveston. The governor of Texas and General Arredondo were to demonstrate that they still possessed the means of defending their provinces against foreign invaders.

An Abortive Counterplot

Any preparations in New Orleans in behalf of the brothers Lallemand must have been known to Pierre Laffite when he returned from Galveston in October, 1817. Here was another opportunity for the former Baratarians to serve the king of Spain, earn a pardon, and perhaps recover some of the thousands of dollars they had spent in that unworthy sovereign's behalf. Felipe Fatio reported

[48] Biddle to Monroe, Philadelphia, February 25, 1818, *ibid.*
[49] Biddle to Monroe, Philadelphia, March 5, 1818, *ibid.*, 2130.

that Pierre offered his services for any mission upon which he might be sent,[50] and this offer was satisfactory evidence that the brothers Laffite still had hopes of making their peace with Spain. Pierre began at once to gather information about the plans of the Napoleonic officers. On November 3 and again two days later Fatio sent reports to the captain general containing accounts of the Lallemand preparations and plans to discourage the expedition. Although no answer to these dispatches was received as late as December 30, Pierre was prevailed upon to continue his efforts.[51] Pierre's plan involved the capture of a group of French officers who would proceed to Galveston to join the early arrivals. After the capture of this group of officers by a royal vessel, Galveston could be taken and the French expedition would be over.

Fatio's attempts to interest the captain general were not fruitless, and on January 3, 1818, Guillermo de Aubarede, commanding the brig *Almirante,* anchored off Pensacola. He bore dispatches from the captain general for Fatio and Sedella; but spies were present in Pensacola as elsewhere and Aubarede must have some excuse for sending a messenger to New Orleans. He had captured a privateersman on his way to Pensacola,[52] and, pretending to be short of supplies, he sent one of his men, Antonio Molina, to New Orleans to procure them.[53] Molina bore dispatches in which Aubarede announced that he was waiting for instructions in order to carry out his part of the plan that Pierre Laffite had suggested. The messenger arrived in New Orleans on January 19, in time to revive the hopes of the "friends" and to inspire Pierre to new efforts. Fatio conferred with Sedella, Molina, and Pierre Laffite to determine the best procedure. A new aspect had been placed on the

[50] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, November 1, 1817, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[51] Fatio to Guillermo de Aubarede, New Orleans, January 31, 1817, encl. no. 2 in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, *ibid.*

[52] Aubarede to Fatio, Pensacola, January 3, 1818, encl. no. 1 in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, *ibid.;* Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, *ibid.*

[53] Aubarede to Fatio, Pensacola, January 3, 1818, encl. no. 1 in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, *ibid.*

situation because of President Monroe's determination to send a naval force against the Galveston establishment.[54] Monroe announced in his message to Congress on December 2, 1817, that orders had been issued for the suppression of the establishments at Amelia Island and Galveston.[55] Fatio saw in this announcement a pretext to acquire possession of those points for the United States.[56] Onís likewise was convinced that the United States intended to assume control over Spanish territory. The Tombigbee grant was considered as an excuse for gathering forces for an attack on Florida, and the Lallemand expedition, Onís believed, would begin by an invasion of that province. Monroe's message was interpreted as being an announcement of Anglo-American aggression in co-operation with the French exiles.[57] When news of the American intention to drive the privateers and smugglers from Galveston reached New Orleans, "some of the subjects [French officers and others] who were to embark in the brigantine [*Intrepide*] began to have misgivings about the project of transferring themselves to Galveston," but Pierre quieted their fears by announcing his intention of going to that place to aid in its defense.[58]

The first contingent of the Lallemand expedition, commanded by Rigàu, arrived at Galveston on January 14, 1818, with muskets, powder, lead, iron, and supplies for three months. They let it be known that a large reinforcement would come from the United States to aid in the attack against Texas.[59] With so many formidable guests at the island, Jean could do nothing but welcome them to the corsair headquarters and make them as comfortable as pos-

[54] Fatio to Aubarede, New Orleans, January 31, 1818, encl. no. 2 in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, *ibid.*

[55] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 130.

[56] Fatio to Aubarede, New Orleans, January 31, 1818, encl. no. 2 in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[57] Onís to Cienfuegos, [Washington], December 6, 1817, copy in Cienfuegos to the Viceroy, Havana, January 3, 1818, AGN ND, II, f. 293.

[58] Fatio to Aubarede, New Orleans, January 31, 1818, encl. no. 2 in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[59] Encl. in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, March 11, 1818, *ibid.*

sible,[60] at least until Pierre's arrangements in New Orleans were perfected. The brothers Lallemand, who left Philadelphia about two weeks after the *Huntress* sailed with Rigau and his men, arrived in New Orleans on February 2, 1818. Pierre was soon in communication with them and reported to Fatio that their purpose was to capture Texas and establish a new France; then they would conquer Mexico. Six thousand men were supposed to be engaged in the enterprise, six hundred of whom were already in New Orleans; the Rigau group was merely the vanguard. Charles Lallemand made arrangements with Pierre to use the *Intrepide* for carrying supplies and men to Galveston. After this arrangement he left "to reconnoiter near Atacapas and Opelusas [*sic*], to establish, it is said, his military posts" while Henri remained "to direct the plan and send him the people who are to arrive."[61]

Pierre's plans were progressing perfectly. The original project that had been proposed as a means of capturing Aury in 1817 seemed about to succeed against the Lallemand project. The capture of the privateer vessel by Aubarede gave him a companion ship for the *Almirante* that would be easily recognized as a privateer. Pierre began at once to prepare his brig, the *Intrepide,* for the voyage to Galveston, and Aubarede was given sufficient time to place his man-of-war in position to effect its capture. On board the *Intrepide,* flying the American flag, would be a large group of insurgents and French officers. A box, marked with the initials J. L., would be placed at the entrance to the cabin, with documents sufficient to warrant taking the ship and its cargo as prize. After capturing the *Intrepide,* Aubarede was to proceed to Galveston and follow Fatio's instructions:

> It has been agreed that after taking the brigantine you should man it and taking the schooner with you, proceed to the Port of Galvezton, where at first should be seen only the two prizes with the agreed flags, and that they should await the arrival of a boat that will go out to meet it, in which will be, among others, the brother [Jean] of No. 13 and the pilot of that Bar;

[60] Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.,* 603.

[61] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

these should be detained on board the brigantine which will meet the Almirante and transfer its prisoners.

You will attempt to examine separately and without arousing suspicion in the other prisoners, the brother of No. 13 who will make one of my countersigns, and in this case you may place entire faith and credit in what he tells you for himself as well as for his brother, and he will decide with you as to the best method of effecting an entrance and taking possession.

No. 13 [Pierre] intends to leave here for Galveston as soon as his brigantine is ready, in order to prepare and consult with his brother as to the best method of assuring the success of the expedition.[62]

The original plan to have Aubarede take possession of Galveston had to be modified because of the arrival of General Rigau. Fatio advised Aubarede to be satisfied with capturing the *Intrepide* and taking it to Havana.[63] Detailed plans were given for intercepting the prospective prize,[64] and, although Aubarede was instructed to sail February 10 on the adventurous errand,[65] the *Intrepide* arrived at Galveston without experiencing the arranged encounter. Perhaps the plans went astray because Beverly Chew would not allow Laffite's vessel to sail until the arms and powder which it carried were disembarked. The brig finally cleared on February 19, with General Humbert and other officers on board. Pierre sent his young son, Eugene, as a passenger, with the request that he be treated with consideration and returned to New Orleans, "but without causing suspicion of the true motive."[66]

While Pierre Laffite was arranging for the capture of the *Intrepide* at sea, he was conferring with the brothers Lallemand, who apparently placed complete confidence in him. One of the incriminating letters on the *Intrepide* was for Jean Laffite, instructing him to give General Lallemand every aid and "to be useful to him whenever possible."[67] Whether or not Pierre expected the letter

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] Fatio to Masot, New Orleans, February 12, 1818, *ibid.*

[64] Encl. No. 3 in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, *ibid.*

[65] Masot to Cienfuegos, Pensacola, February 9, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1877.

[66] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[67] [Pierre Laffite to Jean Laffite], New Orleans, February 17, 1818, encl. in Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, March 1, 1818, *ibid.*

to reach its destination, he was playing a dangerous game in as safe a manner as possible. If the *Intrepide* fell into Spanish hands, the letter would serve as incriminating evidence against the French; but if the plan went astray, Jean would follow his brother's request to aid the Lallemand expedition and so establish friendly relations with a group which could have destroyed his establishment with little difficulty. Fatio was fully convinced that the brothers Laffite were acting in good faith, and indeed there seems to be little reason to question their loyalty to their royal employer. Pierre recommended that some four or five hundred men should take possession of Galveston, "which is the key to the Province of Texas on the coastal side, before more people arrive." The approach of foreign vessels to the coasts should be prevented by Spanish men-of-war which could carry landing forces "ready to throw themselves upon any threatened point. . . ." These provisions seemed to Pierre the only method of preserving New Spain for its sovereign.[68] The recommendations were certainly sound. If they were not followed, the fault did not lie with Pierre Laffite.

The End of Fatio's Secret Commission

Whatever hopes Fatio may have had of continuing to co-operate with the brothers Laffite for the destruction of Le Champ d'Asile were shattered when he received the captain general's dispatch of January 19, 1818, terminating all expenditures on behalf of the secret commission. The intendant in Havana had ordered such expenditures to cease on October 1, 1817; but the captain general's communication of December 22, 1817, did not state that his commission was withdrawn, and Fatio continued to advance funds for the object of his mission.[69] The decision to sever relations with the brothers Laffite was probably not known to Fatio until June or July, 1818, when Secretary Luis Noeli arrived from the Wash-

[68] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, *ibid.*

[69] Fatio to Noeli, New Orleans, August 31, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1898. Noeli was secretary of the Spanish legation.

ington legation to conduct an investigation.[70] The consul refused to answer for the future conduct of the Numbers 13.[71]

Noeli was unable to discover any serious grounds for censuring Fatio in the conduct of his mission. Onís, with Noeli's report before him, believed that the consul had been over-zealous and disobedient.[72] The Quaker plot, which gave rise to the commission originally, was considered by Onís as a scheme engineered by Don Angel Benito de Ariza to advance his personal fortunes at Spanish expense. Ariza deceived the Laffites into thinking that they alone could disrupt the Machiavellian plan to cause a Negro insurrection in Cuba, and he terrorized Sedella by anonymous communications describing the threatened uprising. The captain general, confident of Sedella's trustworthiness, did not know that Ariza hoped to benefit by being employed by Fatio. Onís pointed out that in the conferences held by the "friends," no mention was made of the Quaker plot. Efforts in New Orleans had been directed toward capturing corsairs; and, in spite of repeated failures, the captain general approved the plan against the Lallemand expedition until lack of funds forced him to cancel Fatio's commission. These unproductive efforts had cost Spain $16,000 for Fatio's expenses, $7,000 due Rodón, and $18,000 due the brothers Laffite, "without any benefit having resulted to the royal service."[73] Onís admitted that the expenditures had been made in good faith, and that there was nothing in Pierre's conduct to indicate anything but loyalty to Spain![74] The Spanish minister was therefore disposed to regard with favor the plan which Pierre proposed to him in Washington in November, 1818.

Exiles from the restored Bourbon regime in France were received sympathetically in the United States and were given land grants in Alabama. Their efforts to cope with the southern wilder-

[70] Noeli to Fatio, New Orleans, July 3, 1818, *ibid.*

[71] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, September 28, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[72] Onís to José Pizarro, Washington, November 22, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] Onís to the Intendant, Washington, November 25, 1818, *ibid.*

ness failed while the colony was still young, but by that time some of the Frenchmen were looking longingly toward Texas. Many of the exiles were likewise involved in a plot to restore their fortunes by placing Joseph Bonaparte on the throne of New Spain. The ever-present hope of rescuing Napoleon from St. Helena played its part in their plans. The Texas enterprise promoted by the brothers Lallemand was well known to American, French, and Spanish officials; but no effective measures were taken to disrupt the project until the exiles were well on their way. Then the brothers Laffite and their Spanish friends in New Orleans began to arrange for the capture of the Lallemand partisans. Charles Lallemand played into their hands by engaging Pierre Laffite's brig to carry men and supplies to Galveston. Although the plot to capture the vessel failed, the brothers Laffite were apparently acting in good faith toward Spain.

Chapter 10

The French Exiles in Texas

Le Champ d'Asile

Galveston was a busy place in the early months of 1818. General Rigau arrived in January with the men on the *Huntress*. General Humbert, with more officers, men, and supplies followed in February on the *Intrepide*. The instructions and explanations which Pierre had written with the expectation that they would serve as incriminating documents when Aubarede captured the brig were thus placed in the hands of Jean Laffite. With such an array of Napoleonic officers, recruits from various nations, and large supplies of munitions of war, it is not strange that Jean gave his assistance to the expedition. General Charles Lallemand left New Orleans on February 19 to obtain supplies at Attakapas and Opelousas,[1] where he bought oxen and horses for the settlement.[2] Henri remained in New Orleans to send on supplies and recruits [3] with the expectation of joining the colony later.[4] Charles, accompanied by a group of French officers, arrived at Galveston early in March,[5] blissfully ignorant of the plot that his Baratarian agent had formed against his expedition.

[1] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1900; [Henri Lallemand to Stephen Girard, New Orleans, February 20, 1818], quoted by McMaster, *The Life and Times of Stephen Girard*, II, 338.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 19, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1900; Bancroft, *History of the North Mexican States and Texas*, II, 44.

[4] McMaster, *The Life and Times of Stephen Girard*, II, 338. Henri did not go to the Texas colony but returned to Philadelphia in May. *Ibid.*, 341.

[5] Hartmann, *Le Texas*, 27; Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, April 12, 1818. AGI PC, leg. 1900.

Pierre Laffite in New Orleans continued to act as Fatio's informant regarding the progress of the expedition. Through him the Spanish consul learned that many of Spain's enemies, among whom the French were prominent, were leaving New Orleans and other points of the United States to join the forces at Galveston. It was feared that from five to eight thousand men would be gathered by spring, and that the expedition would reach such alarming proportions that New Spain would be seriously threatened. Fatio's alarm, expressed in a dispatch to the captain general, was genuine:

> I foresee the most fatal consequences if the most vigorous measures are not adopted for destroying this project in its beginning.
>
> No. 13 [Pierre Laffite] is very exact in his information, and says that it is necessary for us to take possession of Galvezton, and to post some gunboats and a large force for its defense, besides maintaining some war vessels on that coast to intercept their convoys. . . .
>
> The American squadron not having arrived in these waters to dispossess the pirates of Galvezton, may also indicate some dangerous coincidence in favor of Lallemand that should give us great cause to suspect this Power.
>
> There is no time to lose. . . . The project of General Lallemand is extensive and threatens us with a torment whose fatal consequences will be very difficult to avoid if it is not attacked in the beginning.[6]

Fatio's subsequent dispatches indicate that Jean reported frequently to his brother, and that the latter promptly conveyed the information to the apprehensive consul. On March 28 Fatio wrote that "the number of adventurers is increasing rapidly in that port [Galveston], and this circumstance leaves me no doubt of their sinister intentions against the Kingdom of Mexico." Rigau was supposed to have five hundred men who had joined him from various points and were waiting for Charles Lallemand before taking up a position on the Brazos or the Trinity.[7]

Henri Lallemand in New Orleans made at least one effort to allay suspicion about the French expedition by publishing a statement in the *Louisiana Gazette*. He assured the public that the French colonists had no hostile intentions, were not connected with

[6] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, March 17, 1818, *ibid.*

[7] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, March 28, 1818, *ibid.*

any previous gathering in Texas, and would not engage in smuggling or privateering.[8] This communication may have been the basis for Fatio's report that the French officers were supposed to have left the United States because they had "not met with the hospitality that was due them in their misfortunes" and that "the establishment which they propose to make on the River Trinity is purely agricultural. . . ." [9] There is, however, a possibility that the scheme to rescue Napoleon had not been dropped.[10]

At Galveston preparations went forward to move up the Trinity to establish the colony, and Jean Laffite followed his brother's injunction to aid the Lallemand group in every way possible. On the afternoon of March 10, 1818, twenty-four small boats set out across the bay to begin the final stage of the journey to the selected site. The boats were scattered by a storm, four men were drowned, and after other vicissitudes the exiles gathered at a point near Atascosito to build their forts and organize a colony along military lines.[11] Among the members of the expedition, which numbered about 120 persons in all,[12] were "Spaniards, Mexicans, Americans, and Poles" together with a contingent of "freebooters from MacGregor's colony on Amelia Island and pirates who had served under Aury and Lafitte." [13] On May 11, 1818, Lallemand issued a proclamation setting forth the purposes of the establishment. The exiles, he proclaimed, had been driven by a series of misfortunes to find an asylum, and considered they had a right to establish themselves on the unoccupied land in Texas. Their purposes were peaceful but they would defend themselves in case of attack.[14] This proclamation agrees with Lallemand's declaration to Jean Laffite that his intentions were peaceful and that "he planned to form an

[8] *Niles' Weekly Register*, XIV (August 8, 1818), 393–94.

[9] Fatio to the Captain General, April 12, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1900.

[10] Cf. *Lamar Papers*, V, 47.

[11] Hartmann, *Le Texas*, 28–30; Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 604–607.

[12] Hartmann, *Le Texas*, 50, gives the number as 400.

[13] Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 604. For details regarding the building of the forts and the organization of the colony, see Hartmann, *Le Texas*, 57 *et seq.*

[14] Hartmann, *Le Texas*, 44–48; L'Heritier, *Le Champ-D'Asile*, 44–47; Bancroft, *History of the North Mexican States and Texas*, II, 45.

establishment at a place that would offer most security to the asylum of the unfortunate Frenchmen who accompanied him and to others whom he expected from different places in Europe and America. . . ." [15] According to Laffite, the French general suggested that Le Champ d'Asile would form a "barrier against the ambitious designs of the United States. . . ." [16]

There is some question as to the exact location of the forts built by the exiles, but they were probably located "at the Orcoquises bluffs about 18 miles above the mouth of the Trinity. . . ." [17] The main fortification was of considerable size and was supported by a smaller fort. Together, the two structures mounted eight cannon for protection against the Indians.[18] The military organization was established with Charles Lallemand as commander-in-chief and General Rigau as second in command. The colonists were divided into three companies of cohorts, each commanded by a colonel.[19] Severe military discipline prevailed, drills were held daily, and in the evenings the exiles regaled themselves with stories and dreams of Napoleonic glory.[20] If agrarian pursuits and military drill lost their attraction, the exiles could obtain food along the Trinity. Cattle and hogs were numerous; bears, deer, and buffaloes abounded, and the woods were "alive with turkeys—." [21] The reports that reached the United States from the colony led to the belief that the arrival of recruits would soon make it possible for the exiles to undertake the liberation of Mexico.[22]

[15] Nocli and Fatio to [the Captain General], New Orleans, June 27, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1877.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Graham to Adams, Bayou Rapides, September 9, 1818, Consular Letters, Galveston, 1817–1841, I; Walter Prichard (ed.), "George Graham's Mission to Galveston in 1818: . . . ," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XX (1937), 642.

[18] Testimony of Sarrassin, Défourni, and Holzer given at Béxar, November 24, 1818, encl. no. 10 in Venadito to the First Secretary of State, Mexico, January 31, 1819 (No. 16), AGI PE AM, leg. 14.

[19] Hartmann, *Le Texas*, 52–53.

[20] Reeves, "Napoleonic Exiles," in *loc. cit.*, 610.

[21] Joshua Child to John Quincy Adams, Pinckneyville, January 24, 1818, Miscellaneous Letters, January, 1818.

[22] *Niles' Weekly Register*, XV (September 28, 1818), 80.

Late in June, 1818, Jean Laffite, relieved temporarily of his motley group of guests, returned to New Orleans to report personally upon the situation at Galveston. He had nothing but praise for the industry of the French colonists who worked steadily without offering the "least complaint against the privations that they suffer" and who were inspired by the example and encouragement of their leaders. They had formed some sort of alliance with the Indians and from them were secured supplies for maintaining the colony. The Spanish agents were convinced that the brothers Laffite were acting in all sincerity and were truly desirous of co-operating in destroying the Lallemand colony; but Jean's statement that Lallemand had no understanding with the United States, because of a manifested dislike toward that country and its people, was not accepted as being true.[23] Jean not only reported concerning the progress of the Lallemand establishment, but also suggested a practical plan to destroy it. Forty or fifty men could be stationed at a discreet distance from the fortifications to cut off supplies from the Indians and their communication with the exiles. Two schooners and a brigantine, stationed near the mouth of the Trinity, could prevent corsairs from sending aid up the river. A force of three or four hundred men could foil an attempted flight by land.[24] This plan, which appealed to Noeli as being simple and easily executed, was strikingly similar to the procedure followed by Viceroy Apodaca, General Arredondo, and Governor Martínez in the efforts they had already initiated to expel the French intruders from Le Champ d'Asile. The United States was also planning to investigate the Lallemand enterprise.

George Graham's Galveston Mission

James Monroe could have written an extremely interesting account of his part in the plots to aid the Mexican Revolution. Had he

[23] Noeli and Fatio to [the Captain General], New Orleans, June 27, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1877.

[24] *Ibid.*

done so, the mission upon which George Graham was sent in the summer of 1818 would have formed an illuminating chapter in that story. One wonders if John Quincy Adams was aware of a scheme, which the President may have discussed with Graham, to take possession of Texas while he was negotiating with Onís for the treaty that was finally signed on February 22, 1819. If the Secretary of State was informed of proposals which Graham was to make to Jean Laffite in Galveston, apparently he has left no record that indicates possession of such information prior to Graham's departure.

Don Luis de Onís complained to Adams that American neutrality was being violated by those who were interested in the Lallemand expedition. The French adventurers were being assisted with men and supplies from Charleston, New Orleans, and Savannah. The minister particularly objected to the enlisting of men in the United States for the Galveston enterprise.[25] The United States was not especially interested in preventing violations of the neutrality laws, although Adams had no desire needlessly to antagonize Onís in the negotiations then pending. The Lallemand expedition did offer an opportunity to clarify the attitude of the State Department toward the occupation of any part of Texas by non-Spanish forces. Moreover, the Laffite establishment on Galveston Island was a notorious source of smuggled goods and smuggled slaves. The Laffites were a nuisance. They were constantly violating the laws of the United States, but were also fairly consistent in their respect for vessels flying the American flag. If they were smugglers, so were many of the substantial citizens of Louisiana. Galveston was not a part of the United States, and the extreme claims of Adams and other expansionists did not make it so; but public interest demanded the extinction of the vipers that found shelter on Snake Island.

The Lallemand expedition required different consideration. The

[25] Onís to Adams, [Washington], May 7, 1818, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 494.

French exiles had no feeling of loyalty to the United States, and should they succeed in establishing themselves firmly on the Trinity they might be bought off by Spain or they might throw their lot with the Mexican patriots. Either event would be unfavorable to the claims of the United States. From the frontier Joshua Child reported the rumors that Lallemand would be supported by forty French cruisers in the Gulf, and he feared that if a second Napoleon should revolutionize New Spain, the United States would have to dispute the title to Louisiana with him. From New Spain it would be easy for an army to march into the South and free the slaves. The time was ripe for the United States to "take possession of their own soil, and people it with a population that can defend it; thereby placing an imperviable barrier between slavery and the temptations of Mexico—." [26] Child confessed that he was not in the secrets of the expedition, but his fears probably reflected the attitude of many citizens in Louisiana.

The protest from Onís and information from Child probably brought the matter to a head. The Lallemand expedition was the chief subject of discussion at the cabinet meeting of May 13, 1818, at which time the proposal was made that "a person of confidence" might be sent to Galveston "to ascertain the object of the recent lodgment by the Frenchmen under Lallemand and to warn them that they are upon territory of the United States." [27] Adams and Monroe had been suspicious of the Lallemand enterprise, and had even suspected that Onís was engaged in some high intrigue. Nicholas Biddle was asked to keep an eye on Lallemand's visits in Philadelphia; and on February 7, 1818, he had reported that the Lallemands were not, apparently, in the service of the Spanish legation.[28] Graham's mission, in the light of this suspicion, and in view of the Spanish minister's protest on May 7, does not seem at

[26] J. Child to John Quincy Adams, Pinckneyville, March 28, 1818, Miscellaneous Letters, February–March, 1818.

[27] Adams (ed.), *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, IV, 91.

[28] Biddle to Monroe, Philadelphia, February 7, 1818, Monroe Papers, XVII, 2122.

all strange. The outcome of the cabinet discussion was the decision to send George Graham to Galveston.[29] He was instructed to

> express the surprise with which the President has seen possession thus taken without authority from the United States of a place within their territorial limits, and upon which no lawful settlement can be made without their sanction . . . [and] to ascertain the precise & real object of the expedition; the numbers of the persons already there; the sources from which they have derived the means of defraying the expenses of their undertaking; and those from whom they expect future aid & support. You will notice especially any thing which may tend decisively to ascertain whether any part of their funds are supplied by Joseph Bonaparte, or by Mr. Onis; or by both; whether they have any intercourse with the Viceroy of Mexico.[30]

These written instructions did not include the proposals which Jean Laffite reported to his brother Pierre and which the latter related to the Spanish authorities.

Graham proceeded to Galveston by way of the "extinguished town of Nacogdoches," and there on August 8 he engaged the services of one José Dost [John Durst?] to guide him to Galveston. Dost, or Durst, reported that Graham was going to dislodge the pirates[31]—someone must have been doing some undiplomatic talking. When he arrived at the corsairs' rendezvous on August 24, Graham called at once on General Lallemand.[32] The Frenchman was considerably embarrassed and ill at ease. He assured Graham that his intentions had been peaceful. He acted under no national authority whatever, and wanted to establish a place of refuge for Frenchmen in Texas. Spain had nearly abandoned the province and he was not aware "that the United States had determined to

[29] Graham had been president of the Washington branch of the Bank of the United States, having been appointed on August 5, 1817. New York *Advertiser*, August 12, 1817.

[30] Adams to Graham, Department of State, June 2, 1818, Domestic Letters, XVII, 172–73.

[31] Encl. no. 19 in Ignacio Peres [Pérez] to Arredondo, Campo de Trinidad, December 3, 1819, Historia (Archivo General y Público de la Nación, Mexico), tomo 162. Hereafter cited as AGN Historia. John Durst was the natural son of Samuel Davenport.

[32] The French exiles abandoned Le Champ d'Asile on or about July 23 and reached the bay on July 24.

assert their claim to the province. . . ." Although his plans were peaceful, he had decided that very day to publish a declaration of war against Spain because he had been compelled to retire to Galveston. However, he would refrain from these bellicose plans in deference to the wishes of the United States. After he warmed to the subject, Lallemand confessed that he had planned to use the Trinity establishment as a focus for attacks against San Antonio. The French exiles had no connection with the Laffite establishment, and Graham accepted Lallemand's word for it.[33] He promised that in event of occupation by the United States, the members of the expedition and their property would be respected.[34]

Having settled affairs with Lallemand, Graham then decided that the spirit of his instructions justified an investigation into Laffite's position. The island was not fortified, although Lallemand had been finishing an earthen work begun by Mina. North of this crude and unfinished fortification "a large and strongly built Brig of 350 or 400 tons burthen" lay in the bay. The brig, its mast gone, was firmly grounded and served "as a dwelling, storehouse and arsenal" for Jean Laffite.[35] Graham wrote to Laffite to demand, in the name of the United States, by what right he had assumed possession of the Port of Galveston. The United States claimed "the country between the Sabine & the Rio Bravo de Norte [Río Grande], [and] will suffer no establishment of any kind, and particularly one of so questionable a character as that now existing at this place, to be within these limits." [36] Laffite replied rather curtly, asking under what authority Graham was acting.[37] The latter asked the master of Galveston to visit him, at which time he would

[33] Graham to Adams, Baiou Rapide [Bayou Rapides], September 9, 1818, Consular Letters, Galveston, 1817–1841, I; Graham to Lallemand, Galveston, August 26, 1818, *ibid.*; Lallemand to Graham, Galveston, August 26, 1818, *ibid.*

[34] Graham to Ripley, Galveston, August 28, 1818, *ibid.*

[35] Graham to Adams, Bayou Rapides, September 9, 1818, *ibid.*

[36] Graham to Laffite, Galveston, August 26, 1818, *ibid.*; encl. in Onís to the Captain General, Washington, November 25, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1898; Onís to Apodaca, Washington, November 27, 1818, AGN ND, I, f. 210.

[37] Laffite to Graham, Galveston, August 26, 1818, Consular Letters, Galveston, 1817–1841, I.

be enlightened. The resulting conversation on August 27 revealed that Graham had no desire to antagonize Jean Laffite. He assured the corsair that the United States had not forgotten his services during the British attack on New Orleans, but a smugglers' nest on the coast of Texas would not be tolerated.[38]

Jean Laffite knew that the United States would not for long endure his establishment, and so he took the opportunity to record his case officially. But in doing this he neglected to include an account of the part played by Felipe Fatio in helping to set him up in business. He had occupied Galveston, he said, because Aury's instability of character had caused him to abandon the post, which was rapidly becoming important. Being then at Galveston, Laffite "conceived the project of preserving it and maintaining it" at his own expense. He could thus satisfy two passions that dominated him imperiously: "that of offering asylum to the armed vessels of the revolution and that of being able . . . to fly to the aid of the United States if circumstances should demand." The American flag had always been respected. Although unfavorable conditions had prevented his obtaining the legal authorization of the Mexican patriots, Laffite was not aware that "the American government intended to claim the entire coast from the Sabine to the Río Grande." In protesting his innocence, the ruler of Galveston bowed humbly before the United States. His conduct had been open, loyal, and irreproachable; his spirit was tranquil in the face of detractors who charged him with evil doings. Nevertheless, the will of the United States be done, and he agreed to abandon Galveston as soon as he could collect his forces.[39] Had Graham known the truth about Laffite's dealings with Felipe Fatio, he might not have been so conciliatory. Laffite was bluffing, but so was Graham. Adams was in favor of occupying Galveston, but no such orders had been given nor were they likely to issue. But Graham pretended that occupation was not far away, and gave Jean a guaranty for the

[38] Graham to Adams, Bayou Rapides, September 9, 1818, *ibid.*
[39] Laffite to Graham, Galveston, August 28, 1818, *ibid.*

protection of persons and property "in the event of the occupation of the place by the forces of the United State[s] before they should abandon it."[40] After this exchange of views, Jean Laffite, Charles Lallemand, and Graham had several conferences in which "everything seemed to be arranged. . . ."[41]

The arrangements were indeed interesting. Major Graham proposed that the Laffites, Aury, and the Lallemands unite their forces to hold Galveston against the Spaniards. Laffite agreed to the proposal in order to gain Graham's confidence, and then Monroe's messenger revealed the rest of his plan. The United States proposed to assist the forces at Galveston "in taking possession successively of all the points on the coast to the Río del Norte [Río Grande]" and would then go through the formality of attacking each establishment. The corsairs would surrender their strongholds for compensation from the United States.[42] Lallemand's men understood that he was going to organize an expedition on behalf of the United States, and that Graham offered to grant letters of marque to the corsairs.[43] There may have been some basis for the first rumor; but the second was without foundation, except that Graham probably suggested that the corsairs should have commissions from a government less nebulous than the patriot government of Mexico. Lallemand left Galveston on September 1 with Graham, "and wrote from Carcasiu [Calcasieu] *that we should be prepared to take an active part in the great events that were going to happen more quickly than he believed, etc.*"[44]

When George Graham called on Adams in Washington, he

[40] Encl. no. 9 in Graham to Adams, Bayou Rapides, September 9, 1818, *ibid.*

[41] [Fabias Forní (Défourni)] to the Viceroy, [Monterrey, December 24, 1818], encl. in Venadito to the Secretary of State, Mexico, January 31, 1819 (No. 16), AGI PE AM, leg. 14.

[42] Onís to the Captain General, Washington, November 25, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1898; Onís to Apodaca, Washington, November 27, 1818, AGN ND, I, f. 208. The Laffites were thereafter given the code number 19.

[43] Encl. in Viceroy to the Secretary of State, Mexico, January 31, 1819 (No. 16), AGI PE AM, leg. 14.

[44] *Ibid.*

aroused considerable apprehension in the Secretary of State. Adams recorded in his diary that Graham

had a sort of negotiations, it seems, with Lallemand and Laffite, from which it appears that Lallemand's case is desperate. Graham's transactions with Lafitte, as related by himself, did not exactly tally with my ideas of right, and they were altogether unauthorized. He says Lafitte told him that he had commissions for his privateers from the Mexican Congress, but they were like Aury's commissions and he (Graham) advised him to take a commission of Buenos Ayres and gave him a letter to De Forrest, at New York, to assist him in obtaining one, and that Lafitte took his advise [*sic*] and immediately dispatched a men [*sic*] to New York for that purpose. Now I should not be surprised if we should hear more of this hereafter, and not in a very pleasant manner. But it was all of Graham's own head and in my opinion not much to the credit of its wisdom. He is for taking immediate possession of Galveston, and so am I.[45]

Adams neglected to record any more of Graham's report, and perhaps the envoy did not reveal the full extent of the agreement with Jean Laffite and Charles Lallemand. There may be some question as to Graham's proposal that the privateers should occupy various places along the Texas coast and then surrender them to the United States; but there can be no doubt that he made the suggestion regarding the commissions from Buenos Aires.

Castañeda's Expedition to the Trinity

Within less than two months after Graham and Lallemand left Galveston, Jean Laffite received a visit from Spanish troops sent to dislodge the French exiles. Le Champ d'Asile had hardly been established when General Arredondo informed the viceroy of the invasion. In response to this warning, Apodaca ordered troops from other provinces to aid in the defense of Texas and asked the naval commander at Havana to furnish four warships for an attack on Galveston.[46] Don Antonio Martínez, the governor of

[45] Adams (ed.), *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, IV, 175–76.

[46] Apodaca to the Minister of War, Mexico, May 27, 1818, AGI PE AM, leg. 13.

Texas, also informed the viceroy of the invasion and expressed a hope that he might be able to send a force to expel the French interlopers. Such a force, he complained, would have to traverse two hundred leagues of bad roads and cross seven swollen rivers.[47] The prospect of soldiers swimming and floundering in flood waters did not prevent Apodaca from ordering Martínez to attack the French colony, an order which the governor promised to obey as soon as reinforcements arrived.[48] Danger from Indian attacks, especially from the Comanches, worried Martínez so much that he posted an advance force of one hundred men on the San Marcos River, about twenty-five leagues from San Antonio, with the idea that they would also be a guard against a possible surprise from the French.[49] This maneuver caused the heroes of Waterloo to retreat to Galveston, for Jean Laffite had sent a messenger late in July to warn Lallemand that the Spaniards were coming. The exiles embarked at once for Galveston and arrived at the mouth of the Trinity on July 24.[50]

All danger from the French exiles on the Trinity passed away with their precipitate flight, but Governor Martínez decided to send a party to reconnoiter the mouth of the river.[51] Don Juan de Castañeda was given command of a force numbering 240 men who marched out of San Antonio on September 16,[52] fifteen days after Charles Lallemand left Galveston to return to New Orleans. Castañeda was ordered to destroy the settlement on the Trinity, make war on the Indians, destroy Nacogdoches, and disperse the Spanish and foreign merchants who were there. The viceroy dis-

[47] A[ntonio] M[artínez] to the Viceroy, Béxar, June 26, 1818 (No. 59), Nacogdoches Archives.

[48] [Martínez to Apodaca, Béxar], June 2 and July 7, 1818, *ibid.*

[49] [Martínez to the Viceroy], Béxar, June 26, 1818 (No. 59), *ibid.*

[50] Graham to Adams, Bayou Rapides, September 9, 1818, Consular Letters, Galveston, 1817–1841, I.

[51] Antonio Martínez to Arredondo, Béxar, September 7, 1818, encl. no. 6 in Apodaca to the Secretary of State, Mexico, October 31, 1818, AGI PE AM, leg. 13.

[52] Encl. no. 1 in Apodaca to the Secretary of State, Mexico, January 31, 1819, AGI PE AM, leg. 14.

approved of the order to destroy Nacogdoches as being too drastic and too antagonistic to the Anglo-Americans.[53]

The royalist forces were plagued with misfortunes from the inception of the expedition, and Castañeda made no effort to minimize the difficulties he encountered. The Guadalupe River was very high when the detachment reached it on September 23 and many of the supplies were so wet from the crossing that a day was spent in drying and resting. Five days later this dispirited little army crossed the Colorado, and here two soldiers fell in. Castañeda faithfully recorded that the unfortunate men got wet. The first three days of October were spent in crossing the Brazos, and the troops were in such a sorry plight on the fourth that it was impossible to say mass. The San Juanito River, also very high, was crossed on October 8, and on the following day camp was made at a place called Ranchería. Two days later a party was sent ahead to reconnoiter the Atascosito and Cayo Gallardo, and on the eleventh Castañeda marched his bedraggled army to the Trinity.[54] In order to reassure the Anglo-Americans, Castañeda sent a dispatch to the United States with the explanation that his expedition was intended to clear Texas of factious persons.[55]

With nothing to fear from the empty forts on the Trinity, Castañeda sent Don José Sandoval to Galveston with a dispatch. Upon displaying a white flag, the emissaries were received by the "officials" of the port. The French officers assured Sandoval that everyone was disgusted and discontented, many had already left for New Orleans and others wanted to leave. Jean Laffite was still living on his brig in the bay and there Sandoval met the famous Baratarian and General Rigau. The two masters of Galveston conferred in French, which the Spaniard did not understand. Sandoval was able to learn, however, that the disorganized crowd of 150 men

[53] Apodaca to the Secretary of State, Mexico, January 31, 1819, *ibid.*

[54] Encl. no. 1 in Apodaca to the Secretary of State, Mexico, January 31, 1819, *ibid.*

[55] Castañeda to the First Authority dependent upon the Congress of the United States, Camp Español en Punto de Busto, October 13, 1818, Miscellaneous Letters, August–October, 1818.

faced starvation.[56] They had very few guns and little powder; a shortage of supplies made their condition desperate. The crisis in their affairs was the result of a storm that flooded the island with three or four feet of water from September 13 to 15. Some of the French officers took advantage of Sandoval's presence to confer with him without Rigau's knowledge, and when the Spaniard left, a group of the officers accompanied him under a safe conduct.[57]

Castañeda's dispatch, borne by Sandoval, demanded the evacuation of Galveston. The exiles were reminded that their forces were inadequate and that no aid could be expected from New Spain. The unenviable fate of Mina and Gutiérrez was cited as proof of the futility of attempting to revolutionize New Spain. Spanish military and naval forces were converging on Galveston, according to Castañeda, but the occupants would be permitted to leave the island upon surrendering their arms and munitions.[58] This temperate demand was answered by Rigau with the protest that the French exiles had merely endeavored to establish an asylum for their unfortunate compatriots, and that their intentions were peaceful. Proof of this attitude could be seen in the withdrawal to Galveston at once when they learned that royal troops had begun their march to the Trinity; but since Galveston Island was so uninviting, they would remain only until Lallemand could supply the means of their departure, and then they would go to the lands they had acquired in the United States. In short, Rigau replied that his men would leave when they were ready and would take their arms with them.[59]

Castañeda was not satisfied with Rigau's reply, and informed the Frenchman that he would be given three days to evacuate Galveston, an order which included Jean Laffite. If no reply came

[56] Encl. no. 2 in Apodaca to the Secretary of State, Mexico, January 31, 1819 (No. 16), AGI PE AM, leg. 14.

[57] *ibid.*

[58] Juan de Castañeda to [the commander at Galveston], Campo Punto de Busto, October 13, 1818, encl. no. 5, *ibid.*

[59] Rigau to Castañeda, Galveston, October 17, 1818, encl. no. 6, *ibid.*

within that time, more severe measures would be taken.[60] This bit of bluff ended the communications between Castañeda and Rigau. The Spaniard knew that he had nothing to fear from the refugees, so he spent his time in sending out parties to investigate the situation in that part of Texas. During the last two weeks of October, a few Americans were captured and expelled from the province. Lallemand's fortifications on the Trinity were destroyed on October 30 and 31, and on the first of November the return trip was begun by way of La Bahía. The expedition arrived at Béxar on November 22,[61] accompanied by the officers who had communicated with Sandoval at Galveston.[62]

Castañeda had apparently accomplished one object of his mission, even though he did fail to attack the Indians.[63] Nevertheless, the faithful officer, after all of his worries, had labored more or less in vain since Graham had already persuaded the exiles to abandon Texas. Perhaps his insistence hastened their departure. The disappointed colonists at Galveston prepared to return to New Orleans shortly after receiving Castañeda's second demand that Galveston be evacuated. A group of forty or forty-five, including women and invalids, left the island with General Humbert on October 24[64] for an ignominious return to New Orleans. The readers of the *Kentucky Reporter* learned from a letter dated New Orleans, November 12, that

> The establishment at Galveztown has at length been broken up, and General Humbert with his suit has arrived in this city; they were found on board of a vessel which has arrived in the river as prize to the U. States ketch Surprise, lieut. M'Keever. We are ignorant of the real cause of this abdica-

[60] Castañeda to Rigau, Campo de la Vanguardia Español en Punto de Busto, October 19, 1818, encl. no. 7, *ibid.*

[61] Diary of Juan de Castañeda, Béxar, November 24, 1818, encl. no. 1, *ibid.*

[62] Declaration of Charetú [Sarrassin] and others, Béxar, November 24, 1818, encl. no. 10, *ibid.*

[63] Venadito believed that Castañeda was not equipped for a punitive expedition against the Indians. Venadito to the Secretary of State, Mexico, January 31, 1819 (No. 16), *ibid.*

[64] Memoir of Delfosse, New Orleans, May 8, 1819, encl. in Fatio to the Viceroy, New Orleans, May [8?], 1819, AGN ND, II, ff. 209–11.

tion of the chief, and the dispersion of the band. Some say that an agent of the American government ordered them away: others assert that the vicinity of the Spanish army from St-Antonio occasioned so much uneasiness to them, that they deemed it best not to remain.[65]

So ended the Napoleonic invasion of Texas. The far-flung plot to put Joseph Bonaparte on a throne in New Spain, to rescue Napoleon from St. Helena, to establish a refuge on the Trinity, or for whatever other purpose the brothers Lallemand and their associates may have had in mind, ended in a hasty flight caused by a rumor. Lallemand's expedition, in spite of all of these grand schemes, proved to be but a minor irritation to the officials of New Spain. The brothers Laffite, true to their Spanish masters, had done what they could to earn the pardon which proved to be so elusive.

Failure of Another Intrigue

Jean Laffite lost no time in advising his brother about the latest developments caused by Graham's visit. When that envoy left Galveston on September 1, Charles Lallemand and Luis Brion's one-time secretary, V. Garrot, were with him. Garrot was entrusted with the letter to De Forest which Graham had given to Jean Laffite. The envoy of the Lallemands and the Laffites was in Philadelphia in November and conferred with De Forest, the unrecognized consul general from Buenos Aires.[66] The results of the conference were revealed in a letter from Garrot to Pierre Laffite, then in Washington to confer with Onís. Pierre delivered the communication to the Spanish minister, together with Graham's letter to Jean at Galveston, and Onís forwarded copies to the captain

[65] Lexington, December 2, 1818.

[66] David C. De Forest was commissioned as consul general for the United Provinces of South America by Pueyrredón. He applied for recognition in May, 1818, but Adams refused to receive him. The request was renewed on December 9, 1818, and was again refused. Report of John Quincy Adams, Department of State, January 28, 1819, transmitted by James Monroe to the House of Representatives, January 30, 1819, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 413. Garrot was a former judge of admiralty at Galveston. Chew to Crawford, [New Orleans], August 30, 1817, *ibid.*, 135.

general in Havana. This letter from Garrot exposed the state of affairs at that stage and confirms the various reports which were made concerning Graham's mission. The conference between Garrot and De Forest occurred on November 16, at which time Graham's letter of introduction was presented. Graham asked that De Forest give Pierre Laffite "the flag with the dispatches from Buenos Aires, besides naming the primary authorities" who were to be in charge of the government established by the privateers in the Gulf of Mexico. De Forest promised to ask that the United States postpone for a year its seizure of Galveston, in order to permit the privateers to select the next place for their headquarters. Arrangements for arms and supplies were to be made with Mr. Thomas Tenante, a Baltimore merchant, whose co-operation was necessary for the success of the plan. After the conference with Tenante, De Forest would go on to Washington where he hoped to meet Pierre Laffite.[67]

When Pierre conferred with Onís, he gave every indication of his desire to continue his pursuit of the king's pardon. He offered to take to Galveston the supplies necessary for the fortifications; to evict the Americans in case they had captured Lallemand's forts; and to capture the corsairs if the plan proposed by Graham should fail. Onís refused to commit his government until he had communicated with the captain general.[68] In addition to these activities, Pierre offered to open communication with Spanish officials:

> One of the persons with whom Lafit proposes to open his correspondence directly is the Commandant General of the Eastern Internal Provinces, to whose district Texas belongs, in order to give him information as to the movements of the pirates under the pretext of selling him supplies, arms, and munitions, expenditures for which, as well as those which he may in-

[67] Garrot to [Pierre Laffite], Philadelphia, November 17, 1818, encl. no. 4 in Onís to the Captain General, Washington, November 25, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1898; Onís to Apodaca, Washington, November 27, 1818, AGN ND, I, ff. 211–12. For translations of various documents in this affair, see Harris Gaylord Warren (ed.), "Documents Relating to George Graham's Proposals to Jean Laffite for the Occupation of the Texas Coast," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXI (1938), 211–17.

[68] Onís to the Captain General, Washington, November 25, 1818, AGI PC, leg. 1898.

cur in the transmission of information, are to be paid by the Intendancy of Havana, and besides he asks that the King Our Master pardon him and grant him a compensation or honorable employment in order that he may live on that Peninsula which he says is his fatherland.[69]

While the viceroy and the captain general were considering the amazing propositions that were communicated to them from Washington, Pierre Laffite was completing arrangements with De Forest and at the same time planning with Onís. The minister was asked to suggest a person to be governor of the establishment. Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of Argentina, was supposed to be sending Don Manuel Moreno from Buenos Aires to represent that government, and Garrot would act as the judge of the prize court "to condemn all the prizes that the corsairs bring there. . . ." An agreement was even reached concerning the division of expected spoils:

Moreno and No. 19 [Pierre Laffite] will have a part of all the cargoes taken by them, all the payments incurred for anchorage, condemnation, and other [charges] which they will divide between them; one per cent will be given to Consul Forestt [De Forest], who will issue corsair commissions, and one per cent will be for the Minister of Buenos Ayres who has signed said commissions.[70]

Laffite would be the real chief at Galveston, not Manuel Moreno, and Onís was more than ever convinced that Pierre was acting in good faith. In view of the concluding moves then being made in the negotiation of the treaty of February 22, 1819, between Spain and the United States, it is interesting to note that Onís expected that the new attempts against Spain's sovereignty would be directed against Florida. Pierre Laffite concurred in this opinion, and advised that the establishment should therefore be made at Galveston rather than Tampa.[71]

Don Luis de Onís was a diplomat with the capacity for intrigue

[69] Venadito to the Secretary of State, Mexico, April [30?], 1819 (No. 19), AGI PE AM, leg. 14.

[70] Onís to the Intendant of Cuba [Alexandro Ramírez], Washington, January 8, 1819, *ibid.*

[71] *Ibid.*

which is popularly, and not without reason, associated with diplomacy. A diplomat may prefer to arrive at a given destination by following a circuitous route. There is a certain zest in the game and the capable Spanish minister was an expert player. Don Juan Ruíz de Apodaca, Conde del Venadito, was a man of action, a naval officer who would rather accomplish his purposes with a fleet of war vessels than by resorting to the devious labyrinth of plots and counterplots. Perhaps this difference between the man of action and the diplomat, as well as an undercurrent of jealousy, accounted for the disagreement between Onís and Apodaca as to the wisdom of co-operating with the brothers Laffite in their latest proposals. To Onís they seemed to offer a means of increasing the Spanish naval force without expense to the royal treasury, since the prizes taken to Havana would more than pay the expenses of the Galveston establishment.[72] But the Count of Venadito could see only injury to Spain in any further dealings with the brothers Laffite. In his report to Spain he wrote sarcastically of Jean's services in breaking up the Lallemand expedition:

> . . . it being certain that that pirate, at the expense of the robberies he has committed against ships of Spanish commerce, aided and sustained with supplies and other assistance the adventurers who, without his favor and aid, would surely have perished from hunger and misery in the deserts of Texas. The Lafite person is only concerned with his own affairs, and double-dealing with us and the adventurers, he has had several communications with His Majesty's consul in N. Orleans, giving him information and pretending zeal for the interests of the King Our Master under the name of number 13, at the same time that he favored and aided General Lallemand and his followers.[73]

Three months after he expressed this opinion, Apodaca was still violently opposed to permitting the establishment at Galveston. Occupation of that point by a force of rebels from Buenos Aires could be only for the purpose of preying on the coasts and vessels of Spain. The viceroy did not want to see those rebels in Galveston,

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] Venadito to the Secretary of State, Mexico, January 31, 1819 (No. 16), *ibid.*

. . . nor on any point of the coasts of this Kingdom, where they would cause serious damages, consequently arousing with such a pernicious example the natives of the country, whose pacification has cost such efforts, blood, and wealth, and would give them the necessary supplies of arms, munitions and other aid which at present are scarce because of my having taken from them all their means of waging war, leaving them only their tools and implements of agriculture and industry.[74]

He also feared that the information which would be sent to the Spanish officials could not arrive in time to be of any use, and so another useless expense would be incurred. In all of their dealings with Fatio and Onís, Apodaca was convinced that the brothers Laffite were acting with deception. He repeated the accusation, which was true enough, that even while they were concluding with Fatio plans to disrupt the Lallemand expedition, the Laffites were in reality giving every assistance to the French exiles, assistance without which Le Champ d'Asile could not have been established. The proposal that they offer aid to the Interior Provinces was regarded as useless because the viceroy could provide everything needed; impolitic, because foreigners would be able to obtain information of use in any future invasion; prejudicial, because Galveston would be used for smuggling. He considered "Lafit as a lost man, reduced to poverty and without the means of subsistence. . . ." Apodaca concluded his indictment of the new scheme by recommending that the pirate rendezvous be attacked and destroyed completely as many times as necessary. This procedure would be less costly than the plan proposed by No. 19, and he was preparing ships for that purpose.[75] Without the approval of the viceroy, nothing could be done; and another splendid scheme suffered the ignominious fate of its predecessors.

Felipe Fatio had not been informed of the newest enterprise of the brothers Laffite, and when certain French officers in New Orleans prepared to sail for Galveston, he feared that an attempt would be made to attack Tampico or Campeche. The privateer

[74] Venadito to the Secretary of State, Mexico, April [30?], 1819 (No. 19), *ibid.*
[75] *Ibid.*

captain Pierre Lamaison had arranged for his confiscated *Panchita* to be purchased for him by a New Orleans merchant. This vessel, with Humbert, Dominique You, and more than thirty other adventurers, prepared to leave New Orleans. Fatio caused its detention for four days, but no violation of law could be shown and the *Panchita* cleared for St. Thomas—but in reality, so Fatio believed, for Galveston. The consul reported that "a large number of adventurers have left in the last few days by sea and land, with the intention of arming not only the *Panchita,* but two or three other ships and to attempt with them some blow against Tampico and Campeche." [76] This movement of men toward Galveston, and preparations to send another vessel with other adventurers to the same port, would have caused Fatio little concern had he known of Graham's proposal to Lallemand and Pierre Laffite's plan to betray the undertaking.

Even though his chief source of information, Pierre Laffite, was not then functioning in his behalf, Fatio learned that the *Panchita* had actually gone to Galveston where Lamaison was waiting, and where various corsairs were being armed. Recruiting was being carried on in New Orleans for an attack on Tampico, Tuxpan, Nautla, and Campeche.[77] More than two hundred adventurers had gathered at Galveston, including some who had been with Lallemand.[78] Fatio believed that the expedition would be directed against Tampico, and that four hundred men would effect a landing north of that city.[79] The expedition, which was reported as having left Galveston on May 9 or 11, was supposed to have consisted of four armed vessels, with six larger ones preparing to follow.[80] If such an expedition actually left Galveston, the attack would surely have been made before June 22, the date when the viceroy acknowledged receipt of Fatio's dispatch of May 29. The

[76] Fatio to Venadito, New Orleans, March 31, 1819, AGN ND, II, ff. 167–68.
[77] Fatio to the Viceroy, New Orleans, May 11, 1819, *ibid.*, f. 184.
[78] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 25, 1819, AGI PC, leg. 1900.
[79] Fatio to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 29, 1819, *ibid.*
[80] Fatio to the Viceroy, New Orleans, May 29, 1819, AGN ND, II, f. 189.

viceroy merely stated that he would warn the officials at Tampico to be vigilant;[81] but the governor of Nuevo Santander was not informed of the threat until July 10, hence we may conclude that Apodaca did not see any serious danger from the Galveston corsairs.[82] He had more important matters to think about, especially James Long's leadership of the last filibustering expedition of the decade.

Charles Lallemand was assisted by Jean Laffite in moving his military colonists up the Trinity to Atascosito. Laffite then went to New Orleans to recommend a scheme for reducing the colony; but Apodaca, Arredondo, and Martínez had already set a punitive expedition in motion. Rumors of their plans reached Le Champ d'Asile in such an exaggerated form that the French exiles abandoned their colony in ludicrous haste. Graham's Galveston mission and his proposals to Lallemand and Laffite came as an anti-climax to the French expedition. Graham suggested that the corsairs should occupy successive points on the Texas coast and then surrender them to American forces which would go through the motions of attacking them. It is difficult to believe that Graham made the proposals upon his own authority, and the whole affair reminds one of the part played by Shaler in 1812 and 1813. The brothers Laffite refused to abandon their intrigues in the face of rebuffs from Mexico and Cuba and made use of Graham's proposals to offer their services again to Spain. This intrigue to disrupt any efforts made in accordance with Graham's proposals had no immediate result other than to leave Galveston in the possession of pirates and privateers.

[81] Viceroy to Fatio, Mexico, June 22, 1819, *ibid.*

[82] Viceroy to the Governor of Nuevo Santander, [Mexico], July 10, 1819, *ibid.*, f. 191.

Chapter 11

James Long, the Last of the Early Filibusters

The Republic of Texas

A trying era was drawing to a close in New Spain and royalist power seemed to be fairly well secured after a decade of turbulence. Of the many revolutionary chieftains who had raised the flag of independence, only Guerrero remained to cause the viceroy any considerable difficulty. New Spain was not pacified, but the worst of the fighting seemed to be ended with the defeat of Mina in October, 1817. The Lallemand expedition was completely disrupted a year later, and, although the resources of Texas were in a deplorable condition, there was reason to hope that they would be equal to the task of defense. Don Luis de Onís and John Quincy Adams were still negotiating for a settlement of the western boundary. The treaty that they signed on February 22, 1819, recognized Texas as a part of New Spain. The Mexican Revolution closed two years later when Agustín de Iturbide announced the Plan of Iguala, thus putting an end to the greatest pretext for filibustering; but in the meantime Dr. James Long was engaged in the last of those raids against the sovereignty of Spain in Texas.

James Long was an ambitious drifter who sought in vain for fame, fortune, and importance. His parents migrated from Virginia to Kentucky and Tennessee. As a boy of fifteen he engaged in an unsuccessful mercantile venture, then worked as a clerk in his father's store for two years, and finally acquired enough medical knowledge to join the army as a surgeon. After the British defeat at New Orleans, Long moved to Natchez, married Jane H.

Wilkinson, and resigned from the army. For a while he practiced medicine at Port Gibson; then he purchased a plantation near Vicksburg, sold it in 1817, and joined W. W. Walker as a merchant.[1]

The spirit of the frontiersman, the trader, the expansionist, and the adventurer made it easy for citizens in the southwestern states to believe that their interests had been sacrificed by the treaty of 1819.[2] Agitation against the treaty centered in Natchez and soon interested parties were plotting to invade Texas. A public meeting held in that city in May, 1819, aroused interest in the project.[3] Among the men who promoted the last filibustering raid into Texas were several prominent border characters, including Henry S. Foote, Horatio Biglow, Eli Harris, James Gaines, David Long, Hamlin Cook, Stephen Barker, John Sibley, Samuel Davenport, John G. Burnett, Joshua Child, W. W. Walker, and José Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara. They invited General John Adair to the command and then turned to James Long when he refused.[4]

Those who hoped to profit from the enterprise subscribed to its expenses. General Long, as he was called, pledged his "fortune," [5] and approximately $500,000 was said to have been subscribed by various persons.[6] Recruits were attracted not only by the usual prospect of an exciting adventure, but by the more substantial promise of a league of land to every soldier. This was one expedition in which the United States government was not involved, and the adventurers were looked upon as "a group of brigands who are going to commit a thousand atrocities." [7] This exaggerated statement by Félix Trudeaux, the Spanish consul at Natchitoches,[8] was

[1] *Lamar Papers*, II, 53.

[2] See Philip Coolidge Brooks, *Diplomacy and the Borderlands*, . . . (Berkeley, 1939), for an excellent discussion of the treaty.

[3] Rowland, *History of Mississippi*, I, 501.

[4] *Lamar Papers*, II, 56; Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, II, 202–203.

[5] Rowland, *History of Mississippi*, I, 501.

[6] Eli Harris to M. B. Lamar, Providence, Louisiana, January 18, 1841, in *Lamar Papers*, III, 483.

[7] Félix Trudeaux to Fatio, Natchitoches, June 9, 1819, AGN Historia, tomo 162.

[8] Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 328.

probably caused by the appearance of Eli Harris at that point with his advance force. Harris was a printer who had been sent to set up his printing establishment in Nacogdoches.[9] He left Natchez with sixty men; a part of this group may have been the twenty-two soldiers who arrived in Natchitoches on June 7 and left for Nacogdoches the following day. Approximately 120 men crossed into Texas on the eighth of June, and recruits were reported to be coming from various points in Louisiana.[10] About the same time, supplies were loaded on barges and sent up the river past Rapides, near the modern Alexandria. Although the men in charge of the four barges seemed anxious to avoid observation, the expedition "made much noise, and many persons of that country joined it." The point of rendezvous was fixed at a place ten leagues beyond the Sabine.[11]

When Long left Natchez on June 17, after an unsuccessful attempt had been made to arrest him,[12] he was accompanied by about seventy men. The group passed through Natchitoches on the way to the border and Nacogdoches[13] where Long intended to build a fort.[14] He arrived in Nacogdoches on June 21 and rumors credited him with having six hundred Americans and Mexicans supported by a large number of Indians.[15] The citizens of Nacogdoches and its vicinity assembled on the same day and "proceeded to establish a provincial government." A council of twenty-one members "was invested with the supreme authority of the State." General Long was elected President of the Supreme Council and

[9] Harris to Lamar, Providence, Louisiana, January 18, 1841, in *Lamar Papers*, III, 483. Harris claimed to have printed the *Star*, a newspaper edited by Horatio Biglow.

[10] Trudeaux to Fatio, Natchitoches, June 9, 1819, AGN Historia, tomo 162. These rumors coupled the names of Robinson, Adair, and Humbert with the expedition.

[11] New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette*, June 14, 1819, extract in AGN Historia, tomo 162; New York *Advertiser*, July 20, 1819.

[12] Mateo de la Serna to Venadito, Philadelphia, July 19, 1819, AGI PE AM, leg. 14; *Niles' Weekly Register*, XVI (July 24, 1819), 366.

[13] *Lamar Papers*, II, 56–57; Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, I, 203.

[14] Declaration of José Sotelo Palafox in Manuel García to Apodaca, New Orleans, July 15, 1819, AGN Historia, tomo 162.

[15] Fatio to the Viceroy, New Orleans, July 24, 1819, *ibid.*; New Orleans *L'Ami des Lois*, July 16, 1819.

Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Nature, too, smiled on the efforts of the invaders. Rain relieved a drought and promised an ample crop. The "rising Star of the republic announced the dawning of a magnificent day." [16] Long accepted the honor, and, appealing for co-operation, pledged himself to carry on with all his abilities and to enforce discipline.[17] On June 23, 1819, Texas was declared to be an independent republic.

The preamble of this declaration of independence, a paraphrase of the American document, was followed by a complaint against the treaty of February 22, 1819. The "citizens of Texas" had been encouraged to believe that their territory would be included within the United States. It was this hope that "prevented any effectual effort to throw off the yoke of Spanish authority, though it could not restrain rebellions against an odious tyranny." But the recent treaty "dissipated an illusion too long fondly cherished, and has aroused the citizens of Texas from the torpor into which a fancied security has lulled them." Now they were abandoned "to all those exactions which Spanish rapacity is fertile in devising." The citizens of Texas would not be true to their noble heritage nor worthy of the age in which they lived if they submitted to Spain. So they spurned a disgraceful vassalage and refused to submit "to the most atrocious despotism that ever disgraced the annals of Europe. . . ." This interesting declaration concluded with the announcement that a representative government, religious liberty, freedom of the press, liberal education, and a free commercial intercourse would be established.[18]

[16] Natchez *Mississippi State Gazette*, August 14, 1819, letter dated Nacogdoches, June 25, 1819; New York *Advertiser*, October 1, 1819. Horatio Biglow, Hamlin Cook, W. W. Walker, Stephen Barker, John Sibley, Samuel Davenport, John G. Burnett, Joshua Child, Pedro Procello, and Gutiérrez were members of the council. Bancroft, *History of the North Mexican States and Texas*, II, 48; *Lamar Papers*, II, 58; Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, I, 203–205; Rowland, *History of Mississippi*, I, 501.

[17] Army of Texas, General Order, Camp Freeman, June 22, 1819, Natchez *Mississippi State Gazette*, August 14, 1819.

[18] Philadelphia *Aurora and General Advertiser*, September 10, 1819; Lexington *Kentucky Reporter*, September 1, 1819; Natchez *Mississippi State Gazette*, August 14, 1819; AGN Historia, tomo 162.

The chief motive which animated the leaders of Long's expedition was the desire for land.[19] Seen from this point of view, the last filibustering expedition of the period was definitely a phase of American expansion to the Pacific. American citizens have been noted for their assumption that they are endowed with an inalienable right to go wherever their inclinations might lead them. This attitude was clearly present in the Long invasion, and if those modern barbarians made a feeble attempt to adorn their land grabbing with a mantle of righteousness, they deceived no one. "The purpose of the movement, on the part of the leaders and the best element, was to get possession of Texas and open it to settlement from the United States." [20] The Supreme Council decreed that "each private who enters the service before the first of October, ensuing, shall receive ten sections of land as soon as the government is settled. . . ." [21] A bill was also passed providing for the survey and sale of land on the Red River. The plots were to be in sections, with a river frontage of one-half mile, extending back two miles. The best quality was to sell for fifty cents an acre and the poorest for twenty-five cents. Lands not fronting on the river were to sell at twenty-five cents for the best, and a half of that for the poorest. One half of the purchase price was to be paid on October 1, 1820, and the balance a year later. Payment could be made in supplies as well as in cash. Each settler was entitled to a section for himself, a quarter section for each child or ward under eighteen years of age, and a half section for each member of the family between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. These terms were to hold until March 1, 1820.[22]

It is interesting to observe how attempts have been made to

[19] Bollaert commended Moses Austin for his methods, apparently contrasting his plans with those of Long. William Bollaert, Private Journal, 1842–43 (Edward E. Ayer Collection, Newberry Library), entry of January 15, 1843.

[20] Rowland, *History of Mississippi*, I, 501.

[21] Lexington *Kentucky Reporter*, September 22, 1819.

[22] Nashville *Clarion*, October 12, 1819, from the *Texas Republican*, quoted by Douglas C. McMurtrie, "The First Texas Newspaper," in *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XXXVI (1932–1933), 44–45.

give a noble aspect to this proposed real estate grab. A former president of Texas wrote that the filibusters from Natchez sought to free Texas from "the merciless domination of Spain. . . ." [23] But even he recognized that "General Long hoped to achieve by military operations what the two Austins . . . [did] by peaceful negotiation." [24] John Hamilton Robinson was probably the author of an announcement that received wide circulation. He held that Texas was rightfully a part of the United States, that it was abandoned by the government, and that "Our citizens have a right to migrate whithersoever they choose—and it is beyond the power of government to prevent them." [25] Such statements may be taken as depicting with considerable accuracy the Western attitude. The New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette* published a letter on July 7, 1819, bemoaning the exchange of Texas for Florida; but the editor charged the Long expedition with being an illegal scheme, intriguing only to vagabonds.[26] Even though the national government did bargain Texas for Florida as a result of Eastern jealousy of the potential power of the West, it desired to maintain neutrality.[27] If sentiment in New Orleans was in some quarters only lukewarm toward the Long expedition, editorial comment from St. Louis supported it with enthusiasm: "Every friend of the western country, every man who wishes to see *liberty* continue her march to the Pacific ocean, must wish success to the adventure in Texas." [28] The editor of *Niles' Weekly Register* recognized the great "temptation of getting vast tracts of some of the finest land in the world," but suggested that past failures of such attempts should be a warn-

[23] *Lamar Papers*, II, 56.

[24] *Ibid.*, 57; Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, I, 204.

[25] New York *Advertiser*, July 23, 1819; Philadelphia *Aurora and General Advertiser*, August 5, 1819. Robinson died of yellow fever at Natchez about the end of October, 1819. Washington *National Intelligencer*, November 20, 1819.

[26] AGN Historia, tomo 162.

[27] New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette*, July 12, 1819. Long's activities were clearly violations of neutrality under the law of April 20, 1818. See Fenwick, *The Neutrality Laws of the United States*, 176; *United States Statutes at Large*, III, 447.

[28] Lexington *Kentucky Reporter*, September 8, 1819, from the St. Louis *Enquirer*, n.d.

ing to young men not to "embark in this wild scheme at present." [29] The *National Intelligencer* also warned young men not to take part in an enterprise which had no chance of success. Most of the families in Texas were described as recent arrivals, but according to the proclamation of the invaders, "one would suppose that they, with thousands of others, were groaning under the lash of Spanish tyranny. . . ." [30]

While the newspapers were discussing the merits of the expedition, small numbers of recruits arrived at Nacogdoches. About three hundred men were on the Spanish side of the Sabine, and others were expected from Louisiana. John Sibley and Stephen Barker provided supplies.[31] By the middle of July, General Long could report hopefully that his force was stronger than he had expected.[32] Prospects of success were described in glowing terms by an officer who announced that the frontier was in an uproar and crowds of settlers were on their way.[33] Comanches near San Antonio were expected to keep the Spaniards busy.[34] Despite such optimistic forecasts, some observers discounted the exaggerations from Texas and regarded the filibusters as plunderers.[35]

Long's Relations with the Brothers Laffite

Jean Laffite was still at Galveston, and, although Spanish officials viewed the two brothers with increasing suspicion, Jean and Pierre were willing to serve Ferdinand VII—and themselves. An opportunity presented itself when two messengers arrived with

[29] XVI (July 17, 1819), 347.

[30] New York *Advertiser*, October 1, 1819; New York *Evening Post*, October 2, 1819, from the Washington *National Intelligencer*, September 27, 1819.

[31] Encl. in Fatio to the Viceroy, New Orleans, July 16, 1819, AGN Historia, tomo 162.

[32] Extract of a letter by James Long, Nacogdoches, July 12, 1819, encl. in Fatio to the Viceroy, New Orleans, July 24, 1819, *ibid.*; Lexington *Kentucky Reporter*, September 1, 1819.

[33] Lexington *Western Monitor*, September 7, 1819.

[34] Lexington *Kentucky Reporter*, September 23, 1819.

[35] Lexington *Western Monitor*, November 16, 1819.

an invitation to unite the Galveston establishment with Long's republic.[36] The bait was an offer to give Laffite a commission in the government and a letter of marque authorizing depredations on Spanish commerce. Together, the united forces could foil any hostile attempts by Spain and the United States.[37] Jean Laffite's reply encouraged Long but made no embarrassing commitments. The corsair expressed his pleasure that Long had embraced a cause which he himself had been defending for eight years and which he would never abandon.[38] Something might be gained from a union, but first Laffite desired to be assured of some positive result. He had seen three failures,[39] and his aid to other invaders had been of little effect. His boast that "the spirit of liberty is sprouting under my cultivation, in these fertile countries," was pure nonsense. Jean Laffite was cultivating nothing more important than his black mustache. He warned Long not to treat Arredondo lightly even though Spanish power appeared to be very weak. An admiralty court might be established, but final arrangements would have to be postponed until Pierre arrived from the trip he had taken.[40] In the meantime Long should give a complete account of his resources and plans and indicate what route should be used in forwarding supplies when it would be possible to do so.[41]

Jean Laffite was probably telling the truth when he said he could not spare supplies at that time; but his request for complete information warrants the suspicion that he wanted to be in a position to do whatever Pierre thought best,[42] even to betraying the expedition to the Spaniards. When the messengers returned from Galveston, Long found it necessary to scatter his men in order that they might obtain provisions by hunting and from the Indians.

[36] *Ibid.*, September 7, 1819.

[37] James Long to Jean Laffite, Nacogdoches, June 24, 1819, encl. in Cagigal to Venadito, Havana, September 4, 1819, AGN Historia, tomo 162.

[38] The Laffites apparently began privateering in 1811.

[39] The Gutiérrez-Magee, Mina, and Lallemand expeditions.

[40] Pierre was in Washington conferring with Onís at this time.

[41] Jean Laffite to James Long, Galveston, July 7, 1819, in *Lamar Papers*, I, 30–32.

[42] This situation showed clearly that Pierre was the leader of the Laffite enterprises.

He was also disappointed when a barge bearing valuable supplies was captured by American officers.[43] While small detachments of filibusters took up positions at various points, Long sent messengers again to Galveston.[44] They could tell Laffite that the troops at La Bahía and San Antonio were disposed to join the revolution, and that prospects were bright.[45]

Long sent his emissaries to Galveston to establish an admiralty court and to constitute the place a port of entry for the Republic of Texas.[46] The men left Nacogdoches about August 1,[47] and a fortnight later one of them was reported to be on his way up the Trinity "with a large boat loaded with provisions and munitions of war."[48] The mission failed in its principal objective, but rumors at Nacogdoches announced that Galveston would soon adhere to the republic.[49] The rumors were correct. Pierre had ordered his brother to co-operate with Long, and so on September 30 Jean sent two lawyers, who had come from New Orleans, to make arrangements with the filibuster.[50] In accordance with this communication, the Supreme Council on October 9 declared Galveston a port of entry and delivery, and authorized the erection of a fort on Bolivar Point. Jean Laffite was given a commission as governor of Galveston.[51] In the same month Pierre Laffite wrote to the intendant of Cuba to report on the situation at Galveston.[52] The brothers Laffite were once more ready to betray an expedition to

[43] Eli Harris to M. B. Lamar, Providence, Louisiana, January 18, 1841, in *Lamar Papers*, III, 483.

[44] Lexington *Kentucky Reporter*, September 22, 1819.

[45] E. W. Winkler, "Notes and Fragments," in *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association*, VII (1903–1904), 242–43.

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] Lexington *Kentucky Reporter*, September 22 and 29, 1819.

[48] Winkler, "Notes and Fragments," in *loc. cit.*, 242–43.

[49] New Orleans *Louisiana Gazette*, October 4, 1819, *ibid.*, 242, n. 3.

[50] Jean Laffite to James Long, Galveston, September 30, 1819, in *Lamar Papers*, I, 34.

[51] *Ibid.*, II, 59; Bancroft, *History of the North Mexican States and Texas*, II, 42. Garrison states that Long failed to enlist the aid of the Laffites. *Texas*, 123.

[52] N. 19 to the Captain General, New Orleans, December 11, 1819, encl. in Cagigal to Venadito, Havana, January 7, 1820, AGN ND, IV, f. 50. Under their new code numbers, Pierre Laffite was 19-uno and Jean was 19-dos.

which, as in the case of the Lallemand expedition, they had given aid. Long did not suspect that the Laffites were plotting to betray him, and on October 22 he left Nacogdoches with thirteen men with the intention of going to Galveston.[53] The approach of Colonel Ignacio Pérez with his punitive force caused him to return hastily, but too late.

The End of Long's Republic

Spanish authority in Texas was indeed weak during 1819, and the so-called patriots had reason to believe that their efforts would succeed. But Long made a fatal error in breaking his small force into detachments which were scattered widely. The Anglo-Americans were, however, faced with a difficult dilemma. If the army remained as a unit at Nacogdoches until it could move against La Bahía or San Antonio, supplies would have to be found somewhere. American officers at Fort Jessup and elsewhere were sufficiently vigilant to prevent the passage of necessary supplies in significant quantities. The only alternative was to send out hunting parties until a source could be developed at Galveston. It was this problem with which Long was faced when Colonel Pérez arrived in "republican" territory with an army that was little more than a straggling mob.

Governor Antonio Martínez knew of Long's invasion by June 17, 1819, when his messenger returned from Natchitoches.[54] Felipe Fatio was convinced that Texas was threatened by the most serious invasion since the beginning of the revolution.[55] With these and similar reports before him, Viceroy Apodaca gave a series of orders to prepare the Interior Provinces for defense. General Arredondo was ordered to reconnoiter the Sabine with a force of five hundred cavalry and to recruit twice that number if the situation warranted the move. If the enemy were numerous, Arredondo was

[53] *Lamar Papers*, II, 63. Lamar gave the date as September 22, but October must have been intended.

[54] Testimony of Miguel Arciniega, San Antonio, June 17, 1819, AGN Historia, tomo 162.

[55] Fatio to the Viceroy, New Orleans, July 16, 1819, *ibid.*

to take an advantageous position and wait for reinforcements. The intendant at Zacatecas was ordered to send 20,000 pesos to Saltillo for preliminary expenses, and Arredondo was asked to send 5,000 pesos to San Antonio.[56] Governor Martínez was commanded to co-operate with Arredondo in the attempt to rid Texas of the invaders.[57] Other officers, including the commanding general of Potosí and the commanding general of the Western Interior Provinces, were requested to recruit and equip troops for service.[58] Long's letter of June 24 asking for aid from Jean Laffite was sent to the viceroy by Captain General Cagigal. When Apodaca received this alarming letter he sent a copy to Arredondo with orders to overcome the invaders before they could establish themselves "at any point in His Majesty's Dominions." [59]

At the end of September a sufficient number of troops were ready at San Antonio for the pacification of Texas. Colonel Pérez was placed in command and he left the capital on September 27 with about 550 men. About 100 remained in San Antonio, but these were also sent to join Pérez when Martínez learned that various Indian tribes had gathered on the Colorado to attack the expedition. San Antonio was thus left without a defending force and practically stripped of supplies.[60] The Indians did not venture to attack Pérez, but they hindered his movements by setting fire to the plains.[61] Two spies, who had been sent to investigate the situation at Nacogdoches, reported that the main force of the enemy was on the Sabine and only cripples and invalids remained in the town. This infor-

[56] Venadito to Arredondo, [Mexico], August 25, 1819, *ibid.*

[57] [Venadito] to the Governor of Texas, [Mexico], August 25, 1819, *ibid.* When Martínez received the order on September 16, he sent spies out to gather information. Martínez to Venadito, Béxar, September 16, 1819, *ibid.*

[58] [Venadito] to the Commanding General of Potosí and to the Commanding General of the Western Interior Provinces, [Mexico], August 25, 1819, *ibid.* The latter, Alexo García Conde, raised a force of four hundred cavalry. Conde to the Viceroy, Durango, September 13, 1819, *ibid.* The viceroy ordered the force sent to Saltillo.

[59] Venadito to Arredondo, [Mexico], September 28, 1819, *ibid.*

[60] Martínez to Arredondo, Béxar, October 2, 1819, *ibid.*; Martínez to the Viceroy, Béxar, October 13, 1819, *ibid.*

[61] Martínez to Arredondo, Béxar, October 4, 1819, *ibid.*

mation caused Pérez to plan an attack on the place first and a fight against the Indians on his return.[62]

Pérez advanced cautiously, consuming a month in the march to Nacogdoches, which should have been accomplished in not more than three weeks. This slow advance would have permitted the Anglo-Americans to escape had their intelligence service been operating properly. The Spaniards followed a route which took them to the junction of the Brazos and the Navasoto rivers. At the arroyo Yegua, sometimes called the river Yegua, an Indian reported that there were eight Anglo-Americans trading with his people. This information caused Pérez to send out several parties of men for the purpose of intercepting the enemy.[63] On October 11 the Spaniards captured ten of Long's men.[64] The remainder of the march to Nacogdoches was a succession of raids against Anglo-American parties, which resulted in a few captures.[65]

Nacogdoches was not much of a prize when Pérez reached the town. Major Hamlin Cook and his men fled to the Sabine when they learned of the approach of the royalists, "as if they were competing for the Stadium Crown." [66] General Long had hurried back from his visit to Galveston, but he had time to do nothing more than to conceal the arms that had been left behind by Cook.[67] On October 26 he left for the Sabine, two days before Pérez arrived. The Spanish army was broken up into detachments for a scouring operation which netted a few captives by the end of October.[68] Pérez went on to the Sabine, where he arrived the last of October without further incident. By this time his prisoners included twenty-six Anglo-Americans, three Mexicans, and one Ne-

[62] Pérez to Martínez, Campamento Bisnagas, October 5, 1819, *ibid.*

[63] Pérez to Arredondo, Campo de Trinidad, December 3, 1819, *ibid.* The traders abandoned their arms, supplies, horses, and mules when the Spaniards approached.

[64] *Lamar Papers*, II, 69. According to Pérez, his men captured two of a group of twenty-two Anglo-Americans at the junction of the Brazos and Navasoto. Pérez to Arredondo, Campo de Trinidad, December 3, 1819, AGN Historia, tomo 162.

[65] *Ibid.*

[66] *Lamar Papers*, II, 69.

[67] *Ibid.*, 64–69.

[68] Pérez to Arredondo, Campo de Trinidad, December 3, 1819, AGN Historia, tomo 162.

gro slave. An American force from Fort Jessup was stationed on the opposite bank. The two commanders exchanged courtesies and the American asked for the release of the Anglo-Americans on the ground that they had been engaged in making a living and were innocent of aggression against the Spaniards. Pérez replied that these men had indeed been engaged in hostile enterprises, and were therefore liable for their crimes. In response to a query as to the reason for his being on the Sabine, the American commander replied that he was under orders to arrest General Long and also to prevent the Spaniards from crossing the river. Pérez then withdrew two leagues and camped for the night.[69] Within a short time he decided to free eighteen of his prisoners on condition that they would stay out of Spanish territory.[70]

The process of pacification continued through November until most of the ranchos were destroyed. Anglo-Americans were driven away from the Atascosito, Callo Gallardo, Puente Pacana, and the other places where they had settled; and more than twenty houses were burned. Pérez was satisfied that there was no further danger.[71] Some of Long's men found refuge at Galveston, but most of them crossed the Sabine and returned to the United States. Long's invasion was thus brought to an end, and a resident of Natchitoches had good reason to write that "The Dons certainly have exhibited more energy than was expected." [72]

One of the objects of the Pérez expedition was to attack hostile Indians in the province. This purpose could not be accomplished because of scarcity of supplies, and so Pérez began his march back

[69] Pérez to Arredondo, Campo del Arroyo de los Aes, November 2, 1819, *ibid.*

[70] Pérez to the Commander of the Detachment on the River Sabine, Campo de Trinidad, December 3, 1819, *ibid.* William Elafez and David Long took this letter to the American forces, hence Lamar's account of the latter's death is incorrect.

[71] Pérez to Arredondo, Campo Arroyo de los Aes, November 2, 1819, and Campo de Trinidad, December 3, 1819, *ibid.* On November 28, Rodríguez was sent back to Béxar with forty-four prisoners. Pérez to Martínez, Campo de Trinidad, November 26, 1819, *ibid.* He arrived at the capital on December 7. Martínez to Arredondo, Béxar, December 10, 1819, *ibid.*

[72] "Extract of a Letter to a gentleman in this City, dated Natchitoches, Nov. 3," in New York *Advertiser*, December 10, 1819.

to San Antonio. His army was in such a deplorable condition that he feared its dissolution before the return could be accomplished.[73] With his troops on the verge of starvation, his horses worn out and useless, Pérez arrived in San Antonio on February 2, 1820.[74]

Arredondo was discouraged at the prospect of what was before his provinces, in spite of the success attending the Pérez expedition. The result of the eight years of destructive warfare waged by the Anglo-Americans was apparent, and Texas had become a "desert." The invaders assured themselves of eventual victory by fleeing when attacked, and Arredondo could see no hope of a successful defense with the limited supplies available.[75] Of all the Interior Provinces, the condition of Texas was the least promising. When Antonio Martínez, the last Spanish governor of Texas, assumed control late in May, 1817, he found the province in a deplorable condition. The treasury was empty; the Indians could not be controlled; foreigners were active on the border; and for defense there were about three hundred "pickets from other provinces," practically devoid of clothing, food, and military equipment.[76] The garrison at La Bahía was small, dismounted, and "absolutely naked and perishing for the necessities of life." Only discarded and damaged weapons, originally of inferior quality, were available for the troops. Practically all of the twenty-four cannon in San Antonio were useless, and Martínez doubted if he could muster enough men to spike them if necessary.[77] Castañeda's expedition against Le Champ d'Asile in 1818 was possible only because Arredondo furnished men and supplies, and the same thing was true of the Pérez expedition a year later. The province

[73] Pérez to Martínez, Campo sobre el Arroyo de Lobanillo, January 23, 1820, AGN Historia, tomo 162.

[74] Martínez to Arredondo, Béxar, February 2, 1820, *ibid.*

[75] Arredondo to Venádito, Villa de Mier, March 6, 1820, *ibid.*

[76] Martínez to the Commandant General, Béxar, May 30, 1817, in Mattie Austin Hatcher (ed.), "Letters of Antonio Martínez, the Last Spanish Governor of Texas, 1817–1822," in *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XXXIX (1935–1936), 69–72.

[77] Martínez to the Commandant General, Béxar, June 4, 1817, and Martínez to the Viceroy, Béxar, June 7, 1817, *ibid.*, 140–44.

was destitute after Long's invasion was overcome. With the exception of Indians, there were not more than four thousand people in all of Texas. "To the eastward of San Antonio nearly all signs of civilization that remained after the destructive work of 1813 were now swept away. All the intruders were driven out, and the country was laid waste." [78] The Mexican Revolution and the filibustering era were rapidly drawing to a close. The Americans were unable to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the exhausted province.

Organization of Long's Second Attempt

After the Pérez expedition put an end to his republic, James Long took his wife to Natchitoches and then went to Bolivar Point where some of his men were gathered. Conditions there made it imperative to acquire supplies, so Long went to New Orleans and then back to Natchitoches. According to the sympathetic Lamar, the wandering filibuster had been fleeced by his agent at Natchitoches.[79] His Natchez agent, Dr. Abram Longaker,[80] apparently had nothing left after settling the accounts of the firms J. & D. Long and Long & Walker. After futile attempts to obtain aid in Alexandria and Natchez, Long returned to Bolivar Point by way of Lake Calcasieu, accompanied by his wife and W. D. C. Hall.[81] The refugees, among whom was the printer Eli Harris, had been living on the country. They obtained powder and lead from Jean Laffite in exchange for venison and other meat,[82] but this mutually advantageous arrangement was soon broken up. When James Long arrived at Galveston Bay on April 6, 1820, Jean Laffite was leaving his famous "Red House" forever.[83]

[78] Garrison, *Texas*, 118.

[79] *Lamar Papers*, II, 72–73.

[80] Natchez *Mississippi State Gazette*, June 16, 1819, advertisement.

[81] *Lamar Papers*, II, 75.

[82] Eli Harris to M. B. Lamar, Providence, Louisiana, January 18, 1841, *ibid.*, III, 483.

[83] Nicolás Josef de Villavaso to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 30, 1820, AGI PC, leg. 1945. Fatio died on February 4, 1820, and Villavaso took over the

Galveston had been an irritation to American officials since its first establishment by Aury. Beverly Chew had protested frequently against the depredations and smuggling that centered on the island. Although the brothers Laffite, and especially Jean, were charged with responsibility for most of the crimes committed by hoodlums in the Gulf area, their culpability was by no means as great as romance relates. Nevertheless, the United States government determined to be rid of the Galveston nuisance no matter who was responsible. On December 2, 1817, President Monroe announced that orders had been given for suppression of the Galveston banditti.[84] Onís objected to this projected "invasion" of what he rightfully claimed as Spanish territory,[85] and so the brothers Laffite were not disturbed in spite of the threat. The Pérez expedition made it impossible for them to render a service to Spain by betraying the young Republic of Texas. The arrival of a number of Long's men at Bolivar Point gave Pierre an opportunity to make another effort to induce the Spaniards to pay the obligations he had assumed in their behalf. He assured the captain general that James Long undoubtedly intended to take possession of Galveston for the United States, a danger which could be avoided by establishing Spanish authority. A force of from eighty to a hundred men would be sufficient, and Pierre offered his aid to effect that result.[86] Perhaps Pierre had reason to believe that Jean would have to move out anyway and that a Spanish force at Galveston would prevent American interference. Captain General Cagigal referred Pierre's proposal to the viceroy, Apodaca, who had never been anything but hostile toward the Laffites. In view of his limited naval resources and the presence of Pérez in the Galveston area, Apodaca refused to have anything to do with the plan.[87] Cagigal sent a

consulate. Faye, "Consuls of Spain in New Orleans, 1804–1821," in *loc. cit.*, 684; Villavasó to the Captain General, New Orleans, February 5, 1820, AGI PC, leg. 1945.

[84] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 130.

[85] Onís to Adams, December 6, 1817, *ibid.*, 450.

[86] N. 19 [Pierre Laffite] to the Captain General, New Orleans, December 11, 1819, encl. in Cagigal to Venadito, Havana, January 7, 1820, AGN ND, IV, f. 50.

[87] [Venadito] to Cagigal, Mexico, February 9, 1820, *ibid.*, f. 49.

similar reply to Villavaso for delivery to Pierre Laffite.[88] This refusal by Spanish officials to have any further dealings with the brothers Laffite coincided with the appearance of an American naval vessel, the *Enterprize,* bearing a demand for the evacuation of Galveston. It was because of this demand that Long found himself deprived of a possible ally when he arrived at Bolivar Point on April 6, 1820.[89]

Long remained at Bolivar Point long enough to issue a proclamation to the effect that all members of the enterprise were to report at the Point by April 10 under penalty of having their names "stricken from the army and past dues forfeited." He left W. W. Walker in charge of the camp and went to New Orleans with his wife and Major Hall, arriving there about April 25 for a visit of six weeks.[90] Rumor, always present when intrigues are on foot, soon linked General Humbert, Long, and other factious persons in a new attempt to invade Texas.[91] A Swiss trader told the Spaniards that he met Pierre Laffite with two hundred men in five launches on Bayou Lafourche bound for Galveston,[92] and Villavaso learned that Long would have that number of men with whom to conduct raids against the inhabitants of Texas.[93] These reports were probably without serious foundation inasmuch as James Long experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining aid in New Orleans. Finally, he won the support of General E. W.

[88] Villavaso to the Captain General, New Orleans, March 29, 1820, AGI PC, leg. 1945.

[89] A colorful account of the evacuation of Galveston is in Saxon, *Lafitte the Pirate,* 247–56. Part of this story is probably true. Jean Laffite's fate remains something of a mystery, but it is probable that after a short career of piracy and smuggling at Las Mujeres island off Yucatan, he died in Silan in 1826. Thomas M. Duke to Ferdinand Pinckard, Matagorda, May, 1843, quoted by B[ollaert], "Life of Jean Lafitte," in *loc. cit.,* 445. Pierre continued to live in New Orleans and died about 1841.

[90] *Lamar Papers,* II, 77.

[91] Manuel García to Venadito, New Orleans, April 28, 1820, AGN ND, I, García, f. 105. A group of dispatches, labeled "1820 El Teniente Coronel D. Manuel Garcia, cónsul de S. M. en la N. Orleans," is included in the Notas Diplomáticas bearing folio numbers 101–131, which duplicate folio numbers of other dispatches in the same volume.

[92] García to Venadito, New Orleans, May 1, 1820, AGN ND, I, García, f. 130.

[93] Villavaso to the Viceroy, New Orleans, May 3, 1820, *ibid.,* f. 130.

Ripley, Isaac T. Preston, and a few other citizens who supplied funds for assembling an outfit. John Austin and Benjamin Rush Milam, two men who were to figure prominently in Long's final effort, also joined him.[94] About fifty recruits were found ready to join the garrison at Bolivar Point, but the United States marshal arrested them when they attempted to march for that place.[95] In order to prevent his supplies from suffering a similar fate, Long took a small boatload up the Mississippi with the intention of going to Galveston by way of Calcasieu and Vermilion Bay, while Milam and Austin sailed the *Three Sisters* along the coast.[96]

One of Long's first acts when he returned to Bolivar Point was to convene the Supreme Council, whose deliberations had been so rudely interrupted by the Spanish army under Pérez. When the members met on June 4, 1820, they decided to continue their deliberations as though the Pérez expedition had not intervened.[97] The council had very little business to transact during the next few months, since Long had received aid in New Orleans on condition that he make no hostile move until his force became large enough to be formidable. One of its acts was to elect General E. W. Ripley to the position of President of the Republic of Texas with an annual salary of $25,000 and a large tract of land.[98] Ripley accepted the offer in a letter which announced a very liberal program for his administration, but complications in his private affairs kept him in New Orleans.[99] Long was impatient to make an attack on La Bahía; but his friends in New Orleans refused

[94] *Lamar Papers*, II, 78. Eleazar Wheelock Ripley (1782–1839) emerged from the war of 1812 as a brigadier general. He resigned from the army in 1820, practiced law at New Orleans, and was a state senator in 1832. He closed his career with four years in Congress. *Dictionary of American Biography*, XV, 621–22.

[95] *Niles' Weekly Register*, XVIII (June 17, 1820), 288; Villavaso to the Captain General, New Orleans, May 30, 1820, AGI PC, leg. 1945; *Lamar Papers*, V, 351.

[96] *Lamar Papers*, II, 78. Ripley, Preston, and the other friends of Long supplied the *Three Sisters* for the expedition.

[97] *Ibid.*, 80–81.

[98] Long to Ripley, Republic of Texas Headquarters, June 23, 1820, *ibid.*, 82.

[99] Ripley to Long, New Orleans, July 10, 1820, *ibid.*, 83–84. Ripley's acceptance was little short of a violation of the neutrality law of April 20, 1818.

to agree to such an early movement, apparently waiting until Anglo-Americans could move to Texas to guarantee the success of the expedition.[100] After beating off an attack by the Karankawa Indians on July 30,[101] the impatient "army" occupied itself with building on Bolivar Point a fort which was named Las Casas. Under that name Galveston was declared, on August 30, to be a port of entry for the Republic of Texas.[102]

Although Long had fewer than a hundred men, Governor Martínez was told that the force numbered about eight hundred soldiers and was increasing daily in preparation for an attack on La Bahía or Soto la Marina. The governor was warned that one of the purposes of the invaders was to attack and rob travelers on the La Bahía–San Antonio road.[103] These informants were greatly exaggerating the danger to Texas, but Long did gain one recruit that promised to increase his prestige. General Ripley met one José Félix Trespalacios, a native of Chihuahua, in New Orleans.[104] Ripley and other "angels" of the expedition agreed with Long that Trespalacios was to be given command if he could obtain official sanction from the insurgents of Mexico. This authorization was arranged through merchants of New Orleans. Long urged Ripley to send supplies with the new commander and advised an immediate move against San Antonio in order to prevent his men from deserting.[105] Ripley again advised delay and suggested that as soon as Trespalacios arrived at Las Casas, all the troops should swear allegiance to the government of Mexico. The problem of supplies and pay for the soldiers would be solved by issuing treasury notes.[106] Trespalacios apparently ar-

[100] Preston to Long, New Orleans, July 8, 1820, *ibid.*, 89.

[101] Alexandria *Louisiana Herald*, September 2, 1820.

[102] *Lamar Papers*, II, 88.

[103] Ramon Querk and James Gaines to the Governor of Texas, Sabinas, September 20, 1820, Nacogdoches Archives.

[104] Trespalacios had been imprisoned in Cuba for revolutionary activities. After his release he went to New Orleans and became interested in Long's scheme. *Lamar Papers*, II, 93.

[105] *Ibid.*, 93–94.

[106] Ripley to Long, Bay of St. Louis, October 31, 1820, *ibid.*, 94.

rived at Las Casas about the middle of November to assume command, and when Gutiérrez was made vice-president of the Supreme Council,[107] the expedition had a decided Mexican character.

Trespalacios was welcomed at Las Casas, but resentment soon arose when the treasury notes proved to be worthless. He decided to return to New Orleans in order to set matters right and to send back more supplies.[108] Moses Austin, who was then in San Antonio on business relating to his proposed colonization, informed Governor Martínez that Long's situation was nearly desperate since he had been abandoned by all but twenty or thirty of his men.[109] Austin's two companions testified that Long had not more than fifty or sixty men at the mouth of the Trinity and that American sentiment was opposed to his operations.[110] With these declarations before him, Martínez informed the viceroy that Long's assembly was not to be feared. Martínez would, however, be vigilant until he could send troops to break up the establishment.[111] Austin was correct in reporting that many men had departed from Las Casas, and when Trespalacios went to New Orleans for aid, about fifty of the malcontents accompanied him. These men rebelled against their chief when they discovered that the treasury notes were worthless.[112] Long also had trouble at Bolivar Point when one of the Mexicans defied his authority.[113] With these troublemakers finally out of the way, Long decided to go to New Orleans to help Trespalacios. He sailed on June 24, 1821, leaving Ben Milam in charge.[114] Milam soon wrote that he had supplies for fifteen days only, and that if his men became discontented before Long's return, he would

[107] *Ibid.*, 96–97.

[108] *Ibid.*, 97–98.

[109] Austin's Declaration, San Fernando de Béxar, December 23, 1820, Nacogdoches Archives.

[110] Declarations of Jacob Forsai [Forsythe?] and Jacob Kirkham, San Fernando de Béxar, December 23, 1820, *ibid.*

[111] Martínez to the Viceroy, Béxar, December 25, 1820, *Lamar Papers*, II, 111.

[112] *Ibid.*, 98–99.

[113] *Ibid.*, 99–100; John Henry Brown, *History of Texas from 1685–1892* (St. Louis, 1892), I, 76.

[114] *Lamar Papers*, II, 103–104.

put them on the schooner and sail for Matagorda Bay for an attack on La Bahía.[115] But Long returned to Las Casas late in July or early in August,[116] and the attack was postponed. It was at this time that Long and Milam learned about Iturbide's Plan of Iguala which was promulgated on February 24, 1821. Although this new development did not please them, they decided to support the plan.[117]

Information concerning the true situation in Mexico was difficult to obtain. Long heard rumors that Iturbide was captured and that he had accepted the pardon offered by the viceroy. This state of uncertainty made it advisable for the Supreme Council at Las Casas to settle the question of its relationship to the insurgents, and so Trespalacios and Milam sailed about August 20, 1821, in an attempt to communicate with Iturbide or Guerrero from Vera Cruz and report regarding the insurgents of Texas.[118] Early in September Long, having received reliable information that Iturbide was at the head of a large army, thought the time was ripe to distract royalist attention by making a diversion in the north.[119] On September 19, 1821, Long left Las Casas with three vessels and fifty-two men, leaving a few soldiers to hold the fort during his absence.[120] La Bahía offered no resistance to Long's night attack, and since Francisco García, the military commander, had posted no sentries,[121] the small band of Americans simply walked in and took possession. One of the alcaldes reported that the invaders were much concerned about La Bahía's loyalty to the revolution.[122] Long wrote at once to Martínez requesting an interview,[123] but the gover-

[115] Milam to Long, June [July] 11, 1821, quoted by Lois Garver, "Benjamin Rush Milam," in *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XXXVIII (1934–1935), 88–89.

[116] Preston to Long, New Orleans, August 15, 1821, *Lamar Papers*, II, 112.

[117] Long to Iturbide, Monterrey, December 10, 1821, Estranjeros Delincuentes (Library of Congress), caja 1821–1826.

[118] *Ibid.*

[119] Cf. *Lamar Papers*, II, 113–15.

[120] Long's Declaration, October 10 [?], 1821, in *Lamar Papers*, I, 47–48.

[121] García López to Martínez, Saltillo, November 2, 1821, *ibid.*, 51–52.

[122] Report of Tomás Buentello, La Bahía, October 11, 1821, *ibid.*, 49.

[123] Long to the Commanding Officer at San Antonio, La Bahía, October 4, 1821, *ibid.*, 46–47.

nor of Texas sent Ignacio Pérez to demand his surrender. On October 8, after a day of harmless shooting, the leader of the last filibustering expedition surrendered.[124] The Mexicans were not very kind to James Long. After a short period of imprisonment and bad treatment, the filibuster was sent to Mexico City. There he was ignored and finally he lost his life under suspicious circumstances on April 8, 1822.

The last filibustering expedition against Texas had a fitful existence from 1819 to 1821. Discontent with the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819 was undoubtedly a factor in promoting the raid, but the chief motive was the desire to take possession of large tracts of land. With anything like the support given to Gutiérrez and Magee, the promoters of Long's raids could have succeeded in their object; but the United States government considered such activities as reprehensible annoyances and had no desire to jeopardize the settlement with Spain. The frontiersmen, too, had lost their enthusiasm for baiting the hated Spaniards. Peaceful colonization under Stephen Austin, son of Moses Austin, was destined to accomplish some of the dreams of the filibusters.

[124] Long to Iturbide, Monterrey, December 10, 1821, Estranjeros Delincuentes, caja 1821–1826; *Lamar Papers*, I, 49–51.

Conclusions

PATRIOTISM and national pride may be served well by picturing the United States in the early nineteenth century as a lusty young republic using its strength to help the Spanish colonies in their struggle against tyranny. An examination of the filibustering era compels us to discard such a notion, at least in reference to the Mexican Revolution. At no time during that conflict did the United States openly lend its official assistance to the revolutionists. There were too many issues involved for a young and weak republic to risk the consequences. The desire for Florida and possibly Texas was a strong factor in causing American officials to observe the form if not the substance of neutrality in most of the war between Spain and her colonies, especially since the outcome of that war was very much in doubt during the greater part of its duration. The sympathies of the American people were overwhelmingly in favor of the colonial cause. This attitude, together with the desire for commercial gain, made it possible for privateers and pirates to use the principal American ports as headquarters for their depredations against Spanish commerce.

The Mexican revolutionists, disunited and without an adequate government, had practically no official representation in the United States. Gutiérrez was crafty, loyal, and sincere; but he was no diplomat. Herrera was capable, but his experiences in New Orleans with sharp merchants and sharper lawyers discouraged him. Anaya scarcely merits consideration. Toledo's authority came chiefly from himself and he was not a man to inspire confidence. Other Spanish colonies did have capable men in Washington and Philadelphia, but their failure to gain support from the United States warrants the conclusion that the Mexicans would have fared no better had

Gutiérrez and Herrera been endowed with the ability of the greatest of diplomats.

The principal contribution of the United States to the independence of Mexico was its failure to enforce neutrality. Its ports were open to privateers almost without hindrance, and its territory in the southwest was allowed to become fertile in the production of filibustering movements. The privateers harried Spanish commerce and the filibusters caused Texas to be turned into a "desert." American neutrality was violated with impunity during most of the early filibustering era, and if the Mexican Revolution was not prolonged as a result, royalist resources were certainly diminished. The Gutiérrez-Magee expedition was the only filibustering raid in which an American agent was more or less openly involved. That expedition was secretly promoted by James Monroe, possibly to forestall an attack from New Spain during the impending war with Great Britain and possibly to demonstrate to Spain that the United States could extend its dominion to the Río Grande. Intentional or not, the raid was a means of testing royalist power in Texas. In all of the expeditions American officials refused to take effective measures in behalf of neutrality, even when goaded by the constant stream of protests that came from Spain's capable and loyal representatives. There is little reason to suppose that the Proclamation of 1815, the law of 1817, and the various proclamations of state and territorial governors were more than gestures. Something similar to an enforcement of neutrality began with the act of April, 1818, and the last of the early filibusters, James Long, was considerably hampered by efforts to embarrass his expedition.

Various motives must be ascribed to the leaders and to the adventurers who invaded New Spain from the United States. Gutiérrez wanted to dissipate royalist strength by creating a diversion in Texas; he intended eventually to march southward into Mexico. He sought the independence of his country rather than personal gain. Magee was a soldier of fortune, lured into Texas by the

prospect of honor, glory, and perhaps riches. Toledo was always interested in advancing his own interests. John Hamilton Robinson was an American patriot who could see no definite limit to his country's expansion. Mina was a genuine lover of liberty and liberalism who tried to strike at Ferdinand by aiding the Mexican Revolution. The French exiles were still shell-shocked from the explosive shattering of the Napoleonic world. Lallemand and his companions were seeking military employment while clinging desperately to the hope that somehow they might rescue Napoleon. James Long was interested in subdividing Texas in a grand real estate operation. These leaders had almost nothing in common except a real or pretended hatred for what was known as Spanish tyranny in a world that was hearing much about the rights of men. Their followers were a curious mixture of good and bad frontiersmen, honest lovers of liberty, and ambitious young men—all in pursuit of wealth, adventure, and honor, in that order. Americans had been penetrating into Texas and beyond long before the Mexican Revolution made it possible for them to throw the mantle of liberty over their pack horses and farming tools.

From a study of the filibustering era the brothers Laffite emerge from a welter of romantic nonsense. These interesting characters of uncertain origin were masters of smugglers and privateers. It would be extremely difficult to prove that either of them actually commanded a vessel in a piratical attack, or that their vessels sailed the Gulf without commissions from some sort of government, or that they were cruel in the manner of pirates toward the prisoners who came on the prizes to Barataria and Galveston. They were lawbreakers, outlaws, smugglers. Edward Livingston was their friend; John Randolph Grymes gave them legal advice; and Andrew Jackson defended New Orleans with supplies from their arsenal. Under the leadership of Pierre, the brothers entered Spanish service in an attempt to mend their fortunes. Perhaps this pretended service was a ruse; but the game was so dangerous, the information

they provided was so accurate, and the plans they proposed so generally feasible as to warrant giving them the benefit of a reasonable doubt.

The brothers Laffite established themselves at Galveston with the advice, consent, and financial assistance of the Spanish consul at New Orleans. Trusting in this support they incurred heavy debts ostensibly to promote the interests of Spain, debts which the Spanish minister acknowledged. Pierre and Jean Laffite were probably sincere in their efforts to win Spanish favor from 1815 to 1821, and certainly they cannot be blamed for a large share of the depredations committed by Gulf pirates over whom they had no control. Galveston was little more than a desert island during the four years of Laffite supremacy. A number of rude huts and a few more pretentious habitations made up the fabled Campeachy where respectable planters from Mississippi and Louisiana came to buy stolen slaves, and where prize goods were prepared for the lucrative New Orleans trade. Perhaps the fanciful title "Pirates of the Gulf" is not entirely appropriate to the brothers Laffite; but if it is, one should remember that Livingston and Grymes, Duncan and West, were tarred with the same brush.

The filibusters and privateers were not constant in their loyalty to the cause of freedom. Gutiérrez, Mina, Robinson, Long, and Perry were the only prominent leaders among them who were true to whatever principles they followed. All of them, the faithful and the faithless, demonstrated the futility of filibustering. Although they exercised little influence on the course of the Mexican Revolution, their activities may have been a factor in the decision to permit Anglo-American colonization of Texas.

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folkchain appendix

The Sword Was Their Passport: A History of American Filibustering in the Mexican Revolution. By Harris Gaylord Warren. Baton Rouge (Louisiana State University Press), 1943. Pp. ix, 286. $3.00.

The sword has been the passport of soldiers on many occasions and in many periods of history, and hence the main title of this book fits the filibusters and plotters of this excellent treatise no better than it would fit many others whose main interest in life has been the same. The subtitle is, however, really descriptive of the contents of this book.

The discussion covers slightly less than a decade of time, that is, from 1812 to 1821. It encompasses the work of a number of major filibusters with whom were associated certain less important men, all of whom, it may be surmised, regarded their work as very important. The majors of the story, dispensing with their given names and titles, were Gutiérrez, Magee, Alvarez de Toledo, Humbert, the Lafitte brothers (consistently spelled Laffite in this book, except in a few footnote references), Aury, Herrera, Mina, Lallemand, and Long. The minors included such men as Dr. John Hamilton Robinson, Juan Mariano Picornell, Reuben Ross, Samuel Kemper, Henry Perry, General Irenée Amélot de Lacroix, Vincent Gambi, Arsène Lacarrière Latour, Bartholomé Lafon, John K. West, E. W. Ripley, John Austin, and Isaac T. Preston. The list is very long. Nathaniel Coggswell, Samuel Alden, Jean Jacques Paillette, Pierre Girard, the Frenchman Caliavette, William Prentiss, John Sibley, and many others appear, it seems to me, in rôles among the less important group. Many New Orleans merchants, anxious for possible profit to be derived from these expeditions, plots, and counterplots, frequently encouraged the main and minor actors; and the New Orleans associates, a group in which "membership was contingent upon occasional coöperation in enterprises that ranged from smuggling to outright piracy" (119, n. 2), included some interesting men.

Against the filibusters, their many associates, and their many plans Don Luís de Onís, the Spanish minister to the United States, had to be constantly on the alert. One wonders that he had time for anything else. Certainly the book is replete with the reports which de Onís made to the American State Department during the administrations of Madison and Monroe concerning the filibusters and their plans to attack and free at least a part of the Spanish monarch's possessions. In this phase of

his work de Onís had the help of many Spanish officials, such as Governor Manuel de Salcedo, Diego Morphy, Father Antonio de Sedella, Felipe Fatio, and Governor Antonio Martínez.

Prominent American spectators of this border drama were Governor William C. C. Claiborne of Louisiana; General James Wilkinson of the American army; William Shaler, special agent for Secretary of State Monroe; George Graham, whom President Monroe sent to Galveston to see Jean Lafitte; Pierre Duplessis, United States marshal at New Orleans; John Dick, the Federal district attorney for Louisiana; Beverly Chew, customs collector at New Orleans; and last and greatest, John Quincy Adams, whose work with de Onís and whose interest in westward expansion we well know.

The book is divided into eleven chapters. The first three deal with the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition, the third chapter being entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Republic of Texas." Then there is a chapter on rivalry on the Sabine involving José Alvarez de Toledo, on whom "twilight was descending" (80), General Jean Humbert, described as "about forty years of age, and even then somewhat *loco*" (78), and Dr. John Hamilton Robinson, supported in Natchez by the so-called "Friends of Mexican Emancipation." The fifth chapter is on Pierre and Jean Lafitte of Barataria fame. Incidentally, the Spanish government had a number on these two, Pierre being No. 13 one and Jean No. 13 two. Herrera's mission to the United States and General Mina's invasion of Mexico follow in order as the sixth and seventh chapters. Then there is a chapter on plots and counterplots involving Louis Aury and the Lafittes. Two chapters deal with the French exiles under Charles and Henri Lallemand and their attempt to cultivate the olive and the vine in a colony in Alabama near present-day Demopolis and to found Le Champ d'Asile in Texas on the Trinity River in the Atascosito region. The last chapter relates the work of Dr. James Long, and finally there are four pages of conclusions especially well done. Each chapter closes with a summary which I regard as an exceptionally worth-while feature of the book.

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The Sword Was Their Passport: A History of American Filibustering in the Mexican Revolution. By HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN. (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1943. ix + 286 pp. $3.00)

Despite complexities in which secrecy and deception were so prevalent that the historian risks being deceived by each of the innumerable bits of enticing evidence, Dr. Warren offers in this book a valuable synthesis and much new information. He has achieved his purpose of preparing a comprehensive treatment of the threats to Spanish domain in Texas from 1812 to 1821. His greatest contribution is from the reports of Spanish royalist officials in the United States, which he used in the collection of transcripts at the Newberry Library. Felipe Fatio, consul at New Orleans, Luis de Onís, minister at Washington, and other zealous, capable agents were constantly frustrated by lack of au-

thority and funds, and by the ineffectiveness of the Spanish government in one of its worst periods.

From Dr. Warren's account of the unofficial aid given the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition by William Shaler, Monroe's representative at New Orleans, one learns much of the role of the United States in these enterprises. By the time John Quincy Adams became secretary of state this government's role was more nearly neutral than before, chiefly because Adams sought concessions from Onís in negotiating the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819. Public favor toward the filibusters is shown by the recurrent vitality of the Texas invasion idea despite repeated defeats.

Dr. Warren characterizes each of the filibusters, with some new light on each of them. Gutiérrez and Mina were sincere revolutionists. Magee was an adventurer, Toledo a capable, though not admirable man, a betrayer of causes who let personal ambition lead him where it might. The Lallemands and others of Napoleon's exiled officers Dr. Warren well describes as "still shell-shocked" by European explosions. Long was an inept promoter who failed to do what Austin soon achieved, when Mexico allowed peaceful settlement in Texas. Those "masters of smugglers and privateers," Jean and Pierre Lafitte, appear as the most able of the border characters in promoting their own interests, and Dr. Warren's accounts of their activities are the most interesting parts of his narrative.

This whole topic is a most difficult one to present succinctly, and Dr. Warren has had to take the sordid characters with the illustrious. He has run down his facts with assiduity. Omission of some of the many names and of some of the footnote references, which fall in almost every sentence, might have effected a simpler solution to the problems presented by a highly complex subject. This reviewer would prefer different handling of some features of the book that are ancillary to its main purpose. The footnotes are confusing since there is no explanation of abbreviations or supplementary reference to the page on which each first occurs. The bibliography is difficult to use because of the listing of manuscript items. Entry of the Adams papers, for example, alphabetically under "General Correspondence" does not make for easy reference. One may hope that the filibusters had more adequate maps than those on the inside covers of this book. The format is attractive, however, and the type excellent.

PHILIP COOLIDGE BROOKS

The National Archives

Harris Gaylord Warren (1906–1988)

JERRY W. COONEY* AND THOMAS L. WHIGHAM**

The recent death of Harris Gaylord Warren deeply saddened friends and colleagues of this distinguished historian of Paraguay. As the first researcher in the United States to delve seriously into the history of that often-ignored land, Harris Warren was an inspiration to a generation of scholars. In Paraguay, as well as in the United States, his contributions will long be remembered.

Dr. Warren proudly claimed a rural, midwestern background, one that stressed an earthy pragmatism with an open mind. His family reinforced that attitude by imparting to young Warren a high value on education. Born in Nebraska in 1906, he moved to northern Indiana two years later and received all of his early schooling there. Warren graduated from Purdue in 1926, and began his academic career in Mountain Home, Idaho, where his duties teaching Spanish and history already pointed him toward his future interests. In 1928, he gained an appointment as clerk of the U.S. Legation in Asunción, Paraguay. There, his life-long fascination with the history and culture of that land was kindled. For reasons of health, Warren had to resign that position within a year and returned to the United States.

He soon enrolled at Stanford University, where in 1930 he received a master's degree in Latin American history; his thesis concerned the Chaco conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia, then very much a hot issue. The young historian returned to the Midwest and taught at various institutions while earning his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University in 1937. At Northwestern he worked under Isaac J. Cox. The next year Warren married Katherine Elizabeth Fleischman who was to be his future collaborator on several works. In 1940, he received an appointment as an assistant professor in Latin American history at Louisiana State University.

Warren spent the war years in North Africa and Italy in military intelligence, and emerged from these experiences with the rank of major

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in the U.S. Army. His chief duties in those years were researching and writing the history of the U.S. Army in the North African and Italian campaigns. After the war, Warren returned briefly to LSU, and in the late 1940s became professor of history at the University of Mississippi. In 1957, he became head of the history department of Miami University of Oxford, Ohio, a post he retained until his retirement in 1971.

The scholarly career of Harris Gaylord Warren was marked by a wide-ranging catholicity of interests. While he is generally remembered today as the father of Paraguayan studies in the United States, his early work focused on borderlands history. His first book was *The Sword Was Their Passport: A History of American Filibustering in the Mexican Revolution* (1943); it is still considered a standard reference. Warren also authored many articles on the same theme and collaborated on various textbook ventures in his early career.

In 1949, Warren produced the first serious English-language text on Paraguayan history, *Paraguay: An Informal History*. He saw this monograph as being solely introductory, but it has, in fact, stood well the test of time and for many of us has served as the point of departure in the present "boom" in Paraguayan studies. While wanting to continue work on Paraguay, Warren was unable to return immediately to the South American archives. He concentrated instead on administrative work and topics that might be accomplished closer to home. In this vein, he published *Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression* (1959), as well as several short borderland studies and articles on U.S.-Latin American relations.

By the 1960s, despite his heavy administrative burden at Miami of Ohio, Warren returned to his first love, the history of Paraguay. He steadily contributed articles on Paraguayan immigration, politics, railroads, banking, and personalities—mostly for the post-Triple Alliance War period. On retirement, he resolved "finally to get some work done" on the history of Paraguay. Fulfilling his own predictions, his most productive period came in the decade after he left university service. Articles continued to flow from his pen, but more important were two significant and well-received monographs. In 1978, *Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The Postwar Decade, 1869–1878* appeared to general acclaim. With this one book Warren opened a hitherto closed chapter. Before, this period had been held sacrosanct by the two traditional parties of Paraguay—both founded in that era. Now Paraguayans felt free to examine that sensitive era. In 1985, that first study was followed by the solid *Rebirth of the Paraguayan Republic: The First Colorado Era, 1878–1904*.

Harris was researching the twentieth-century Liberal period of Paraguay when his health began to fail. To the end he remained optimistic, anxious to continue his work on Paraguay. His wife, Katherine, had died

in 1985. He is survived by a daughter, Gwendolyn Elliot, a son Gordon, and several grandchildren. He is also survived by the fond memories that his friends in Paraguay and the United States will always have of him. When Paraguayans heard of his death they stated truly, "Rohechagauta mbo'ehara karaí Warren."

Warren, Harris G., *The Sword Was Their Passport.* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943, pp. iii, 286.)

This is a documented historical work with most careful attention paid to facts, those of a most interesting sort. The scene and time are the Southwest at the beginning of the nineteenth century when adventurous fillibusters attacked Spanish power.

The United States, then relatively weak and about to be involved in the War of 1812 with Britain, had a dislike for Spain. Its citizens, on the frontier especially, believed like children that anything was possible if supported by strong desire.

Against such a background the adventurers—Anglo-American, Spanish, Mexican, French and British—made their plans. The first revolt discussed by Professor Warrent is that of Gutierrez, a patriotic but unskillful Mexican. He was aided by Magee, a soldier of fortune from

the United States. Although this expedition against Spanish power in what is now Texas met some success, the Spanish soldiers crushed it.

There were others who followed. Toledo worked hard to throw off Spanish control only to become a turncoat and aid Spain. Herrera, a third Mexican leader, achieved enough success to be called minister. Mina, a Spaniard who had fought against the Napoleonic regime in Spain, only found that the return of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne did not bring liberty to the Spaniards. Led by this ideal, he tried to overthrow the king's power in the New World.

The La Fitte Brothers and the other Baratarians played a role that is not entirely clear today, while as privateers and smugglers they operated from both New Orleans and Galveston Island. At first they were hired to carry out naval operations for the fillibusters, but later they accepted service with the Spanish forces. There were other Frenchmen, refugees from Bourbon rule, who sought to lead rebellions and regain their lost power and wealth.

James Long, an Anglo-American, was the last of the early fillibusters. He hoped to make money from extensive real estate deals that he felt sure would follow his military successes in Texas. He too failed.

It is impossible to rank any of these men with Hidalgo, Bolivar, or San Martin; not only is this true because they were not specatcular successes, but they lacked the unselfish spirit of the greater leaders.

Attention is called to the obscure diplomatic attitude of the United States toward Spain and later Mexico during this entire period. On the surface this nation was friendly to Spain, but there was little in the action of the government to bear this out. Onis, the Spanish minister to the United States, time and again informed the authorities of plots that were being carried forward on American soil against Spain. The government acted slowly and ineffectually against the fillibusters. Shaler, who gave some aidto the Gutierrez expedition, was in some ways also an agent of the United States. The Anglo-Americans wanted the land of Spain and the United States hindered them as little as possible.

The Sword Was Their Passport is a very scholarly work with an excellent map of the locale under condition. Professor Warren closes his fine study with an unusually large bibliography that will serve as a guide to others planning research in this field.

2nd Lt., Air Corps, AUS CHARLES GERALD FORBES

The Sword was their Passport. A History of American Filibustering in the Mexican Revolution. By Harris Gaylord Warren. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943. Pp. x, 286. Frontispiece. $3.)

Though this book is a synthesis of a good deal of information that has already been published on the various filibustering expeditions into the Texas part of Mexico, it also is to a very considerable extent the result of widespread investigations of the original sources. The author prepared the first draft of it as a doctoral dissertation under the direction of Professor I. J. Cox at Northwestern University. For smooth easy reading, it still bears too many marks of the researcher, especially seen in the rough disjointed weaving of the documents into the narrative and in such strict translations and uses of words, as leagues instead of the equivalent in miles.

The scope of the work does not lead back far enough to include the expedition of Philip Nolan, but it does tell a rather stirring story of the Gutierrez-Magee invasion, of the Laffite brothers, and of the other incursions into Spain's fast crumbling province of Texas. Professor Warren completes his work with an account of the filibustering activities of James Long. This book fulfills well its purpose of giving an entegrated account of the various invasions which plagued New Spain, from 1812 to 1821.

The Sword Was Their Passport. A History of American Filibustering the Mexican Revolution. By HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943. Pp. viii, 286. $3.00.)

The unwary reader, led by the picturesque title of this volume to expect a rousing chronicle of battle and adventure, will be sadly disappointed. The sword is seldom unsheathed in its pages and the central theme is that of the plots and counterplots which flourished like weeds among the frontiersmen, merchants, privateers, revolutionaries, and political exiles who rubbed shoulders in the exuberant and bustling city of New Orleans during the years in which the Viceroyalty of New Spain was transformed into an independent Mexico. The author might equally well have used the motto, "the double cross was their watchword," for a more devious record of treachery and deception mixed with avarice and ambition has seldom been recorded. With the exception of the generous young Spaniard, Francisco Javier Mina, few of the actors on this stage exhibited nobility, though many were able and most were crafty. The behavior of José Álvarez de Toledo, the brothers Lafitte, and Juan Mariano Picornell, especially, was compounded of self-seeking treachery, but the Americans in-

volved, with the possible exception of Augustus Magee and Henry Perry (fighting men above all), though less complex personalities than their Latin associates, were scarcely more attractive. Their activities, however, are an important part of the history of the Southwest during this era.

Professor Warren has unraveled an extremely complex web of plots and designs centering around the names of those mentioned above and others: José Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara, Dr. John Robinson, General Jean Humbert, Juan Pablo Anaya, Louis Aury, the Lallemand brothers, "General" Long, to mention only the principals. The goings-on of this peripatetic gentry have been known to historians in a partial and inadequate way for some time, but no one, until the author of this volume undertook his study, had unearthed the complete story of the filibustering and plotting for which New Orleans was a center during these years. Professor Warren has been very thorough in his collection of relevant source material and has used archival sources in Mexico and the United States to very good effect. These include photocopies of material from Spanish archives. (Incidentally, the publication of this book is excellent proof of the wisdom of the project carried out a decade ago by the Library of Congress for photographing American historical material in European archives, now inaccessible, and, in some cases, doubtless destroyed. The reliance of the author on this material is indicated by the more than one hundred footnote references to material from the *Archivo de Indias* alone in the first six chapters of the book.) The Papeles de Cuba have been used to particularly good advantage and enable the author to present a full view of Spanish counter-espionage.

It would be pleasant to say, in the case of a work into which so much careful scholarship has gone, that it had literary excellence as well, but unfortunately this is not possible. In spite of the frequently dramatic theme, the book is written in a pedestrian style. The author's estimates of his principal characters are not always convincing and it appeared to the reviewer that contemporary judgments (those of William Shaler on Gutiérrez de Lara for example) are occasionally taken too much at face value. The author's emphasis on the fidelity of the Lafittes to Spain also seems open to some question. No evidence is given that they were not working primarily for their own profit on either side that seemed to offer advantage. At times Professor Warren limits his subject too drastically. It is difficult to see why practically nothing is said about the career of Álvarez de Toledo after his reconciliation with Spain, or about Mina's campaign after the landing in Mexico. It is also surprising to find no

mention of the "Firebrand" incident in which a United States naval vessel was attacked by a Spanish cruiser, an event closely connected with others chronicled in the book.

Minor blemishes, which might not even be mentioned were it not for the basic excellence of the book, are the weakness of the index, except as a list of proper names, the failure of the endpaper maps to show many places mentioned in the text, and the very summary way in which manuscript material used is listed in the bibliography. The volume is well printed and contains no typographical errors visible to the reviewer. All in all, Professor Warren has made a distinct contribution to our knowledge of a subject that is related to two major movements in American history: the independence of Spanish America and the expansion of the United States.

CHARLES C. GRIFFIN.

Washington, D. C.

THE SWORD WAS THEIR PASSPORT. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FILIBUSTERING IN THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION. By Harris Gaylord Warren. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1943. Pp. viii, 286. End maps. $3.00.)

Students of the borderlands in the days of the Mexican war of independence have usually found that writers on filibusters have passed over the epoch and come to rest on mid-nineteenth-century characters like William Walker. To do this a half-dozen famous expeditions had to be shouldered aside. Schroggs' *Filibusters and Financiers,* to which many of them have been led, is a good example. It is this deficiency which Mr. Warren was trying to make up when he prepared *The Sword Was Their Passport.* While this title is colorful and fits into the current tendency to give each new book a title more arresting than the last, it also means that the title does not, except in the secondary part, convey any idea about the book. After all, Prescott did not appear to be under any necessity of concocting a catchy title. Be it said on Mr. Warren's behalf that his secondary title is fitting and that an apt quotation was almost more than any man could resist.

The book actually covers American filibustering in Mexico from the beginning of the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition in 1811 to demise of the Long Republic of Texas in 1821. Some of these stories have already been told well (a few by the author himself), some have been slurred over, and some have hardly been touched. Mr. Warren's contribution, therefore, is twofold: he synthesizes the whole story and pieces out the little-known features. Parts which are especially his own are the sections taking up the life of José Alvarez de Toledo y Dubois, whose chameleon career was for a time blended with intrigue in the United States, later with the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition, and finally with mother Spain—if indeed it ever parted from her. The author's discussion of the plot of the French exiles to take Napoleon off St. Helena and carve out an American empire for Joseph makes a small but distinct contribution to American history. To do this it was necessary for him to go beyond such works as Reeves' *Napoleonic Exiles* and to draw upon the many unpublished documents in this country. In these chapters Mr. Warren demonstrates the great labor which he has brought to the collecting of material for this book. His canvass of possibilities in the United States is as complete as any reasonable critic could expect. There are many references to reproductions of documents originally

found in the Archives of the Indies and other European depositories. The Spanish archives, it must nevertheless be remembered, have never failed to supply an investigator with something important after all the possibilities in the transcripts had been exhausted in this country. This is not to complain about the painstaking documentation upon which the author has depended in these years of exclusion from Europe, but to remind ourselves that even in the best circumstances there is no absolutely satisfactory substitute for the original archives.

The conclusion of this book is very suggestive. It dispels the retrospective wishful thinking in which Americans have engaged when they imagined that the United States did anything substantial as a nation for Mexican independence. It also calls attention to the fact that this book rescues the Lafitte brothers from the "sentimental nonsense" to which fiction and the moving pictures have consigned them. It was also a relief to see the author finally shake free of his citations, his qualifications, his parentheses, his quotations, and lift his literary style up to the plane where it must be if it represents the writer and not the handbook of historical method. This book represents a good, thorough, painstaking compilation of available information on the filibusters during the Mexican war of independence. Those libraries and historians concerned with border history and international relations will not want to be without it.

JOHN TATE LANNING.

DUKE UNIVERSITY,
DURHAM, N. C.

The Sword Was Their Passport: A History of American Filibustering in the Mexican Revolution. By Harris Gaylord Warren. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943. viii + 258 pp. Bibliography and index. $3.00.)

This book is a scholarly account of the filibustering expeditions against Texas which were organized from the American Southwest between 1812 and 1821. Natchitoches and New Orleans were important centers of the plotting. The filibusters were a diverse group including Mexican patriots, Spanish adventurers, French pirates, and land-seeking Americans. The most notable expeditions were the Gutiérrez-Magee venture, 1812-1813; Toledo's failure on the Sabine, 1814; General Mina's invasion, 1816-1817; the settlement of the Napoleonic exiles on the Trinity, 1818; and the campaign of James Long, 1819-1821. As the filibusters were bound to each other by self-interest alone, their personal relationships were marked by a duplicity notable even in the annals of border intrigue.

Except for the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition, which Professor Warren feels was "secretly promoted by James Monroe," then Secretary of State, American agents were not involved in the attacks on Texas in this period. The author concludes that "the principal contribution of the United States to the independence of Mexico was its failure to enforce neutrality." Only after the act of April, 1818, did we take measures that seriously interfered with filibustering in the Southwest. Professor Warren feels that although these filibustering activities had little effect on the Mexican Revolution they "may have been a factor in the decision to permit Anglo-American colonization of Texas."

The book presents the first comprehensive treatment of these campaigns against the last days of Spanish power in Texas. It is based upon thorough investigation of the materials in this country, of which the richest source is the Edward E. Ayer Collection in the Newberry Library. The volume is well documented, and the bibliography will be a helpful guide to other specialists in the history of the Spanish-American frontier. Its reading is greatly facilitated by an attractive end-paper map.

Pomona College E. Wilson Lyon

AN INTERVIEW WITH HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN: FROM THE BORDERLANDS TO PARAGUAY*

Harris Gaylord Warren was, by common consent, the father of Paraguayan studies in the United States. His broad-ranging activities—from diplomatic undertakings in South America to military service in Italy to administrative and scholarly work at various North American universities—marked him as an historian of rare depth and insight. Not commonly known is that Dr. Warren began his career as a historian in the 1930s as a borderlands specialist. *The Sword was their Passport: A History of American Filibustering in the Mexican Revolution* (Baton Rouge, 1943) is yet recognized as the definitive work on North American adventurers in that turbulent era. As an officer in the United States Army in World War II he was selected for various military history projects. After the war Dr. Warren returned to teaching and then administration. At that time his publications ranged from texts to *Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression*, (New York, 1959).

By his choice in the early 1960s of Paraguay as a field of study, Warren reopened a topic that, except for an occasional article, had been ignored by North American scholars since the times of Charles Ames Washburn.

The mention of Washburn is by no means out of place. While the latter served as United States' commissioner in Paraguay just before and during the Triple Alliance War, Warren also acted as a minor U.S. diplomat in that country—in this case, during the difficult period before the Chaco conflict. But there the parallel ends, for Washburn had little interest in composing anything more than a polemical assault on Francisco Solano López. Warren's work, on the other hand, is notable for a thoroughgoing objectivity that bypasses the polemics and thus brings the study of Paraguayan history to a higher, more analytic level. In article after article, book after

* This interview was conducted by Jerry W. Cooney who is Professor of Latin American History at the University of Louisville and Thomas Lyle Whigham who is Assistant Professor of Latin American History at the University of Georgia.

book, he endeavored to elevate his subject above anecdote and uninformed description, and in so doing, produced excellent accounts of Paraguayan railroads, the Febrerista revolution, the foundation of the Liberal and Colorado parties, banking in the late nineteenth century, immigration and much more. His last effort, *Rebirth of the Paraguayan Republic. The First Colorado Era. 1878-1904* (Pittsburgh, 1985), was the first comprehensive treatment of this period based on archival materials. It included analyses of Paraguay's demographic recovery, its public debt, and the sale of state lands. This book succeeds in untangling the confused web of political maneuvering that so dominated the Paraguayan scene. In appreciation for his contributions, Dr. Warren in 1985 was made the first honorary member of the Asociación Paraguaya de Estudios Americanos.

Professor Warren remained active until his death April 24, 1988 and had planned another volume on Paraguayan history, to deal with the 1904-1954 era.

The following interview was conducted in Bellingham, Washington on December 27, 1985. Several additional points were clarified by telephone conversations over the next month.

Cooney: I think readers would be interested in some general background—where you grew up and went to school.

Warren: Basically, I'm a Midwestern farm boy. My father had a PhD in agronomy from the University of Nebraska. When I was about four years old we went to northern Indiana where he became manager and vice president of the Grasmere Land Company which had about 5,000 to 6,000 acres of undeveloped land that was lying about sixty miles southeast of Chicago. The company wanted to develop that area into productive farmland so they wrote the Department of Agriculture, where my father was working, and asked for a man who could manage the job. My father was glad to take hold of it. So we went to northern Indiana when I was very young and I grew up near the town of Valparaiso. We were not a typical farm family since my mother, a former teacher, was a daughter of a well-known criminal lawyer in Lincoln, Nebraska, and my father a scientist. I went to Purdue as the whole family did; there were seven children in the family, and six of us have bachelor degrees from Purdue. At the university, I didn't know what I wanted to do so I majored or minored in four areas: Biology, History, Spanish, and English. The first job that came along was teaching Spanish and history and coaching debate in Mountain Home, Idaho. That was in 1926. I wasn't quite twenty when I took that teaching job. At Mountain Home, I still felt restless and I wanted to go places so I applied to the State Department's diplomatic service for a job as a clerk. And that's how I got to Paraguay. The State Department assigned me to that country because I could type, take shorthand, and speak Spanish, and God knows they needed that in our legation in Asunción. The

U.S. minister in Asunción was George L. Kreeck, formerly the mayor of Lawrence, Kansas. He was an accomplished organist and very simpático but his Spanish was abominable. I would cringe every time I would have to listen to him make a speech in Spanish. I'd write most of the speeches and he'd deliver them, but they didn't come out quite the way I had written them. Fortunately, we had the aid of Robert Lemmon who was a director of the Escuela Internacional. Between the two of us and his wife we more or less were able to keep the minister's Spanish on line. So after two years of teaching in Idaho, I was in Paraguay.

Whigham: What was Asunción like in those days?

Warren: The whole Paraguayan social milieu today is so different from what Asunción was when I first saw it in 1928. Now there are girls running around the streets of Asunción in short shorts. And in warm weather, you almost never see a man with a coat or a jacket. When I was there you would never see a gentleman without at least a pyjama jacket on and carrying a cane. Everyone had a *bastón*. I had to have a bastón. Of course, with so many dogs running around they were handy weapons. Kreeck used to jokingly refer to "Perro-guay." A few years before my trip to Paraguay in 1985, my wife had had an accident that left her needing a cane. I wanted to get her a fancy one from Paraguay. And when I was there in 1928, there were canes everywhere. Now the only thing you can find is an orthopedic cane. Nobody carries a cane in Asunción. But, during the 1920s, this was like going out undressed. You wouldn't think of being seen in public without a hat, a jacket, and a cane, and if you didn't have them you just weren't a gentleman. That was all there was to it. Now, they're playing rock n' roll, and even *Patria* is showing on its back pages pictures of Paraguayan beauties wearing bikinis. For *Patria* to do that, now, that's something.

Whigham: How was work in the legation?

Warren: Well, I certainly remember those lengthy dispatches. Kreeck was either the most verbose or most thorough writer I've ever encountered. He would bring me a dispatch of twenty pages or more, single-spaced, which I had to correct and then type double-spaced on legal size paper. Of course. some dispatches were very short. Every afternoon we had *mate* on the verandah, sitting in the shade while one of the girls brought us hot mate or *tereré*, depending on the weather, and light sandwiches. Mrs. Kreeck was a very lovely woman, one of those blondes who definitely was sent from heaven. She was a marvelous hostess, and had an extraordinary sweet disposition, but also had an intellect that made the minister, me, and the vice consul try to keep the conversation away from abstract subjects. Dresses were long in those days, and Mrs. Kreeck never wore hers more than 12 inches from the floor. So, when she sat and crossed her legs, probably one inch of hose would show above her shoe. The prudish minister would look at her and about a dozen times in the course of our tea-taking would admonish her: "Ethel, pull your skirt down!" And I still can't see why she had to.

Whigham: Did you ever get out to the campo?

Warren: Yes, frequently. I shared an apartment at the Gran Hotel Paraguay with Dr. John Austin Kerr. director of the *Campaña Sanitaria* for the Rockefeller Foundation. He was running the hookworm program then. John had a German police dog, a yellow Buick roadster with a right-hand drive, and a profound faith in his ability to do anything—except play golf well. On one occasion, December 8, 1928, we were en route to Caacupé to pay our respects to the Blue Virgin. John B. Faust, then the vice consul and Third Secretary of the legation, sat in the front seat, while my lowly status relegated me to the rumble seat. There had been rain during the week—not unusual in Paraguay in December—so creeks were swollen and, of course, there just weren't any bridges. At every place where the track crossed a creek, a campesino clad only in a short shirt that rarely reached his hips had a team of oxen ready to pull motor cars through the high water. John got tired of paying up to 50 pesos per haul and finally decided he could drive through one of the flooded crossings. I warned him: "John, you'll break the block sure as hell!" I spoke from experience, having done just that with a Model T on the farm in Indiana. "Oh, no!" John replied, "The water's warm!" So he eased the Buick into the stream. There was a sizzling, then a sharp crack! and I yelled "Turn off your engine!" So John hired the naked campesino to pull the Buick into the next village where we had a delightful time talking with the *jefe político* until the next bus for Caacupé came along. But that's another story.

Whigham: Did you know any of the Paraguayan historians at that time?

Warren: Yes, I knew Pablo Max Ynsfran very well, and met Cecilio Báez, Juan Emiliano O'Leary, and Fulgencio Moreno. Ynsfran was quite a character and a good friend of mine. One night back in the late twenties, we were wandering together down on Calle Palma in Asunción. It was very late and, in those times there were police booths, night watchmen really, at several places along the street. At one corner, we came upon one policeman, sound asleep with his feet up. Pablo Max went up to this fellow and gently unlaced his boots and pulled them off. We walked on for a couple blocks or so laughing about this and then Pablo Max threw the boots over a wall, saying, "*¡Allí va el sueldo de dos meses!*" On another occasion, I was a flower bearer for Mr. Kreeck. We were celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Hayes Award of 1878. A party of notables, with me shadowing the minister, went by launch to Villa Hayes where we marched solemnly from the landing to the village plaza. There was a flagpole there, and a band, and God only knows how many school girls and boys. Every girl, I'll swear, had a bouquet of some kind. The minister made appropriate remarks—I had written them for him, but his pronunciation was really out of this world and out of the Chaco as well—and the bands played. A couple of little girls approached the minister and, after nice little speeches, presented him with flowers. Every

girl in the ranks had flowers. As the bouquets were passed forward to the minister, he in turn passed them back to me. Soon I was loaded with the damn things. And the girls had neglected to take out all of the various *bichos* that liked flowers. After the ceremony, we started back to the landing. The minister looked at me and asked innocently, "Do you really like flowers?" "My God, Mr. Minister," I said, "what in the name of heaven can I do with this mess?" Fortunately, Pablo Max was walking along with us, and he said, "Let me take care of those for you." And he threw them into the nearest ditch.

Whigham: But you didn't stay in Paraguay very long?

Warren: No. unfortunately, while I was there, I developed appendicitis. John Austin Kerr advised me to get back to the United States as long as I could do it perpendicularly and so I resigned and went to Palo Alto, California. I boarded a tanker in Bahía Blanca which carried me to San Pedro via the Straits of Magellan, and then I took the train to Palo Alto. But doctors in the latter town wouldn't operate on me until I put on some weight. So I decided I might just as well get a master's degree while I was waiting. I applied for an assistantship in the history department at Stanford University, where Payson J. Treat was the head. He got me the assistantship. One day later I walked into his office and presented him with my master's thesis. He said "Here's your what? What's it on?" I said it concerned the Chaco dispute. Frankly, I now think it was very poorly researched; fortunately the department accepted the thesis.

Cooney: Was the American legation involved in trying to ameliorate the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay in the late twenties and early thirties, or was it just keeping an eye on events?

Warren: A little bit of both. I've forgotten the name of our minister in Bolivia but he was very pro-Bolivia, and Mr. Kreeck was very pro-Paraguay. They would write back and forth arguing the case. This is one place where I got a lot of my information and I decided neither of them knew what they were talking about because they hadn't read enough history. So I got Fulgencio Morenos's books on the Chaco. Of course every historian in Paraguay then was writing about the Chaco, Juan O'Leary and everybody else. In fact, many still are. Our ministers just didn't know enough about the historical background, but they certainly were well informed about current events. About the only background that Kreeck knew, other than the gossip and traditions, came out of Washburn's *History of Paraguay*. After all, what else was there on Paraguay in English except Washburn? Then along came Barrett's *Woman on Horseback* which at least was interesting. But the Ministers were not aware that Paraguayans were beginning to write good history then, especially from those investigations that they carried out in the archives in Seville. Manuel Gondra and others were very important in this respect and built up a mass of material that serious historians could work through. People

in Pablo Max Ynsfran's generation, Efraím Cardoso and Julio César Chaves, for instance could now write on the subject. There's a fine crew of very bright young Paraguayan historians appearing now as well.

Cooney: That's what I wanted to ask you about. Two things. Why have we seen the emergence of a generation of much more professional Paraguayan historians over the last fifteen years, and what do you think the future will hold for their work on Paraguayan history?

Warren: I think the future is very bright. In this respect, credit must be given to people like Efraím Cardoso. Pablo Max Ynsfran, and Julio César Chaves. Paraguayan intellectuals have always been interested in history, and it shows in the traditions they have created. The various cultural institutes that they have organized in Paraguay have also strongly directed their efforts toward the study of history. And the various national associations such as the Hispanic Society, the German Society, the Italian Society have all played a role in directing interest toward the history of their own people in Paraguay in such places as Nueva Italia, Nueva Germania and San Bernardino.

Cooney: Moisés Bertoni is a good example of such influences.

Warren: Yes. Then, of course, the Jesuits have always been historically minded, particularly Argentine Jesuits like Guillermo Furlong who contributed so much on colonial Paraguay. The clergy helped establish a very strong professional trend for historians. I think a major impetus would also have to be assigned to the Chaco Boreal dispute as well as the question with Argentina over the Misiones and the Chaco Central and the dispute with Brazil over the northeast. These border problems forced the Paraguayans to get historical ammunition, and they selected bright young men to go to Europe to get that ammunition. Whereas the Bolivians poo-pooed the idea of searching through musty archives to get the information they needed, the Paraguayans showed them that that's exactly what had to be done. They learned to use the archives and that carried over to the creation of the Archivo Nacional. By the way, Carlos Antonio López was very much interested in creating state archives and libraries but he's never been given sufficient credit for that. But they didn't get very far into it when the Paraguayan War intervened. And I should mention one more influence in Paraguayan historiography—that of foreign immigrants like Josefina Pla.

Cooney: Regarding the connection between boundaries and historians, would you say that José Segundo Decoud was the first to utilize archives for the defense of Paraguay's borders back in the 1870s? Or was he already an archivist when he worked as a diplomat?

Warren: I think his interest in archives probably came first. But his service in Washington as a delegate at the Panamerican Conference of 1889 and his work in compiling the *Biblioqraphy*—I think these two things also had a great impetus. I haven't been able to find out much about the Decoud family,

that's one of the hundreds of projects I wanted to do about Paraguay. Why hasn't somebody really finished a life of José Segundo or his brothers? That's a fascinating family.

Cooney: Hector, too.

Warren: Yes. Hector himself was a fine historian. His *Ensayos*, for example, was a beautiful piece of work. Diógenes in Buenos Aires was a top-notch doctor as well as a good poet. Of course, you would have to have that intellectual tradition among the major families who came over from Europe. I presume that the Decouds were French basically or perhaps from Northern Spain. Certainly they were influenced by the French scholarly tradition.

Cooney: Interesting that you should mention that. I've done some work on the Northern Spanish influence in Paraguay in the last years of the Viceregal period. The Gellys, Decouds, Domecqs—you find a lot of them are Northern Spanish.

Warren: Another interesting family would be the Ayalas. I made an error in my last book; I called Eusebio and Eligio cousins. Eusebio and Eligio sometimes would come to the legation together when I was there. They were always calling one another *primo*. *El primo*. They weren't primos. I just assumed that they were cousins. I shouldn't have gotten caught like that.

Whigham: How did you get involved in Mexican history and then military history in the thirties and forties?

Warren: The Mexican history grew out of my interest in the work of C. W. Hackett during the Depression when I was teaching economics and political science in Joliet Junior College. Hackett wrote extensively on the Mexican Revolution and it would have been nice to work with him. I had to find some place with a good Latin American program that didn't cost much money to attend. Of course, I was close to Northwestern University where Isaac J. Cox was but it cost money even then to go to Northwestern. So I went to the University of Texas where I could get a room for one summer term for five dollars, a very cheap proposition indeed. Hackett was there as well as J. Lloyd Mecham, who wrote on inter-American affairs. I was much influenced by classes I took with Hackett and Mecham on Mexican History, and I eventually got interested in the problem of the Brothers Laffite and filibustering in general along the Gulf Coast. No one was writing much about that in those days. And then I finally got a fellowship to go to Northwestern.

Cooney: Did you finish your doctorate before the war intervened?

Warren: Yes, I finished my Ph.D. in 1937 with Cox, and then taught a night class at Northwestern. He had become very interested in the filibustering period. When I came there I told him I was interested in Texas history and he was delighted since he had a whole raft of notes which no one could read, not even Cox. He had taken them from the Adams archives, but those archives

were closed when I was at Northwestern. Cox also had done a lot of work in the State Department on Louisiana and the filibusters. He said, "If you can make any sense out of these notes, why go ahead." Well, I couldn't make sense out of most of them. But there was a man in Aurora, Illinois named Stanley Faye, former editor of the *Chicago Daily News* who had been gassed in World War I and retired early. He was working on the filibusters—particularly the brothers Laffite. He had a book manuscript which I still think should be published called "The Great Stroke of Pierre Laffite." Pierre Laffite was a spy in the service of Spain and so was his brother Jean. Pierre was termed Number one and Jean Number Two. From these two Luis de Onís received all his information about the dirty work that the United States was carrying on in the whole of the Florida area. Pierre and Jean incidentally were not pirates. They possessed Letters of Marque which we then respected.

Cooney: And after Northwestern?

Warren: I then went to Michigan State College for a year and eventually to MacMurray College for Women in Jacksonville, Illinois. They have dropped the "for Women" now and it's just MacMurray College, a school that turned out to be a good place to work in the time of the Depression. I'd been writing articles on filibusters and Pierre Laffite's relations with Spain and the Galveston privateers and so on. I sent them to the *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* where Walter Prichard was the editor. He was very kind to me and, in 1939, when they created the Latin American program at Louisiana State University, Prichard recommended me to handle the history program. I had just signed a contract to teach another year at MacMurray College but the president very kindly released me and so I went to LSU in 1940. And of course the war broke out in December 1941. Early in 1942 the War Department was looking for men who knew any language other than English, for work in intelligence. So I applied for a commission in the army and was very much surprised when I got it. My first assignment was at the military censorship school in Fort Washington, Maryland. After I finished there I was sent to New Orleans for some practical experience in the censorship station reading the foreign letters that had come in, mainly Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian. Eventually they sent a group of us up to Camp Ritchie in Maryland which was the Military Intelligence Training Center.

At that time, the Fifth army was being prepared to invade Spain if Franco joined the Axis. One of the jobs of the MITC, Military Intelligence Training Center, was to prepare sabotage teams to parachute ahead of the invading forces. Thank God Spain never entered the war because as a First Lieutenant I was selected to head one team that included a Mexican fellow named Musquis and a Puerto Rican named Rivera. The three of us made up a team. We were going to be dropped ahead of the projected invasion, along with several other teams of the Fifth Army to commit sabotage and send back

intelligence reports. I probably wouldn't be here now if Spain had entered the war! After we finished the course at Ritchie, our leaders decided that Spain wasn't going to enter the war. So, rather than sit there in Camp Ritchie in the officers' pool I went down to Washington along with Chester Starr, who is just now retiring as professor of ancient history at the University of Michigan, and David Rockefeller. Rockefeller had gotten his commission in the engineers and because he knew French well he had ended up at Camp Ritchie as well. Just by pure accident, the three of us decided at the same time that we were tired of sitting there in that officers' pool. David's brother, Nelson, was prominent in Latin American affairs in Washington. So we went down to Washington looking for jobs. The War Department was just organizing the Historical Branch, G-2. The people in charge there decided they wanted somebody to do pamphlets on the North African campaign, pamphlets that could be read by soldiers who were wounded and wanted something to do and to read what they had done. So they turned the job over to me. The first that I wrote was on the North African Campaign although I had never been in North Africa. The only material I had to work with were the G2 journals, sometimes the S2 journals, battalion and regimental level journals and some telegraphic traffic. I was supposed to write interesting pamphlets from these meager sources!! The first one was *To Bizerte with the II Corps*. I turned that over to the head of the branch. He said, "This isn't very fascinating reading, is it?" I replied, "No sir, it certainly isn't, but every word in there is what's in the records—it can be footnoted if you want footnotes." "Well," my superiors said, "we'll see what we can do with this." So they brought in Benny De Voto to see if he could jazz it up—write something that could really interest the soldiers. They turned De Voto over to me and he said, "Show me the material you've been using." I took him into the archives and he went through it. Then he said to me, "Do you mean to tell me that this is all you've been writing from?" I said, "That's absolutely all of it plus some maps so I could get some idea of the terrain." He stated, "I think you've done a splendid job. I wouldn't touch this with a ten foot pole." Later, the department heads decided they were going to send organized historical teams —INH teams, Information Historical Teams—out into the field. So Chester Starr, Robert Komer, and I were sent into Italy by way of North Africa. I stayed with the Fifth army as we pushed up the Italian peninsula and over the next months aided in writing a few pamphlets in *The American Forces in Action* series. Then General Mark Clark decided he wanted a history of the Fifth army. Our Historical Section eventually did a nine volume history of the Fifth Army. Six volumes were published in Italy and three volumes were published in the United States. When our troops were just about ready to occupy Florence, I was ordered home to Washington to take a position in the Air Force Historical Office. At that time the Historical Branch of army Intelligence was engaged in publishing what became 145 or so volumes of the history of World War II. At Air Force Headquarters, I worked on special

operations because of my Intelligence work. For instance, I wrote the history of clandestine air drops of material into Yugoslavia to Mihailovic and others opposing the Nazis.

Whigham: How would you assess the impact of your military experiences on your development as a historian?

Warren: Well, I think it's very important. As far as teaching is concerned my work in military history gave me good insight into how command decisions are made, and how forces operate in the field, because I was in the field with our forces a lot of the time. I could thus interpret military history almost as though I were there. I think, for example, of the campaign of Rosas against the Indians in southern Argentina and the battles against the Indians in the Yucatán and in Northwestern Mexico. With Paraguay, of course, there was the Triple Alliance conflict and the Chaco War and the various colonial campaigns against the Guaicurú. People say Carlos Antonio López had some Guaicurú blood in him, by the way, but I don't know whether he did or not.

Whigham: After the war, what led you into Paraguayan studies, specifically the writing of *Paraguay; An Informal History?*

Warren: Well, I got out of the army. My first book, *The Sword Was Their Passport*, had been published in 1943. It concerned the activities of North American adventurers in Texas and Mexico between 1810 and 1821. But now, I wanted to get back to work and to research, and my wife, Katherine, suggested Paraguay. She had read some of my legation letters, copies of which I'd kept, and became very interested in Paraguay. I observed that we did not then have the money to do any travelling in Paraguay and that research grants were practically impossible to get. She asked if there were not enough materials to do a synthesis on Paraguay and I agreed that, yes, if she would help me with the German, it would be possible. My German frankly was not good enough to wade through all the reports from German immigrants and others in Paraguay. And, of course, Schmidel's *Crónica* was written in German. Katherine volunteered to take on that task; she had a Master of Arts Degree in Latin American history from Northwestern University and had also worked with Cox. We decided that since there wasn't much on Paraguay outside of Washburn, our effort ought to be first-rate, so I wrote to Savoie Lottinville at the University of Oklahoma Press and asked him if he had any interest in a book on Paraguay. His response was encouraging and so we got working on it when I was teaching as a visiting professor at the University of Denver. The library there surprisingly had a fair number of books on Paraguay, most of them on the Chaco. I discovered there was enough that I could rough out a draft of *Informal History* and I called it an informal history simply because it's not based on much original research except for some documents from the State Department.

Cooney: How do you think it has withstood the test of time? After all, nearly forty years have passed.

Warren: Well, I said in the preface of the *Informal History* that scarcely a period or a phase of Paraguayan history exists that doesn't require archival research and that's turned out to be true. I think in general my interpretations have stood up pretty well. Obviously it will require a tremendous amount of work to flesh it out. For example, I had one chapter which I called "Between Wars." I've now written two full books on that period and I have another one planned. And even this was fairly shallow since I didn't much develop the economic side. For instance, I didn't know anything during the late 1940s about the colonial *güembé* industry. That deserves more work.

Cooney: After you wrote *Paraguay: An Informal History*, did this lead you permanently into work on Paraguay?

Warren: Well, I had been at Louisiana State University when I went into the army, and while I was gone, I was promoted to associate professor but before I got back the board of trustees rescinded all of the promotions that they had given to people who had gone into the army. So many of us left LSU and went elsewhere. I ended up at the University of Mississippi. I went from an assistant professor at LSU to a full professor at "Ole Miss," but when I got to Mississippi their library didn't even have Washburn, but it did have a wonderful collection of federal documents. So I gave up on Paraguay for a time and concentrated on the presidency of Herbert Hoover. There was plenty of secondary material available so I wrote a massive volume called *Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression* which was published by Oxford University Press, after being reduced drastically. So that's what I did at Mississippi. At the same time, I kept working on Paraguay through inter-library loan. In 1957 I received an offer to be Chairman of the History Department at Miami University in Ohio. So I went there with my microfilm from the State Department—all of the early diplomatic dispatches, and other documents on microfilm. I've got shelves of it. I wanted to get back to Paraguayan studies but as chairman of the department I discovered that I had little time even to write an article. I not only ran the department at Miami, but a department at Hamilton, and one at Middletown, and we organized Humanities for Wright State University. So for some years I was running four history departments and that ate into my research time. Just as soon as I approached sixty-five I retired so I could get something done. I did most of my Paraguayan work, except for articles, after I retired. I have written over a dozen articles and two books since I retired. My wife, Katherine, was a tremendous help with the books.

Cooney: Why did you concentrate on the immediate postwar period of Paraguay from the 1870s onward?

Warren: Well, I wanted to do the whole thing. I wanted to go back to the colonial period, and had ambition enough to be twice as old as von Ranke

before I quit. I wanted to do a multi-volume history of Paraguay beginning with the colonial period and saw this was impossible. I looked at the War of the Triple Alliance, and I knew that Paraguayan archives were so limited in material on the war—I had visited them when I was a clerk in the legation—and I decided that I just didn't have the resources to do archival research. We'd just gotten through with World War II and I figured people were probably fed up with reading about wars anyway. But for the period just after the Paraguayan war, there was almost nothing on Paraguay. The only thing that existed then that was any good was Decoud's *Escombros*, which I thought was fascinating reading. In fact it deserves translation.

Whigham: A discussion of this era leads naturally to some interesting features of Paraguayan political history.

Warren: Yes. Once you get into the postwar period you have to discuss the organization of the parties which in fact became a major focus for my work. The last time I was in Asunción in June, 1985, representing the United States Information Agency, a beautiful girl from *Ultima Hora* came to interview me. She explained that Paraguayans are taught that Bernardino Caballero was the founder of the Colorado Party and yet I had said at a conference sponsored by the Centro Paraguayo Americano and the USIS that he was not. Now who was the founder of the Colorado Party? I pointed out that Bernardino Caballero didn't have sufficient political experience per se to organize a party. But he had brains, and he recognized in José Segundo Decoud somebody who had the organizational talent. And they also learned from the example of Cándido Bareiro, the man who established the basic policies that the Colorado Party adopted. All that Bernardino Caballero did, I think, was at Decoud's suggestion. After the Liberals had organized their own party, Decoud told Caballero, "Look, we've got to have a party, too." I think a party to Caballero simply meant a bunch of guys getting together drinking caña. Well, he invited about a hundred of them to a meeting at his country home and then to the theater in Asunción, and formally organized a party which elected Caballero as party chief—naturally, because he was already a major political force in the country. Decoud, who suffered from the onus of being a Legionario, wouldn't have wanted the job and couldn't have gotten it anyway.

Cooney: Regarding the nationalist interpretation of Paraguayan history, what about the López period? What is your opinion of the rehabilitation of Francisco Solano López and his era? Has this been a worthwhile development, or is it dangerous?

Warren: I think it's more worthwhile than dangerous because after the war, Paraguay desperately needed a hero. You couldn't make a hero out of Francia. Now who was there in more recent history to turn to? General Díaz, perhaps. Sure he's a genuine hero but he's a dead soldier.

Cooney: And a subordinate too.

Warren: He was a subordinate to López. you certainly couldn't make a hero out of any of López's brothers. Caballero? Well, Caballero was still alive, and live heroes were rather suspect when O'Leary started his work. So, the attention focused on the rehabilitation of Francisco Solano. And I'm convinced, like O'Leary, that Argentina and Brazil historically wanted to annex Paraguay. But the only thing that kept them from doing it was their jealousy of one another and the threat of the López army. There were those two things. So O'Leary picked Francisco Solano López, and, don't forget, Francisco Solano had a very good press agent in U.S. Minister Martin MacMahon who, himself being a soldier, saw López in a much different light than had Washburn.

Cooney: MacMahon was not unique but he did something that none of the other foreign diplomats did when they were on the scene. He went and visited the army.

Warren: Yes, he saw the war at first hand. He was at Lomas Valentinas during the battle. He had the López children in a little hut in which mattresses were placed all around the walls, and he protected them in there. I'm sure he had them lying down. But bullets frequently pierced the mattresses. Before the battle was over, MacMahon took the youngsters and Madame Lynch to safety. Then Madame Lynch returned and escaped with López. It's a fascinating period. Incidentally, MacMahon did not take much money out of the country for Madame Lynch López because she had already sent it to England. That tale has always been exaggerated.

Cooney: You've had probably more contact with Paraguayan historians, with those historians in the United States and elsewhere that deal with Paraguay than any person alive. What do you feel are the most crucial areas of research that should be emphasized right now?

Warren: Now that's very difficult to say because we don't know what direction the Paraguayan economy is going to take. For example they're building a steel mill which they probably don't need. They have got Itaipú in operation which Brazil needs and part of which Paraguay needs. Yacyretá will be in operation so there will be plenty of electricity. Paraguay has the power and it has the desire to become something like another Taiwan, but it needs to pay more attention to things like economic history. I think one thing Paraguayan historiography needs desperately is more biography—more dependable biography. And we also need a reworking of Zook's *Conduct of the Chaco War*. Alfredo Seiferheld may end up doing this. Nowadays, you go to Los Comuneros or Ancor or any of the book stores and you'll see volume after volume on the Chaco and I think we will soon see serious treatments of the social and economic impact of the Chaco War. Seiferheld has written a book in answer to Bray's *Letras y Armas*. There's more interest in the Chaco War

now in Paraguay, and they're delving deeper into it and some historians will be able to get into private archival sources. I must add that there are many exceptionally well trained historians in Paraguay now, both men and women, whose work represents a tremendous advance in Paraguay's intellectual life.

Cooney: Perhaps because the Chaco War was won by the Paraguayans, the very fact of their victory leads them to a more critical analysis for the period and afterwards.

Warren: I think it may. It produced the Febreristas, the Veterans Association and other groups. Those people began to take a broader look at themselves. There is room also for a very good intellectual history for Paraguay now. The compilationists—like Centurión—did a good job in their time but there is now room for something more analytic and speculative.

Whigham: What about economic history broadly considered?

Warren: No one has yet written a presentable history of animal husbandry in Paraguay. I'm also interested in the history of foreign aid to Paraguay. The material in the Rockefeller Foundation records I'm sure is available. The Campaña Sanataria was an important campaign, and no one, to my knowledge, has written anything on it, nor is there a history of US AID on Paraguay.

Cooney: Paul Lewis has started to do some good work on the great economic transformation in the Stroessner years. What about that for a topic?

Warren: No question about it. The economic transformation has been enormous in Paraguay. You look at that the bridge across the Paraguay River, for example. There is a very large volume of traffic now between the Chaco and eastern Paraguay. Another bridge is being finished at Concepción. The bridging of the Paraguay and Paraná Rivers cannot fail to have important economic results!

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THE SWORD WAS THEIR PASSPORT: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FILIBUSTERING IN THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION. By *Harris Gaylord Warren,* Assistant Professor of Latin-American History, Louisiana State University. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1943. Pp. viii, 286. $3.00.)

THIS book tells the story of the filibusters who from 1812 to 1821 fought against Spain in the Mexican War of Independence.

Except in the latter years of the period, the author says, the Federal government, influenced largely by a desire for Florida and perhaps Texas, observed the form, if not the substance, of neutrality as between Mexico and Spain, especially

because the outcome of the war was doubtful; Anglo-American sympathy with the insurgents and desire for commercial gain "enabled privateers and pirates to use . . . American ports as headquarters against Spanish commerce."

The filibuster leaders are described as having little in common save real or pretended hatred of "Spanish tyranny"; Gutiérrez de Lara, *e.g.*, as truly patriotic, hoping eventually after "creating a diversion in Texas," to continue across the Rio Grande the fight for Mexican independence; Magee, "soldier of fortune, seeking honor, glory, perhaps riches"; Robinson, patriotic Anglo-American expansionist; Mina, sincere, patriotic Spanish guerrilla, hoping to strike against King Ferdinand by helping the Mexican revolt; the Lallemands, "shell-shocked" Napoleonists, seeking military employ, hoping somehow to rescue Napoleon; Long, seeking in Texas a field for "grand real estate operation." Their followers were "a curious mixture of good and bad frontiersmen, honest lovers of liberty . . . ambitious young men . . . all in search of wealth, adventure . . . honor."

The brothers Laffite, "interesting characters of uncertain origin," admittedly "lawbreakers, outlaws, smugglers," are, he thinks, entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to the fairness of their legendary title "Pirates of the Gulf"; for they had reputable connections with Anglo-Americans and with Spanish diplomats; they furnished supplies from their Barrataria stronghold to aid Jackson in defense of New Orleans; they aided Spain after moving headquarters to Galveston Island.

"The filibusters and privateers," he concludes, "were not [all] constant in their loyalty to the cause of freedom . . . all of them, the faithful and the faithless, demonstrated the futility of filibustering. Although they exercised little influence over the course of the Mexican Revolution, they may have been a factor in the decision to permit Anglo-American colonization of Texas."

Notwithstanding a few minor shortcomings, mostly stylistic, the discerning reader of this book, even though he may not agree with all of the author's conclusions, can hardly fail to be impressed by the full and careful documentation upon which statements of fact are based, by the meticulous care with which footnotes indicate sources, by the adequate bibliography of primary and secondary source material, by the clear and helpful map, by the excellent typography, and by the attractive general mechanical style of the volume.

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